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ABSTRACT 
THE TWO GOATS 
A CHRISTIAN YOM KIPPUR SOTERIOLOGY 
 
 
Richard J. Barry IV 
 
Marquette University, 2017 
 
 
This dissertation draws on recent historical-critical research into ancient Jewish 
temple theology, the priestly book of Leviticus, and especially the Yom Kippur liturgy of 
Leviticus 16, to develop a more paradoxical interpretation of Christ’s saving work for 
modern Christian systematic theology. Prompted by the pioneering research of Jacob 
Milgrom, there has been a surge in sympathetic interpretations of the priestly theological 
tradition, which has inspired fresh interpretations of the Levitical Day of Atonement. I 
argue that an adequate Christian theory of atonement must be attentive to both the overall 
“landscape” of Jewish biblical thought, and to the specific rhythm of the Yom Kippur 
liturgy, which clearly distinguishes the “work” of two goats—one elected to be a spotless 
sacrifice, the other called to bear the sins of Israel into the wilderness.  
Christian theology should observe this distinction within the united saving work 
of Jesus Christ. Yet modern interpretations of the cross often implicitly emphasize one 
“goat” or the other. For example, we find a “goat for the Lord” soteriology in the 
Anselmian satisfaction tradition, which has been beautifully rearticulated by David 
Bentley Hart; here Christ’s spotless sacrificial obedience recapitulates creation done well. 
In the controversial “descent to hell” theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, on the other 
hand, there is a “goat for Azazel” soteriology; here Christ as the sin-bearing goat removes 
impurity to the furthest possible distance from the Father through his saving descent. By 
seeing Christ as fulfilling the work of both goats in his single act of cruciform love, the 
Catholic tradition can better draw on the ancient Jewish insight that atonement requires a 
unifying movement toward the center, to the holy of holies, as well as a removal of sin to 
the far periphery, the godforsaken exilic wilderness.  
This work is rooted in the conviction that, first, Christian theology should always 
honor, and remain in deep conversation with, its Jewish roots, and second, that advances 
in historical-critical research should be utilized to cultivate a modern theological 
interpretation of scripture, all in the service of a richer, more ecumenical understanding 
of the basic paradoxes of Catholic soteriology. 
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Part I: A Tree Stands at the Center 
CHAPTER 1: TREE OF LIFE, FIRST AND LAST 
And the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
   
—T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding 
 
 
If the tree is known by its fruit, what kind of tree was planted on Mount Calvary? 
Its tragic fruit, its only fruit, seems to be death: the lifeless body that descends into the 
arms of a heart-pierced mother. And yet, Christians have seen this same tree as the icon 
of love and the only source of life for a sin-torn world. It is to this tree that they return, 
day by day, year by year, with faith in its ability to heal and bind and soothe and revive; 
many have found upon this tree the only fruit able to fill the hungry soul. If we know the 
tree by its fruit, how then do we classify the cross of Jesus Christ? 
There is a tree mentioned in the opening paragraphs of the first book of the 
Christian Bible, mentioned again in the final chapter of the last book, and essentially 
ignored in the hundreds of intervening pages. The return of the “tree of life” in John’s 
Revelation seems as sudden as its disappearance after the third chapter of Genesis, yet 
attentive readers can hear the rustling of its leaves on every sacred page. As Peter 
Thatcher Lanfer says, this tree creates an inclusio, it is a bracket that surrounds and 
ultimately orients the entire Christian canon toward the center of the lost garden Eden.1 
Therefore, even though rarely mentioned, the tree of life is always strangely present in 
                                                 
1 Peter Thacher Lanfer, Remembering Eden: The Reception History of Genesis 3: 22-24 (Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 34. 
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Holy Scripture because it forever remains the human soul’s most basic and most intimate 
goal. The great drama that unfolds between YHWH and Israel should thus be depicted as a 
narrative of return, the invitation to begin again on the journey for which we were made. 
As the book culminates, the Apocalypse of St. John blossoms into a vision of the 
New Jerusalem, the glorious dwelling place of God, descending from the sky. The author 
of this revelation, throughout his entire book, weaves threads from the Hebrew Bible into 
an iridescent garment for the resurrected messiah. Especially notable in the final chapters 
is the way he uses the basic landscape of the garden of Eden, infused with major cultic 
imagery drawn from the Jerusalem temple, and configured according to the pattern of the 
eschatological temple in Ezekiel. That the words of the prophet Ezekiel should be echoed 
in John is no surprise; both are given visions of a new Jerusalem after a tragic period of 
“Babylonian” exile. In Ezekiel 47, the prophet emphasizes the water that flows East from 
below the “threshold of the temple,” and he then reports that “All kinds of trees for food 
will grow up on both banks of the stream. Their leaves will not wither nor their fruit fail; 
they will yield new fruit every month, because the water for them flows from the temple. 
Their fruit will serve for food and their leaves for healing.” (47:12)2 
John’s eschatological vision is harmonious, and different, when compared to 
Ezekiel. He starts by saying, “I saw no temple in the city, for its temple is the Lord God 
the Almighty and the Lamb.” (21:2). It is insufficient to stop reading at the words “no 
temple,” to imagine that the center of Jewish worship is eradicated in the new creation. 
John is saying something more profound: the reality of the temple is glorified beyond 
                                                 
2 For biblical citations, unless otherwise noted, I will use the New Jewish Publication Society translation 
(NJPS) when quoting the Hebrew Bible, and the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) when quoting 
the New Testament.  
3 
 
what mind has conceived, for the enthroned God Almighty and the Lamb eternally are an 
ever-present temple.3 That the reality of the temple is not simply wiped away is further 
suggested by the fact that key features of the earthly Jerusalem and its focal point, the 
temple, are preserved, including gates that remain always open (Rev. 21:25; cf. Ezekiel 
46:1), purity laws in the temple precincts (Rev. 21:27), and a great river of living water 
which flows from the center, “from the throne of God and of the Lamb” (Rev. 22:1). 
Magnifying Ezekiel’s vision of the rebuilt temple, with trees lining the river’s banks, 
John sees something more specific. He sees the great tree of Eden: “On either side of the 
river is the tree of life with its twelve kinds of fruit, producing its fruit each month; and 
the leaves of the tree are for the healing of the nations” (Rev. 22:2b). For John, the final 
blessing promised to those who are “victorious” (Rev. 2:7) and who “wash their robes” 
(Rev. 22:14; cf. Rev. 7:14) is access to this boundlessly fruitful and healing tree. The 
glory prepared for Adam and Eve, the fullness of life hidden since the foundation of the 
world, is now the gathering point of a restored and deified humanity.  
Because of the tree’s apparent absence after Genesis 3, John’s vision may at first 
come as a shock—like seeing a lost friend after long years—but on second thought, 
John’s description of the tree draws our attention to the way in which it was always there, 
even when our eyes were dim to its presence. In his book, The Genesis of Perfection, 
Gary Anderson highlights the way in which the opening pages of a novel, or the first 
minutes of a movie, are often fully understood only after seeing how the story ends.4 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Gregory Stevenson, Power and Place: Temple and Identity in the Book of Revelation 
(Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 268–69; Robert A. Briggs, Jewish Temple Imagery in the Book of Revelation 
(Peter Lang Pub Incorporated, 1999), 107, note 203. 
4 Gary A. Anderson, The Genesis of Perfection: Adam and Eve in Jewish and Christian Imagination 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 8–13. 
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From a Christian canonical perspective, the primordial account of the creation and fall of 
Adam and Eve is more perfectly understood as the drama unfolds. Anderson says, 
“Religious readers know where the story is heading before they have glossed even one 
word,”5 and therefore believers inevitably interpret key persons and symbols in a way 
that respects the “narrative unity”6 of the inspired text’s final form. Thus, with the help of 
Revelation, we discover how the garden of Eden and the Jerusalem temple mirror and 
interpret one another, and how the eschatological “New Jerusalem” further clarifies and 
elevates the meaning of these sacred places.  
 The first key to unlocking the relationship between the sacred geography of Eden 
and the floorplan of the temple of YHWH is the location of the mysterious tree of life in 
Genesis: “And from the ground the Lord God caused to grow every tree that was pleasing 
to the sight and good for food, with the tree of life in the middle of the garden, and the 
tree of knowledge of good and bad” (Genesis 2:9, NJPS).7 This is a garden oriented 
around a sacred center: the same God who breathes life into dust offers yet more life, an 
over-abundance of life, in the form of a fruitful tree. The expulsion narrative in the third 
chapter makes it clear that, after sin, what was initially offered as a free gift and an 
implicit goal must now be guarded and hidden. “Now that the man has become like one 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 8, emphasis in the original. 
6 Ibid., 11. 
7 The NJPS translation puts greater emphasis on the tree of life as standing at the center of the garden, but 
as other translations suggest—along with Eve’s own comments in Genesis 3:3—both trees are somehow 
“in the middle.” This has prompted some scholars, beginning with Karl Budde in the late 19th century, to 
argue that there was actually only one tree. The impulse was thus to choose one tree or the other as more 
original in Gen. 2:9, and consequently the tree of life is often seen as a later addition. For a good survey 
of the different views, Tryggve N. D. Mettinger, The Eden Narrative: A Literary and Religio-Historical 
Study of Genesis 2-3 (Eisenbrauns, 2007), 5–11. (Al Benthall suggests an interesting possibility with 
theological potential when he asks “whether there are really two trees there at all, or only one tree viewed 
under two aspects”, a tree “both singular and double.” In other words, perhaps the one tree is a source of 
life or death depending on how it is approached. “A Tale of Two Trees: Knowledge and Life in the Book 
of Genesis,” Nova et Vetera 9, no. 2 (2011): 347, 352.) 
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of us, knowing good and bad, what if he should stretch out his hand and take also from 
the tree of life and eat, and live forever!” (Genesis 3:22). The eternal Life at the center, 
for which Adam and Eve were made, has suddenly become a threat to their survival. 
Therefore, an unknown number of cherubim are stationed at the easterly entrance to the 
garden, with a flaming sword preventing any attempted trespass.  
 Gordon J. Wenham has argued that a number of features of the garden allude to 
the temple and suggest that it is an “archetypal sanctuary.”8 For example, cherubim are 
the traditional guardians of holy places, and they are especially associated with the 
temple in the Hebrew Bible.9 Two are stationed above the ark of the covenant, and 
images of cherubim are woven into the curtain and carved into the walls. The fact that the 
Eden cherubim are stationed to the east calls to mind the fact that the temple also is 
entered from the east. Water flows from each sacred space, and both are notable for their 
“good gold” and many precious gems. This connection between the garden of Eden and 
the temple was well understood by ancient Jewish and Christian readers of scripture. 
Anderson shows how the early Jews and Christians developed the idea that Eden and the 
temple had corresponding layouts. The second century BC Book of Jubilees, for example, 
says that Noah “knew that the garden of Eden was the holy of holies and the dwelling of 
                                                 
8 Gordon J. Wenham, “Sanctuary Symbolism in the Garden of Eden Story,” in I Studied Inscriptions before 
the Flood (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1994), 399–404. Other research that explores this connection 
includes G. K. Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission: A Biblical Theology of the Dwelling Place 
of God (Westmont, IL: IVP Academic, 2004), 66–80; Joshua Berman, The Temple: Its Symbolism and 
Meaning Then and Now (Northvale, N.J.: J. Aronson, 1995), 21–34; Jon D. Levenson, Resurrection and 
the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God of Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008), 82–90; Leigh M. Trevaskis, Holiness, Ethics and Ritual in Leviticus (Sheffield, England: 
Sheffield Phoenix Press Ltd, 2011), 93–95; L. Michael Morales, Who Shall Ascend the Mountain of the 
Lord?: A Biblical Theology of the Book of Leviticus (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2015), 39–
74. Positive and negative evidence for the garden’s holiness is explored in David P. Wright, “Holiness, 
Sex, and Death in the Garden of Eden,” Biblica 77 (1996): 305–29. 
9 Cf. Rachel Elior, The Three Temples: On the Emergence of Jewish Mysticism in Late Antiquity (Oxford: 
Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2005), 75–76. 
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the Lord.”10 St. Ephrem the Syrian further suggests that the tree of life is found in the 
“inner region of Paradise,” and that the tree of knowledge serves as a kind of curtain 
protecting the most sacred tree, which is the primordial holy of holies. Anderson explains 
that, for Ephrem, “if [Adam and Eve] hadn’t disobeyed God’s command, they would 
have been given access to the Inner Sanctum.”11 Instead, with a reach, they fall into exile.  
 And that’s the other geographical landmark: if the promise of abundant and 
supernatural life stands at the holiest center, surrounded by that garden sanctuary which is 
remarkable for its flourishing and flowering, its joyfulness and peace, there is another 
place beyond the walls: “the Lord God banished him from the garden of Eden, to till the 
soil from which he was taken. He drove the man out …” (Genesis 3:23-24a). This is the 
first mention of wilderness, the land of exile, the lonely landscape of a pilgrim people. It 
is the place called “Godforsaken,” seemingly outside God’s providence. Desert. Chaos. 
Here in its first three chapters, the entire geography of the Hebrew Bible is summarized: 
what follows is a human drama that occurs in the space between the inner sanctuary and 
the place of exile. Israel again and again finds herself in the wilderness, outside the gates, 
banished from her promised home, but never fully, because hope for the holy of holies, 
the tree of life, never dies.  
 Thus we return to Revelation 21-22, which draws these themes together 
brilliantly. As we have seen, John describes the vision of a city of open gates, were there 
is nothing “unclean” (nothing touched by death and decay), and where the tree of life 
                                                 
10 James H. Charlesworth, ed., “Jubilees,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, trans. O.S. Wintermute, 
vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1985), bk. 8.19; cf. J.T.A.G.M. van Ruiten, “Eden and the 
Temple: The Rewriting of Genesis 2: 4-3: 24 in The Book of Jubilees,” Paradise Interpreted: 
Representations of Biblical Paradise in Judaism and Christianity, 1999, esp. 75-79. 
11 Anderson, The Genesis of Perfection, 80; cf. 46-47, 56-57. 
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stands at the center. “Then he showed me a river of the water of life, clear as crystal, 
coming from the throne of God and of the Lamb, in the middle of its street. On either side 
of the river was the tree of life (ξύλον ζωῆς), bearing twelve kinds of fruit, yielding its 
fruit every month; and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations. There 
will no longer be any curse; and the throne of God and of the Lamb will be in it 
(αὐτῇ)…” (Rev. 22:2-3, NASB). Lanfer, in his study of tree of life imagery in ancient 
Jewish and Christian texts, says that it was not uncommon in then-contemporary 
literature to merge the images of the tree of life and the throne of YHWH,12 thus 
suggesting the possibility that it is the tree itself in Rev. 22 that is the throne of God and 
the Lamb.13 In other words, in the final chapter of Christian scripture, the imagery of the 
garden of Eden and the temple’s holy of holies—the throne room of YHWH on Mount 
Zion—are fused and embodied in the image of a lamb standing as slain (cf. Rev 5:6). 
This is the culminating depiction of perfect holiness, around which all history 
mysteriously spirals. 
 Revelation also says “there will no longer be any curse.” Which curse is lifted? 
Every curse, for sure, but above all, I’d argue, the curse of exile begun in Genesis 3, 
which was recapitulated frequently in Israel’s history as a nation, and is also felt as a 
                                                 
12 Lanfer, Remembering Eden, 55. Cf. Andrei Orlov, Dark Mirrors Azazel and Satanael in Early Jewish 
Demonology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), 22–23. Orlov draws attention to a 
number of relevant passages. For example, in the Life of Adam and Eve (which is roughly contemporary 
with Revelation) it says, “And the throne of God was fixed where the Tree of Life was” (22:4). Similarly, 
2 Enoch says, “And  in  the  midst  (of  them  was)  the  tree  of  life,  at  that  place where  the  Lord  
takes  a  rest  when  he  goes  into  paradise…” (8:3).  
13 This idea is further supported, Lanfer says, by the fact that the pronoun αὐτῇ in verse three could easily 
point back to the tree of life: “The only other singular referents in which the throne could be placed are 
the river or the street and neither of these seems likely, whereas the singular Tree of Life could be the 
“seat” of God’s presence, as it is so frequently elsewhere” (63). Lanfer further suggests that the tree 
stands on both sides of the river precisely because it is the river’s source: the river  flows from the tree 
because the tree is the throne.  
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strange alienation in each human heart. With the final unveiling of the tree of life, 
Revelation vividly portrays our homecoming, our return after an impossibly long journey.  
When the sacred tree is fully revealed at the end of history, it is leafy, fruitful, and 
crimson stained.14 When the Christian imagination looks closely at the tree’s bark, it sees 
that the tree has been bloodied, that it is coated in the ancient symbol of life. We discover 
that this same tree has been the site of a death which is the ultimate source of everlasting 
Life. While the primary word used to describe the instrument of Christ’s death in Greek 
is σταυρός, translated “cross,” five New Testament verses refer to Christ’s death on “the 
tree,” ξύλον.15 The influence of Deuteronomy 21:22-23 for this choice of words is 
universally recognized—the connection with Deuteronomy is explicit in Galatians 3:13: 
“Cursed is everyone who is hung on a tree.”16 But the earliest theologians, geniuses at 
drawing theological connections, also associated Christ’s “tree” with the tree of life.17 
Therefore, Ephraem the Syrian can sing, “Very sad was the Tree of Life / that saw Adam 
hidden from him. / Into the virgin earth he sank and was buried, / but he arose and shone 
forth from Golgotha.”18  
                                                 
14Remarkably, 2 Enoch also notes the crimson coloring of the tree: “And that tree [of life] is indescribable 
for pleasantness and fine fragrance, and more beautiful than any (other) created thing that exists. And 
from every direction it has an appearance which is gold-looking and crimson, and with the form of fire.” 
James H. Charlesworth, ed., “2 Enoch,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, trans. F. I. Andersen, 
vol. 1 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1983), sec. 8.4 (long version), pg. 114. 
15 Acts 5:30, 10:39, 13:29; Galatians 3:13; 1 Peter 2:24 
16 See chapter six for further analysis of this verse.  
17 In the Greek translation, ξύλου της ζωῆς. 
18 Saint Ephraem, Ephrem the Syrian: Hymns (Paulist Press, 1989), 332. Similarly, John of Damascus says, 
“The tree of life which was planted by God in Paradise pre-figured this precious Cross. For since death 
was by a tree, it was fitting that life and resurrection should be bestowed by a tree,” “An Exposition of 
the Orthodox Faith,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, vol. 9 (Buffalo, NY: Christian 
Literature Publishing Co., 1899), 80. And, in the West, Hilary of Poitiers says, “…but now, thanks to the 
redemption wrought by the tree of Life, that is, by the Passion of the Lord, all that happens to us is 
eternal and eternally conscious of happiness in virtue of our future likeness to that tree of Life,” 
“Homilies on the Psalms,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, vol. 9 (Buffalo, NY: 
Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1899), 241. 
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 In other words, the cross of Jesus Christ is the ultimate revelation of the tree of 
life. It is creation’s most beautiful tree, the sacred center of the universe, the greatest icon 
of love, the very throne of YHWH, and something that should never have happened. The 
cross is the form that the ancient tree must take in the context of sin—perhaps only the 
eyes of faith can see how this cursed death can be the very picture of triune love—but in 
any case, the fruit has been the same from the beginning: the gift of a Life so full and so 
overflowing that it cannot be circumscribed by time. Life immortal, everlasting, and 
eternal. In fact, this offer of immortality can be nothing less than participation in the 
divine nature, the original promise that was unsatisfied in the first generation, but is 
abundantly fulfilled in the last. The narrative arch of the entire Christian Bible is brought 
into focus, and we realize that when we receive the fruit of Christ’s cross, we are starting 
again from where we began.  
Starting again, but not starting over in such a way that the intervening chapters 
become irrelevant. Rather, it is now clear that the promise of Eden, and of the tree that 
stands at the center of the garden, is discovered as the hidden hope behind the deepest 
mysteries of Israel as she confronts in her history the steady rhythm of promised land, 
exile, return, and longing still. Between Eden and the new Jerusalem of Revelation is the 
ark of the covenant and the temple. And one cannot speak of the temple without 
acknowledging the sacrificial practices that brought life to Mount Zion day and night.  
With the tree of life, the holy of holies, thxe throne of God and the lamb, one 
finds in the Bible the hope of return to the center. There is also a continuous feeling of 
being driven to the perimeter as Israel is banished from the garden, sent into exile, cast 
into outer darkness. This simultaneous movement in and out finds its greatest expression 
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on Israel’s highest holy day, the once-yearly Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur. On this 
day the high priest, representing the nation, goes beyond the veil and is permitted to 
worship before the throne, at creation’s cosmic center. On this day, all impurity and sin is 
eradicated and banished from the holy city. This is the day that attempts to heal a nation 
that finds itself perpetually caught between Zion and wilderness, caught in sin, hoping for 
Eden. For Christians, the work of Yom Kippur is perfected in the death, descent, and 
resurrection of the Messiah, Jesus Christ. But to understand all these rich symbols and 
complex liturgies, to really embrace the profound priestly word “atonement,” and thus to 
approach the meaning of Christ’s cross from a thoroughly biblical perspective, one must 
learn to think with the mind of ancient Israel, a perpetually challenging task, and yet 
necessary. It is, in the end, the only way to arrive at the beginning.  
 
* * * * * 
 
 This book is a study of the tree of life which comes finally to be planted outside 
the city walls. This cross is both the center and displaced, the point at which two 
extremes are embodied simultaneously, in a remarkable mystery—the most holy and the 
least, Zion and the wilderness. The central argument is simple: first, an adequate 
Christian soteriology, an adequate interpretation of the cross, must maintain the 
distinction between these two movements—to the center, to the periphery—and second, 
these movements are expressed with special and permanent profundity on Yom Kippur, 
when two identical goats prefigure a single atoning work. One, as spotless sacrifice, the 
other as sin-bearer: two goats, without collapsing the difference—or should we 
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nevertheless say one goat looked at with crossed-eyes? In any case, the cross of Jesus 
Christ should be interpreted as a fulfillment of this form, outlined in Leviticus and 
faithfully observed yearly in Jerusalem. The newness of Christ is a trans-figuring 
newness, and thus the shape of atonement for the ancient covenant remains the proper 
shape of atonement in the new, only now (according to Christian conviction) illuminated 
from within by the glory of the incarnate Son.  
 The argument will unfold in the next four chapters. In chapter two, we will turn 
toward the theology of atonement as revealed in the ancient covenants, starting with the 
basic geography which they presuppose: the extremes of Zion and wilderness. First, Zion. 
To begin with a theology of the temple is to emphasize what is positive first; the temple 
is not just a remedy for sin, but an expression of what is eternally beautiful, good, and 
true, or as I’ve already suggested, a recapitulation of Edenic joy. In fact, it is through 
temple theology that Israel embarks on her own rich meditation on the “transcendentals,” 
since the temple itself is the site of transforming glory (beauty), it is the site of sacrificial 
right-action (goodness), and it is the site where true heaven and true cosmos are 
symphonic. The temple and the sacrificial cult therefore represent the culmination of 
creation, and Zion becomes the icon of peace and harmony between heaven and earth. At 
the same time, Israel is more and more acutely aware of the reality of sin; she finds 
herself surrounded on all sides by wilderness. It is this desert through which she must go 
as she flees Egypt, this wasteland to which she will occasionally return as she struggles to 
live up to her covenantal promises. Starting with Genesis, this complex geography shapes 
biblical theology, and it is especially foundational to Levitical thought. Therefore, to 
understand Yom Kippur, one must first survey Zion and wilderness. 
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The third chapter, then, will move on to a more detailed description of Israel’s 
sacrificial cult itself, relying as heavily as possible on the insights of the best modern 
Hebrew Bible scholarship. Here especially I will strive to ensure that historical-critical 
research on the book of Leviticus (which is often written by Jewish scholars who are 
keen to overcome the anti-priestly prejudices of earlier generations) authoritatively 
informs my understanding of biblical soteriology. The overarching theological goal of 
this book is a more profound understanding of the cross in Christian systematic theology, 
but a major underlying conviction is that recent historical-critical research, like a good 
pair of glasses, is indispensable in helping us to more clearly see the shape and texture of 
an authentically Jewish understanding of the priestly word “atonement.” At the same 
time, I will also feel free to make theological connections across texts, and to 
occasionally critique historical critical scholarship when it downplays the theological 
questions within the text or otherwise seems excessively narrow, while nevertheless 
vowing to remain sensitive to the basic historical shape of Jewish priestly thought. 
With that in mind, therefore, the third chapter will attempt to arrive at a 
sophisticated understanding of Israel’s “sin offering” (or, in Jacob Milgrom’s terms, the 
“purification offering”), and even more so, a deeper appreciation for the original logic 
and rhythm of Yom Kippur in ancient Israel. In this liturgy we encounter a profound 
theological reflection on the meaning of the word “atonement.” Here we will trace the 
distinct movements of each of the two goats that are brought before YHWH on this holiest 
of holy days, and reflect on why both goats are needed if the nation, and the cosmos, is to 
be thoroughly healed.  
 In the fourth and fifth chapters I will explain the need for, and unpack the 
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meaning of, Christian Yom Kippur soteriology. In chapter four I will discuss how the 
Day of Atonement shaped the earliest Christian interpretations of Jesus Christ and his 
cross, both in the New Testament and in patristic theology. Drawing on the research in 
the previous two chapters, we will see how each goat embodies a distinct lexicon, and 
how learning to clearly differentiate the “goats” (the twin movements necessary for 
atonement) helps to clarify a number of crucial New Testament passages that have 
sometimes been misread. Then, turning to the early church, we will see how common it 
was to interpret Christ’s saving work explicitly in terms of both the YHWH-goat and the 
Azazel-goat (often translated “scapegoat”). The advantages and disadvantages of the 
unique way in which patristic theologians interpreted Christ in light of Yom Kippur will 
be assessed.  
 Finally, in chapter five, I will show how two major figures in modern Christian 
theology—David Bentley Hart and Hans Urs von Balthasar—provide remarkable yet 
incomplete accounts of Christ’s saving work. Each account is incomplete insofar as it 
emphasizes only half of the work performed on the Day of Atonement, either focusing on 
the YHWH-goat or the Azazel-goat. First, then, I will focus on the “goat for the Lord,” the 
pure and spotless gift of love that recapitulates the original pattern of creation. The 
connection between recapitulation and Jewish sacrificial theology has been brilliantly 
developed in modern times by Hart, and thus his work will represent the best of 
contemporary YHWH-goat soteriology. While Hart will be the spokesperson for this 
aspect of Christian Yom Kippur soteriology, I will briefly suggest how the satisfaction 
model developed by Anselm and Aquinas—which is the most typical approach in 
Catholic theology—puts its emphasis in the same place. Second, I will turn to a very 
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different approach, which has also found advocates in modern theology, and which has 
been especially controversial. This section will deal primarily with the disputed 
soteriology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, but will also draw from the related teachings of 
Karl Barth and Sergei Bulgakov. I will show that Balthasar ultimately articulates a 
theology that perfects the work of the “goat for Azazel,” and I will explain why this 
movement is also necessary in a comprehensive soteriology.  
 After reviewing the works of Hart and Balthasar, I will wrestle with the question 
of how the one Christ, in his single passion, death, and resurrection, can and does fulfill 
the work of the two distinct goats. In fact, to put it even more strongly, I will argue that 
the two “movements” represented by the two goats actually require each other in a 
comprehensive account of Christian salvation. By insisting that Christ fulfills the work of 
the YHWH-goat and the Azazel-goat simultaneously on Mount Calvary, even though 
these two movements initially appear to be opposite extremes, I will try to articulate the 
paradox proper to Christian soteriology.  
Finally, in the epilogue, we “arrive where we started,” at the tree of life, to 
contemplate how a Yom Kippur soteriology might help us better understand that biblical 
mystery planted at the origin and culmination of the Christian canon.
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Part II: The Shape of Temple Soteriology  
CHAPTER 2: FROM ZION, PERFECT IN BEAUTY, GOD SHINES FORTH 
Introduction 
Christian theology is inescapably incarnational—strangely attentive to the history, 
to the drama, of dust—but incarnational predispositions are not strictly a Christian 
innovation. In a short but fascinating article, Jewish theologian Michael Wyschogrod has 
argued that incarnational theology can find its roots in the Hebrew Bible. These ancient 
scriptures make a claim that is anathema to deists and panthesists alike: God takes up a 
spatial, earthly dwelling.1 Without denying omnipresence, Wyschogrod insists that in the 
Bible, “God also has an address…He dwells in Number One Har Habayit Street. Number 
One Temple Mount Street.”2 Wyschogrod elsewhere recognizes that thoroughgoing 
biblical opposition to idolatry—especially the worship of fabricated gods—coupled with 
later Jewish commitments to apophaitic theology—exemplified in Maimonides’ 
philosophical resistance to anthropomorphism—have all contributed to a negative 
attitude toward the idea of divine incarnation in Jewish thought.3 And yet, Wyschogrod 
says that these convictions should not blind us to other themes that are in no way 
marginal to biblical theology: “The whole history of the tabernacle and of the temple in 
Jerusalem is a history of a concept of a home for God in the world, a dwelling place for 
                                                 
1 The verb ןַכ ָׁש, shakan, to dwell, is the root of the noun shekinah, the important rabbinc concept 
emphasizing God’s dwelling presence. The Hebrew word “tabernacle,” mishkan, simply means dwelling 
place. 
2 Michael Wyschogrod, “Incarnation,” Pro Ecclesia 2, no. 2 (1992): 210. 
3 Michael Wyschogrod, “A Jewish Perspective on Incarnation,” Modern Theology 12, no. 2 (1996): 199–
201. 
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God.”4 The very word dwell suggests the intimacy, the weight, of God’s presence, in this 
place. The God of the Bible may not be limited, but he also does not abhor the notion of 
spatial location: in making himself present to a people, he locates himself in their world 
to draw them to his.5 
As we saw in the first chapter, Israel’s emphasis on spiritual geography begins in 
the very first verses of Hebrew scripture, and remains a persistent focus throughout the 
Jewish theological tradition.6 This same emphasis swells in the book of Revelation as 
                                                 
4 Wyschogrod, “Incarnation,” 210. Wyschogrod says that there is a “temptation to lift God above 
spatiality,” Wyschogrod, “A Jewish Perspective on Incarnation,” 203.; many feel they are honoring God, 
exalting God, by refusing to entertain the idea that God should be committed to physical location. We 
might call it the Petrine temptation: “Far be it from you, Lord!” (Matthew 16:22). Without disrespecting 
the genuine concern not to limit God (a concern that is also fully expressed in scripture—the dialogical 
brilliance of the Hebrew Bible is seen with outstanding clarity in Solomon’s speech at the dedication of 
the temple, where God’s real dwelling in the house is simultaneously acknowledged and questioned; 1 
Kings 8, vv. 13 and 27), the truth is that we in fact limit God more when we predetermine what sort of 
behavior is appropriate to the Lord. God is not limited when we allow ourselves to be surprised by God’s 
own willingness to become shockingly present.  
5 For Wyschogrod, it is even more important to say that “The Jewish people, as a people, in some degree 
and in some form is the dwelling place for God in the world.” Wyschogrod, “Incarnation,” 212; cf. 
Wyschogrod, “A Jewish Perspective on Incarnation,” 204–8. This, he says, is the “seriousness of the 
election of Israel.” Wyschogrod, “Incarnation,” 212.  
  New research by Crispin H.T. Fletcher-Louis is offering yet another way of approaching 
incarnation in a Jewish context by focusing on the idea that human being in creation (Genesis 1), and 
especially the high priest in the temple (Exodus 25-40), is the true “divine image” analogous to the cultic 
idol. He says, “The Christological fulfilment of this ab creatio vision is anticipated by a biblical 
Israelology according to which God’s chosen people are his visible, concrete presence in history and 
creation (Ezek. 16). At Sinai the vision is refracted through a still narrower lens in the singular 
embodiment of divine presence in Aaron and his successors.” Crispin HT Fletcher-Louis, “God’s Image, 
His Cosmic Temple and the High Priest: Towards an Historical and Theological Account of the 
Incarnation,” Heaven on Earth: The Temple in Biblical Theology, 2004, 99. 
  Of course, to speak of God’s incarnation in the people Israel, or to speak of God’s incarnation in the 
temple, is to use the word analogously, especially compared with the Christian affirmation of the doctrine 
of incarnation. The word “homoousios” remains the great challenge, as does the definition of Chalcedon. 
Gary Anderson has said that there are good historical reasons why sustained reflection on Jesus’ 
incarnation in light of the temple theology of indwelling is rare in the Christian tradition: Theodore of 
Mopsuestia used this very temple theology to argue that the divine presence abandoned Christ on the 
cross, just as the Lord abandoned the temple before the Babylonian exile. For Nestorius too, “the 
indwelling of God in Jesus’ body, like a temple, is a wholly extrinsic affair.” Gary A. Anderson, “Mary 
in the Old Testament,” Pro Ecclesia 16, no. 1 (2007): 47. Anderson shows that temple imagery did not 
simply disappear from Christian theology, however, but it migrated to the person of Mary, the 
Theotokos, in whom divinity was pleased to tabernacle. Ibid., 49 ff.  
6 Michael A. Fishbane argues that one does find “structural, symbolical coherence” in the Hebrew 
Scriptures through focus “on the symbolic structure of the ‘sacred center’,” with reference to the work of 
Mircea Eliade. Fishbane links Eden, the notion of axis mundi, the “mountain of God,” and Zion, as 
various symbols of this center, which is characterized by the way the “two wills [divine and human] are 
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ancient biblical symbols are layered, one upon the other, to suggest a fulfillment beyond 
imagination. In the final chapters of the Christian canon, Revelation 21 and 22, biblical 
geography is not set aside, but it is developed and transfigured: our vision is centered on 
the slain Lamb, on the Tree of Life, on the great throne, all illuminated by divine glory 
and bathed in living water. What we see in the descending Jerusalem is a people brought 
back from exile, washed clean, and gathered finally into the eternal holy of holies, 
gathered in for worship, gathered in to dwell with joy in God. The coordinates are the 
same as ever before. We have the open gates inviting in and orienting all creation toward 
worship in unity, but we also have the “outside” (ἔξω), the place of those who will not 
wash their robes. The coordinates are the same, but they are here intensified as salvation 
history crescendos toward the final “amen!”  
Moving toward a Christian Yom Kippur soteriology, we must pursue an even 
more intimate knowledge of this biblical map as it is charted from the first chapter to the 
last. For a deep appreciation of Israel’s mature sacrificial theology broadly, and Yom 
Kippur specifically, we must place ourselves within the sacerdotal geography that 
structured Jewish thought and prayer. It is on this stage that Jesus Christ acted, in the 
drama of his life and death, and it is with attention to this spiritual landscape that the 
earliest Christians interpreted his death and resurrection. But as Christianity spread 
through the Mediterranean, and then across the world, the original landscape was left 
behind, literally and figuratively. Names and places mentioned in the Bible no longer call 
to mind vivid images, sounds, and smells. Descriptions of the temple no longer caused 
the heart to strangely warm. It quickly became possible to write expansive atonement 
                                                 
aligned at the sacred center…” Michael A. Fishbane, “The Sacred Center: The Symbolic Structure of the 
Bible,” Texts and Responses, 1975, 9. 
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theologies with only cursory reference to the temple or the sacrificial cult, and then for 
these references to take on a decidedly negative tone.  
Certainly, we can be quite sympathetic to the fact that later theologians drew upon 
images and ideas closer to hand in attempting to understand the mystery of salvation. 
Such pragmatic catechesis is already seen in the teaching of Paul,7 so there can be no 
question about its validity in Christian discourse. Yet it would be misguided for Christian 
theology to forget its Jewish roots. The Gestalt of the old covenant (even if for Christians 
it is a teleological form, ordered toward further revelation) must shape our perception of 
the new, even as Christians maintain that the revelation of Jesus Christ transfigures the 
old, from glory to glory. It is precisely this kind of forgetfulness that makes it possible for 
modern theologians and sociologists to casually depict and dismiss Zion as a mountain of 
violence, cruelty, and punishment.8 Compare this mentality to the theophany of Psalm 50: 
“The mighty one, God the LORD, speaks and summons the earth from the rising of the 
sun to its setting. Out of Zion, the perfection of beauty, God shines forth” (vv. 1-2, NIV). 
Certainly this same psalm also challenges any superficial sacrificial theology,9 and it 
                                                 
7 This point is well made by Stephen Finlan, The Background and Content of Paul’s Cultic Atonement 
Metaphors, 19 (Society of Biblical Lit, 2004), 1–2; Stephen Finlan, Options on Atonement in Christian 
Thought (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007), 1. 
8 Among modern Christian writers, the association between temple, ritual sacrifice, and violence is 
everywhere. Whether one is reading defenders of penal substitutionary atonement—like John Stott, J.I. 
Packer, or the authors of Pierced for our Transgressions, Steve Jeffery, Michael Ovey, and Andrew 
Sachs—or critics of traditional Christian soteriology—ranging from Rene Girard, Raymund Schwager, S. 
Mark Heim, J. Denny Weaver, Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker, Rita Nakashima Brock, 
Delores S. Williams, Darby Kathleen Ray, Margaret Daphne Hampson, or Stephen Finlan—one finds 
Jewish cultic places and practices associated primarily or exclusively with wrath, punishment, and death. 
For example, in his defense of penal substitution, Thomas R. Schreiner looks at the temple cult and says, 
“But reflect on the violence of the activity: the blood, the entrails and the goriness of it all. The death of 
the animals shows that the penalty for sin is death. When we are told that the sacrifices are a soothing 
aroma, the image indicates that they satisfy God’s wrath, that they appease his anger.” “Penal 
Substitution View,” in The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views, ed. James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy 
(Westmont, IL: IVP Academic, 2006), 83. This is just one example, but it could by multiplied many 
times over.  
9 See vv. 8-14. 
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emphasizes the theme of YHWH’s judgement against the wicked,10 but all of this work is 
done in the overarching context of beauty and intimacy, the basic theme of Zion’s 
holiness. Therefore, the first step in encouraging a Christian Yom Kippur soteriology is 
to walk in the footsteps of our Jewish fathers and mothers—including the holy family, 
Mary, Joseph, and Jesus—and make a theological pilgrimage to Zion, the mountain of 
God.  
Our pilgrimage will unfold in three major sections. It will more or less explicitly 
attempt to sustain a dialogue between modern biblical scholarship—especially recent 
Jewish reflection on priestly theology—and contemporary Christian systematic 
theology—especially the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar—all to better understand the 
theology of the Jerusalem temple. The primary contribution of the Christian theology in 
this chapter is structural: just as Balthasar organized his magnum opus in three parts, 
corresponding to the three transcendentals—beauty in The Glory of the Lord, goodness in 
Theo-Drama, and truth in Theo-Logic—this chapter will be a mini-trilogy reflecting 
specifically on the mystery of the temple. Thus, the first section will consider the temple 
as the doxological center of Israel, the place where God is encountered in glory. The 
second section will consider “the action,” the drama between God and his chosen one, 
Abraham, which will forever mark this space as holy ground. The third section will 
consider the temple as the space of divine truth, where creation points toward heaven, and 
heaven comes down to earth.  
Balthasar can help modern historical-critical research into Jewish temple 
theology, and vice-versa. Balthasar provides scholars of biblical theology a way to 
                                                 
10 See vv. 16-22. 
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systematically consider the various themes that gather around the temple. At the same 
time, Balthasar’s theology can benefit from recent biblical research. Balthasar wrote his 
impressive study on the “old covenant” in 1967, and the scripture scholar he relied on 
most was the Lutheran Gerhard von Rad. This penultimate volume of the Glory of the 
Lord series—along with its companion on the “new covenant”—without a doubt 
demonstrates the depth and the seriousness of Balthasar’s lifelong engagement with 
scripture across the Christian canon. Nevertheless, biblical research has advanced 
significantly in the last fifty years, especially when it comes to a sympathetic reading of 
Jewish theology generally, and priestly theology specifically. It is most appropriate, 
therefore, to continue to clarify, sharpen, and strengthen the biblical foundations of 
Balthasar’s work in dialogue with updated research. Therefore, while arranging the 
material through the help of Balthasar, the substance of what follows is drawn primarily 
from critical scholarship on the theology of ancient Judaism.   
Part I: Doxological Spaces 
While Christian theologians often link the institution of the temple with the words 
appeasement, propitiation, violence, and death, this association at best represents a 
radically truncated understanding of Israel’s most sacred space; such words simply fail to 
capture the awe and joy inspired by Zion according to those who actually lived in the 
shadow of its wings. For these people, the temple is synonymous with worship, praise, 
beauty, and peace; it is the source and summit of the nation’s liturgical life, and as such it 
was understood to be the one place where life was lived well. Put succinctly, “The 
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Temple is the world as it ought to be.”11 It is, first and foremost, the doxological center of 
Israel, and thus it stood as a permanent invitation to sing God’s glory: here the nation’s 
weak voices practiced harmonizing with the angelic choir. Here they learn the movement 
of worship in spirit and truth. Here they join the liturgy of praise for which the world was 
created and through which we are most truly free.  
It is necessary, therefore, to more deeply understand how the temple—as the icon 
of indwelling Glory—is a positive and transformative reality in ancient Jewish thought. 
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s approach to “theological aesthetics,” which consistently 
emphasizes the biblical theme of glory, offers concepts and terminology that can help 
modern readers to approach temple theology more sympathetically. Insofar as divine 
glory streams from the temple in Jewish priestly theology, and the temple is also the 
definitive place of humanity’s doxological-liturgical response, it is rightly a place of 
special significance for theological aesthetics. From a Balthasarian perspective, this raises 
profound questions: what form does this space take in the biblical imagination? How is 
this mountaintop sanctuary related to the themes of revelation and encounter, desire and 
transformation? How can this structure, this cedar house, communicate divine glory? And 
perhaps most importantly, is the Jerusalem temple ultimately a form of beauty and life, or 
is it a monument to the deformation of violence and death? To tackle these questions, and 
thus to better understand the place of the temple in the rich symbolic theology of ancient 
Israel, it is helpful to review some of the key concepts in Balthasar’s theological 
aesthetics. 
                                                 
11 Jon D. Levenson, “The Jerusalem Temple in Devotional and Visionary Experience,” in Jewish 
Spirituality, Vol 1 (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 53.  
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Detour: Contemporary Theological Aesthetics 
Balthasar finds the traditional aesthetic attention to splendor and form 
indispensable,12 and in the inaugural volume of his trilogy, Seeing the Form, he begins to 
develop these themes through the analogous concepts of interiority and communication 
(and then also, soul and body).13 That which is interior, which is most intimate, shines 
forth in its exterior expression, the self-revealing form which that inner life takes. For 
example, Balthasar asks, “What is a person without a life-form, that is to say, without a 
form which he has chosen for his life, a form into which and through which to pour out 
his life, so that his life becomes the soul of the form and the form becomes the expression 
of his soul?”14 What is especially true for the human being, whose interior depths are 
fathomless, is true also of all creation: no being can fail to express something of its own 
inner light, the essence that shimmers in and through this existence.  
It is that inner light which, as it finds expression, is perceived as splendor, and it 
is captivating because it communicates the basic goodness and truth of this being’s 
interiority. Or again in Balthasar’s words, “The appearance of the form, as revelation of 
                                                 
12 Adian Nichols helpfully defines Balthasar’s understanding of the word “form.” He says, “The perceptible 
form of an object is the expression, under particular conditions, of its metaphysical form—its essence or 
nature. We are glad when a perceptual form is rich, clear, and expressive because we feel that it lays 
open the object to us, even though we may also feel there is more in the thing’s nature than appears in 
this or that single expression.” Aidan Nichols, A Key to Balthasar: Hans Urs Von Balthasar on Beauty, 
Goodness, and Truth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2011), 17. 
13 Balthasar works with these philosophical categories without, of course, suggesting that they pre-
determine the shape of Christian revelation. He critiques the “aesthetic theology” of the Romantic period 
extensively. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Vol. 1: Seeing the 
Form (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 79–104. On the other hand, these concerns do not detract 
from the conviction that philosophical reflection can augment Christian contemplation: attention to form 
and splendor makes a rich contribution so long as these philosophical concepts remain open to correction 
or expansion in the light of Christ. Thus, for example, Neoplatonic attention to harmony must not be used 
to smooth over the concrete drama of Christ’s life, including especially the cross and descent, with all of 
its ugliness and formlessness. Cf. Cyril O’Regan, Anatomy of Misremembering: Von Balthasar’s 
Response to Philosophical Modernity. Volume 1: Hegel (Chestnut Ridge, NY: The Crossroad Publishing 
Company, 2014), 457–58. 
14 Balthasar, GL1, 1982, 24. 
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the depths, is an indissoluble union of two things. It is the real presence of the depths, of 
the whole of reality, and it is a real pointing beyond itself to these depths.”15 That which 
appears truly communicates itself, but without exhaustion. The “depths” are both 
genuinely expressed in the concrete form, and yet the depths also remain ever-more 
profound such that the form can only “point beyond itself” toward even greater mysteries.  
This is the nature of “symbol,”16 which is a mode of discourse that does not 
despair of communication, even as it remains fully aware of the fact that a gap between 
expression and comprehension (mastery) always remains. But we must not see this “gap” 
as an ugly ditch! It is not the torment of the finite soul, but the cause of finitude’s greatest 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 118. In the same section, Balthasar says, “The form as it appears to us is beautiful only because the 
delight that it arouses in us is founded upon the fact that, in it, the truth and goodness of the depths of 
reality itself are manifested and bestowed, and this manifestation and bestowal reveal themselves to us as 
being something infinitely and inexhaustibly valuable and fascinating.” Ibid. Notice, this manifestation is 
a bestowal, and suddenly with this word “bestowal” we are brought into the domain of gift-giving. The 
concrete form makes present the gift that this being bestows, it offers this creature’s unique participated 
truth and goodness as free gift. This gift of being, Balthasar then says, is “infinitely and inexhaustibly 
valuable and fascinating”—and with this, it seems there is also an allusion to Rudolph Otto’s famous 
definition of “the holy”: mysterium tremendum et fascinosum, mystery fearsome and fascinating. In other 
words, then, when being, precisely through its unique from, communicates its inner depths as gift, it 
creates wonder and fascination in the perceiver. For an analysis of Balthasar’s use of Otto’s 
phenomenology of “the holy,” see Cyril O’Regan, “Newman and von Balthasar : The Christological 
Contexting of the Numinous,” Eglise et Théologie 26, no. 2 (1995): esp. 194ff.  
16 This word should be understood in the context of “sacramental ontology.” David Bentley Hart has 
articulated useful guidelines for better and worse uses of the term “symbol.” David Bentley Hart, The 
Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2004), 26–28. He finds, for example, that Paul Tillich’s semiotics are finally inadequate precisely 
because the concrete form is disrespected. While Tillich says “the symbol participates in the reality of 
that for which it stands,” a formula that has promise, in practice Tillich uses symbols as diving boards 
into deeper waters. Hart complains, “Of course, the advantage of vague talk concerning ‘symbol’ is that 
it allows theology to prescind from the difficult details of particular narratives to the more governable 
realm of abstractions, but its price is often a denatured faith, a kind of docetism, wrapped in the apparel 
of a theoretical category: it is no longer the concrete details of the gospel narratives but the simple 
categories of universal or ‘spiritual’ meaning that may be prized from them, that constitute the 
kerygmatic essence of faith.” Ibid., 26. (This calls to mind George Tyrrell’s misinterpretation of 
Newman; in James Livingston’s helpful summary, “it is the idea, and not the historical fact, that is the 
basis of Christianity. According to Tyrrell, religion is the embodiment of the spiritual ideal in changing 
historical forms; hence religious statements are always symbolic” James C. Livingston, Modern Christian 
Thought: The Enlightenment and the Nineteenth Century, 2 edition (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 
373.) A proper theological aesthetics, Hart insists, never gets around or behind the concrete form, and 
thus any talk of symbol must be understood “in terms of sacrament, icon, or real presence.” Hart, Beauty 
of the Infinite, 28; cf. Balthasar, GL1, 1982, 124, 438–39; Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The 
Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry, First Edition edition (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 2011). 
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joy: the space between expression and comprehension is the space of wonder that never 
fails to delight and satisfy precisely because it is never mastered. In this context, we must 
speak also of mystery, the mystery that gives itself to our perception fully, inexhaustibly, 
drawing us in rapture, moving us toward song.17 Again, form communicates depth—not a 
submerged depth that trickles out here and there, like clues in a whodunit, but rather a 
depth that is entirely present on the “surface” of form, a depth which the form expresses 
entirely, but never finally, because the depth cannot be exhausted. Why? Because this 
“depth” of existence is—referring now to Erich Przywara’s Analogia Entis—
participation in an essence that always exceeds us. Being is “suspended” by that “in-and-
beyond” rhythm called analogia, meaning each created thing truly expresses what it 
cannot fully express.18 
Therefore, in theological aesthetics, the gap between expression/existence and 
interiority/essence is a valley of splendor, and each encounter with splendor inspires both 
delight and longing (eros) in the human subject. The perceiver rejoices in the gift of such 
                                                 
17 Cyril O’Regan helpfully specifies that Balthasar emphasizes “positive mystery,” which is “the 
superlative presence of the divine as glory, or the superlative manifestation of the divine glory.” 
O’Regan, “Newman and von Balthasar,” 166. Here mystery has content (especially Christological 
content) which “invites participation.” Ibid., 188. Positive mystery is distinguished from “negative 
mystery,” a merely privative understanding of mystery that serves only to specify “the limit of the 
competence of cognition to inquire into and grasp the nature of divine reality.” Karl Rahner makes a 
similar point: “The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology,” Theological Investigations 4 (1966): 36–
73. 
18 Erich Przywara’s philosophy is foundational in this section, and for this entire book. His watershed 
Analogia Entis has only recently been translated into English, eighty years after it first appeared. Erich 
Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysics : Original Structure and Universal Rhythm (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013). In this book, Przywara attempts to articulate a 
“creaturely metaphysics,” an approach in which metaphysics has no solid resting place, but is a 
movement, a dance, a joyful restlessness that resists every closure and silence. Creaturely metaphysics is 
a suspended tension in which each element (for example, being and consciousness) can ﬁnd itself and 
deﬁne itself only by moving toward the other…but at the same time, this movement is not the 
monotonous back and forth of the metronome, because there is a certain directionality, a “becoming” that 
keeps the dance going in new and more exciting movements and variations. At the heart of metaphysics, 
for Przywara, there is incompleteness, openness, and ambiguity which can never be rounded off, but 
which at the same time is not chaotic movement hither and thither, but somehow always ordered toward 
greater fullness. It is for this reason that being can truly articulate a mystery that is nevertheless infinite.  
25 
 
beauty, and longs for deeper communion with this lovely self-revelation. The result is 
rapture: the encounter with splendor draws the subject out of herself toward the self-
communicating other. Again, in Balthasar’s words, “We are ‘enraptured’ by our 
contemplation of these depths and are ‘transported’ to them. But, so long as we are 
dealing with the beautiful, this never happens in such a way that we leave the (horizontal) 
form behind us in order to plunge (vertically) into the naked depths.”19  It is important to 
underline again the fact that the appearing form of the beautiful is not a husk to be 
discarded in pursuit of a wholly spiritual, disembodied essence, but that external form 
and inner splendor are interrelated such that the expressive form is never left behind.  
The theme of rapture also brings attention to two crucial points. Aesthetic 
delight—first of all—depends on, and celebrates, distance and difference; if the “other” is 
mastered, devoured, or otherwise eliminated, there is no space left for appreciation or 
desire. Second, the other must genuinely communicate itself and make itself available to 
be received: if the “object” is maximally incomprehensible, or absolutely formless, or 
purely imperceptible, it would fail to arouse desire and enkindle delight. Theological 
aesthetics, therefore, requires the distance of otherness, and also the hopeful joy of unity-
in-difference. From this perspective, the need for both kataphatic and apophatic moments 
in theological expression is fully protected.20 
The main point to emphasize here is how the place of aesthetic splendor and 
                                                 
19 Balthasar, GL1, 1982, 119. 
20 For the analogical relation between apophatic and kataphatic, Hart is especially clear: Beauty of the 
Infinite, 310–11. O’Regan’s articulation of Balthasar’s defense of the kataphatic against modern critics is 
also helpful here. O’Regan says, “…the trilogy speaks with one voice concerning both the necessity of 
apophasis and its secondariness. Mindful in general that the discourse of apocalyptic is a discourse of 
symbols—thus of signs that present the reality they represent—and mindful in particular that the 
governing symbol of apocalyptic, that is, the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world, is 
incorrigibly kataphatic, Balthasar sets limits to apophasis.” O’Regan, Anatomy of Misremembering, 
2014, 446;  cf. 240 f. 
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rapture is the space of rejoicing. As Balthasar extensively describes it, the “objective 
evidence” of the appearing form draws out a response from the subject, who in being 
drawn toward the object is transformed by it. The object becomes part of the subject; it 
leaves its mark on the subject as it elevates her and invites her to participate in its beauty. 
Beauty is not selfish, it does not close itself up, but it streams forth to gather others to 
itself, drawing them in peace toward unity. To more fully receive the gift, the subject 
must often be transformed to make space for this new beauty: certain internal boundaries 
must be removed, certain fresh faculties must be developed, certain prejudices must be 
reevaluated, a certain vulnerability must be risked. Openness to beauty necessarily 
implies openness to change, because beauty always involves an “other,” and aesthetic 
otherness inevitably implies new possibilities for growth and expansion.  
If this is true for beauty generally, it is supereminently true of “glory” (Hebrew 
kabod, Greek doxa), the biblical word for divine radiance (as Wholly Other) making 
itself perceptible to human subjects, and drawing them in to partake of and be 
transformed by divine glory.21  For Balthasar, “response” is therefore a key word. One is 
not given the grace to perceive divine glory so as to become a dumb spectator, but to be 
transformed and empowered to act and live as a partaker of this glory, which is to say, 
                                                 
21 The Hebrew word is דוֹב ָׁכ, kâbôd, and its root, Balthasar points out, “initially connotes what is physically 
heavy or weighty, but then it can refer to everything which gives any living being…an external force or 
impetus (gravitas) that makes it appear imposing…” Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A 
Theological Aesthetics, Vol. 6: Theology: The Old Covenant (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 33. 
As with any other attempt to predicate a human reality to God, the analogical nature of divine Glory is 
fully emphasized. Balthasar says, “The theophanies, of which the most important takes place on Sinai, 
are intended to be understood as overwhelming events in which the living God becomes present. On the 
one hand, they occur in such a way that the sensory sphere that belongs essentially to man is brought into 
play: an experience takes place whereby God is externally ‘seen’ and ‘heard’. On the other hand, 
however, the person involved clearly understands that the sensory manifestation is the indication, as it 
were a signal or symbol, for the fact that the absolute, spiritual and invisible Mightiness is here present, 
comparable to the way a person catches his interlocutor’s attention before he begins to speak with him.” 
Ibid., 34. For the variety of Hebrew words translated as δόξα in LXX, see Ibid., 51–53. 
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glory inspires, and requires, a doxological response. Encountering glory, receiving glory, 
we are glorified, brought into the communion of glory, and thus our lips are opened to 
proclaim God’s praise. Those who sing quickly discover that even this responsive song is 
a gift; speaking specifically of the Christian experience, Balthasar says, “The believer 
cannot consider his answer to the light of God’s witness to be a second, autonomous 
word existing alongside Christ’s word, even though it is true that the believer never yet 
felt himself taken so seriously as a person and so fulfilled as when he spoke this word. He 
knows that both he and the word of faith he gives in reply are taken up into the trinitarian 
witness (Jn 5.36f.; 8.16ff.).”22 The doxological response—in both its contemplative and 
active dimensions—is a genuine response emerging from the worshipper’s own heart—
she does not merely mouth the words from a songbook—but she also experiences it as a 
grace that is given unexpectedly by an astonishing generosity.  
Therefore, Balthasar’s theological aesthetics raises many crucial issues that are 
essential as we pursue a more sympathetic temple theology. First, most generally, there is 
the aesthetic emphasis on sense experience, with special attention paid to vision. What 
role does the visual experience play in temple theology? Second, there is emphasis on 
transcendental “beauty,” and especially the relationship between inner essence, or 
“splendor,” and exterior communication, or form, in the study of beauty. With respect to 
the temple, what is the essence of this place, and how does its form communicate that 
essence? Is the sanctuary on Zion experienced as beautiful, with a form expressing an 
inner radiance? Third, there is the way form both communicates, and fails to 
communicate, the expressed splendor. The “depths” that are expressed in the beautiful 
                                                 
22 Balthasar, GL1, 1982, 191. 
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form are still more profound than their expression, and this is the space of mystery. How 
does the temple express itself in a way that points toward further depths, or heights, 
inviting the worshiper deeper into the theological mystery? Fourth, when we encounter 
the beautiful, the result is delight, longing, and rapture. Beauty brings joy, it enflames 
desire, and it draws the subject out of himself. It is therefore important to ask, is this the 
experience of Israel with respect to the temple? Is the place associated with dread and 
disgust, or hope and delight? Fifth, closely related, the encounter with beauty is 
transformative. The experience of being drawn toward the beautiful form involves an 
elevation and re-formation of one’s own soul. How does the temple transform the lives of 
those who are drawn to it? Sixth, one must insist upon the uniqueness of theological 
Glory and the glorified response. While beauty generally reveals the truth and goodness 
of being, divine glory invites one to a more immediate encounter with Being-itself. As 
Aidan Nichols explains:  
Every beautiful form possesses an openness to the infinite, but some beautiful 
forms possess this more than others. Beautiful form is heterogeneous, 
differentiated, qualitatively variable, or more or less significant in terms of 
focusing the totality of being at large…Every form is a contraction of the totality 
of being, and some are more contracted than others. This should remind us that it 
is for God to provide the norm by which he will interpret himself…Only God can 
fashion a form that could be a comprehensive revelation of himself, the world and 
our relation to both of these.23 
 
Therefore, how does the temple, as it is described in the Bible, uniquely associated with 
the revelation of divine glory? How does it transform humanity in a distinctly theological 
way as it draws Israel into communion with God? In what sense is it depicted as a 
“form,” given by God, as a means of self-revelation?  
These are some major topics in a theological aesthetics of the temple. Some of 
                                                 
23 Nichols, A Key to Balthasar, 27. 
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these questions will be addressed in this section, and all of them will be addressed over 
the course of this chapter.  
The House of Glory, the Joy of Israel 
Having reviewed key terms in Balthasar’s theological aesthetics, we can turn 
more fully to Zion. Without question, the temple as the preeminent doxological space in 
the Hebrew Bible. Admittedly, there are drawbacks to associating divine glory with the 
temple: it may seem to diminish glory by giving it too narrow a context. God is certainly 
not parsimonious with his glory. In the Bible, the whole world is filled with God’s glory 
(for example, Numbers 14:21, or Psalm 19:1-6), and the whole earth is called upon to 
sing his praise (Psalm 66:1-4). At the same time, many passages suggest that this terrific 
weight is sometimes present in a more particular way: glory settles on Sinai (Exodus 
24:16), it blazes at the tent of meeting (Leviticus 9:23-34), it fills Solomon’s temple (1 
Kings 8:11), and it characterizes the eschatological temple (Ezekiel 43:1-5); in the New 
Testament, it is made incarnate in Jesus Christ (John 1:14). A celebration of divine 
immanence is a central biblical theme.24  
Although the philosophically sensitive reader might wish to accentuate divine 
transcendence, Benjamin Sommer has shown that biblical writers were not shy about 
speaking even of God’s immanent bodily presence; for the priestly writer specifically, 
“kabod refers to God’s body and hence to God’s very self.”25 From this perspective, the 
                                                 
24 This is especially true in P: “Indeed, a central theme of priestly tradition—perhaps, the central theme of 
priestly tradition—is the desire of the transcendent God to become immanent on the earth this God has 
created.” Benjamin D. Sommer, The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 74 emphasis in original. As we will have occasion to note below, it 
is less true of D, and the tension between these different approaches is theologically productive.  
25 Ibid., 68. Sommer’s book opens with a shocking claim, “The God of the Hebrew Bible has a body” Ibid., 
1. He goes on to show that, in some of the oldest strands of biblical tradition, God even has “bodies”—
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full wonder of the last verses of Exodus can be appreciated: “And then the cloud covered 
the tent of meeting. YHWH’s kabod had filled the tabernacle!”26 In the most ancient 
priestly tradition, God is truly here, bodily here, ablaze in the tabernacle, in the midst of 
his people Israel. The priestly writer has a vivid sense of indwelling where God becomes 
locally present, and perceptible, in his sanctuary.  
If God is God—if God is not a being among beings—it seems inconceivable that 
divine glory or presence could be limited to a point on a map.27 At the same time—
circling back to the basic affirmations of theological aesthetics —the self-revelation of 
the transcendent God to human beings involves, in the biblical tradition, God’s glory 
manifesting itself in creation, which does not ensnare God in finitude, but draws all 
creation to God through the particular. Furthermore, while the most ancient idea that God 
has a “body” will certainly be interrogated in the unfolding Jewish and Christian 
                                                 
that there is “fluidity” in divine selfhood—a fact that is seen with greater clarity when the text is read in 
its broader ANE context. The priestly writers, he says, reject the idea of fluid divine selfhood and 
multiple embodiments, but they do not reject embodiment outright. For them, the kabod is the divine 
body, it has “a particular shape” even though “it is not clear that it has a permanent size.” Furthermore, 
Sommer borrows a Newtonian distinction to suggest that, in priestly writings, “the kabod is made of 
energy but not matter.” Ibid., 71. Cf. Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School 
(Eisenbrauns, 1972), 198–206; Jarl Fossum, “Glory,” in Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible, 
ed. Karel van der van der Toorn, Bob Becking, and Pieter Willem van der Horst (Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 1999), 348–52, esp. 349; April D. DeConick, “What Is Early Jewish and Christian 
Mysticism?,” in Paradise Now : Essays on Early Jewish and Christian Mysticism, ed. April D. DeConick 
(Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006), 11–14. 
26 Translation of Exodus 40:34 in Sommer, Bodies of God, 73. Sommer insists that here and in many other 
priestly texts, “the identity between the kabod and God” is clear. Ibid., 73, cf. 222 n.65. This view is not 
universal; while Michael B. Hundley acknowledges that “the [kavod YHWH] is an especially appropriate 
metonym for YHWH himself,” he hastens to nuance this position: “although the glory is inextricably 
linked with the divine presence, the glory does not encapsulate that presence.” Keeping Heaven on Earth: 
Safeguarding the Divine Presence in the Priestly Tabernacle (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 43. 
Hundley emphasizes “ambiguity” and concealment in the priestly account of divine presence. Ibid., 49–
52; with Sommer, Bodies of God, 68–78. Ronald E. Clements goes even further in distinguishing God’s 
glory from God himself: God and Temple, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965), 104, 113–14. 
27 This is, Sommer explains, the Deuteronomist insight, where “God dwells in heaven and nowhere else. On 
earth God places His shem, in the one place he chooses for it (viz. the Jerusalem temple)…[T]he shem is 
only a sign of the divine presence, not a manifestation of God Himself.” Sommer, Bodies of God, 62; cf. 
Clements, God and Temple, 90–91, 94–96, 100. Thus, Solomon says, “But will God really dwell on 
earth? Even the heavens to their uttermost reaches cannot contain You, how much less this House that I 
have built!” (1 Kings 8:27, NJSV) 
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theological traditions, that there is “shape” to God’s indwelling luminosity and 
splendor—that God is not sublime formlessness, but “infinitely formosus, the 
supereminent fullness of all form”28—contains an insight worthy of appreciation and 
preservation. One therefore finds the first stirrings of theological aesthetics in the priestly 
texts insofar as there is an emphasis on vision, beauty, form, and splendor; for modern 
Christian theology, this remains a significant achievement.  
From the perspective of philosophical materialism, the finite cannot ultimately 
give access to the infinite, but can only trap our gaze in the idolatry of beings. By 
contrast, the analogical, sacramental approach described above makes it possible to 
imagine unfathomable depths being present in the appearing form as an icon that heals 
and elevates the mind and heart of the perceiver. As Cyril O’Regan points out, 
Balthasar’s view is well summarized in the title of his 1963 book: Das Ganze im 
Fragment (“The Whole in the Fragment”)29: “For Balthasar, a fragment is a particular, 
irreplaceable seeing of a whole.”30  This idea of the capacity of the fragment to 
communicate the whole is true of being generally, but the symbols of revelation have a 
privileged transparency to the whole—maybe the best way to say it is, in these icons, the 
whole is especially to the surface.31 The conviction behind this chapter is that—in the 
context of the Jewish covenantal religion—the temple is that “fragment” and “symbol” 
                                                 
28 Hart, Beauty of the Infinite, 177. Speaking of the form of revelation, Balthasar insists that the God who is 
revealed is not “an infinite non-form (ἄπειρον), but the appearance of an infinitely determined super-
form.” Balthasar, GL1, 1982, 432. Cf. Ibid., 117–19. 
29 O’Regan, Anatomy of Misremembering, 2014, 500. Das Ganze im Fragment was translated as A 
Theological Anthropology: (Eugene, Or.: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2010). 
30 O’Regan, Anatomy of Misremembering, 2014, 510–11. 
31 For Balthasar, “The revelation of grace is not the establishment of a new form within the created world; it 
is but a new manner of God’s presence in the form of the world, a new intimacy in our union with him, 
an intimacy to which the child of God has access and in which he participates.” Balthasar, GL1, 1982, 
452. 
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which expresses the truth of the divine “whole” in an exceptional, even unparalleled, 
way. A strong clue to this fact is the astonishing attention to detail given to the 
tabernacle, its furnishing, its construction, and its liturgy, given in the second half of 
Exodus and the first half of Leviticus. To repeat what Nichols says in summarizing 
Balthasar’s position: “Only God can fashion a form that could be a comprehensive 
revelation of himself, the world and our relation to both of these.”32 The fact that the 
priestly writers have God himself giving, and often repeating, remarkably precise 
instructions on how to construct the tabernacle suggest that they understood this holy 
space to be incomparable as a site of divine revelation, a place where the intimacy 
between Israel and her God, as well as all creation and its God, finds its unique 
expression. This is the form that God gives to express his presence and his infinite beauty. 
We will explore this theme in much greater detail below; it is here sufficient to say that 
the rich symbolic theology merits our careful attention.  
Recent scholarship has increasingly shown the importance of vision in biblical 
temple theology. For example, Gary Anderson has described the iconic role of the temple 
in his article “To See Where God Dwells: The Tabernacle, the Temple, and the Origins of 
the Christian Mystical Tradition.” Anderson first reviews a number of biblical texts that 
associate seeing the temple or the ark of the covenant with actually seeing God; in an 
interesting example, Anderson says that even though the vowel markers for Exodus 23:17 
in the Masoretic text suggest that Israel must “appear before the face of the Lord” three 
times a year, it can be argued that the verbal stem has been wrongly vocalized, and that 
the original requirement was that Israel visit the temple thrice yearly “to see the face of 
                                                 
32 Nichols, A Key to Balthasar, 27. 
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the Lord.”33 Other texts express the importance and seriousness of seeing the temple and 
its furniture more straightforwardly. Consider the importance David places in seeing the 
ark and its dwelling (2 Samuel 15:25), or how adamant the author of Numbers is that the 
Kohathites not see the temple furniture “lest they die” (4:20). Psalm 48 is also presented 
as an outstanding example of this emphasis on the visual. The psalm first focuses the 
singer’s attention on the “holy mountain,” “beautiful in elevation,” which is “the joy of 
all the earth,” before identifying it as Mount Zion in “the city of the great King” (vv. 1-2). 
It is here, “in the midst of [God’s] temple” that worshipers “ponder [God’s] steadfast 
love” (v. 9). Then the psalm culminates with a remarkable invitation to the pilgrim in 
Jerusalem: 
Walk about Zion, go all around it, 
   count its towers,  
consider well its ramparts; 
   go through its citadels, 
that you may tell the next generation  
   that this is God, 
our God for ever and ever. 
   He will be our guide for ever. (vv. 13-15, emphasis added)34 
 
Anderson comments on how profound this affirmation is: he quotes Amos 
Hacham, who says that “the one who sees the Temple in its splendor and glory feels 
within himself as if he saw, face to face, the glory (kavod) of the Lord. He cries, ‘this 
[this building] is God, our God.’”35 Thus, according to Anderson, “these texts exhibit 
ancient Israel’s deeply held view that God really dwelt in the Temple and that all the 
                                                 
33 Gary A. Anderson, “To See Where God Dwells: The Tabernacle, the Temple, and the Origins of the 
Christian Mystical Tradition,” in Letter & Spirit, Vol. 4: Temple and Contemplation: God’s Presence in 
the Cosmos, Church, and Human Heart, ed. Scott Hahn and David Scott (St. Paul Center for Biblical 
Theology, 2008), 15. For a similar argument, see Anderson, “Mary in the Old Testament,” 2007, 43–46. 
For Anderson’s argument on the vocalization of the stem ra’ah, see Anderson, “To See Where God 
Dwells,” 15, note 6. Balthasar also reflects on the call “to see” the face of YHWH: Balthasar, GL6, 70–72. 
34 This is Anderson’s translation at “To See Where God Dwells,” 18. 
35 Ibid. 
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pieces of that building shared, in some fashion, in his tangible and visible presence.”36 
After then reviewing extra-biblical evidence,37 Anderson concludes that to gaze upon the 
temple and its furniture was often associated with actually seeing the face of God. This, 
then, is the significance of the psalmist’s command that the pilgrim walk about, go 
around, go through, count, and consider the details of a building and its surroundings, 
culminating with the command to go forth and tell future generations of the architectural 
theophany: “this is God.”38 From the perspective of biblical priestly theology, God’s 
glory so permeates this place, and shines through it, that it serves as an icon most worthy 
of contemplation. It seems that, with his glorious indwelling, God himself has become the 
splendor of the Zion sanctuary, and the pilgrim has access to this inner mystery through a 
sensory, visual encounter with the form of the building itself.  
Anderson is not the only scripture scholar to find that an encounter with the 
temple and its furniture was understood as a visual encounter with the invisible God. 
                                                 
36 Ibid. The view that God was truly present in the temple was still widely affirmed in common Judaism 
around the time of Christ. E.P. Sanders says, “The temple was holy not only because the holy God was 
worshipped there, but also because he was there. The notion of God’s special presence in the temple—
more precisely, in the Holy of Holies…was accepted by most.” E.P. Sanders, Judaism: Practice and 
Belief, 63 BCE-66 CE (London; Philadelphia: SCM Press ; Trinity Press International, 1992), 70. But 
then, see N.T. Wright’s arguments that the fullness of God’s glory was not to be found in the second 
temple as it was in the first, and that somehow Israel’s exile was ongoing during the second temple 
period. This view is expressed most recently in N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God (Fortress 
Press, 2013), 105–8. 
37 Including the Qumran community’s seventh song from the Songs of Sabbath Sacrifice, and notable 
midrashic reflections. 
38 Anderson finds that in later tradition the table of presence, which is separated from the holy of holies by 
just a curtain, “shares enough of the divine presence that seeing it constitutes a fulfillment of the 
command, ‘to see the face of God’.” Anderson, “To See Where God Dwells: The Tabernacle, the 
Temple, and the Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition,” 33. Anderson brings forward various 
pieces of evidence to suggest that the table was put on display for pilgrims during certain pilgrimage 
festivals; one interesting example is the coins that have been discovered from the period of the Bar-
Kokhba revolt that depict the table in the temple: Ibid., 31–33. 
  With reference to that verse from Numbers mentioned above—where the Kohathites are warned 
against viewing the ark furniture—Anderson noted the extreme danger associated with seeing temple 
furniture, and so this idea that the furniture was put on display during certain festivals so that the pilgrims 
might “see the face of the Lord” is an apparent contradiction. Aware of this tension, Anderson 
summarizes some of the possible second temple approaches to the question. Ibid., 28–30. 
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Michael B. Hundley has similarly explained that, while holiness is a quality peculiar to 
God as transcendent of the created world, “elements”—such as the temple and its 
furniture—“closely associated with the deity may absorb some of the divine essence.”39 
God does not dwell in creation like a ghost in an old house, a wispy presence that leaves 
the physical surroundings unaffected. Nor is God’s tabernacling necessarily destructive, 
as if divinity is in conflict with the material creation itself. Rather, in the theological 
imagination of the ancient cultic writers, God’s indwelling draws material creation up so 
that sanctuary furniture, priestly rites, and the temple as a whole, communicate God’s real 
presence to the worshipers who gather in Jerusalem.  
The Hebrew Bible scholar Walter Brueggemann has similarly drawn attention to 
the emphasis on beauty in priestly literature, on the corresponding attention to visionary 
experience, and the connection between these themes and divine holiness. Brueggemann 
argues that, while the “Deuteronomic-covenantal-prophetic traditions,” which emphasize 
hearing and obedience, typically get more attention in biblical scholarship (especially 
Protestant biblical scholarship), “Less recognized is a second perspective on obligation, 
stemming from the tradition of tabernacle-temple-Priestly tradition: that Israel is to see, 
to look on the splendor and beauty of Yahweh.”40 Brueggemann later expands on this 
                                                 
39 Michael B. Hundley, “Sacred Spaces, Objects, Offerings, and People in the Priestly Texts: A 
Reappraisal,” Journal of Biblical Literature 132, no. 4 (2013): 753. In this article, Hundley is exploring 
the nature of “holiness” in ancient Israel, comparing the concept of holiness to the way certain objects are 
divinized in surrounding ancient Near Eastern cultures. He says that, for ancient Israel, “…no person, 
place, or object is intrinsically holy. For example, on its own, the ark is simply a pretty box. Rather, 
holiness is derived exclusively from its source, YHWH, and roughly connotes belonging to the deity and 
thus to the divine sphere. As we will see, holiness is more than just a label; it likewise seems to carry 
some of the dangerously potent divine essence.” Ibid. After looking at how certain objects are divinized 
in surrounding polytheistic cultures, Hundley returns to Israel: “Although the Priestly terminology and 
ancient Near Eastern terminology are different, the effects are similar; sacralized and divinized elements 
belong to the divine  realm and are imbued with some of its essence.” Ibid., 754. 
40 Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Fortress Press, 
2005), 421. 
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point:  
Israel is summoned to worship YHWH in a holy place of unspeakable splendor 
(Pss 29:2, 96:9; 1 Chr 16:29; 2 Chr 20:21). The old, familiar translation of the 
recurring phrase in these texts is “the beauty of holiness.” The NRSV prefers to 
render “holy splendor,” thus accentuating the awe, which precludes any ease or 
artistic coziness. What interests us in this recurring formula, rendered either way, 
is that the visibly powerful sense of presence in the shrine has a mark of holiness 
to it, which variously reflects symmetry, proportion, order, extravagance, awe, 
and overwhelmingness. This is a sense of the “surplus” of Yahweh, situated at the 
center of Israel’s life, which is experienced as visual and which from its central 
and dominant position resituates and recharacterizes everything in Israel’s 
mundane world in relation to this center of occupying holiness. 
 
Therefore, for Brueggemann, at the center of the priestly literature is a theological 
aesthetics that accentuates many of the points that Balthasar also emphasizes. These texts 
clearly present an aesthetic experience which is visual, which is beautiful, and which—
even more importantly—is a direct encounter with divine holiness. This is an experience 
of the splendor of God, which takes more familiar, philosophical aesthetic categories 
(symmetry, proportion, order) and interweaves them with concepts that suggest the glory 
of the tabernacling Lord (extravagance, awe, overwhelmingness). 
Such encounters with glory are transformative in ancient Israelite religion. Just as 
surely as the temple and its furniture—constructed of acacia wood, gold, bronze— 
conveys divine glory, the human worshiper is also taken up into, and then herself 
communicates, this indwelling kabod. As we have seen, for Balthasar, beauty is 
indispensable to a well-rounded theology because of the way it draws the perceiver 
toward contemplation and enkindles a desire for unity. Beauty, in sharing itself, inspires 
the viewer’s full responsive participation. This phenomenon is true yet more profound 
when divine glory is communicated, when the wholly-other, invisible God condescends 
to human perception, elevating the vision of the believer to see what infinitely surpasses 
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the power of mortal humanity’s weak eyes, and strengthens our voices to join the 
doxological refrain known only to the angels—“Holy! Holy! Holy!” Balthasar says, 
“There is no dodging this paradox, which begins with the self-communication of the 
Wholly Other and ends with the thanksgiving of the creature that has been overtaken.”41 
Certainly, Balthasar is clear that for biblical religion, all initiative exists on God’s side, 
and our participation in glory is such that we receive what remains always beyond us: our 
glorified existence in God is at every moment a gift of God’s grace, and our response is 
one of humility and desire.  
This, in fact, is the story of the temple: the humble worshiper, invited to dwell in 
God’s house, is enflamed with desire for greater and greater intimacy. Who can forget 
King David’s passionate plea: “One thing I asked of the Lord, that will I seek after: to 
live in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the beauty of the Lord, and 
to inquire in his temple” (Psalm 27:4). Scripture is also certainly aware of how the 
encounter with God is transformative. The most famous example of this in the Old 
Testament, which within biblical narrative is chronologically before tabernacle or temple, 
but not unrelated, is the account of the glorification of Moses. After Moses encounters 
God at the peak of Mount Sinai, it says: “So Moses came down from Mount Sinai…[he] 
was not aware that the skin of his face was radiant, since he had spoken with [the LORD]” 
(Exodus 34:29). The glory that was proper to God now shines through the human being 
who has drawn nearest to him. Crispin Fletcher-Louis points to another fascinating 
passage, this time in Ezekiel, where God explains how he had rescued Israel from utter 
despair, entered into a (marital) covenant with her, and clothes her with beauty. God says, 
                                                 
41 Balthasar, GL6, 10. 
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“Your fame spread among the nations on account of your beauty, for it was perfect 
because of my splendor that I had bestowed on you, says the LORD  God” (Ezekiel 16:14, 
NRSV). Fletcher-Louis explains that, for Ezekiel, “Israel really is the genuine bearer of 
divine presence and, as queen to her king, the rightful wearer of God’s glory. This is why 
the first half of the piece climaxes with the statement that Israel’s beauty was perfect 
because God bestowed his own splendor on her.”42 Therefore, it is clear that 
transformation in divine glory is not specific only to an isolated few, but it is a gift given 
to the nation. We will also see further down in this chapter how an analogous 
glorification was, in later biblical and extra-biblical literature, especially associated with 
the appearance of the high priest ministering in the temple, making the visual encounter 
with the priest a type of theophany that then transforms the worshipers gathered at the 
temple. In any case, the important theo-aesthetic themes of craving for union with God, 
in his great and fearsome beauty, and the transformation that comes through such 
intimacy, are both clearly prominent in the priestly tradition.43 
The promise of the temple, of Jerusalem, and of the holy land, is the promise of 
                                                 
42 Fletcher-Louis, “God’s Image, His Cosmic Temple and the High Priest,” 88. 
43 Recent research has shown the absolute centrality of priestly theo-aesthetic themes like the vision of God 
(theophany) and human transformation as a result of such visions (including theosis) in ancient temple 
theology, early Jewish mysticism, in the Christian scriptures, and in the (especially Eastern) Christian 
mystical tradition. This research is especially vibrant in the “Theophaneia School,” a body of work 
associated with Alexander Golitzin, Andrei Orlov, and their collaborators. See Alexander Golitzin, 
“Theophaneia: Forum on the Jewish Roots of Orthodox Spirituality,” Scrinium 3 (2007): xvii–xx; 
Alexander Golitzin, “Christian Mysticism Over Two Millenia,” Scrinium 3 (2007): xxi–xxxiii.  
  It would be impossible to here discuss the debates over the nature of “theophany” in the Christian 
tradition. Some Eastern Orthodox theologians believe that Augustine’s interpretation of biblical 
theophanies—where he disassociates the Old Testament theophanies from the pre-incarnate Christ and 
suggests that they are in some sense “created”—was one of the great errors in Western theology. For an 
example of the critique of Augustine, see Bogdan G. Bucur, “Theophanies and Vision of God in 
Augustine’s De Trinitate: An Eastern Orthodox Perspective,” Saint Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 52, 
no. 1 (2008): 67–93. For a fascinating, brilliant attempt at reconciling the Augustinian-Western tradition 
with the Palamite-Eastern tradition using the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar, see John Panteleimon 
Manoussakis, “Theophany and Indication: Reconciling Augustinian and Palamite Aesthetics,” Modern 
Theology 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 76–89. 
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hospitality, inviting the elect to live into a space that is not properly their own, but to 
which they are nevertheless called and for which they are most intimately made.44 It is 
the space of God’s own life that must become a permanent home for the chosen people, 
and this eternal space is iconically present in Israel. As the psalm says, “You who live in 
the shelter of the Most High, who abide in the shadow of the Almighty, will say to the 
Lord, ‘My refuge and my fortress; my God, in whom I trust.’...Because you have made 
the Lord your refuge, the Most High your dwelling-place, no evil shall befall you...” 
(Psalm 91:1-2, 9-10, NRSV). When God dwells in Zion, and Israel draws near in worship, 
they are not merely dwelling in proximity to God in the promised land, but the psalmist 
goes so far as to say that they dwell in God himself.45 What we see in temple theology, 
therefore, is the drama of a people invited to live in the space that God opens within 
himself. Of course, as is so clearly evident throughout the Hebrew Bible, such intimacy 
also brings risk and judgment when the covenant people turn away, when they give up 
their share in God’s glory. To turn from holiness is to close off the self from freedom and 
love, and therefore to truly live within the “space” of God’s holiness, human beings must 
make “space” for God in themselves, through openheartedness, so as to live ecstatically 
in God (without, of course, collapsing the metaphysical distance between finite and 
infinite). Such transformation and mutual indwelling between heaven and earth, God and 
humanity, is the great hope of priestly theology. 
                                                 
44 See the section entitled “A dwelling place in God’s life” for this theme in Balthasar: Balthasar, GL6, 178 
ff. 
45 Cf. N. T. Wright, The Case for the Psalms: Why They Are Essential (HarperCollins, 2013), 98–99. 
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Zion as Liturgical Mountain 
With this talk of communal intimacy and transformation, we enter the liturgical 
sphere. There is a widespread assumption in scripture that the heavenly realm is a realm 
of praise and thanksgiving, and that it is our highest dignity to mirror that way of being. 
Zion, from the perspective of Second Temple Judaism, exists for this purpose of both 
echoing and embodying this heavenly praise in song and silence46—what Balthasar calls 
a “dialogue of mutual blessing: man sends God’s blessing back to him…Israel wanted to 
be pure answer and pure light reflecting back light…”47 When Balthasar develops the 
theme of covenant in the sixth volume of the Glory of the Lord, he emphasizes—without 
diminishing the wholly unanticipated and perfectly free initiative of God—the dialogical 
nature of Israel’s covenantal relationship with God. The relationship is simultaneously 
one-sided and mutual: the God who speaks the word elicits an answer.48 Mount Zion is 
that place where the covenantal answer is given rightly and justly, and thus Israel is here 
realized as essentially a doxological reality. Balthasar makes this point powerfully: 
Israel’s true ‘originality’ lies in the fact that it is able to transform everything into 
                                                 
46 Many Levites (minor clergy) were charged with the responsibility of singing, and the Psalms were their 
hymnbook. Ben Sira, describing the movements of the  high priest during a temple service, says, “Then 
the sons of Aaron the priests sounded forth / On trumpets of turned metal-work: / So they sounded and 
made heard the glorious noise… / And the singers gave their voice…” Robert Hayward, The Jewish 
Temple: A Non-Biblical Sourcebook (London: Routledge, 2002), translation of Hebrew Sirach 50:16a, 
18a on page 42-43. Hayward points to the importance of the singers is already clearly seen in 1 
Chronicles 15:16-22; 25:1-31; 2 Chronicles 29:25-30. Ibid., 58–59; cf. Sanders, Judaism, 62, 78, 80, 81. 
  At the same time, the temple was also known for its orderly rhythms and profound contemplative 
silence, a feature emphasized by Aristeas, writing around 150-100 BC. He says, “And a complete silence 
reigns, with the result that one might suppose that there was not a single person present in the place, even 
though there are around 700 ministering priests present and a great number of men bringing up the 
sacrifices; but everything is discharged with awe and in a manner worthy of the great Godhead.” 
Hayward, The Jewish Temple, Aristeas 95, on page 29. Cf. 33-34, where Hayward suggests biblical 
parallels such as Habakkuk 2:20 and Zechariah 2:13. 
47 Balthasar, GL6, 207. As one example, Balthasar points to Psalm 134, which can be quoted in its entirety: 
“Praise the LORD, all you servants of the LORD, all who stand in the house of the LORD night after night. 
Lift your hands toward the holy place, and praise the LORD. May the LORD, the maker of heaven and 
earth, bless you from Zion.” 
48 Cf. ibid., 155. 
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praise, to invite everyone to join in its song of glorification, and even to draw 
them into this whether they wish to take part or not….Here, in giving back the 
word, Israel best understands its universal mission to give back to God, in the 
name of the world, God’s word which goes forth to the world as a whole.49  
 
When the liturgical mission of Israel is accentuated, the centrality of Zion is again 
reinforced, because the temple is unquestionably the principal site of Israel’s liturgical 
life in the Second Temple period.  
David Fagerberg says, “Liturgical theology is the faith of the Church in ritual 
motion”50—along the same lines, the liturgical life of the temple is the faith, hope, and 
love of Israel in ritual motion. As the nation gathers together in this space to join in the 
ongoing rituals, the covenant is reaffirmed and realized. But, crucially, this liturgy is 
wholly rooted in its place. As Crispin Fletcher-Louis has said, “The temple is theatre. The 
high priest is an actor on a cosmic stage.”51 While the scriptures painstakingly spell out 
the specifications for this tabernacle, this dwelling place of God, this liturgical “stage,” it 
is every bit as detailed with respect to the daily and yearly rituals that were dramatically 
performed here and nowhere else. With surprising regularity, modern scholarship will 
speak either of the temple as a physical structure, or of sacrifices as ritual practices, 
without bringing the two themes together. But this physical structure, known for its 
breathtaking beauty, is at all times alive with sacrificial ritual. The beauty of the place 
and the drama of its liturgy are inseparable.  
This mountain is uniquely the mountain of worship, because it is the very address 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 209. Notably, Anderson shows that “praise” is not a private, individual action in the Hebrew Bible, 
but it is a cultic reality, and “the location of praise is none other than the cultic sanctuary itself.” Gary A. 
Anderson, “The Praise of God as a Cultic Event,” Priesthood and Cult in Ancient Israel, 1991, 18–19. 
50 David W. Fagerberg, Theologia Prima: What Is Liturgical Theology? (Chicago, IL: Hillenbrand Books, 
2012), ix. 
51 Crispin Fletcher-Louis, “Jesus’ Divine Self-Consciousness: A Proposal” (British New Testament 
Conference, Manchester, 2014), 4, https://www.academia.edu/8211442/Jesus_Divine_Self-
Consciousness_A_Proposal_British_New_Testament_Conference_2014_. 
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of YHWH.52 But why this mountain? If God is Lord over all of creation, what theological 
reason could there be for privileging one mountain over another? Are we to believe that 
the great and glorious God of ancient Israel arbitrarily chose a modest hill as his earthly 
home? Why should this “mountain” merit Israel’s attention, why was it seen as uniquely 
revelatory, and how could it possibly claim our attention today—especially given the 
well-known fact that the ancient world was rife with “sacred mountains”?53 To answer 
this question, we will turn to the theo-drama that, in the Jewish theological imagination, 
definitely establishes Zion as the true cornerstone of creation and mirror of heaven. To 
know why this really is the mountain of God—earth’s highest point and source of all 
beauty—to know what sets this temple apart—over and above every other structure that 
claimed to house the gods—we must meditate on the binding of Isaac.  
But before transitioning to that topic, some provisional conclusions can be drawn 
from this first foray into temple theology in light of theological aesthetics. What is most 
clear is that priestly theology put immense emphasis on the importance of a visual 
encounter with God in the temple; indeed, Zion is the place where Israel gathers to see 
God through the experience of the temple, its rituals, its furniture, the high priest, and 
other sensory experiences. It is precisely by means of this rich and dramatic “form” that 
the splendor of the indwelling Lord became manifest to the chosen people; it is the glory 
of the Lord that is the splendor of Zion, and in the Hebrew Bible this glory finds its 
                                                 
52 Gary Anderson has drawn attention to the way that praise and joy, in the Hebrew Bible, are very 
specifically cultic realities. He says, “In Hebrew as well as in the other Semitic languages of the ancient 
Near East (Hebrew, Jewish Aramaic, Syriac and Akkadian) the term ‘joy’ is not so much a general term 
of emotional happiness, but rather a term which connotes particular pleasures associated with the 
observation of specific rituals.” Anderson, “The Praise of God as a Cultic Event,” 25. Thus from the 
perspective of priestly theology, to say all life is ordered toward praise is precisely to say it is ordered 
toward the temple and liturgy.  
53 Cf. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and The Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 36–41. 
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complete liturgical, iconic expression here alone. Balthasar’s approach to theological 
aesthetics suggests that we must not conceive of the concrete form of the temple as a 
husk that can be discard so that we can “plunge (vertically) into the naked depths.”54 The 
vast theological meaning of this place, so absolutely central to the ancient Jewish 
covenants, is neither voided nor overcome by the new covenant; it is the irreplaceable 
context in which Christ’s own saving work takes place. Balthasar strictly condemns the 
view that “all that God has instituted for our salvation, culminating in his Incarnation, is 
in the end only something preliminary which must finally he transcended by either a 
mystical or an escahtologico-celestial immediacy that would surpass and make 
superfluous the form of salvation, or, put concretely, the humanity of Jesus Christ.”55 The 
indissoluble prominence of the temple is entailed in this claim.  
Furthermore, we have seen that, from this theological perspective, it is through 
aesthetic visual experiences that the covenant people are elevated and transformed. As 
the psalms so often suggested, this experience further enflames Israel’s desire: “How 
lovely is Your dwelling-place, O Lord of hosts. I long, I yearn for the courts of the 
Lord…Better one day in Your courts than a thousand [anywhere else]; I would rather 
stand at the threshold of God’s house than dwell in the tents of the wicked” (Psalm 84:2-
3, 11). What is most clear of all, perhaps, is that Mount Zion is associated repeatedly and 
consistently with beauty, awe, bliss, and glory. In approaching a biblical understanding of 
atonement, temple, and sacrifice, these are the first and most important words. At the 
center of priestly theology, that which orients all else, is splendor and peace, not wrath 
and violence. And yet, the great liturgical act by which this “peace” is expressed is 
                                                 
54 Balthasar, GL1, 1982, 119. 
55 Ibid., 301–2. 
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sacrificial; it involves slaughter and blood and immolation. How can such a ritual be 
associated with a place known from its otherworldly beauty? That will be a key question 
moving forward.  
Part II: The Drama on the Mountain Stage 
 Toward the end of the Abraham cycle in Genesis, the narrative seems to 
accelerate, and events of remarkable theological importance are described with stunning 
concision. In the twenty first chapter of the book, Isaac is conceived, born, circumcised, 
and weaned in eight swift verses, then focus shifts suddenly to the dismissal of Ishmael, 
which is described in thirteen verses. The writer or compiler of Genesis then interrupts 
the fascinating family drama with an account of the establishment of Beersheba, before 
once again shifting gears with a hazy transition: “Some time afterward…” What follows 
in the first nineteen verses of the twenty-second chapter—only about three-hundred 
Hebrew words—is a narrative that has inspired and challenged interpreters for millennia. 
There have been Jewish rabbis and commentators who have identified this drama—the 
Akedah, the binding of Isaac—as the central mystery of their covenant faith. In modern 
times, others have identified this same story as exemplifying the dangerous religious 
roots of violence and fanaticism. As we will see, theological interpretation of both Mount 
Zion and the sacrificial rites of the temple are intimately tied up with this debate over the 
nature of Abraham’s greatest test. The theological coherence of Yom Kippur, and 
similarly of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross, rises or falls with the coherence of 
Abraham’s response to YHWH as recorded in Genesis 22.56  
                                                 
56 While I will refer to “Genesis 22” throughout this section, my focus will be on the first nineteen verses, 
the narrative of the binding of Isaac and the subsequent blessings, and not vv. 20-24, which gives the 
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 At Genesis 22:2, God issues that famous command: “Take your son, your favored 
one, Isaac, whom you love, and go to the land of Moriah, and offer him there as a burnt 
offering [ה ָָׁ֔לֹעְל, root: ‘olah] on one of the heights that I will point out to you” (NJPS). The 
question that invariably presses on commentators today is, how should Abraham have 
responded? The traditional response for Jews and Christians has been to see Abraham’s 
“readiness” as exemplary of covenantal obedience and faithfulness. With Immanuel Kant, 
however, new questions were raised:  
Even though something is represented as commanded by God, through a direct 
manifestation of Him, yet, if it flatly contradicts morality, it cannot, despite all 
appearances, be of God (for example, were a father ordered to kill his son [Sohn 
töten], who is so far as he knew, perfectly innocent [ganz unschuldigen]).57 
 
The principle that this passage articulates is brilliant in its moral clarity and theological 
wisdom. After all, only the most doctrinaire voluntarist would suggest that God could 
command a moral evil, and that it would be right to do evil if a higher power commanded 
it. Kant seems to merely reproduce, in a philosophical idiom, the fundamental truth 
proclaimed by John: “This is the message we have heard from him and proclaim to you, 
that God is light and in him there is no darkness at all” (1 John 1:5). At first sight, then, it 
seems that Kant has completely undermined the moral integrity of both the (alleged) 
divine tester and the (alarmingly) obedient Abraham in this foundational narrative.  
Yet, the situation with respect to Genesis 22 may not be as “open and shut” as 
Kant suggests. First, we should immediately point out that while the German Bible—in 
translating the Hebrew wĕhaʿălēhû šām lĕʿōlâ—has “opfere ihn daselbst zum 
                                                 
genealogy of Rebekah, who will become Isaac’s wife.  
57 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 81–82. That Kant has 
Abraham in mind in  making this argument is even more explicit in a later book, The Conflict of the 
Faculties; see R. W. L. Moberly, The Theology of the Book of Genesis (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 181–82.   
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Brandopfer,” Kant has conceived the key word of this command more generally as a 
demand “to kill, töten.” Second, Kant emphasizes that the son in question is “completely 
innocent, ganz unschuldigen”—in other words, morally spotless—suggesting that the 
killing would at least be more justifiable if the son were not so pure. The relevance of 
these observations should become clear in what follows, but for now we can simply flag 
the questions: are “to offer” and “to kill” simple synonyms? And within the biblical 
mindset, how does the innocence of the son relate to God’s command?  
 I mentioned that, with Kant, “new” questions are raised in relation to Genesis 22. 
This is only partially true. As far back as the first century, and probably earlier still, this 
story was the subject of polemics. Philo, for example, angrily denounced Abraham’s 
“quarrelsome critics.”58 Early Jewish apologists were aware of the need to argue in 
defense of their patriarch. But anxieties over Abrahams’s actions have certainly 
intensified since the Enlightenment. After Kant, we are not surprised to find modern 
authors who allege that any god who would issue such a command is in fact Satan,59 and 
who classify the man who would follow through with the act a “sacred monster.”60 If the 
moment of Abraham’s greatest theological triumph—according to the mainstream 
tradition—is now despised by modern thinkers as a moment of violence, fundamentalism, 
and irrationality, are the Abrahamic faiths—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—
permanently undermined? 
 Kant’s approach, of course, is to contrast an unalterable ethical maxim with a 
                                                 
58 See Edward Kessler, Bound by the Bible: Jews, Christians and the Sacrifice of Isaac (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 38. 
59 See, for example, Moberly’s review of the work of feminist theologian Bobbie Groth in R. W. L. 
Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith: A Study of Abraham and Jesus (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 168–69.  
60 Richard Holloway quoted by Moberly, The Theology of the Book of Genesis, 182. 
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historically contingent narrative or event, thus severely undercutting the account in 
Genesis. Unless the biblical interpreter is willing to retreat into theological voluntarism in 
an effort to salvage the legitimacy of God’s command and Abraham’s obedience—and 
even here Kant offers a solid retort, virtually echoing the warning of St. Paul that “Even 
Satan disguises himself as an angel of light” (2 Cor. 11:14; cf. Gal. 1:8) to say that the 
ethical maxim is unambiguous while the legitimacy of a supposed divine “apparition” is 
much less clear61—it seems that the narrative must be dismissed as a relic of ancient 
savagery. But as I’ve already begun to suggest, despite all his moral certitude, Kant 
obviously has little interest in, or time for, the theological or narrative context of this 
story within the Abraham cycle, the book of Genesis, the Hebrew scriptural canon, or 
ancient Jewish thought generally.  
 A careful reading of Genesis 22 indicates that—whether or not the narrative can 
ultimately be received as morally acceptable—something far more subtle and interesting 
is occurring in the text than a cruel test of loyalty. Walter Moberly, a scholar of the 
Hebrew Bible who has defended and developed the theological interpretation of 
scriptural texts, has argued that the proper interpretation of Genesis 22 demands 
contextualization of the story that pays close attention to the use of certain theology-rich 
terms: interpretation must be attentive to the meaning of these words in their historical 
and canonical context.62 Following this method generally, I will focus on five key words 
in the Hebrew text that at least complicate the dismissive reading that is common today, 
                                                 
61 Kant quoted in Ibid. 
62 Moberly describes and justifies his method of “contextualization of the story within the Old Testament” 
in The Bible, Theology, and Faith, 75. The four key words that he chooses are in the context of his study 
relating these central Old Testament themes with Matthew’s account of Jesus (especially focusing on the 
“great commission” at Matt. 28:16-20). Thus, the terms Moberly emphasizes are: “test”(nissah), “fear of 
God” (yere’ ’elohim), “provide/see” (ra’ah), and “bless” (barek). With one exception, my focus will be 
on a different set of words.  
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and that will also suggest that the story is most illuminating when read in in the context 
of temple theology.63 
The First Word: Abraham/hinneni  
In establishing the drama that will be recounted in this pivotal Genesis chapter, 
the first verse opens with a two-word dialogue that immediately captures the reader’s 
attention with its beauty, simplicity, and profundity: God (Elohim) says “ם ָ֖ ָׁה ָׁרְבַא, 
Abraham,” Abraham responds, “יִנ ֵּֽ  נִה, hinneni, here I am.” The whole theology of the 
Akedah has already been communicated in this two-word dialogue—and, actually, no 
dialogue could better capture the mature theology of Sinai and Zion. This is the entire 
mystery of Israel in embryonic form: the joy and the sorrow of the one called and the one 
                                                 
63 The question of the original historical context for this narrative is incredibly difficult to determine, and it 
seems at this point that there is no consensus. It is typically said that the historical-critical consensus is 
for an Elohist origin, which would suggest that the earliest setting for the narrative preserved in Genesis 
22 is the Northern Kingdom, but many today question whether E, as a separate source, even existed, or 
whether this “document” is a modern scholarly construction (see, for example, David M. Carr, “No 
Return to Wellhausen,” Biblica 86, no. 1 (2005): 107–14.) From the advent of source criticism, even 
those who assigned this text to E recognized a variety of additions and redactions, weaving in material 
from J and revising the document in a number of places. Assertions on what is original and what is 
redaction are rooted in presuppositions concerning the texts earliest form; Levenson points out, “the 
efforts by adherents of the [Elohist] consensus to excise YHWHistic features are circular at best…”  Jon 
D. Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son: The Transformation of Child Sacrifice in 
Judaism and Christianity (New Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 122; cf. John van Seters, 
Abraham in History and Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 229–231, 239–240.  
  A review of all the different theories on date, province, authorship, and redaction history of this text 
would be a massive undertaking that would not ultimately get us very far; a literature review of some of 
the most recent theories can be found in Janice Ann Curcio, “Genesis 22 and the Socio-Religious 
Reforms of Ezra and Nehemiah” (Diss., Brunel University, 2010), esp. 33 ff.. Whatever the prehistory of 
the text may be, there is good reason to believe that in its current and final form the text, intentionally or 
not, promotes and strengthens priestly concerns—this point will hopefully be substantiated in what 
follows. Curcio performs a redaction critical analysis to argue that Ezra gives the story of the binding of 
Isaac its final form in the Persian Period to draw the exile community together around the re-emerging 
temple. Curcio, “Genesis 22.” Whether or not this thesis wins wider support in the future, the research of 
Levenson, Anderson, Moberly, and many others—which itself revives and bolsters the ancient rabbinic 
insight that the sacrifice narrative is an etiology for the Jerusalem temple and the sacrificial cult—is 
persuasive. For elaboration on the priestly elements in Genesis 22, and an argument for the fact that this 
text is redactional, drawing together a number of biblical traditions, see Konrad Schmid, “Die Rückgabe  
Der Verheißungsgabe: Der ‘heilsgeschichtliche’ Sinn von Genesis 22 Im Horizont Innerbiblischer  
Exegese,” in Gott Und Mensch Im Dialog: Festschrift O. Kaiser, ed. M. Witte (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), 
271–300. 
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learning to say hinneni. In a short essay on Christian ethics, Balthasar reflects on 
Abraham as a “moral subject” and says that he “is constituted by the call of God and by 
obedience to this call (Heb 11:8).”64 These two themes, call and obedience, are expressed 
with outstanding clarity in this opening exchange. 
It starts, therefore, with the profound reality of a God who speaks, and more 
remarkable still, the God who addresses this man by name—not just any name, but the 
name that God himself gave specifically and personally to the chosen one: ‘av hamon, 
Ab-ra-ham, “Father of Many” (Genesis 17:5). This is important. The first word of the 
unfolding drama immediately recapitulates and reaffirms everything that came before in 
the Abraham cycle by the simple confirmation of a name—not a nominalistic name, but a 
vocational name, and equally, a promissory name. Simply by saying the name, God says 
also to this God-fearing man, “Do not be afraid.” Perhaps this helps us to understand the 
surprising peace and confidence that pervades the drama of Genesis 22; Father-of-Many 
knows who he is, and who he is becoming by grace. He knows that his name is a vocation 
and an obligation, and thus he is ready to listen to his Lord’s command.  
But it seems also that, in speaking this name, God is not merely recognizing 
Abraham; he is opening a space for Abraham’s own response. God makes room for 
genuine dialogue and real action, for humanity’s participation in the unfolding drama.65 
                                                 
64 cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics,” in Principles of Christian Morality, 
ed. Heinz Schurmann, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, and Hans Urs von Balthasar (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1986), 89. 
65 This differs from Gordon Wenham’s reflections on the verse: “the narrative could simply begin 
‘Abraham, please take...’ (cf. [Gen] 12:1, 15:1, 16:8, 17:2). Yet this prolongation is suggestive. Is God 
hesitating before giving his awful order? The text does not say so, but the break in the address raises such 
questions.” Gordon Wenham, Word Biblical Commentary Vol. 2, Genesis 16-50 (Dallas, Tex.: Thomas 
Nelson, 1994), 104. In contrast, Balthasar says, “All biblical ethics is based on the call of the personal 
God and man’s believing response.” Balthasar, “Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics,” 89. 
Understanding this “prolongation” as a reflection of God’s making room for Abraham’s participatory 
response—rather than the hesitation of a god who is preparing himself to make a unethical request—
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Just as much as there is a hidden reassurance in this opening address, there is also a 
hidden question: are you with me still? Do I still have a partner in the saving work I have 
begun? As Balthasar insists, true drama fully engages the actor’s freedom,66 and so God 
asks the aged Abraham, his covenantal partner, if he is ready for one more adventure, if 
he is willing to set out again.67 All at once, therefore, God announces his presence, 
recognizes his chosen one by name, reinforces Abraham’s unique vocation, and invites a 
response.  
In responding to this personal call, Abraham inevitably expresses himself: there is 
a (so to speak) condensation whereby Abraham communicates his being in language. 
There are countless words that he might have used. He chose one: hinneni. The usual 
English translation is “Here I am,”68 but others have preferred “yes”69 or “ready.”70 Jon 
Levenson says, “There is no good English equivalent for the [Hebrew] ‘hineni’…The 
term indicates readiness, attentiveness, receptivity, and responsiveness to instructions.”71 
                                                 
seems more appropriate to biblical theology generally.  
66 This is the main argument of Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: The 
Dramatis Personae: Man in God, Vol. 2 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), esp. 171 ff. 
67 For the echo created between Genesis 12:1 and Genesis 22:2 by the use of the term “lek-lĕkā, go forth,” 
see Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 127; Nahum M. Sarna, Genesis: The 
Traditional Hebrew Text With the New Jps Translation (Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 150. Gordon 
Wenham sees a chiastic structure in the Genesis Abraham cycle, where Genesis 12 and Genesis 22—
Abraham’s first and final encounters with God—are parallel. “In the present text we have a ﬁtting ﬁnale 
to the promises made to Abraham.” “The Akedah: A Paradigm of Sacrifice,” Pomegranates and Golden 
Bells: Studies in Biblical, Jewish, and Near Eastern Ritual, Law, and Literature in Honor of Jacob 
Milgrom, 1995, 98–99. 
68 NJPS, NRSV, NIV, KJB, ESV, etc. 
69 Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 18-50 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1995), 97. 
70 E. A. Speiser, Genesis: Introduction, Translation, and Notes, 1st edition (Garden City: Anchor Bible, 
1964), 162. 
71 Jon Levenson, “Genesis Introduction and Annotations,” in The Jewish Study Bible. Tanakh (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 45. The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old 
Testament similarly says that hinneh “in response to a call, indicates the readiness of the person 
addressed to listen or obey,” quoted in Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 97. Or again, “It is close to 
saying, ‘I am willing to execute everything I am about to hear.’ This is a ‘confession of readiness.’” 
Mishael Caspi and John T. Greene, “Prolegemenon,” in Unbinding the Binding of Isaac (University Press 
of America, 2007), xiii. Nahum M. Sarna agrees: “hinneni expresses an attitude of attentiveness and 
receptivity. It is the only word Abraham utters to God in the entire episode.” Sarna, Genesis, 151. 
51 
 
Certainly the idea of obedience is in play here, and for many commentators, therefore, 
hinneni casts a shadow over the entire episode—indeed, over the entire biblical tradition. 
Modern thought generally, and modern theology specifically, is extremely sensitive on 
this point: the need to protect individual autonomy is paramount.72 Any force or figure 
external to one’s own conscience that would claim authority or demand obedience is 
immediately framed in terms of power struggles and vulnerability to abuse. If traditional 
Judaism and Christianity have exalted hinneni as the very perfection of creaturely 
being,73 many post-Enlightenment thinkers consider the promotion of passivity and 
obedience to be religion’s original sin.  
Abraham’s hinneni, in other words, is radical and divisive. It certainly does not 
help—from the perspective of those who might want to defend biblical hinneni / fiat 
anthropology—that the “test” that immediately follows Abraham’s declaration of 
readiness is the command to offer his beloved son. That Abraham appears to move 
forward without hesitation reinforces the awful dangers lurking in this word. While a 
                                                 
72 Cyril O’Regan points out that a critique of traditional Christian anthropology is fundamental to 
modernity’s counter-narrative. He says that, from the perspective of the Enlightenment, “…Christian 
forms of life are shown to be pathological in that they represent attacks on human integrity, autonomy, 
and legitimate self-regard.” O’Regan, Anatomy of Misremembering, 2014, 7. For O’Regan, Balthasar is 
engaged in a symphonic “remembering” of Christianity’s pre-modern beliefs, practices, and forms of life, 
which requires him to challenge the unquestioned supremacy of human autonomy in figures such as 
Hegel (Ibid., 193–94.) and Moltmann (Ibid., 342–43). The conflict between these different 
anthropologies is carried out also in biblical commentaries; Moberly reviews the work of some modern 
Jewish biblical interpreters who contrast Abraham’s “ethically engaged” boldness in challenging God on 
the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen 18:16-33) with the “submissive” Abraham of Genesis 22, 
who prefers “devotion to ethics”: Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith, 155. As Moberly points out, 
when the issue is cast in these terms, the “questioning” Abraham is often seen as the true father of 
(modern) faith.   
73 In Christianity, this same concept is more often discussed under the term fiat; Mary’s fiat (“let it be 
done”) should be read as a recapitulation and perfection of Abraham’s hinneni. The word used to 
translate the Hebrew in LXX is ἰδοὺ, which is also the first word of Mary’s response to the angel in 
Greek in Luke 1:38, “εἶπεν δὲ Μαριάμ Ἰδού…, Mary said, ‘Behold…’” Joel Green has shown the many 
parallels between the opening chapters of Luke and the Abraham cycle, Joel B. Green, The Gospel of 
Luke (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1997), 52 ff. Green also, notably, translates Mary’s Ἰδού as “Here 
am I.” Ibid., 82. 
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comprehensive reflection on this problem is impossible here, something more must be 
said about hinneni because, in fact, the entire temple cult hangs on the strength or 
weakness of this idea.  Can Abraham’s “readiness, attentiveness, receptivity, and 
responsiveness” before God be defended? 
Just as Balthasar’s unparalleled reflection on the theological concept of glory 
assisted us in the last section, so also his work on vocation, obedience, and freedom is 
highly relevant here. In the second volume of his Theo-Drama, Balthasar has a lot to say 
about the relationship between the “two poles” of finite freedom: (1) autonomy of 
movement (autexousion) and (2) freedom of consent (that is, consent to the Good). 
Philosophers have staked out diverse positions between these two poles for millennia—as 
Przywara showed so brilliantly in his own research on creaturely polarities—and this 
philosophical debate has shown itself to be interminable. The loud and stormy 
philosophical arguments about “freedom” are only interrupted by the words “Go forth 
from your native land...” (Gen. 12:1). Another freedom has communicated itself, and so 
our reflection must now grapple not only with the creaturely poles, but also with that 
Freedom that is wholly beyond what finitude conceives: infinite freedom, freedom in no 
way contingent or restricted. Balthasar says,  
Once the residual philosophical problem has been overcome by the self-disclosure 
of infinite freedom, we begin to see that finite freedom, as autexousion [self-
determination], as consent to oneself in the freedom of self-possession, is by no 
means alienated but rather inwardly fulfilled by consenting to that Being-in-its-
totality which has now unveiled itself as that which freely grounds all things, as 
that which, in infinite freedom, creates finite freedom.74 
 
The two poles of our finite freedom are suspended in the always-greater-difference of 
infinite freedom, but this suspension does not rob us of freedom (it is not the suspension 
                                                 
74 Balthasar, TD2, 1990, 242. 
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of a marionette), but opens up the possibility that we might be free indeed.  
Each of the creaturely extremes, left to themselves, become corrupt: on the one 
hand, the emphasis on autonomy inclines toward the illusion that the hubristic, titanic 
striving of the individual will can achieve self-fulfillment through power, or wealth, or 
honors, or earthly pleasures. This catalyzes a cycle of desire that, in attempting to 
augment the self to achieve self-fulfillment, paradoxically diminishes the human soul. As 
Balthasar says, this trajectory leads to the twisted mindset that “everything—including 
God—would be a means (uti) enabling finite freedom to enjoy its own self (frui),”75 and 
thus, finite freedom becomes increasingly enslaved to finitude76 such that, over time, 
“freedom” becomes smaller and smaller until it virtually disappears. On the other hand, 
the freedom of consenting to the Good, insofar as “the Good” is identified as an 
otherworldly ideal—an escape from the quotidian into pure contemplation, a rapture from 
the self, an abandon into One or Nothing—itself does violence to genuine freedom 
insofar as the person and the personal melts away. This is a form of despair, finitude’s 
forlorn self-mutilation, and such violence can hardly represent true freedom. In either 
case, the machinations of finite freedom to establish and protect itself result in its own 
diminishment.  
For Balthasar, with the revelation of infinite freedom—“Now the LORD said to 
Abram, ‘Go…’” (Gen. 12:1)—the hopeless philosophical polarities are brought into a 
new, liberating suspension. The freedom of autonomy is discovered to be a participation 
in infinite freedom, and the freedom of consent—now not just to a philosophical good 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 228. 
76 As Balthasar says, from this perspective, even “God” becomes an object of one’s grasping; this “God” is 
therefore necessarily a god insofar as it is instrumentalized, it becomes a finite object fitted to the 
perceived needs of the finite soul. 
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(which ultimately remained a creaturely ideal), but the Good who calls by name—is 
made personal: each pole is shown to be ordered toward the other, both poles together are 
shown to be ordered toward personal communion. True autonomy is true consent to 
personal relationship with God and neighbor. With the calling of Abraham, one already 
hears the whisper of creation’s most profound truth: freedom is love and love is freedom.  
 The human being is not “grounded” in either herself—as if the center of her being 
were immanently present—nor in a transcendent ideal—as if she has a timeless and 
changeless identity that simply requires her to strip away everything finite and 
impermanent. Related to this discovery of final ontological groundlessness is the 
discovery that there is an indelible openness to our being, a phenomenon associated with 
the phrase “created spirit.” In other words, there is a real fragility to the human condition, 
we are not armored souls; we are most distinguished by the shocking degree of our 
natural openness. David Bentley Hart has expressed this reality with unequaled clarity in 
The Beauty of the Infinite. He shows that, despite the polemic that would condemn St. 
Augustine with the sin of inventing the modern “man,” the ego, the puncticular 
individual, what Augustine actually discovers in the Confessions is something entirely 
different: “The interiority that opens up in the Confessions possesses no center in 
itself…,” it is, rather, “an open space filled with more music than it can contain, 
constantly ‘decentering’ itself, transcending itself not toward an idea it grasps or simply 
‘resembles,’ but toward an infinite it longs for despite its incapacity to contain the 
infinite…”77 This perspective, essential to the father of Western theology, is mirrored in 
the work of St. Gregory of Nyssa, as Hart says:  
The Christian understanding of the soul is, of necessity, dynamic, multifarious, 
                                                 
77 Hart, Beauty of the Infinite, 114. 
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contradictory; no one more profoundly expressed this dynamism than Gregory of 
Nyssa, for whom the soul could be understood only as an ὲπέκτασις, an always 
outstretched, open, and changing motion, an infinite exodus from nothingness into 
God’s inexhaustible transcendence…78 
 
This vision of profound openness should not give the impression of eternally, hopelessly 
chasing after an always-retreating God,79 but rather it underlines the positive nature of 
our impermanence and our eros: this basic dynamism is the condition of the possibility of 
eternal growth in love. We are finite, but nevertheless finite spirit, and thus—according 
to this anthropology—our beatitude is to love with ever greater depth and delight, a 
genuine fullness that never ceases flowing over.80 
This is because—and here we come again to the central point—the “possession” 
of relational joy never closes its fist on the object, but always remains open by handing 
itself over, freely returning itself to the beloved. The joy of love involves giving love 
away, and thus the soul rich in beatitude practices poverty in spirit. It is this mode of life 
alone that corresponds to what human beings truly are, persons suspended in God, made 
to mirror God’s self-giving way of being. And thus every form of idolatry is resisted with 
the greatest possible force precisely because such practices kill the human spirit through 
suffocation. It is not as if the open, self-giving, kenotic way of life is simply more 
fulfilling, it is not as if the sense of being suspended—not grabbing one pole or the other 
in a bid for grounding and permanence in created being, but realizing the freedom of 
being suspended in God—it is not as if this sense simply has more utilitarian value, all 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 114–15.  
79 As Hart himself clarified, Ibid., 205, and as Henri de Lubac cautions, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 
trans. Rosemary Sheed (Crossroad Pub., 1998), 200–206.  
80 For analysis of Balthasar’s own endorsement of Gregory of Nyssa’s epektasis, and the corresponding 
anthropology which describes “the human subject as constitutively erotic and ecstatic,” see O’Regan, 
Anatomy of Misremembering, 2014, 141–45. 
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things considered. Rather, this is the only way of being that reflects the truth of who we 
are as creatures that have their being and freedom only and always through participation 
in Divine Being, through participation in infinite freedom, and therefore, obedience to 
this way of existence is a matter of life or death for the created spirit. In opposition to the 
shrunken lives that generally characterize the human condition, the “mansions” that dwell 
in the Father’s house are the great souls, open and free. 
What we can conclude, then, is that human freedom is fully autonomous at the 
moment in which it enters communion with infinite freedom, when finite freedom comes 
to resonate with infinite freedom in love. At this moment the created soul has achieved 
perfect authenticity insofar as it is obedient to its own great mission to “become…what 
you are”81—where “what you are” is precisely openness to “becoming” as the created 
spirit allows herself or himself to be open to an always-greater freedom that calls her 
forward. Insofar as this call to magnanimous living reflects the basic structure of created 
existence in its integrity, it is the very image of peace. There is no violence to this reality, 
even though it may require real ascetical effort, powered by grace, to strengthen and train 
the heart to love.  
When God speaks, Abraham says hinneni. Admittedly, the theology of freedom 
that we have briefly summarized in this section, with the assistance of Balthasar and Hart, 
may have a Catholic and Orthodox Sitz im Leben: meditation on the two wills of Christ in 
Maximus the Confessor’s post-Chalcedonian theology has been a major impetus for this 
understanding of human being in Christian thought. At the same time, in the opening 
dialogue of Genesis 22, the basic shape of a theology of freedom and vocation is already 
                                                 
81 Cf. Przywara, Analogia Entis, 2013, 124. 
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revealed.82 These ideas are not marginal in Jewish thought, as Jon Levenson has shown in 
his introduction to the theology of Sinai, that is, the theology of covenant. Levenson says, 
“The ancient Near Eastern covenant was not an impersonal code, but an instrument of 
diplomacy founded upon the personal relationship of the heads of state. The essence of 
the covenant lies in the fact that the latter pledge to be faithful to one another.”83 The 
covenant between God and Abraham, like the covenant sealed at Sinai, would certainly 
be analogous to a “suzerainty treaty”—a covenant between unequal parties—but the 
whole idea is nevertheless rooted in the importance of personal response to the suzerain’s 
voice. The notion of obedience to law or command, therefore, was not the impersonal 
“rule of law” characteristic of the modern sovereign state, but rather it is the call and 
response of persons in communion: “At the heart of Israel’s relationship with YHWH lay a 
dialogue of love.”84  
                                                 
82 Balthasar claims that the old covenant establishes a pattern of relation between infinite and finite 
freedom, but it nevertheless remains inadequate: “This confronts us with the problem which Old 
Testament theology cannot solve. Here genuine infinite freedom and genuine finite freedom are joined in 
a covenant, but, in the form in which it is made, this Covenant cannot attain fulfillment; it can only point 
toward it…. in biblical terms, it was necessary for the Spirit of God to be implanted in the hearts of the 
Covenant partners (Jer 31:31), and this, for the present, remained but a promise. Therefore the Sinai 
Covenant itself must undergo mediation so that ultimate immediacy can be attained: and this takes place 
precisely through the christological paradox, according to which, without confusing the freedoms 
(asunchutōs, in the Chalcedonian expression), infinite freedom indwells finite freedom, and so the finite 
is perfected in the infinite, without the infinite losing itself in the finite or the finite in the infinite.” 
Balthasar, TD2, 1990, 201. The fullness of deification—partaking of the tree of life—requires a 
perfection that can only be achieved by the concrete analogia entis, the one who is the personal 
realization of finite and infinite freedom without confusion and without division. But, from the 
perspective of temple theology as I am developing it in this chapter and in this book, I am convinced that 
we can re-frame the more negative assessment of the Old Testament in this particular quote. A 
magnifying glass can be used to study insects or scorch them to death, and Christocentrism can be 
similarly double-sided. It can be used to depreciate the “yes” of Abraham and other Old Testament 
saints—including the “yes” of Mary—or it can magnify the goodness and glory of Israel which, by grace, 
establishes the pattern that Jesus uniquely fulfills. The latter approach seems to me most promising.  
83 Jon D. Levenson, Sinai and Zion: An Entry into the Jewish Bible (HarperOne, 1987), 28. 
84 Ibid., 75. Levenson reflects further on the problem of obedience and freedom in terms of the “dialectic of 
covenantal theonomy,” a dialectic between autonomy and heteronomy. In her covenantal relationship 
with YHWH, Israel is shown to be both autonomous and heteronomous, and these stances are not in 
opposition to each other but “dialectically” related. In the Bible, God embarks on a “courtship” to woo 
Israel’s free obedience. Levenson explains, “Because his commandments are grounded in the history of 
redemption, they are not the imposition of an alien force, but rather the revelation of a familiar, 
58 
 
According to the narrative beginning in Genesis 12, by the time Abraham says 
hinneni ten chapters later, trust and mutual faithfulness have been solidly established. 
Abraham may be obedient, but there is no reason to call his obedience blind. Abraham is 
responding to something he has seen, something he has experienced powerfully in his 
own history. He is responding to a God who has proved faithful again and again, beyond 
his and Sarah’s greatest expectations. The sights and sounds of his household, no doubt, 
were entirely upended by the coming of his son—a child born to a woman who was long 
past menopause, an heir born to a couple who suffered decades of infertility. Can there be 
any doubt that Abraham had pondered this mystery in his heart day and night for many 
years? His own name was a permanent reminder of his incredible vocation, one that had 
come to him by God’s grace alone, and realized through his obedience. At this point in 
his life, Abraham’s whole field of vision has been completely, astonishingly filled with 
living icons of God’s faithfulness and goodness. And this God calls him by name, Father-
of-Many. To say that Abraham’s hinneni—again, a word that communicates readiness, 
attentiveness, receptivity, and responsiveness—is blind or unthinking, especially at this 
point in the narrative, is itself an unperceptive or unreflective reading of the story. 
Therefore, when God calls, Abraham responds. The harmony of infinite and finite 
freedom communicated in this two-word narrative is analogous not to the violent external 
obedience of master and slave, but to the intimate and trusting obedience of dance 
partners. What is exceptional about Abraham is how naturally and easily this old man 
moves in the world; he exemplifies fluidity of movement. Experienced dance partners do 
                                                 
benevolent, and loving God, and the ethic is not one of pure heteronomy.” Jon Levenson, Creation and 
the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence (Princeton University Press, 1988), 
144. 
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not struggle against one another, but they respond to even a slight shift, they get lost in 
their shared gaze, they feel each other’s rhythm, they anticipate one another, they seem 
even to breath together, spontaneously and freely. This is obedience according to the 
word’s etymology: the Latin word obedientia comes from ob-audire, which suggests an 
intensified hearing or listening. Dancers listen to the music in and through their partner, 
and in their bodies they act out a drama that unifies without violence. Abraham has 
learned to dance, and therefore he is fully engaged and truly alive.  
All of this comes even before the command is made, but as I’ve said, the entire 
theology of the Akedah has been expressed proleptically in two words—or, rather, in a 
single word, because these two words are really one: the (objective) identity given by 
God to Abraham, Father-of-Many, is (subjectively) expressed in his identity Hinneni, 
Ready-Receptive-Obedient. In Israel, true patriarchy—if I may use the word—is 
receptive-readiness to fulfill one’s vocation. In the divine economy, to be a spiritual 
father or mother is to be free of idolatry and responsive to divine movement. This is the 
humility necessary to be great. For all the world, greatness comes from seizing, grasping, 
claiming, conquering. Veni, vidi, vici! Abraham already, at the outset, is aware of the fact 
that his greatness is nothing like worldly greatness, his fatherhood has nothing to do with 
his virility, but that his whole identity and his entire hope is a gift. Abraham is already 
called Father-of-Many because Abraham has learned to let go and really listen. Balthasar 
asked, “What is a person without a life-form…?” Hinneni is Abraham’s life form, and 
through this form, splendor shines. 
The Second Word: ‘aheb 
I have spent an extra amount of time on the word Abraham/hinneni due to the 
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conviction that the entire narrative of Genesis 22, and consequentially the whole drama of 
Mount Zion, is here expressed in embryonic form. This foundation will shape the 
interpretation of the other key words. The next verse, which brings us finally to God’s 
astonishing, dreadful command, contains three of these words: “And he said, ‘Take your 
son, your favored one, whom you love (ַָָּׁ֙֙תְב ַַ֙ה ָׁא), Isaac, and go forth to the land of Moriah 
(הָּ֑ ָׁיִרֹמַה), and offer him there as a burnt-offering (ה ָָׁ֔לֹעְל) on one of the heights that I will 
point out to you.”85 First is the word “love,” the Hebrew word ‘aheb.  
As we saw at the beginning of this section, the Akedah has been at the center of a 
philosophical polemic for centuries, and Kant himself drew a line in the sand when he 
said that, “were a father ordered to kill his son”—even if the order ostensibly came from 
God—the moral agent should refuse. Reading the biblical narrative, the modern 
imagination can hardly avoid being influenced by the frequent depictions, in movies and 
television, of wild-eyed cult leaders, or glassy eyed cult followers, or the grim, legalistic 
severity of so many religious parents as depicted in popular culture. And without a doubt, 
these Hollywood depictions are not wholly without basis; tragically, history bears witness 
to the existence of many “true believers” whose hearts are hardened, who are a danger to 
family and society, and who can be abusive, irrational, inhumane, and cruel. Equally 
tragic is the fact that some people really do suffer from mental illnesses that cause them 
to “hear voices,” and there are those rare and terrible instances when such “voices” drive 
the afflicted person to do terrible things.  
On top of all this, there is also a much older anti-Christian polemic that 
compounds the unease many feel when reading Genesis 22. As O’Regan says, “In a 
                                                 
85 This is the NJPS translation with Levenson’s slight modifications. The Death and Resurrection of the 
Beloved Son, 127. 
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variety of Enlightenment rhetorics and disparate chronicling of deviance, church tradition 
is blamed for obscurantism, authoritarianism, fanaticism, and its ultimate conclusion, that 
is, war.”86 One of the great questions of the day is whether all religious belief is, at its 
root, a kind of violence. And so, when we are confronted by those horrifying news 
reports of parents who “hear a voice” and actually do massacre their children, coupled 
with daily news coverage of holy war declarations and religious justifications for every 
imaginable brutality, the situation seems bleak indeed.  
Against this cultural backdrop, we read of a God who says, “Take your son…,” 
and a father who subsequently “rose early…” For many, the only sensible question to ask 
today is whether Abraham had a mental illness, or whether perhaps he is one of these 
stone-faced “believers” who is more prepared to slit his son’s throat than to question his 
beliefs. There is no getting around the fact that, for most of us, there is something chilling 
and unjustifiable here, and by gilding the story with reflections on infinite and finite 
freedom, along with breezy paeans to obedience, perhaps this will all come across as a 
desperate apologetic for a narrative best left in the iron age. Immanuel Kant’s suggestion 
that the “God” of the Akedah is a false god seems to be the only acceptable conclusion.  
By the same token, it is necessary to again insist on attempting to read the story in 
its own context, allowing it to speak and, perhaps, to surprise. When teaching the story of 
creation in Genesis 1 and 2, theologians regularly insist that these chapters be read with 
attention to genre and historical setting—they point out that the author would not have 
intended for these passages to be approached with the same mindset as we approach, say, 
a modern physics textbook. But then, some of these same teachers will dismiss, or 
                                                 
86 O’Regan, Anatomy of Misremembering, 2014, 12. 
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denounce, the events of Genesis 22, as if it was written to be a handbook for modern 
family ethics, or as if it should be read primarily in a twenty-first century judicial context 
where the phenomenon of “hearing voices” is solid evidence in an insanity defense.  
Attention to the portrait of Abraham presented in the biblical canon simply does 
not support the notion that this person can be understood best in light of modern concerns 
about religious fanaticism or (religiously-informed) criminal insanity. Abraham is 
consistently depicted as a responsible, thoughtful, peaceful man. Consider, for example, 
his generous handling of his conflict with Lot: “Let’s not quarrel… If you go to the left, 
I’ll go to the right; if you go to the right, I’ll go to the left” (Gen. 13:8-9), or the way he 
begs for Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 18:16-33). Abraham has flaws, there is no doubt 
about that, but to paint him as a monster is a real stretch.  
An important element of God’s command at Genesis 22:2 is the way Isaac is 
identified, his name coming only after a series of descriptors: “your son, your favored 
one, whom you love.” Edward Kessler says that for both the rabbis and the early church 
fathers, “the purpose of the drawn-out description of Isaac was to increase Abraham’s 
affection.”87 Abraham’s love of Isaac is called upon, and intensified, as God issues the 
command. In fact, some of the earliest recorded interpretations of the Akedah strongly 
emphasize the strength of Abraham’s love and devotion toward Isaac. For example, 
according to Philo, 
The wife of [Abraham] bore to him in full wedlock his only and dearly cherished 
son, a child of great bodily beauty and excellence of soul. For already he was 
showing a perfection of virtues beyond his years, so that his father, moved not 
merely by a feeling of natural affection but also by such deliberate judgement as a 
censor of character might make, cherished for him a great tenderness.88 
                                                 
87 Kessler, Bound by the Bible, 48; Cf. Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 127–27. 
88 Philo, On Abraham. On Joseph. On Moses., trans. F. H. Colson, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935), 85. 
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Josephus similarly begins his retelling of Genesis 22 by saying, 
Now Isaac was passionately beloved of his father Abraham, being his only son 
and born to him ‘on the threshold of old age’ through the bounty of God. On his 
side, the child called out the affection of his parents and endeared himself to them 
yet more by the practice of every virtue, showing a devoted filial obedience and a 
zeal for the worship of God. Abraham thus reposed all his own happiness on the 
hope of leaving his son unscathed when he departed this life.89 
 
Whereas, as we saw, the perfect innocence of the son compounds the disgust Kant feels 
toward this story, both Philo and Josephus are extremely attentive to not mere innocence, 
but in fact this child’s perfection in virtue. Such virtue only served to increase Abraham’s 
love, even beyond the attachments of natural affection, into an ever more passionate 
adoration. Thus as God calls for “your son, your favored one, your beloved,” waves of 
affection grow and reach their peak with the pronunciation of the name, Isaac—a name 
which itself means Laughter. In identifying this person, God identifies everything that is 
good in Abraham’s earthly life, he singles out the very personification of Abraham’s joy. 
Abraham loves his son. With natural affection—as would any father—and with 
moral affection (according to Philo and Josephus)—as any good person would love an 
exemplar of perfect virtue—Abraham loves his son. But then also there is a certain self-
interested affection insofar as Isaac embodies the entirety of Abraham’s future, as 
Josephus himself recognized when he said that “Abraham thus reposed all his own 
happiness on the hope of leaving his son unscathed when he departed this life.”90 This 
point cannot be emphasized enough: Abraham has nothing else; his entire life, his every 
hope, every one of his precious, promised children—more numerous than the stars of the 
                                                 
89 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, Books I-IV, trans. H. St. J. Thackeray, vol. 4, Loeb Classical Library 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ Press, 1967), 109–11.Ibid. 
90 Josephus, 4:111. 
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sky—all of it is to be found in Isaac and nowhere else. For ancient Jewish readers, the 
death of Isaac would be Abraham’s own eternal death.91 There is no alternative, no “plan 
B.” David Bentley Hart put it especially well: “…all of Israel slumbers in [Isaac’s] loins, 
because he is the child of Sarah’s dotage who cannot be replaced, because he is the whole 
promise and substance of God’s covenant…”92  
We are not at liberty to therefore read this story in isolation, as if it is a thought-
experiment designed for a philosophy class. Rather, it is the story of a man called out of 
obscurity and promised unimagined blessings—land, wealth, status, and most 
importantly, descendants—the story of a family that suffered the agony of infertility for 
nearly an entire lifetime, and a family that continued to endure an excruciating wait after 
the promise had been made, and after covenants were sealed. And then: a child, whose 
name is synonymous with joy, the very embodiment of a lifetime of prayers, a family’s 
single chance at life after death.93 The slender word “love”—’aheb—cannot possibly bear 
the weight of what this father felt toward his boy, but it is the only word we have. And 
                                                 
91 The extent to which Abraham put his hope in Isaac is brought out clearly by Kevin Madigan and Jon 
Levenson, who explain that the ancient Hebrew sense of hope in children goes beyond the “truism” that 
children bring consolation that life goes on. This is still a fairly individualistic way of thinking about 
things, whereas Israel’s perspective was different: “If, in fact, individuals are fundamentally and 
inextricably embedded within their families, then their own death, however terrifying a prospect, may not 
be thought to have the finality that death carries in a culture with a more individualistic, atomistic 
understanding of the self, like the culture of the modern West.” Jon D. Levenson and Kevin J. Madigan, 
Resurrection: The Power of God for Christians and Jews (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 
107. The relative fluidity between individual and family in an ancient culture like Israel’s helps to 
explain how the “self” really does survive for the person rich in children, whereas it does not for the one 
who is childless: “the core of the indestructible self is simply embedded in a larger unit and thus survives 
with that unit, even after the individual subject has irreversibly perished.” Ibid., 116. This accentuates the 
degree to which Abraham’s own identity and future hang in the balance.  
92 Hart, Beauty of the Infinite, 351. Moberly is also very good on this point; see Moberly, The Bible, 
Theology, and Faith, 130–31. This point was earlier emphasized by von Rad, who argued that the 
combination of Genesis 21 (the loss of Ishmael) and Genesis 22 (the offering of Isaac) constitutes 
Abraham’s “road out into Godforsakenness.”  cf. Konrad Schmid, “Abraham’s Sacrifice: Gerhard von 
Rad’s Interpretation of Genesis 22,” Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology 62, no. 3 (July 1, 
2008): 270–71. 
93 This is not to ignore the person of Ishmael, but of course at this point in the Genesis narrative the son of 
Hagar is long gone.  
65 
 
then God breaks in again with the familiar command, “go forth.” The first time Abraham 
heard these words, he was told to “go forth from,” leaving behind everything he knew, on 
the strength of a promise. Now, at the end of his life, Abraham is instructed to “go forth 
to,” to set his eyes on the mountains, and to bring with him the promised one, to be 
offered back in sacrifice. Abraham’s love must now pass through a purifying fire.  
The Third Word: Moriah 
 Returning to the key verse in which God gives the command, it says, “Take your 
son…and go forth to the land of Moriah (הָּ֑ ָׁיִרֹמַה)…” We have already emphasized the 
importance of sacred geography in biblical theology, and now as we arrive at the defining 
moment of Abraham’s life, we are told of a specific destination. Various etymologies 
have been offered for the word Moriah, but one popular option is to understand this name 
as foreshadowing the title that Abraham gives to the site, “YHWH-yireh, the Lord will see” 
(22:14). The Hebrew verb ra’ah (ה ָׁא ָׁר), see or provide, is used repeatedly throughout the 
chapter, and therefore it is at least plausible that the name Moriah already alludes to the 
vision, and provision, that is so crucially important to understanding the story.94  
 As important as the earliest etymology of the word may be, what is most relevant 
to us from the perspective of theological development is the canonical history of 
“Moriah.” The word is used on only one other occasion, by the priestly author of 
                                                 
94 For the notion that “Moriah” anticipates Abraham’s vision, see Wenham, Word Biblical Commentary 
Vol. 2, Genesis 16-50, 104–5; Sarna, Genesis, 391. Moberly also sees the verb ra’ah in Moriah, but he 
points out that the missing ’aleph in Moriah is a possible problem; The Bible, Theology, and Faith, 111–
12. See also Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 115; Kessler, Bound by the 
Bible, 87–88.  
  Commentators also link the word Moriah to the word yere’, the word for fear or awe, which would 
also have intratextual resonance as a link to verse 12, “…now I know that you fear God.” Sarna, Genesis, 
391; Bradley Beach and Matthew Powell, Interpreting Abraham: Journeys to Moriah (Augsburg Books, 
2014), 40–41; van Seters, Abraham in History and Tradition, 238. More recent attempts at finding an 
etymology are reviewed by Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 103. 
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Chronicles, and he uses it almost in passing—no special attention is drawn to the word—
but this should not blind us to the brilliant theological connections that the chronicler is 
making. The author says, “Then Solomon began to build the House of the Lord in 
Jerusalem on Mount Moriah (ה ָָׁ֔יִרוֹ ּ֣מַהָּ֙ ַ֙רַהְב), where [the LORD] had appeared (ה ָ֖ ָׁאְרִנ) to his 
father David, at the place which David had designated, at the threshing floor of Ornan the 
Jebusite” (2 Chronicles 3:1, NJPS). Notice that here again there is a theophanic emphasis 
on God’s appearing, ra’ah, but this time with reference to his appearance to King David 
as described at 1 Chronicles 21. In that chapter, David decides to order a census, which 
was understood to be a grave sin (perhaps because it suggests the idea that the king was 
putting faith in numbers, rather than in God alone). As punishment, the nation falls under 
a pestilence that kills many, and an angel of destruction approaches Jerusalem, the new 
royal city. One imagines the angel raising his sword, about to strike, when there is an 
interruption: “God sent an angel to Jerusalem to destroy it, but as he was about to wreak 
destruction, the LORD saw (ַָּ֙֙ה ָׁוהְיָּ֙ה ָ֤ ָׁא ָׁר) and renounced further punishment and said to the 
destroying angel, ‘Enough! Stay your hand.’ The angel of the Lord was then standing by 
the threshing floor of Ornan the Jebusite” (1 Chron. 21:15). The LORD saw. The angel is 
standing on the threshing floor, ready to strike, when the LORD saw. The LORD saw 
what?! The narrative provides no explanation, suggesting that these two words are 
meaningful in themselves. At Genesis 22:14, as we will discuss below, Abraham names 
the mountain in the land of Moriah ה ָּ֑  אְרִיָּ֙הּ֣ ָׁוהְי, YHWH yir’eh, the place where God will see. 
Many years later, an angel stands ready to crush Jerusalem, and ra’ah YHWH, God sees. 
Knowing that a few chapters later this very site will be explicitly identified by the 
Chronicler as Mount Moriah, it seems reasonable to suggest that God sees the obedience 
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of Abraham and Isaac at this place, he sees their sacrifice, and for Abraham’s sake, God 
saves Jerusalem.95  
The passage continues: “David looked up (וי ָָׁ֗ני  עָּ֙ת  אָּ֙די ִִ֜ו ָׁדָּ֙א ָָּׁׂ֨שִיַו) and saw (אְר ַַּ֞יַו) the 
angel of the Lord standing between heaven and earth, with a sword drawn in his hand 
directed against Jerusalem” (1 Chron. 21:16a). Once again there is an emphasis on 
seeing, and here the parallel between Abraham and David is quite explicit. Genesis 22:4 
reports that, after a three day journey, “אְרַּ֥ ַיַוָּ֙ויָ֛ ָׁני  עָּ֙־ת  אָּ֙ם ָ֧ ָׁה ָׁרְבַאָּ֙א ָָּׁׂ֨שִיַו, Abraham looked up and 
saw”—the only difference between this verse and 1 Chr. 21:16 is the use of the name 
Abraham rather than David. In both cases, the men look up—suggesting the height of the 
site—and saw. While Abraham saw the site of his greatest test, David sees an angel 
standing between heaven and earth with a sword raised, but stayed. This sight causes 
David to fall on the ground in repentance. All of this occurred at an elevated threshing 
floor, a place where wheat was processed, separating the grain from the chaff. David, and 
with him the entire city of Jerusalem, will be spared on account of what God saw, but not 
without coming to the threshing floor, a place linking heaven and earth, where the chaff 
will be removed and where the grain will be made ready to become life-giving bread. 
 While we are briefly exploring the theology of Chronicles, it is worth pointing out 
the generous attitude of Ornan himself, who is the owner of the threshing floor. When 
King David tries to buy the site, Ornan immediately offers to give it to him as a gift, 
along with oxen for burnt offerings and the wheat for grain offerings, and ends by saying 
“יִת ֵּֽ ָׁת ָׁנָּ֙ל  ֹכַה, I give it all.” In response to the Jebusite’s generosity, David articulates an 
important principle for sacrificial theology, while explaining why he must pay for the site 
                                                 
95 Cf. Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 180–82. 
68 
 
himself: he says, “No, I will buy them at the full price. I cannot make a present to the 
LORD of what belongs to you, or sacrifice a burnt offering that has cost me nothing” (1 
Chron. 21:24). The importance of the costly “free gift” is fundamental to sacrificial 
theology, and both the former owner and the new owner of the threshing floor exemplify 
this attitude.96 All this is met with divine approval: after David builds an altar, God 
responds “with fire from heaven on the altar of burnt offerings [cf. Lev. 9:24]. The LORD 
ordered the angel to return his sword to its sheath. At that time, when David saw that the 
LORD answered him with fire from heaven at the threshing floor of Ornan the Jebusite, 
then he sacrificed there...” (1 Chr. 21:26-28). The angel returning his sword to its sheath 
certainly refers to the averted punishment, and it probably also alludes to the way 
Abraham’s hand also was stayed on the height in the land of Moriah, but maybe it isn’t 
too much of a stretch to suggest a subtle allusion to the cherubs with their flaming swords 
protecting Eden. What is this mountain that David bought for sixty pieces of silver? 
Without a doubt, the author of Chronicles wants us to imagine that we, with 
David, have returned to an ancient place with profound theological meaning. Given the 
various ways 1 Chronicles 21 seems to echo Genesis 22, the explicit reference to Moriah 
in connection with the threshing floor a few chapters later (2 Chron. 3:1) now seems quite 
natural. This elevated place—the final destination of the tabernacle of Moses after its 
long journey—is founded on the vision and the offering of both Abraham and David, 
patriarch and king, one that links heaven and earth. The covenants of Abraham, Moses, 
                                                 
96 Also significant here is Klawans theory that the prophetic critique of the temple cult is often driven not 
by disgust toward sacrifice itself, but by the phenomenon of the rich stealing from the poor and thus 
offering a sacrifice that has cost them nothing. Jonathan Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple: 
Symbolism and Supersessionism in the Study of Ancient Judaism (Oxford University Press Oxford,, UK, 
2006), 84 ff. 
69 
 
and David, are now brought together at the heart of the new capitol city: from Zion, 
perfect in beauty, God shines forth. Whether or not the author of the Akedah had 
Jerusalem in mind when it was first written, it is a fact that by the time 1 & 2 Chronicles 
were written, a hermeneutic circle had been drawn around Moriah and Zion, such that 
one could not be interpreted without the other.97 Thus, when a second temple Jew heard 
                                                 
97 As we have already indicated in footnote 63 above, there had been a consensus among earlier scholars 
that the Akedah narrative was first preserved by the Elohist, which would have suggested that it 
originated in the Northern Kingdom, and thus the original author would not have been keen to support 
the claims of Jerusalem. From this perspective it might be assumed that “Moriah” refers to a northern 
cult site; see the suggestions in Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith, 113–14. (Since Hermann 
Gunkel, however, it has been more common to see Jeruel as the original site; for a critical review of this 
proposal, Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 115 ff.) From the perspective of the 
earlier consensus, it was regularly suggested that the link between Genesis 22 and Jerusalem came late, 
and some even suggested that the word “Moriah” was added to the Akedah narrative by the Chronicler 
after his history had been written—for examples, see the sources cited by Isaac Kalimi, “The Land of 
Moriah, Mount Moriah, and the Site of Solomon’s Temple in Biblical Historiography,” Harvard 
Theological Review 83, no. 4 (1990): 349, note 12; Leroy Huizenga, “The Akedah in Matthew” (Ph.D. 
diss., Duke University, 2006), 108, footnote 24; Curcio, “Genesis 22,” 41–42.  
  However, as we have seen, the earlier consensus about the early history of Genesis 22 has now 
fallen apart, and no single theory on what is original to the story, or what is redactional, has replaced it. 
Many today argue that the name “Moriah” is original to the Genesis narrative. Some have pointed out 
that, because the word fits so seamlessly in the chapter—see footnote 94 above—the name “Moriah” is 
unlikely to be a late addition to Genesis 22; see Kalimi, “The Land of Moriah,” 349; Wenham, Word 
Biblical Commentary Vol. 2, Genesis 16-50, 104. Levenson’s suggestion—which broadly supports the 
insights of the ancient rabbinic tradition—that the story was in fact intended as a subtle etiology of the 
Temple Mount, has also forced many to reconsider their presuppositions; see Levenson, The Death and 
Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 121–22; Cf. Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith, 109–12. For a 
quite different opinion—that the story was written by a late-exilic “J,” specifically intended to 
“demythologize” the idea of the sacred place entirely—see van Seters, Abraham in History and 
Tradition, 238. By assuming a very different historical setting, van Seters can read the same text and 
reach a conclusion that is effectively the opposite of Levenson’s. For a relevant and sobering critique of 
historical-critical methods of dating and interpreting texts, see Benjamin Sommer, “Dating Pentateuchal 
Texts and the Perils of Pseudo-Historicism,” The Pentateuch: International Perspectives on Current 
Research, 2011, 85–108 esp. 97-100 for a critique of van Seters. 
  Without a consensus on the date, provenance, or redactional history of Genesis 22, it is not possible 
to assertively claim exactly when the “land of Moriah” became associated with the Jerusalem temple, but 
it can at least be said that the scholarly opinion of Isaac Kalimi and others—that the association had 
already been made in the first temple period, only to be reinforced by the Chronicler; Kalimi, “The Land 
of Moriah,” 350, 362—is at least plausible. From this perspective, it is similarly conceivable that early 
temple theology could draw upon Abrahamic traditions, and vice-versa. What is indisputable is that later 
second temple theology, and then post-temple rabbinic theology, took the connection between Abraham, 
Isaac, and Zion as axiomatic. In Jubilees, after following the biblical account of Abraham naming the 
place “the LORD has seen,” the author straightforwardly adds, “It is Mount Zion.” Charlesworth, 
“Jubilees,” chap. 18.13. Similarly, after Josephus says that Abraham set out for the “Morian Mount,” he 
adds that Abraham “proceeded with his son alone to that mount whereon king David afterwards erected 
the temple,” Josephus, Josephus, 4:111–13.  
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the words of Genesis—“Take your son…and go forth to the land of Moriah”—and as she 
contemplated the three day journey that the father and son took, she imagines a 
pilgrimage to Mount Zion, perhaps not unlike the one she herself had made on occasion. 
She is able to interpret her own spiritual journey to “Moriah” in light of Abraham’s 
hinneni-mission, and she is also able to interpret Abraham’s sacrifice in the context of 
then-contemporary temple theology. She believes that the place where Abraham handed 
over what was most precious to him is the place where she makes her own sacrifices, thus 
she can understand that on Mount Moriah she is participating in something that brings all 
the generations of Israelites together in a unified movement of love and trust.  
The Fourth Word: ‘olah 
With the fourth key word, we return one last time to Genesis 22:2—“Take your 
son…and offer him ( ַָּ֙הְוה ֵ֤  לֲעוּ )…as a burnt offering ( ְָּ֙לה ָ֔ לֹע , ‘olah)…” This word, ‘olah, 
appears repeatedly in the chapter—five times between vv. 2-8, and again at verse 13.98 
Many today will skim over the word since the nuances of cultic sacrifice are lost on us. It 
is as if a baseball reporter substituted the generic word “hit” for the words homerun, 
grand slam, base hit, sacrifice fly, and bunt—all of the detail, color, and texture would be 
removed from his story. Similarly, when we come to the biblical word ‘olah, burnt 
offering, many will substitute the generic word “sacrifice” in their minds, and then 
                                                 
98 Here are the places in which the term is used: 
• Genesis 22:2: …and go to the Land of Moriah, and offer him there as a burnt offering… 
• Genesis 22:3: …He split the wood for the burnt offering… 
• Genesis 22:6: Abraham took the wood for the burnt offering and put it on his son Isaac… 
• Genesis 22:7: And Isaac called to his father Abraham, “…where is the sheep for the burnt offering?” 
• Genesis 22:8: And Abraham said, “God will see to the sheep for his burnt offering, my son.”… 
• Genesis 22:13: …So Abraham went and took the ram and offered it up as a burnt offering in place of 
his son. 
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further shrink the word sacrifice to mean “kill.” Thus we have Immanuel Kant thousands 
of years later using the extremely broad verb “töten, kill” to characterize God’s command 
before denouncing it. The Hebrew word harag (to kill) does not appear in Genesis 22, 
nor does the word ratsach (to murder), but instead the word ‘olah. Once again, 
overlooking the details of the narrative, in their historical context, is an unjust reading of 
the text. 
That the word ‘olah appears six times in this short passage is all the more striking 
when one considers the fact that the same root word is used only one time in the rest of 
the book of Genesis, when after the flood it says, “Then Noah built an altar to the Lord 
and…he offered burnt offerings (ת ָ֖לֹע) on the altar” (8:20, NJPS). The word is used often 
in Exodus—especially in the sections attributed to P—and then abundantly in 
Leviticus—over sixty times. It is therefore quite remarkable to find in Genesis 22 the 
clustered repetition, in a very small space, of this key word from the cult’s technical 
vocabulary. This fact further supports the idea that Genesis 22 is best read in conjunction 
with priestly temple theology.99 
We should, therefore, turn to the first chapter of Leviticus to achieve greater 
insight into the meaning of God’s command. Much more will be said about the Levitical 
sacrificial texts in the next chapter. Here we’ll just introduce key ideas that are most 
useful for interpreting Genesis 22. By the end of the book of Exodus, Moses has exactly 
                                                 
99 For an alternative view, see Christian Eberhart, “The Term ‘sacrifice’ and the Problem of Theological 
Abstraction : A Study of the Reception History of Genesis 22:1-19,” in The Multivalence of Biblical 
Texts and Theological Meanings, ed. Christine Helmer (Atlanta, Georgia: Society of Biblical Literature, 
2006), 47–66. Eberhart argues that the presence of cultic terms in this passage is marginal, and that the 
story is not about cultic sacrifice (as he defines it), but about a “secularized” sacrifice. In my view, 
Eberhart neglects the considerable evidence that suggests a Jerusalem/temple etiology (which we 
reviewed above), and I believe the story is misinterpreted when he says that it is just about loss or 
destruction (the death of Isaac) rather than authentic biblical sacrificial giving or the consecration of a 
cult site. I argue in this chapter that the evidence does indeed point in the latter direction. 
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followed God’s instructions in erecting the tabernacle, and the tabernacle, its furniture, 
and the priests are consecrated with oil. With this, Moses’ work is finished; then the 
cloud of God’s glory settles on, and fills, the tabernacle. Transitioning to the book of 
Leviticus, God immediately calls to Moses from the tent of meeting and gives instruction 
on how to perform various sacrificial rituals, starting with the burnt offering. There are 
actually five major categories of sacrifice described in Leviticus: the burnt offering (ה ָׁלֹע, 
‘ōlâ), grain or cereal offering (ה ָׁחְנִמ, minḳâ), thank offering or well-being offering (ָּ֙חַב  ז
םי ִָ֖מ ָׁלְש, zebaḥ šĕlāmîm), sin offering (ה ָׁא ָׁטַח, ḥaṭṭā’ṯ) and guilt offering (ם ָׁש ָׁא,’āsām). That 
the burnt offering is listed and described first, here and in nearly every other place where 
sacrifices are enumerated, is striking, and surely significant.100 James W. Watts says that 
this pattern suggests “rhetorical preeminence,” which can be explained in various 
ways.101 In explaining the prominence of the burnt offering, Jacob Milgrom, who will be 
introduced more formally in the next chapter, mentions “its hoary antiquity, popularity, 
versatility, and frequency”.102 The burnt offering is also the first and last sacrifice offered 
each day: the Tamid, in which a year-old lamb is offered every morning and evening (cf. 
Exodus 29:38–42; Numbers 28:1–8), is the temple’s opening and closing liturgy, and thus 
it seems to frame and orient the various other sacrificial practices that occur at the 
tabernacle or temple throughout the day. For these reasons, it seems that the ‘olah was 
especially meaningful in ancient Israel.  
This suggests that there might be special theological and symbolic significance to 
                                                 
100 This is true in P, Deuteronomy, the prophets, Psalms, and in Chronicles: James W. Watts, Ritual and 
Rhetoric in Leviticus: From Sacrifice to Scripture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 64–
65. 
101 Ibid., 64. 
102 Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. The Anchor 
Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 146. 
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the burnt offering. Within the literature, however, there is a continuing debate about the 
feasibility of determining the symbolic interpretation of ancient sacrificial practices. 
James W. Watts has raised a number of concerns about the tendency of interpreters to 
explain what these rituals “really mean.” He points out that such explanations are almost 
always imposed on the text; while Leviticus offers detailed rubrics for ritual action, it 
says little about the symbolic or metaphorical significance of these acts. Unquestionably, 
Watts is sympathetic to the motives of Jacob Milgrom and others in their drive to 
describe the symbolism of ritual acts; earlier scholarship was sometimes marked by its 
blatant contempt for priestly texts, and ancient Jewish sacrificial practices were 
frequently dismissed as “superstition and empty ritualism.”103 In response to such a 
flippant approach, one that was even more common in early historical-critical research—
seen most explicitly in Wellhausen104—Milgrom veers in the opposite direction, and 
                                                 
103 Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 6.  
104 Julius Wellhausen’s (1844-1918) influence on the trajectory of modern biblical interpretation has, of 
course, been monumental, but not always positive. When Christian biblical interpreters and theologians 
in the modern period disparage the priestly tradition as an inferior theological strand, they are following 
the path especially forged by Wellhausen. Jonathan Klawans points out the anti-Semitic bias in 
Wellhausen’s work, a bias that is reflected in Wellhausen’s claim that the Jews squandered a pure 
religion of “ethical monotheism” in favor of law and ritual. Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 50; Cf. Lou  
H. Silberman, “Wellhausen and Judaism,” Semeia 25 (1982): 75–82; Joseph Blenkinsopp, Prophecy And 
Canon: Theology (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 19–22. Klawans says, 
“Wellhausen’s contempt for priests, their rigidity, and the cult goes hand in hand with his reverence for 
the prophets, their spirit, their authentic religion, and their ethics.” Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the 
Temple, 75. Crispen Fletcher Lewis, in a section entitled “The Priesthood: A Pariah of Biblical 
Scholarship,” similarly condemns Wellhausen’s “brazen derision of the Priestly material in the 
Pentateuch” and says that he is “a clear example of the commitments and values of a certain (liberal) 
Protestantism that has dominated biblical scholarship for the majority of the modern period.” “Jesus as 
the High Priestly Messiah: Part 1,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 4, no. 2 (2006): 156. 
More broadly, Jon Levenson protests that “the dominant impression one receives from the literature, 
especially in America, is that the Temple, its traditions, and its personnel are an embarrassment to those 
who wish to present the Old Testament sympathetically. Their sympathy stops at the foot of a certain hill 
in Jerusalem.” “The Temple and the World,” The Journal of Religion 64, no. 3 (1984): 282. For the 
subtle ways in which an academic tradition of “anti-Judaism” continues to infect biblical scholarship, see 
Benjamin D. Sommer, “Dialogical Biblical Theology: A Jewish Approach to Reading Scripture 
Theologically,” in Biblical Theology: Introducing the Conversation (Abingdon Press, 2009), 8–12. 
  This general attitude affects Wellhausen’s interpretation of Israel’s sacrifices. He believed that in 
the most ancient layers of Jewish scriptures, sacrifices were seen as natural, spontaneous and joyful gifts 
given to God—the emphasis was on the integrity of the gift itself rather than the details of how it is 
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offered. Julius Wellhausen, Prolegomena to the History of Israel, trans. Allan Menzies and John 
Sutherland Black (Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black, 1885), 61. The most important aspect of the ritual 
in the early texts was the shared community meal. In the priestly texts, however, Wellhausen finds a 
corruption to this more pure early history. Suddenly there is an emphasis on Jewish particularism and 
ritual precision, replacing joyful sacrificial practices with “a minute classification of the various kinds of 
offerings,” a priestly obsession that had the effect of usurping a heartfelt practice and replacing it with 
burdensome legalism. Ibid., 52–53.  
  According to Wellhausen, in the earliest strands of material, two kinds of sacrifice are 
represented—the ‘olah and the thank-offering—and Wellhausen generally thinks that the burnt offering 
takes back seat to the thank-offering. The burnt offering “occurs only in conjunction with [thank-
offerings], and when this is the case the latter are in the majority and are always in the plural, while on 
the other hand the first is frequently in the singular.” Ibid., 70. Wellhausen’s preference for thank-
offerings is apparently driven by his strong emphasis on sacrifice as a shared community meal—with the 
thank-offering, a token portion of the sacrificed animal is given to God, but the rest is consumed by the 
worshippers, while with the burnt offering the whole sacrifice goes up in the flame. He says, “Where a 
sacrifice took place, there was also eating and drinking…there was no offering without a meal, and no 
meal without an offering…” Ibid., 71. In another place, he paints an idyllic pastoral picture: “In the early 
days, worship arose out of the midst of ordinary life, and was in most intimate and manifold connection 
with it. A sacrifice was a meal, a fact showing how remote was the idea of antithesis between spiritual 
earnestness and secular joyousness. A meal unites a definite circle of guests...” Ibid., 76. 
  From this perspective, Wellhausen laments the way the Priestly Code divorces burnt offerings from 
thank-offerings, making it possible to have the former without an accompanying meal, and then (even 
worse) the way the priests add “sin offerings” and “trespass offerings,” which are “fines and penalties” 
that benefit only the priests; they are “not gifts to God, they are not even symbolical,” Ibid., 74. The meal 
disappears more and more, replaced with priestly power-grabs and cultic centralization which destroys 
the connection between sacrifice and daily life. This is the origin, Wellhausen reports, of the unhealthy 
emphasis on sacrificial slaughter and blood atonement—here is the devastating transition from sacrifice 
as wholly joyous “merrymaking” before God to the “monotonous seriousness” of the priestly cult. Ibid., 
81, cf. 74-75. Wellhausen effectively concludes, “The connection of all this with the Judaising tendency 
to remove God to a distance from man, it may be added, is clear.” Ibid., 79. 
  One consequence of Wellhausen’s identification and separation of distinct documents in the 
Pentateuch was his discovery in “Moses” of earlier and later strands, which were matched with a general 
preference for the primitive (e.g., the pure) over the late (e.g., the corrupted). Here we see that a major 
hallmark of corruption is ritualization and centralization, which spoils the purity of the spontaneous and 
joyous. What is left, instead, is legalism, the great enemy of the spirit. The traditional way of reading the 
Pentateuch as a coherent narrative ordered toward a divine end is now replaced with the discovery of 
factions and power plays, and for Wellhausen the priests are the primary antagonists. It is also clear that, 
given the conviction that the earliest sacrifices were unifying communal meals, Wellhausen has a hard 
time making sense of the burnt offering (which, he admits, is also very early) and therefore his strategy is 
essentially to marginalize it as a practice that is unambiguously secondary. And in any case, the burnt 
offering was definitely corrupted by its integration into, and importance within, the centralized, ritualized 
priestly system. 
  What we have here, for Wellhausen, is a small elite institution primarily concerned to obtain and 
protect its own power at the center of Jewish society. A major component of that power is the way in 
which the priesthood alone is seen as qualified to practice sacrifice according to the incredibly precise 
rubrics that have been promulgated. These rituals have little or no theological import; their meaning can 
primarily be found in the effort to disenfranchise everyday Jews and support the ruling elite. From this 
perspective, it makes little sense to seek the theological assumptions underlying these practices; 
Wellhausen’s priests seem very little concerned about such things. Therefore, to the extent that 
Wellhausen represents a popular perspective in early historical-critical research, the quest for the 
theological coherence of P was definitely stymied. In this context, the importance of Milgrom and his 
students become clear. With this new scholarship, the priestly texts were allowed to speak in their own 
terms, without strongly Protestant, and sometimes also anti-Semitic, presuppositions. Scholars were now 
permitted to imagine that there was, perhaps, some genuine religious conviction and feeling behind these 
texts, that at least some priests genuinely wanted to serve and benefit Israel, not simply accrue power, 
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says, “I assume the Priestly Code makes sense…it is a self-contained system—logical, 
coherent, and whole. A system is built on postulates, but, in our case, they are nowhere 
stated.”105 
While respecting Milgrom’s disagreement with the, at best, condescending 
attitude found in some Christian biblical scholarship which indicated that priests obsessed 
over empty ritualism, Watts believes that Milgrom’s last point—that the postulates that 
make sense of sacrifice are nowhere stated—calls our attention to the main problem in his 
method. Watts stresses that “ritual practices, such as animal offerings, are usually far 
older than their interpretation by ancient texts, not to mention by modern ethnographers 
and interpreters. It is difficult to show that any one symbolic interpretation of them is 
widely shared by those who participate in the rituals themselves.”106 At the extreme limit 
of this position we find Fritz Staal’s claim that “ritual is pure activity, without meaning or 
goal.”107 Such a conclusion certainly puts a damper on the hope of understanding the 
theology of the temple cult generally, and the burnt offering specifically. So far as Watts 
is concerned, Milgrom succeeds in showing that there is at least one symbolic system that 
makes coherent the ritual acts described in Leviticus, and it is possible that there were 
some ancient people who had a theological perspective similar to what Milgrom 
describes. The next question, Watts says, is “who did so, and when?”108 In other words, 
for Watts, a “unified and static symbolic system,”109 like the one suggested by Milgrom, 
cannot fully account for the way in which “rituals, texts, and society” interrelate and shift 
                                                 
and that some even believed that what they were doing was necessary for the common good. 
105 Jacob Milgrom, Cult and Conscience: The Asham and the Priestly Doctrine of Repentance (Brill 
Archive, 1976), 2; quoted in Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 3–4. 
106 Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 8; cf. Hundley, Keeping Heaven on Earth, 27.  
107 Quoted in Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 9. 
108 Ibid., 10. 
109 Ibid., 7. 
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over time. Therefore, Milgrom’s unified system must always be something of a historical 
fiction, at best only narrowly applicable. In any case, one must always remember that the 
suggested symbols “are not explicitly stated in the text” and therefore “they impose a 
theology on [Leviticus] that the book does not express.”110 Historians should be more 
modest in their interpretation.111 
Jonathan Klawans is also critical of Milgrom, but this time for being inadequately 
attentive to the symbolic meaning of sacrificial practice.112 In his groundbreaking book, 
Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, Klawans challenges scholars to consider their 
presuppositions about the origins of sacrifice. Two assumptions in particular characterize 
modern scholarship: evolutionism and supersessionism. Klawans says, “Texts are 
plugged into preconceived conceptions of religious history, where trajectories are 
assumed to run from primitive, pre‐Israelite cult practices to ancient Jewish symbolic or 
‘spiritualized’ understandings of sacrifice [evolutionism], culminating in the 
                                                 
110 Ibid., 6–7, footnote 17.  
111 For his own part, Watts wants to see what rhetorical studies might contribute to the interpretation of 
Leviticus. He is keen to point out that the book of Leviticus does not in fact present a ritual, but a text 
(which happens to describe certain ritual acts). People write to persuade, and so the question becomes, 
why did the author of Leviticus1-5 write this detailed section on sacrificial rites in the way he did? 
Overemphasis on the search for a text’s “meaning” easily misses its “broader function as an instrument 
for persuasion.” Ibid., 30. Reading the text with an awareness of rhetorical concerns is illuminating, as 
Watts proves throughout the study. One apprehension I have, however, is the way in which the text can 
easily be diminished, becoming only a window into (reconstructed) ancient power conflicts—and thus, 
Leviticus is seen as an effort to persuade worshippers to embrace new sacrifices (the sin and guilt 
offerings) that, it so happens, are economically beneficial to the priests themselves. This type of reading 
echoes Wellhausen’s own highly political interpretation (see footnote 104 above), even if Watts is far 
more nuanced and sympathetic toward priestly motives: see especially ibid., chap. 7, “The Rhetoric of 
Priesthood.” Watts makes many fascinating and helpful observations, and I will refer to his study often 
below, but his desire to find a setting for the text within some mere intramundane struggle remains 
nevertheless inadequate to an interpretation of these passages as scripture. As Moberly says, readings like 
this can be reductionistic, taking texts that for so long have been vehicles for contemplating the mystery 
of the living God’s relationship with human beings, and making them records of petty human squabbles. 
Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith, 179 ff. One need not forbid investigation into possible 
controversial settings behind a text to simultaneously insist that, as scripture, these texts reveal Truth. 
More will be said along these lines below. 
112 Watts himself says that Klawans’ critique of Milgrom is “virtually the opposite” of his own. Watts, 
Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 6, footnote 17. 
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nonsacrificial practices of contemporary Christianity and Judaism [supersessionism].”113 
Klawans describes the pattern of evolutionist scholarship when he says that, first, one 
presupposes what the most primitive sacrificial idea must have been, then finds “only the 
faintest echoes” of this idea in the Hebrew Bible. With a sense of relief, the scholar notes 
that at least the ancient Jews had improved upon—“spiritualized”—the especially 
unsophisticated ideas of their ancestors and neighbors, such as the childish notion that the 
gods must be quite literally feed. Through progressive efforts over time, the crude 
original meaning of sacrifice is downplayed, and the practice “ultimately remains in 
ancient Israel as a meaningless, vestigial ritual, a relic from a more primitive era.”114 As 
Klawans notes, the evolutionary trajectory usually leads from some indefensible original 
idea, through ascending stages, reaching finally a “highest rung,” which is the modern 
author’s own theological priority.115 Klawans believes that both of these methods are 
used by scholars to undermine the relevance of ancient sacrificial practices by generally 
seeing these practices as a transitional stage in social development or in religious 
consciousness, thus making it easy to conclude that this stage is now, in itself, 
theologically unimportant.  
Klawans points out that an analogously critical or dismissive attitude was also 
taken toward purity laws until the work of Mary Douglas, who pointed out that such 
cultural regulations are not primitive (using the rules of modern hygiene to show the 
persistence of not-always-strictly-rational “avoidance behaviors” in modern society), and 
                                                 
113 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 4. 
114 Ibid., 7. 
115 According to Klawans, “supersessionism” is another version of evolutionist thinking. Supersessionists 
identify some historically consequent, non-sacrificial, morally superior practice—such as prayer in 
Maimonides, or the non-bloody Eucharist in Christian theology—and says that “the ancient Jewish 
sacrifice was itself superseded by something better that came later.” Ibid.  
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that they symbolically communicate core societal values. Douglas makes the basic point 
that “dirt is essentially disorder”: even though different communities, or perhaps different 
individuals, identify “dirt” differently, it is generally shunned. Crucially, “Eliminating 
[dirt] is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organize the environment.”116 
From this very basic human need for order, different cultures establish practical 
guidelines that symbolically communicate the priorities and the self-understanding of the 
community.117 In an important statement, Douglas insists that  
The more we know about primitive religions the more clearly it appears that in 
their symbolic structures there is scope for meditation on the great mysteries of 
religion and philosophy. Reflection on dirt involves reflection on the relation of 
order to disorder, being to non-being, form to formlessness, life to death. 
Wherever ideas of dirt are highly structured their analysis discloses a play upon 
such profound themes.118  
 
In ancient Israel, we will see in the next chapter, the moral and ritual problem of “dirt” is 
addressed principally on Yom Kippur at Mount Zion. 
In the area of purity, therefore, Douglas’ work has shown how communal rituals 
“work together to form expressive symbolic systems, which not only articulate ideas but 
also serve to enforce them.”119 Purity laws should thus be understood as a positive, effort 
at community building. What has not been adequately recognized, however, is the fact 
that (in biblical religion, at least) purity laws and sacrificial practices are deeply 
interwoven, such that they point toward and require one another. It would seem 
                                                 
116 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 2. 
117 To some extent, such “rules of purity” are the backbone of culture: “Culture, in the sense of the public, 
standardized values of a community, mediates the experience of individuals. It provides in advance some 
basic categories, a positive pattern in which ideas and values are tidily ordered.” Ibid., 39–40. 
118 Ibid., 5–6. 
119 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 19. For a helpful overview of the “symbolist school” in 
modern anthropology, see Gary A. Anderson, Sacrifices and Offerings in Ancient Israel: Studies in Their 
Social and Political Importance, 41 (Scholars Press, 1987), 10–12. 
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improbable that impurity laws are rooted in coherent, expressive, community-building 
and theologically-substantive symbolism, while sacrificial practices are meaningless 
vestiges. Klawans, from this perspective, appreciates the way Milgrom has taken the ball 
from Mary Douglas and run with it: his interpretation of Levitical purity laws is nuanced 
and profound, generally respecting the foundational theological convictions that are 
expressed through such laws.120 But on sacrifice, Klawans concludes that Milgrom takes 
a step back, reverting to a focus on evolutionist reconstructions of how Israel’s sacrificial 
cult might have developed—relieved that even more primitive ideas have at least been 
demythologized—rather than paying full attention to “what is going on in the text 
itself.”121 For Klawans, the effort to find more or less primitive ideas in a book like 
Leviticus requires the researcher to imagine what a more or less primitive culture would 
believe about sacrifice, then to use this reconstruction as a measuring stick to organize 
different passages; the presupposition today is often that ancient communities move from 
more literal to more symbolic perspectives. But such presuppositions are 
“unsubstantiated,”122 they take it for granted that the earliest strands of material were 
incapable of metaphorical language,123 and they are rigidly linear (assuming cultures 
develop consistently in one direction only). Another approach is needed.  
                                                 
120 See the next chapter.  
121 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 29. This tendency in Milgrom is especially evident in his 
essay, “On the Theory of Sacrifice,” where he, for example, calls the remnants of the idea that sacrifice is 
food for the gods in the Bible “fossilized vestiges from a dim past…” Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 
440. 
122 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 51. 
123 Klawans writes, “a full contextual understanding of sacriﬁce in ancient Israel requires that we remove 
both sacriﬁce and metaphor from evolutionist schemes like Milgrom’s that place literal understandings of 
sacriﬁce in a primitive stage of human development and metaphor in a relatively late stage. The problem 
with such schemes is that by nature they preclude the possibility that sacriﬁce was understood 
symbolically by those Israelites who practiced it. The origin of the ritual is set back in a pre-metaphorical 
era, and symbolic thought—the essence of metaphor—enters only later. It should be clear that such 
constructions of the remote past are ideologically biased and methodologically ﬂawed.” Ibid., 32. 
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Because he is suspicious of scholarly competence to splice up sources within 
Leviticus and then order them by what is more or less primitive,124 he favors a 
“synchronic readings” of the text in its current form, “and as an integral part of the 
Pentateuch as a whole,” as advocated by Rolf Rendtorff and Joseph Blenkinsopp.125 After 
giving oneself the freedom to actually read and interpret the text that we have, the next 
step is to see how sacrifice interacts with purity rules to form a complex but coherent 
symbolic system. The goal is not to find a single “theory” that can exhaustively explain 
sacrifice,126 but instead to identify “organizing principles” that will help illuminate the 
basic presuppositions that shape the priestly imagination. Klawans says that these 
“organizing principles will need to be concerns central to the priestly traditions of the 
Pentateuch, which will help us understand better the dynamic between the systems of 
sacrifice and defilement.”127 He identifies two: (a) a desire to imitate God and (b) a hope 
to attract and maintain God’s presence in the temple. These themes will be a point of 
focus in the next chapter on the theology of Yom Kippur. 
In a more recent article, Klawans identifies three approaches to symbolism in 
Israelite ritual: “ubiquitous symbolism,” “selective symbolism,” and “antisymbolism.”128 
                                                 
124 See ibid., 49–52. This does not mean that Klawans denies that the text has a history—that more than one 
hand has contributed to its composition—but only that reconstructions of that pre-history, given the 
extremely limited evidence we have, inevitably draw on assumptions that say more about us than the 
people we are describing. 
125 Ibid., 51. 
126 Anthropologists have proposed a number of such theories to explain the origins of sacrifice—whether it 
is to see sacrifice as a gift, as a bribe, as a commemoration of a primitive murder, as a ritualized meal, 
etc. Watts provides an especially clear and concise overview of the various theories of sacrifice in 
modern literature: Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 176–80; Cf. Gary A. Anderson, “Sacrifice and 
Sacrificial Offerings (OT),” The Anchor Bible Dictionary, 1992, 871–72. Klawans believes that such 
approaches are flawed because they, once again, rely on evolutionist thinking, but also because each 
individual theory is inevitably too narrow to encompass a richly complex symbolic system like cultic 
practices.  
127 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 48. 
128 Jonathan Klawans, “Symbol, Function, Theology, and Morality in the Study of Priestly Ritual,” in 
Ancient Mediterranean Sacrifice, ed. Jennifer Wright Knust and Zsuzsanna Varhelyi (Oxford University 
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Milgrom is associated with the middle position, showing more willingness to interpret 
purity laws symbolically than sacrificial practices, and therefore he is open to criticism 
from both sides. Watts believes that any symbolic scheme imports ideas into the text that 
are not explicitly present, while Klawans believes that minimizing a symbolic 
interpretation to exclude sacrifice imports evolutionist assumptions into interpretation 
that amount to a modern bias. Watts wants to read the text more strictly and narrowly 
with the help of rhetorical criticism to better discover the author’s motivation for writing, 
while Klawans wants to read the text synchronically and canonically to more 
sympathetically appreciate the religious imagination behind temple theology. As already 
noted,129 rhetorical analysis is a powerful tool in Watts’ hands, and with it he makes 
discoveries that are very useful. The unfortunate thing is that, generally eschewing 
symbolic or theological meaning, the text’s rhetorical goals are often seen first of all in 
terms of political posturing, as if these texts are most meaningful in the context of power 
struggles.130 The effect of such a reading is to take the text and turn it on its head: what 
seems on the surface, and what has been received for millennia, as an invitation to true 
worship of the one God becomes, in fact, the remnant of an ancient but prosaic bid for 
control. The call to worship is pretense to the demand for earthy submission. In the end, a 
                                                 
Press, 2011), 106–22. 
129 See footnote 111, above. 
130 It is important to emphasize again that, in making this argument, Watts is very sympathetic to the 
priesthood; he does not dismiss them as historical “bad guys,” but rather he ascribes charitable motives to 
them, and invites scholars to strive for a “sympathetic reception” of priestly rhetoric. Watts, Ritual and 
Rhetoric in Leviticus, 163. Watts finds that the priests were generally successful in the second temple 
period both in terms of promoting and practicing high religious standards and ensuring the political 
survival of Israel in an extremely turbulent time. He celebrates the fact that the Aaronide priests were 
more pragmatic, and more tolerant, than their monarchic or Hasmonean counterparts. Therefore, the fact 
that their rhetoric is designed to secure their authority and broaden their financial support is not 
necessarily nefarious; there may have been a real existential need to center the nation on the temple, and 
secure financial support for the temple, especially in the traumatic post-exilic period.  
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wall forms between the reader and the text; the new “literal” meaning is remarkably 
esoteric, and words that seem to refer to God actually refer to human maneuvering, once 
you have the eyes to see.  From this perspective, it seems to me that Klawans, by inviting 
us to think symbolically, draws us into the text more profoundly and consistently than 
Watts does, and actually imposes less on the text even though he requires more 
imagination from the reader, who must embed himself or herself in a different culture 
with a distinct theological vocabulary.131 Whether or not there may have been interest in 
achieving greater financial security or communal authority on the part of a possible 
author, I take all of this as secondary to the real message of these scriptures, which also 
happens to be the surface meaning: training in the sacrificial worship of the living God in 
the tabernacle. 
Understanding this debate between Watts, Milgrom, and Klawans is a prerequisite 
for approaching the crucial question of this section: why does the burnt offering have 
priority in priestly theology? What does this offering signify? In closely reading Leviticus 
1, we can identify three primary themes relevant to these questions. First, the idea of 
“drawing near,” second the emphasis on spotlessness, and third the concept of 
“ascending.” Thus, turning to the first point: the description of this offering begins with 
Leviticus 1:3, which says, “If an ‘olah ( ֵָ֤֤  לֹעה ) is his offering (ַָּ֙֙וֹנ ָׁבְר ָׁק)…” The word for 
“offering” is qorbān, which means “that which is brought near”—the root is k-r-b, “to 
draw near”—and is translated in the LXX by the Greek word δῶρον, “gift.”132 The term 
                                                 
131 As Benjamin Sommer points out, studies that never get past reconstructing and arguing about the 
supposed “geo-political conditions” that may lay behind the text are poorly attuned to the theological 
dimension of the ideas presented, and they thus “avoid grappling with these ideas’ deep humanistic 
significance.” He calls this a “cop-out.” Sommer, Bodies of God, 96–97. It seems to me that Klawans’ 
symbolical reading is much less guilty of this weakness which is all too common in modern biblical 
studies.  
132 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 145. Cf. Christian Eberhart, “A Neglected Feature of Sacrifice in the 
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qorban is used 34 times in the first sixteen chapters of Leviticus, and it is an umbrella 
category for the different kinds of gifts that the Israelites might bring. It is important to 
point out that using the word qorban puts the emphasis on a movement toward something 
or someone, without any violent connotations (unlike the connotation of the English word 
sacrifice today).133 The sense of this opening phrase, therefore, is, “If it is by a burnt 
offering that you draw near…,” and the presupposition would seem to be that God in fact 
wants Israel to draw near to him in the tabernacle, and that the rituals described in 
Leviticus are intended to promote such communion—without losing sight of God’s 
holiness and otherness.134 In Exodus 40, God’s Presence, God’s Glory, descends and 
tabernacles at the Tent of Meeting—God has drawn near to his people—and now in 
Leviticus 1, God instructs Israel in how to draw near to him. David Fagerberg says 
“liturgy is the trysting place of God,” and this is very much true of the tabernacle/temple 
and its liturgy.135 
When Israel draws near, what shall she bring? If it is a burnt offering, the chapter 
specifies the type of animal that is acceptable—whether it is from the heard (cattle) or 
flock (sheep or goats)—“a male136 without blemish (םי ִָ֖מ ָׁת, tāmîm)” (Leviticus 1:3, 10).137 
Thus, the second key element is that the gift shall be spotless. For Milgrom, along with 
                                                 
Hebrew Bible: Remarks on the Burning Rite on the Altar,” Harvard Theological Review 97, no. 4 
(October 1, 2004): 491; Christian Eberhart, The Sacrifice of Jesus: Understanding Atonement Biblically 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 71. 
133 For a nice overview of the ways the Latin term “sacrifice” and the Hebrew word “korban” are similar 
and different, see Berman, The Temple, 114–16. 
134 David Bentley Hart spells out the theological implications when he says, “Before all else, though, 
sacrifice is qurban, a drawing nigh, an approach in love to the God who graciously approaches his people 
in love.” Hart, Beauty of the Infinite, 350.  
135 Fagerberg, Theologia Prima, 108. Fagerberg borrows this poetic imagery from G.K. Chesterton. 
136 Milgrom points out that, while a later interpreter like Philo will argue that the male is more complete, 
“the more likely reason is that the male is economically the more expendable, the female being the one to 
supply milk and offspring.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 147.  
137 It is also possible to bring a bird to be brought as a burnt offering (a turtledove or young pigeon), but the 
requirement for spotlessness is not stated.  
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most other modern commentators, the understanding of spotlessness in this text pertains 
to physical perfection specifically.138 Klawans approaches this requirement from an 
interesting perspective: the need to provide a spotless animal is demanding on the offerer. 
She or he must pay careful attention to the herd or flock, diligently protecting the animal 
from injury, carefully inspecting each one to see whether it is suitable.139 There is a call 
to excellence, one that is demanding on the offerer as well, and therefore it is perhaps no 
surprise that the same word also came to characterize human perfection. An especially 
significant text that uses tāmîm in reference to human spotlessness is Genesis 17:1, which 
is generally identified as a Priestly text. It reads, “When Abram was ninety-nine years 
old, the Lord appeared to Abram and said to him, ‘I am El Shaddai [God Almighty]. 
Walk in my ways and be blameless (םי ִֵּֽמ ָׁת)” (NJPS). Similarly, in Deuteronomy, God tells 
his people not to mimic the disgraceful behaviors of the surrounding people: “You shall 
be perfect (םי ִּ֣מ ָׁת) before YHWH your God” (18:13).  Both the Priestly writer and the 
Deuteronomist use the cultic term “without blemish” to describe how Abram’s 
descendants must be before God; the word expresses the high moral demands made on 
the covenant people. By the time of Philo, the requirement of an unblemished sacrifice 
was understood as a “figure” which expresses what God seeks from us: “they must come 
with no infirmity or ailment or evil affection in the soul, but must endeavour to have it 
sanctified and free throughout from defilement, that God when He beholds it may not 
                                                 
138 Leigh Trevaskis argues against this general consensus that the use of tāmîm in Leviticus 1 pertains only 
to physical criteria without ethical implications. In cognitive linguistic terms, Trevaskis says that physical 
wholeness is clearnly intended within the cultic domain, which is primary. Nevertheless, the ancient 
interpreter would have access to a secondary domain for interpreting the word tāmîm, and thus the need 
for ethical integrity is already suggested by the priestly writer. Holiness, Ethics and Ritual in Leviticus, 
chap. 5 and 6.  
139 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 63–64.  
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turn away His face from the sight.”140 As Klawans suggests, the offerer’s careful 
inspection of the sacrificial animal comes to be seen as an imitation of the way God 
carefully inspects us to see if we have remained spotless. There is no doubt that the 
repeated emphasis on the notion that the offering must be without blemish is hugely 
significant in the Levitical cult, and profoundly shaped the interpretation of biblical 
sacrifice.141  
Third, the word ה ָ֤ ָׁלֹע, ‘olah, itself literally means “that which ascends,” from the 
root word ה ָׁל ָׁע, ‘alah, “to ascend, go up.” Once again, we should notice the directionality 
of the cultic practices; returning to Leviticus 1:3, the hyper-literal rendering of “If his 
offering is a burnt offering…” would be, “If by ‘that which ascends’ he ‘draws near’…” 
The horizontal imagery of drawing near to God is linked with the vertical imagery of 
ascension.142 The ‘olah is the paradigmatic ascending sacrifice. It is the only offering 
where “the animal is completely incinerated on the altar.”143 This explains why it is 
called a “burnt offering” in English—even though the word ‘olah does not actually derive 
from the verb “to burn.” 
                                                 
140 Philo, On the Special Laws, On the Virtues. On Rewards and Punishments, trans. F. H. Colson 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939), I.167, page 195. See Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and 
the Temple, 120–21. 
141 Notably, the connection between sacrificial spotlessness and the demands of virtuous living carries over 
into the New Testament. The Septuagint goes in two directions with the term םי ִּ֣מ ָׁת. In the cultic texts, the 
word is nearly always rendered ἄμωμον (spotless, immaculate) while Deuteronomy 18:13 is translated 
τέλειος (perfect, complete). Thus, Jesus insists, “Be perfect (τέλειοι), therefore, as your heavenly Father 
is perfect (τέλειός)” (Matthew 5:48), while Paul exclaims that the Father “chose us in Christ before the 
foundation of the world to be holy and blameless (ἀμώμους) before him in love” (Ephesians 1:4). These 
are two tributaries stemming from the same Hebrew cultic word, םי ִָ֖מ ָׁת. Other texts that refer to human 
spotlessness include Ephesians 5:27, Philippians 2:15, Colossians 1:22, Jude 1:24. There are additional 
texts that even more explicitly link Christ to the spotless sacrificial animal: Hebrews 9:14 and 1 Peter 
1:19. 
142 With this in mind, L. Michael Morales translates ‘olah as “ascension offering.” See Who Shall Ascend 
the Mountain of the Lord?: A Biblical Theology of the Book of Leviticus (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP 
Academic, 2015), 60,  62; 133-137. 
143 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 172. There is an exception to this; Leviticus 7:8 mentions that the hide 
goes to the priest who offers the burnt offering.  
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But again, just why is this type of offering repeatedly given priority? Watts offers 
a convincing suggestions: “the biblical writers regard this offering as most representative 
of Israel’s worship, as best expressing the proper worship of God.”144 Unlike other 
offerings, in which a token portion of the gift is consumed by fire while the rest is 
consumed by the offerer or the priest, the burnt offering represents complete “letting go,” 
absolute freedom from grasping; it is economic foolishness, wild exuberance, an absurd 
excess. Every morning and every evening, the temple would open and close with this 
symbol: I hand life over completely.145 
That’s easy enough to do, one might respond, when the “life” being handed over 
is not your own! When it is the poor bull, or ram, or goat which is the gift—a person’s 
livestock rarely constitutes his or her entire life. But, returning to Moriah, the situation 
was different for Abraham: remember, God identifies Isaac, points toward Moriah, and 
says, “offer him there as a burnt offering”—in Abraham’s cultural context, this does 
represent the handing over of his entire life, as we have seen. Abraham is invited to 
“draw near” to God by giving up his beloved son. He is told that his son should ascend to 
God on that great mountain, in smoke and ashes. The theme of ascension is especially 
prominent in Genesis 22:2, when Abraham is told “to offer him ( ַָּ֙הְוה ֵ֤  לֲעוּ ) there as a burnt 
offering ( ְָּ֙לה ָ֔ לֹע ) on one of the heights”—the word translated “to offer” has, in Hebrew, the 
very same root as the word “burnt offering”—the root ‘-L-H—and so the sense of going 
up or ascending is doubly emphasized.   
                                                 
144 Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 71. 
145 As Joshua Berman puts it, with reference to the Akedah, “[The olah] symbolizes our willingness to 
devote our entire existence to the service of God…it is a vivid symbol of [the offerer’s] own dedication 
to God in the entirety of his essence.” Berman, The Temple, 123–24. See also Leigh Trevaskis’ argument 
for why the burnt offering is “P’s ‘most holy’ offering par excellence.” Holiness, Ethics and Ritual in 
Leviticus, 260; cf. 251-261. 
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In the section describing Abraham’s love for Isaac, we reviewed the belief that 
Philo and Josephus held that Isaac was a moral exemplar. Philo speaks of Isaac’s “great 
bodily beauty,” his “excellence of soul,” and his “perfection of virtues.”146 Josephus 
agrees that Isaac practiced “every virtue” and showed “zeal for the worship of God.”147 
Of course, none of this is mentioned in Genesis 22, and it could be dismissed as 
nationalistic exaltation of ancestors. But in this case, in this context, an argument can be 
made that their claim is rooted in the text precisely because Abraham was called to offer 
Isaac as an ‘olah. That word carries with it the tāmîm requirement: Isaac’s spotlessness is 
strongly implied in the fact that God identified him as a suitable offering.  
The rabbinic tradition continued to build on this connection, and they insisted 
more and more forcefully that Isaac fully participated in the offering of his life. This 
interpretation, again, was not unrelated to the text. As Jon Levenson points out, most 
guesses on Isaac’s age put him in his 20s or 30s. After putting the wood for the fire on 
Isaac’s back and leaving behind the servants, it says Abraham and Isaac “walked 
together” (v. 6). Isaac next asks his father where the animal was for the offering, and 
Abraham says, “God will see to it…”, and the text again affirms, they “walked together” 
(v. 8). According to Levenson, “the first time these words appear [“the two walked 
together”], Abraham has just assured his two attendants that he and Isaac will, after an act 
of worship, return to them. But by the second time, Isaac has accepted his own mandated 
role as a victim. And the two of them still walked together, or to render the Hebrew 
yahdāw more literally, ‘as one.’”148 As the union of purpose between father and son 
                                                 
146 Philo, Philo Volume VI, 85. 
147 Josephus, Josephus, 4:109–11. 
148 Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 134. 
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became a greater focus in later interpretation, Isaac’s faith seemed to soar even higher. 
For example, Josephus has Abraham explain to Isaac that he has been chosen as a 
sacrifice, and then Josephus reports: 
The son of such a father could not but be brave-hearted, and Isaac received these 
words with joy. He exclaimed that he deserved never to have been born at all, 
were he to reject the decision of God and of his father and not readily resign 
himself to what was the will of both… and with that he rushed to the altar and his 
doom.149 
 
This section began with a discussion of the word hinneni, Abraham’s readiness before 
God, and now the interpretive tradition has found that Abraham and Isaac are “as one” in 
this attitude. One can plausibly maintain, given the connections we have been tracing, 
that this constitutes the definitive illumination of the word “without blemish” in the 
Jewish tradition, and in fact, the definite image of the call to ‘olah. 
The Fifth Word: ra’ah 
After the journey, Abraham and Isaac arrive together at the place chosen by God, 
and the scriptures describe how Abraham builds an altar there. And then, “Abraham 
picked up the knife to slay (ט ָֹ֖חְשִל) his son” (Genesis 22:10).150 With these words, the 
fundamental disposition that Abraham put into words in verse 1 (hinneni) is finally and 
thoroughly lived out, spoken in act, by father and son on the mountain of Moriah. It is a 
freedom of the will that gives up everything, clings to nothing, even that which is most 
                                                 
149 Josephus, Josephus, vol. 4, bk. I:232; quoted in Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved 
Son, 191. 
150 To emphasize once more the cultic context for these words, I should point out that the word shachat, to 
slay, is used thirty-three times in Leviticus by P, always in reference to the ritual slaughter of the 
sacrificial animal. The same word is used elsewhere in the Bible for killing more generally, but given the 
centrality of ‘olah terminology in Genesis 22, shachat would be the most natural verb to use. Compare 
Leviticus 1:5, 1:11, 16:15, etc. 
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precious.151 God152 interrupts again: “Abraham! Abraham!,” and the patriarch responds, 
“hinneni.” The fundamental dialogue that frames this drama is repeated after the act, the 
only difference being that this time the old man’s name is spoken twice, effectively 
affirming and re-affirming his vocational identity. Father-of-Many! Father-of-Many! The 
truth of this name is doubled through the action that epitomizes its true meaning: 
“readiness, alertness, attentiveness, receptivity, and responsiveness.”  
The theme of vision weaves through the narrative from beginning to end, with the 
word ra’ah (ה ָׁא ָׁר) appearing numerous times. We have already observed that the very 
name Moriah may gently allude to the importance of seeing. More explicitly, the word is 
used three times in passing. First, on the journey Abraham looks up and sees the place 
where God is sending him.153 Second, after Isaac asks why they had not brought a 
sacrificial animal, Abraham says that God will see (to) it.154 Third, after Abraham’s hand 
is stayed, he looks up and sees a ram caught in the thicket.155 More will be said below 
about the substitution of the ram for Isaac, but for now we will focus on the most 
important use of the Hebrew word ra’ah in Genesis 22. After offering the ram as an 
‘olah, Abraham names the sacred mountain. It says, “And Abraham named that site 
Adonai-yireh (ה ָּ֑  אְרִיָּ֙הּ֣ ָׁוהְי), whence the present saying, ‘On the mount of the Lord there is 
                                                 
151 Nahum Sarna uses a word that has a rich history in the mystical tradition: “disinterested.” He says, “The 
totally disinterested nature of his devotion to God must be established beyond any doubt.” Sarna, 
Genesis, 393. 
152 The text indeed says that it is the “mal’akh YHWH, angel of the LORD” who calls out to Abraham. 
According to Benjamin Sommer, the word mal’akh, which literally means “messenger,” in J and E often 
refers to “a small-scale manifestation of God’s own presence, and the distinction between the messenger 
and God is murky.” Therefore, he says, the term is more similar to an “avatar” (an idea from Indian 
religion) than what we today think of when we say “angel.” Sommer, Bodies of God, 40. 
153 “On the third day, Abraham looked up and saw (way-yar, אְרַּ֥  ַיַו) the place…” (Genesis 22:4) 
154 “And Abraham said, ‘God will see (־ה  אְרִי) to the sheep (ה ָ֛  שַה) for His burnt offering, my son.” (Genesis 
22:8) The word here translated “sheep” is seh, and it is more general, meaning “one of the flock,” and 
could be in reference to a sheep or a goat. Cf. Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith, 107, footnote 52. 
155 “When Abraham looked (ַָּ֙֙אְרַיַו) up, his eye fell upon a ram, caught in the thicket by its horns.” (Genesis 
22:13)  
90 
 
vision (ה ֵּֽ  א ָׁר יָּ֙הָ֖ ָׁוהְי)’” (Genesis 22:14, NJPS). Note the emphasis on vision. This chapter 
opened with a Balthasarian meditation on the theme of glory, the divine splendor that 
communicates itself—gives itself—as revelation to human beings: God making himself 
available to our perception. Especially in priestly theology, the temple on Mount Zion is 
at the center of this aesthetic and visionary experience. The claims made for this location 
are extravagant, even though by all accounts the hill on which the temple stood is quite 
modest. Additionally, anthropologists have shown that the idea of a sacred mountain was 
pervasive in the ancient world. So, to reiterate a central question from the previous 
section on theo-aesthetics: why should this particular site in Judea have any claim to our 
attention today? Why focus on this seemingly arbitrary peak? 
These questions have motivated this extended meditation on Genesis 22, an 
episode that could be called—from the perspective of temple theology—“the action.” It is 
one of the central dramas of the Hebrew Bible, and within the canon itself, it is offered as 
the foundational narrative of the temple site. Now, immediately after the climax of the 
story, the site is named and we return to the aesthetic theme of vision. The name given by 
Abraham, YHWH-yir’eh, can be read in a few different ways, each of them with its own 
theological significance. First, the name echoes verse 8, when Isaac asks about the burnt 
offering animal, where Abraham says “וֹ  ל ־ה  אְרִיָּ֙םי ִַּ֞הלֱא, ‘elohim yir’eh lo, God will see for 
himself”: as Moberly says, “The context seems to require that ‘see’ here has the sense not 
merely of sight but of sight leading to corresponding action…”156 There is a link between 
vision and provision, when God “sees,” God “sees to it,” God ensures that the vision is 
fulfilled. With this in mind, Abraham’s ultimate name for the place, “ה ָּ֑  אְרִיָּ֙הּ֣ ָׁוהְי, YHWH-
                                                 
156 Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith, 107–8. 
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yir’eh, is rendered “the LORD will provide” by most translators. Then the text’s 
commentary on the name—ה ֵּֽ  א ָׁר יָּ֙הָ֖ ָׁוהְיָּ֙ר  ַהְב, behar YHWH yērā’eh—is translated, “On the 
mountain of the LORD it will be provided.”  
The only problem is, these translations hide the significant theme of vision. It 
would be as accurate to say that Abraham names the place “the LORD sees,” and then say, 
“On the mount of the LORD there is vision” (NJPS). But another valid way to read 
Abraham’s original name for the site is, “the LORD is seen,”157 and thus, “On the 
mountain of YHWH, he can be seen.”158 In other words, the name could suggest that at 
this place, both God sees, and God is seen. The place where God sees is equally the place 
of theophany.  
Jon Levenson has analyzed the common rabbinic explanation for the origin of the 
name of Jerusalem. The rabbis said that the name nods to the fact that the land was both 
the site of Abraham’s test, YHWH-yir’eh, and home to Melchizedek (king of Salem; cf. 
Psalm 76:2). Thus the two names for the land were put together: Yireh-salem, 
Yĕrûšālaim.159 Acknowledging that this is an “unscientific” etymology for the word 
Jerusalem, Levenson goes on to explore whether or not the emphasis on sight in Genesis 
22 could have been, for the author of the narrative, an intentional “pun” on the word 
Jerusalem, and thus an allusion to the temple.160 All of this can be added to our earlier 
                                                 
157 Cf. Stanley Walters, “Wood, Sand and Stars: Structure and Theology,” Toronto Journal of Theology 3, 
no. 2 (September 1, 1987): 310; Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 114; Wenham, Word Biblical 
Commentary Vol. 2, Genesis 16-50, 110–11. 
158 Levenson, Sinai and Zion, 95; Levenson, “The Jerusalem Temple in Devotional and Visionary 
Experience,” 44. 
159 This explanation is spelled out in Genesis Rabbah 56:10; cf. Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of 
the Beloved Son, 119. 
160 Levenson says, “Given the centrality of Jerusalem to the history of Israel from the tenth century B.C.E. 
on, it is striking that the name of the city appears in the Pentateuch not once….Whatever its explanation, 
the reticence about naming Jerusalem may account both for ‘Salem’ in chapter 14 and for ‘Adonai-yireh’ 
in chapter 22. In each instance, the text may be deliberately employing a term that only suggests 
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review of the word “Moriah” to further suggest that the drama of Abraham and Isaac was 
always intended to speak to the theological origins of the temple. Thus when we 
emphasize that “Mount Zion is a place of visionary experience,”161 the action of Abraham 
and Isaac at that location is an integral part of the vision. 
We can press the issue one more time: just what is it that God sees at Moriah? 
There is actually a preposition used in the narrative that may help us address this crucial 
question. At Genesis 22:13, we read that the ram is offered in the place of (תַח  ַת, tḥt) Isaac. 
Some later rabbinic interpreters, turning to a secondary meaning of the word tḥt, argued 
that the ram was sacrificed after Isaac. This interpretation was used to suggest that 
Abraham and Isaac really did carry out the sacrifice, Isaac’s blood really was shed, and 
his flesh was even reduced to ashes, but then God resurrected him.162 While this 
interpretation constitutes a rather dramatic elaboration of the biblical text itself, it also 
represents a profound theological insight that is true to the letter of the text. The fact is, 
Isaac really was given over completely—even though the knife did not touch him—and 
the slaying of the ram indeed occurs both after the total sacrifice of Isaac, and also in that 
same place: in the same location, geographically, but also as a sacramental sign that 
shares the same theological-symbolic space.163  
                                                 
Jerusalem and does not name it.” Ibid., 123. Compare van Seters, Abraham in History and Tradition, 
238. 
161 Levenson, Sinai and Zion, 95. 
162 Kessler, Bound by the Bible, 126–28. 
163 Kessler shows that the rabbinic and patristic interpretations are somewhat different here: “Thus, in 
contrast to the church fathers who described the ram as ransoming Isaac, the rabbis described the ram as 
representing Isaac. The ram’s importance is dependent upon its association with Isaac.” Ibid., 144 
emphasis added. The Jewish tradition refers more and more to “Isaac’s blood” and “Isaac’s ashes,” while 
it is the ram that dies. Perhaps it is quite appropriate, from the perspective of the later tradition, to 
imagine Isaac looking upon the ram’s blood and ashes and saying, “This is my blood, these are my 
ashes.” The sacrifice of the ram is increasingly understood as significant because it is in fact the sacrifice 
of Isaac. 
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As the rabbis insist again and again, based partly on their expansion of the 
Genesis story, what God sees on Mount Moriah is Isaac’s blood. In the next chapter we 
will explore the fact that, in priestly theology, blood is not the portent of death, but the 
great symbol of life. Isaac truly is “the boy who lived”; for the early interpreters, his life 
is characterized by total freedom, abandoning even what is most precious to him, in 
genuine obedience before the God who has proven his faithfulness. In all of this, Isaac 
mirrors the remarkable hinneni-freedom of Abraham, who offered everything he had, his 
single hope in life and death. Father and son truly walk as one. Together, called by God, 
they put into motion a self-giving that becomes synonymous with the word “life,” which 
in principle reverses the cursed death of Adam’s clenched fist, and therefore establishes 
this site as truly the new Eden, the place of true life.164 In a unique way, both Abraham 
and Isaac are totally given up, they ascend together through the fire of a heart that “fears 
God.” The gift given to Abraham and Sarah, the beloved son, is reverently returned, and 
then YHWH confirms his perfect mercy and goodness again by giving even more. David 
Bentley Hart puts it best. Isaac, he says, “is the entire gift, returned before the gift has 
been truly given; but then God…gives the gift again…Henceforth Israel is doubly given, 
and can know itself only as gift, imparted by God and offered ceaselessly back to God, in 
the infinity of love’s exchange.”165 
The main theme of Levenson’s book is found in its title: The Death and 
Resurrection of the Beloved Son.166 Levenson notices the key pattern in the Hebrew 
                                                 
164 For the connection between Adam and Abraham in Genesis, see N. T. Wright, The New Testament and 
the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 262–66. 
165 Hart, Beauty of the Infinite, 352. 
166 Perhaps the suggestion in the book that grabs the most headlines is Levenson’s openness to the idea that 
the earliest Jews may have practiced child sacrifice, and that there are faint hints of this shadowy past 
still in the Bible, especially Exodus 22:28. While the re-construction of the stages that may have 
preceded the Israel of the prophets, where child sacrifice is forcefully and repeatedly condemned in the 
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Scriptures: the beloved son belongs to God, the son endures some kind of death (often a 
humiliation), and the son is restored and elevated. Isaac, therefore, is the icon of 
redeemed life, a type of life that passes through death into an even greater abundance. 
The blood that courses through his veins has indeed been given as a burnt offering 
without final loss, and therefore Isaac has a type of resurrection life. As Hart so brilliantly 
emphasizes, this very same blood is shared by all of Israel—from that day to today—
because Isaac is the source of the bloodline. All Israel must live up to the identity that is 
already most intimately hers, from her beating heart to her every limb. Yes, Israel, 
especially when she lives as Abraham and Isaac did, is the resurrection people—perhaps, 
from a Christian perspective, not yet the perfect consummation of this identity, as the 
events of Good Friday and Easter deepen and expand the mystery already present on 
Mount Moriah, but this fact does not at all diminish the true goodness, great beauty, and 
pure grace that is at the foundation of Israel’s life.  
This is the mystery of Moriah, and the Jewish theological tradition has meditated 
on it deeply. We have already mentioned that the morning and evening burnt offering, the 
Tamid, is a liturgical inclusio that contains all other sacrifices at the temple. Exploring 
the meaning of this practice, the rabbis were as perceptive and creative as ever. They 
said, “when Israel would sacrifice the daily offering on the altar and recite this verse [‘on 
                                                 
strongest terms, is inevitably difficult to establish for reasons we have reviewed through the work of 
Jonathan Klawans, Levenson does focus our attention on the essential theme that the firstborn belongs to 
God, which is theologically essential: “The underlying theology of the redemption of the first-born son is 
that, even more so than in the case of other human beings, the life of the son is his not by right, but by 
gift.” Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 59. The son, therefore, must undergo a 
death—although in the Hebrew Bible the death is almost always symbolic (with exceptions, such as 
Abel)—and the beloved child miraculously returns alive. Again and again, humiliation is paired with 
exaltation, and the burdens of “chosenness” are accentuated. From this perspective, Levenson claims that 
the Akedah is not written as a polemic against child sacrifice, but part of the great biblical pattern of the 
death of the firstborn, the humiliation of the chosen, and the final elevation of the one who fears God. 
Whatever the pre-history of Israel might look like, focus on these themes is profoundly illuminating.  
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the ṣ-p-n-h side of the altar’], the Holy One (blessed be He!) would remember the binding 
of Isaac.”167 This is in reference to Leviticus 1:11, which specifies where the burnt 
offering is to be sacrificed: “It shall be slaughtered before the Lord on the north side 
(הָׁנ ָֹ֖פ ָׁצ) of the altar…” As you can see, the vocalized Hebrew in this verse is the word 
ṣāp̄ônâh, which does mean “north side.” But another possible vocalization for the same 
Hebrew consonants (הנפצ) is הָ֖ ָׁנוּפְצ, ṣĕpûnâh, which means “hidden,” or even, “treasured 
up” (cf. Psalm 119:11). By “playfully misreading” the text in this way, the words recited 
morning and evening are “hidden (ṣĕpûnâh) before the Lord,”168 as if the priest calls to 
mind a mystery treasured up in the heart of God. What is it that God sees when these 
words are spoken? It is the blood, the life, of Isaac, given by Abraham and given-again 
by God. In this way, the entire temple cult is, first and foremost, rooted in the mystery of 
the Akedah, a binding which is true liberation for those who follow in the footsteps of the 
ones who said hinneni.169 
This is what God sees, and somehow in this vision, God also is seen. Certainly in 
the burnt offering there is the God who provides the ram, who is faithful to his covenant, 
who freely gives and gives again. Perhaps also, there is here the glimmer of a truth that 
will unfold with greater clarity in the history of revelation. God, we have said, in calling 
Abraham and awaiting his response, is the God who makes space for the freedom of the 
other, who desires genuine and free communion. There is vulnerability and self-giving in 
                                                 
167 Leviticus Rabbah 2.11, quoted in Gary A. Anderson, Sin: A History (Yale University Press, 2010), 201; 
cf. Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 185; Kessler, Bound by the Bible, 143. 
168 Anderson, Sin, 2010, 201. 
169 “…in the rabbinic mind, Israel’s daily sacrificial service was a way of memorializing the heroic self-
offering of the patriarch Isaac. Every time Israel made her sacrifice on earth, God contemplated Isaac’s 
merits that were stored in heaven.” Ibid. Similarly, “…we must see in the name ‘Moriah’ an effort to 
endow Abraham’s great act of obedience and faith with ongoing significance: the slaughter that he 
showed himself prepared to carry out was the first of innumerable sacrifices to be performed on that 
site.” Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 174. 
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this love. Abraham’s response, in word and act, signifies an analogous self-giving that 
comes to exemplify life’s core meaning: not to cling to the self, but to hand oneself over 
in freedom and love in God. In the fullness of time, the tradition stemming from Mount 
Moriah would come to understand that such self-giving in fact captures the inner mystery 
of the triune God who is Love. God is glimpsed on this mountain because Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob170 radiate the divine glory of the human being fully alive. In other words, 
perhaps the mutual-self-sacrificial motion of the three patriarchs on Moriah is, itself, one 
of YHWH’s most luminous theophanies in the Hebrew Bible. 
A Final Word: Akedah 
It seems so appropriate that the story that captures that paradox of true freedom 
and life through self-giving is remembered as “the binding,” akedah. In spite of the way 
this particular drama is so often denounced and dismissed in modern thought, the 
Abrahamic religions remain bound to the mystery of Moriah, and rightly so, because, in 
spite of the critics’ rush to distance themselves from the events described in Genesis 22, 
Abraham’s ‘olah, and the re-presentation of this one sacrifice in the priestly liturgical 
service on Zion, contains a most profound truth of the Jewish, and then Christian, faith. 
Even if this truth is still somewhat hidden, like a shadow that captures the reality only in 
blurred outline, nevertheless the truth is here, and thus we must return again and again to 
Moriah/Zion to meditate on its meaning. 
Throughout this chapter, one of the primary goals has been to critically assess the 
notion that the temple is the site of divine anger and retribution, of violence, and of death. 
                                                 
170 Jacob/Israel as present already in Isaac’s loins, as Hart says.  
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It is necessary to highlight the fact that the story of Abraham and Isaac has nothing 
whatever to do with punishment: there is not even the slightest hint that God calls for 
Isaac’s life to punish Abraham, or anyone, for anything. This story is more analogous to 
the tempting of Adam and Eve in Eden, but unlike our first parents, Abraham succeeds in 
establishing the pattern for paradisiac life—his hinneni, which calls forward toward 
Mary’s fiat, becomes the first word in the new creation. It is as if Genesis 22 provides the 
basic coordinates for finding the way back to the sacred center, the place where humanity 
and God dwell in peace.  
By the same token, this affirmation does not eliminate the difficulty that the 
“offering” demanded involves separating body and blood, letting lifeblood pour forth 
from the flesh. Why should this be part of the command? Even though I just argued that 
there is no mention of sin in the narrative of Isaac’s binding, perhaps this aspect points to 
the vast difference between Genesis 2-3 and Genesis 22. One remembers the shattering 
words of Jesus Christ: “Whoever comes to me and does not hate father and mother, wife 
and children, brothers and sisters, yes, and even life itself, cannot be my disciple” (Luke 
14:26). These words seem uncharacteristic and absurd. But it is apparently necessary: 
something about the human condition is so tied up in the attitude of craving, of clinging, 
of self-centeredness—analogous to the state of Saṃsāra, in Buddhist terms—that the 
medicine seems for us like violence and death. To give up the hold on finite things, to 
hand them over completely, to “hate” them, and to finally allow oneself to be suspended 
in divine freedom and love requires something radical, something seemingly impossible, 
but there is no other way.171 
                                                 
171 For an illuminating reflection on the meaning of “hate” in such contexts, see David W. Fagerberg, On 
Liturgical Asceticism (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013), 66–67. 
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Neither Abraham nor Isaac is called to die in the story as punishment—there is 
certainly no sense of propitiation here—but they are called to hand themselves over 
because this is what it means to live. The goodness of the covenant is not in growing in 
number or in wealth, but in living with God, and such life is characterized by giving, not 
taking. Abraham had Isaac truly only after letting him go, giving him back, recognizing 
what it means to be in communion with God. It is so often said that God “calls off” the 
sacrifice on the mountain, that God did not actually want Isaac’s life, but this seems like 
an inadequate interpretation. God does in fact want Abraham to live out the truth of 
hinneni, to express in his actions the truth that to receive grace, one cannot cling to it but 
must enter into a relationship of giving, even as it relates to that which is most precious to 
us. This becomes the cornerstone of the covenant. Abraham passes the test because he 
does give up what is most precious to him in this world, and God again proves 
trustworthy because nothing is lost but the gift is returned. The total gift of Abraham and 
Isaac is then sacramentally realized and recapitulated in the offering of the ram. This 
should not be read as a retreat, but as the joyful commemoration of what actually 
occurred: “Abraham! Abraham!” “Hinneni.” These words sum up the entire drama, and 
they represent that basic truth which is repeated at both the beginning and the end of the 
story. 
Finally, to reiterate, the abounding faithfulness of God to the covenant is shown 
vividly in the fact that Isaac is twice-given: he is not lost, but given super-abundantly. If 
this were not the case, the story of Israel would have reached its grim end that day, and 
the accusation that the commanding “deity” was demonic would be well supported. It 
would be a story of violence and death, and that’s it. Instead, the maxim concisely 
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articulated by C.S. Lewis finds dramatic expression: “Put first things first and we get 
second things thrown in: put second things first and we lose both first and second 
things.”172 This is not to minimize the life of one’s child, or anybody’s life, as a mere 
“secondary” thing of ambiguous importance—any more than Christ shows disdain for 
parents or spouses or siblings or the self. The point, rather, is that the moment any one of 
these things is idolized as if it were ultimate, everything is lost. On the flip side, Balthasar 
says, “Grace…can belong internally to the creature to the extent that the latter is ready to 
return the gift: thus, Abraham never possessed his son more intimately than after he had 
gone through the ultimate renunciation.”173 The covenant is fully ratified when the 
covenant partner is unspoiled by ego, the son is truly received when the father’s hands are 
unclenched. This is the truth that Abraham seems to perceive, almost intuitively, and 
therefore Abraham really is not blind in his obedience, but more perceptive than anyone. 
When we perceive the theo-logic at the root of the story—an understanding of reality that 
runs at cross-grains with everyday assumptions, but that nevertheless results in an even 
greater freedom and joy than we anticipate—it is easier to explain why this story has 
stood the test of time and remains the spiritual center of the Hebrew Bible.  
Part III: Temple Logic: Truth and Mystery 
We have seen that the temple is the place toward which Israel journeys to enjoy a 
personal, experiential, even visual encounter with the transforming glory of God: it is the 
place of praise and glorification. We have also seen that this vision of glory finds its 
                                                 
172 This concise statement is from a letter Lewis wrote to Dom Bede Griffiths in 1951, The Collected 
Letters of C.S. Lewis, Volume 3: Narnia, Cambridge, and Joy, 1950 - 1963 (Zondervan, 2007), 111; cf. 
Lewis’ essay, “First and Second Things” in God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics (Grand 
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1972), 278–81. 
173 Balthasar, GL6, 147. 
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definitive interpretation in the hinneni-act of Abraham (and Isaac) on the mountain top, 
that Abraham’s free movement in response to the divine call opens this space to uniquely 
become the dwelling place of the kabod-YHWH (the glory of God). True human freedom 
is seen in the person ready to respond positively to his or her God-given vocation, and 
true divine freedom is seen in the God who gives and gives again in abundance. For 
Israel, therefore, Zion is the site of aesthetics and ethics, glory and freedom. Our 
meditation on the theology of the temple cannot be complete, however, until we critically 
assess the logic of this mystery: how can this space iconically represent the truth of 
creation, and the truth of God? In other words, as we have already seen in both of the 
previous sections, there is an assertion that God is distinctively present in this place, that 
infinite divine Being and finite creaturely being somehow intersect and inter-dwell here. 
But is it not the case that infinity and finitude are mutually exclusive? How can they 
come together at Zion? The theological tradition cannot avoid this mystery. 
Indeed, in the long history of Jewish meditation on the mystery of God’s earthly 
dwelling place, we do in fact find a number of approaches to temple theology which 
attempt to conceptualize the relationship between God and creation in the sanctuary. In 
this section I will briefly touch on two main ideas that are introduced in embryonic form 
in the Bible, but then develop much further in post-biblical literature: (1) the idea that the 
temple is a microcosm, and (2) the idea that the temple is the mirror of heaven. As 
Jonathan Klawans has noted,  
it is imperative to distinguish carefully between those sources that describe the 
temple as representing cosmos and those that describe a temple in heaven to 
which the Jerusalem temple constitutes an earthly analogue. While the two ideas 
are not contradictory, there are many tensions between them, and, we will see, it 
is a general rule that ancient Jewish sources will articulate only one or the other of 
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these approaches, and not both.174 
 
While this is the general rule, it is not hard and fast. Distinguishing the “poles,” to borrow 
a Przywaraian term, may help us better notice and appreciate two tendencies in temple 
theology, but hopefully this schematic will not blind us to the nuances of the texts 
themselves. 
The central question in this section is how God relates to creaturely being, and the 
two ways of understanding the temple outlined above correspond with two perspectives 
on God’s relation with the world. (1) As the early Jews developed the notion that the 
temple is a microcosm, they wrestled with the question of God’s immanence, the mystery 
of “God-in-creation.” Similarly, (2) as early Jews reflected on the idea that the earthly 
temple reflects God’s heavenly temple, they pondered the question of God’s 
transcendence, the mystery of “God-beyond-creation.” Notably, therefore, around the 
time when Plato and Aristotle were writing their respective metaphysics, striking the 
matches that would ignite Western philosophy, the ancient Jews were confronting similar 
questions through theological meditation on a central symbol of their faith. When 
Jerusalem and Athens enter dialogue, Zion is the perfect place to host the conversation. In 
any case, anticipating the conclusion of this section, we should look back to the 
introduction of the chapter, which began with an awareness of the fact that the theme of 
incarnation has a pre-history in temple theology; now we will push this claim one step 
further to consider how the temple should rightly be seen as a rough-draft “concrete 
analogia entis.” In other words, climbing Mount Zion from opposing banks, the temple 
themes of “God in creation” and “God beyond creation” will find each other at the peak, 
                                                 
174 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 111. 
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producing the formula “God beyond-and-in creation.”175 This is ultimately a 
Christological affirmation, but it is not without anticipation.176 
At the Center of Creation 
As we have already discussed, one of the difficulties in interpreting ancient 
religious institutions and practices is that the symbolic worldview that animated these 
cultures is rarely described explicitly or systematically, especially in the oldest material. 
The idea that the temple is a microcosm seems to be of first importance in understanding 
its theological significance in ancient Israel, and no temple theme has received more 
attention in modern academic literature,177 even though the Greek word μικρόκοσμος 
                                                 
175 Cf. Przywara, Analogia Entis, 2013, 159–60. 
176 In the last few decades, many studies have appeared that analyze and summarize our two themes, so the 
soil is well-tilled. These studies very often explore the huge claims made for the Jewish temple in light of 
the similar assertions made by neighboring peoples about their own temples and sacred mountains—
Mircea Eliade led the way in this scholarship into primitive symbolism generally. See, for example, 
Eliade, The Sacred and The Profane, 36–47; Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and 
History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 6–21. This line of research has helpfully 
brought greater attention to the “worldview” of the ancient cultures generally, and the Near East 
specifically, which clarifies Israel’s convictions. I will take advantage of what has been discovered in 
these studies, but integrate it with the ideas explored at length in the previous sections; the truth of the 
temple, its ontological relevance, is inseparable from its status as an icon of glory and self-giving 
freedom. The temple and its cult are not arbitrary, they do not ultimately represent narrow ideological 
nationalism, but they have a theological significance that, in this particular and concrete way, exemplifies 
the most profound truth of creation as it reflects the truth of God. 
177 There is now an extensive body of literature on this issue. See especially Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and 
the Temple, 113–23; Hayward, The Jewish Temple, 9–10; Levenson, “The Temple and the World,” 284–
88, 295–97; Levenson, “The Jerusalem Temple in Devotional and Visionary Experience,” 138–45; 
Levenson, Sinai and Zion, 138–45; Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, 78ff; Gary A. 
Anderson, “Introduction to Israelite Religion,” in New Interpreter’s Bible, vol. 1 (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 1994), 278–79; Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission, 32–36; Clements, God 
and Temple, 65–67; Andrei Orlov, Divine Scapegoats: Demonic Mimesis in Early Jewish Mysticism 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2014), 37 ff.; Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam: Liturgical 
Anthropology in the Dead Sea Scrolls (BRILL, 2002), 62–66, 74–75; Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, 
“Jesus, the Temple and the Dissolution of Heaven and Earth,” in Apocalyptic in History and Tradition, 
ed. Christopher Rowland and John Barton, JSPSup - Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha: 
Supplement Series 43 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 122–29; Fletcher-Louis, “God’s 
Image, His Cosmic Temple and the High Priest,” 82–83, 88–89; Margaret Barker, “Time and Eternity : 
The World of the Temple,” Month 34, no. 1 (2001): 16–18; Margaret Barker, Temple Theology (London: 
SPCK, 2004), 17–32; Elizabeth Bloch-Smith, “‘Who Is the King of Glory?’ Solomon’s Temple and Its 
Symbolism,” Scripture and Other Artifacts: Essays on the Bible in Honor of Philip J. King, 1994, 18–31; 
Yves Congar and R. F Trevett, The Mystery of the Temple, Or, The Manner of God’s Presence to His 
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obviously does not appear in the Hebrew Bible. The idea that the temple epitomizes and 
makes present in miniature the reality of the entire cosmos is a key idea, especially in the 
priestly writings.178  
One of the reasons why modern scholars have been more attuned to the 
relationship between creation and temple building in priestly theology is the fact that 
there is now a much greater familiarity with the broader cultural and theological 
landscape. Since the 19th century, scholars of ancient Hebrew religion have had ready 
access to Mesopotamian creation myths like the well-known Enuma Elish, which bears a 
faint family resemblance to biblical creation accounts, like lost cousins raised in different 
worlds. This Babylonian story offers a general theogony, but focuses on the hero Marduk, 
who achieves preeminence by conquering Tiamat, the ocean goddess, bringer of chaos. 
From her defeated corpse he constructs our world, and from the blood of Tiamat’s 
consort, Kingu, he creates human beings who, through their toil, will bring relief to the 
gods. In gratitude for Marduk’s triumph, the other gods build him a temple; they say, 
“You have freed us, / Therefore, we must glorify you. / We will construct a House for 
Marduk known throughout the land / Its precincts will be our place of comfort and 
rest.”179 Soon after receiving this promise, the gods build the temple and Marduk is 
enthroned in his new dwelling. What is notable here is the pattern, which has parallels in 
other ancient cosmogonies, of the god who is victorious over chaos, who establishes the 
                                                 
Creatures from Genesis to the Apocalypse (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1962), 94–100. For 
Mesopotamian and Egyptian parallels to the cosmic symbolism in the Jerusalem Temple, see Bernd 
Janowski, “Der Tempel als Kosmos - Zur kosmologischen Bedeutung des Tempels in der Umwelt 
Israels,” in Egypt -- Temple of the Whole World (Leiden: Bril, 2003), 163–86. 
178 Levenson defines “microcosm” succinctly when he says the temple is an “eikōn…It is not one of many 
items in the world. It is the world in nuce, and the world is the Temple in extenso.” Levenson, “The 
Temple and the World,” 285. 
179 Victor Harold Matthews and Don C. Benjamin, Old Testament Parallels: Laws and Stories from the 
Ancient Near East (Paulist Press, 2006), 19. 
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world, and who commemorates the victory by building a temple, establishing a throne, 
and there receiving tribute.  
 The story of Genesis does not seem to fit this pattern in numerous respects. No 
story of God’s origin is given or implied. The idea of a cosmic war to defeat chaos hardly 
registers.180 And then, in the priestly account of creation, while God rests upon 
completing his work, no temple is mentioned. This series of dissimilarities between 
Enuma Elish and Genesis 1 could imply that—against the surrounding cultural norms—
the creation of the world and the establishment of God’s tabernacle are very distinct in 
the biblical tradition, thus undermining the cosmic relevance of the temple, as if the 
themes of creation and covenant worship are unrelated in Israel. Over the last forty years, 
however, biblical scholars have started to notice long-forgotten parallels in the priestly 
materials that have catalyzed new interest in the temple as a cosmic reality.181 In 1976, 
Joseph Blenkinsopp detected key formulas that appear frequently in the priestly texts: the 
                                                 
180 Jon Levenson’s investigation of the Chaoskampf theme in the Hebrew Bible—largely in response to 
Yehezkel Kaufmann’s claim that the “basic idea of Israelite religion” is the “absolute sovereignty” of 
YHWH—is a modern classic. He suggests that the memory of a war between YHWH and the sea 
god/chaos is retained in a number of passages—references to Yam, Leviathan, Amalek, and Gog all nod 
in this direction. Psalm 74 is presented as a prime example of an alternative creation story where YHWH 
struggles against Yam, and something similar is suggested in Isaiah 51:9-11. Remnants of this ancient 
concept are retained even in the opening chapter of Genesis, where the creation of the waters is not 
mentioned, and the goal might be understood as bringing order to the primordial abyss. Nevertheless, 
Levenson admits that the theme of cosmic war has largely been removed from the priestly account of 
creation. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, esp. 1-13. Sommer has defended Kaufmann’s 
affirmation of God’s sovereignty in the Bible against Levenson; see Sommer, Bodies of God, 271–72 
n.106. A different, useful approach to the questions raised by Levenson is found in Matthew Levering, 
Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (John Wiley & Sons, 
2008), 77ff. 
181 Jon Levenson identifies rabbinic passages where the building of the sanctuary is already correlated with 
the creation of the world. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, 96–99. Even further back, one 
finds creation and temple repeatedly paired in priestly literature. In Jubilees, God “said to the angel of the 
presence, ‘Write for Moses from the first creation until my sanctuary is built in their midst forever and 
ever…’” (1:28). The text then speaks of how the angel communicates to Moses “the division of 
years…from [the day of creation until] the day of the new creation when the heaven and earth and all of 
their creatures shall be renewed according to the powers of heaven and according to the whole nature of 
earth, until the sanctuary of the Lord is created in Jerusalem upon Mount Zion” (1:29). It seems that for 
the author of Jubilees, first creation and “new creation”—the creation of the sanctuary—go together. 
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“solemn conclusion,” which marked the successful completion of a work, and the 
“execution-formula,” which affirmed that the work was carried out exactly according to 
God’s command.182 By tracking the use of these formulas, Blenkinsopp identified three 
key moments in the narrative: the creation of the world, the consecration of the tabernacle 
at Sinai, and the installation of the tabernacle in the land promised to Israel.183 Looking 
carefully at the linguistic parallels between the creation and the sanctuary building 
“conclusion formulas” in P, Blenkinsopp finds that the consecration of the tabernacle is 
“the climax of creation.”184  
One year later, Moshe Weinfeld published a paper in Hebrew which made the 
important observation that the priestly account of God’s creation in Genesis and the story 
of the building of God’s sanctuary in Exodus both end in the same way: with a robust 
theology of Sabbath (Genesis 2:2-3 and Exodus 31:12-17). There are also a number of 
verbal echoes between these passages emphasizing “satisfactory completion of the 
enterprise commanded by God.”185 The goal, in both cases, is the same; as Levenson puts 
it, “the cosmogonic and the historical myths are not to be distinguished: their end point is 
the same, YHWH and Israel at rest in His sacred precincts.”186 Later that same year, Peter 
J. Kearney published similar findings that linked creation and tabernacle.187 He noticed 
that there are seven speeches in Exodus 25-31, each beginning with the words “The Lord 
said to Moses,” and the seventh speech (as Weinfeld also said) focused on keeping the 
                                                 
182 Joseph Blenkinsopp, “Structure of P,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1976): 276.  
183 Ibid., 278. 
184 Ibid., 286. 
185 The Hebrew paper was published in 1977; it appeared in English a few years later. Moshe Weinfeld, 
“Sabbath, Temple, and the Enthronement of the Lord: The Problem of the ‘Sitz Im Leben’of Genesis 1: 
1-2: 3,” Mélanges Bibliques et Orientaux En L’honneur de M. Henri Cazelles, 1981, 503. 
186 Levenson, “The Jerusalem Temple in Devotional and Visionary Experience,” 52. 
187 Peter J. Kearney, “Creation and Liturgy: The P Redaction of Ex 25—40,” Zeitschrift Für Die 
Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 89, no. 3 (1977): 375–387. 
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Sabbath. The first six speeches give precise instructions on how to set up the tabernacle, 
and even these speeches seem in some way to parallel the days of creation. The command 
to construct the lampstand is given in the first speech, which corresponds to the 
separation of light and darkness. The third speech addresses the fabrication of the “laver 
of bronze,” which is elsewhere called “the Sea” (1 Kings 7:23), which could parallel 
God’s separation of the dry land and the sea. The sixth speech, which would be 
associated with the creation of human beings, focuses on the craftsman Bezaleel, who is 
filled with the Spirit as to carry out the work.188 
Therefore, in the mid-1970s various lines of evidence for the connection between 
creation and tabernacle emerged, which helped spur renewed interest in the idea that the 
Jerusalem temple189 was a cosmic institution. Due to the recent, more sympathetic 
readings of priestly texts, it is now regularly argued that, within this theology, the work of 
creation is not properly complete until the tabernacle is erected and God’s glory dwells 
with his people. But perhaps this is putting it badly, because according to this approach 
the tabernacle is not the final piece of the puzzle that must be added before creation is 
whole—it is, rather, the very same creation in miniature, with one notable distinction: at 
                                                 
188 While this work has been well received overall, some find that a few of the parallels described by 
Kearney unpersuasive. For an example of such a critique, Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of 
Evil, 83. As a result, efforts have been made to offer alternative explanations for how the seven days of 
Genesis are symbolically connected to the construction of the tabernacle of Exodus. Margaret Barker 
relates the days of Genesis to the assembly of the tabernacle in Exodus 40:17-32, where the execution 
formula “as the Lord had commanded Moses” is repeated seven times; Barker, “Time and Eternity,” 16–
17; Barker, Temple Theology, 17–19. For an scholar who thinks the persuasiveness of Kearney’s 
elaborate theory of correspondences has been underplayed, see Crispin Fletcher-Louis, “The Cosmology 
of P and Theological Anthropology in the Wisdom of Jesus Ben Sira,” in Of Scribes and Sages: Early 
Jewish Interpretation and Transmission of Scripture, ed. Craig A Evans (Sheffield Academic Press, 
2004), 11–14. 
189 It is notable that the sevenfold pattern is carried over into Temple building too; 1 Kings 6:38 points out 
that it took Solomon seven years to build the temple. It was dedicated in the seventh month (1 Kings 8:2) 
during a seven day festival (1 Kings 8:65). Thus, just as there are parallels between creation and building 
the tabernacle, something similar can be said specific to the Temple. Cf. Levenson, “The Temple and the 
World,” 288–89. 
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Sinai, God invites and empowers his creatures to partake in the work of establishing the 
cosmos.190 The rhythm of Exodus is command and precise execution, and in some ways 
even this mirrors Genesis, which reads similarly: “God said, “Let there be an expanse in 
the midst of the water… God made the expanse…” (Gen 1:6-7).191 But now the execution 
is carried out by free human beings, invited to respond to God’s word and (with the help 
of the Spirit; Exodus 35:31) themselves build the sanctuary where God will dwell. In so 
doing, they recapitulate the divine work of establishing order. Emphasis on establishing 
order is crucial for Levenson as well: “The concern of creation theology is not creatio ex 
nihilo, but the establishment of a benevolent and life-sustaining order, founded upon the 
demonstrated authority of God who is triumphant over all rivals.”192 A “benevolent and 
life-sustaining order”—this is key. True enough, Levenson says, this order is kept 
primarily through maintaining boundaries,193 but are such boundaries the heart and soul 
of this “order”? What is at the very center of the “life-sustaining order” that is the 
hallmark of priestly creation theology? 
According to Gary Anderson, the completion of the work of Moses is not simply 
in building a structure. The work is complete, instead, with the lighting of the sacrificial 
pyre, or in other words, with the inauguration of the Tamid sacrifice, the morning and 
evening burnt offerings. He says, “when the daily sacrifices began (Exodus 29:38-42 = 
Leviticus 9) the goal of all creation would be consummated.”194 It is important to again 
emphasize, therefore, that tabernacle and sacrifice go together. The divine presence 
                                                 
190 Anderson, The Genesis of Perfection, cf. 201. Jonathan Klawans ties this in with the idea of imitatio 
Dei; Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 115–16. 
191 Cf. Gary A. Anderson, “As We Have Heard So We Have Seen,” Conservative Judaism 54 (2002): 55. 
192 Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, 47. 
193 Ibid., 65. 
194 Anderson, The Genesis of Perfection, 202.  
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which is enjoyed at the tabernacle, and the corresponding cosmic order associated with 
the tabernacle, are inseparable from the burnt offerings that would open and close each 
day.195 Therefore, the concept of cosmic order must be read in light of the Akedah 
theology that we have explored in this chapter. If Levenson is indeed correct that the goal 
of creation is to establish a “benevolent and life-sustaining order,” and if Anderson is 
right that this is consummated with the lighting of the sacrificial pyre, then it can rightly 
be argued that this order is ultimately characterized by the mysterious word hinneni: true 
freedom, true readiness before God.  
Levenson continues by suggesting that order was “founded upon the demonstrated 
authority of God who is triumphant over all rivals,” but again, if triumph over chaos is 
commemorated in the temple, in the microcosm, then it must be a triumph that works 
itself out through the self-giving posture that characterizes the sacrificial practices that 
bring life to the sanctuary. After all, God is seen, YHWH-yireh, specifically at the place 
where the Abraham-hinneni relationship is brought to act; somehow this way of being 
must itself be the undoing of every chaotic and demonic force. If the theology of the 
Akedah and the theology of Mount Zion are interrelated, and if the temple consummates 
and re-presents creation in its most essential form, then it must be the case that the very 
heart of creation itself was expressed on Mount Moriah. This, in any case, is how I 
understand the affirmation that the temple is a microcosm.  
Stemming from the widely recognized relationship between creation and temple-
                                                 
195 One finds hints of this idea already in the Greek translation of Sirach, which says that at the culmination 
of the Tamid sacrifice, the priests would lead the congregation in shouts and song: “Then all the people 
hastened together / And fell to their faces, to the ground… / And the people besought the Lord Most 
High / In prayer before the Merciful One, / Until the order (kosmos) of the Lord was completed.” Sirach 
50:17, 19 in Hayward, The Jewish Temple, 74. Hayward notices that in the translator’s choice of words, 
“we are invited to see the implication that the kosmos, the universe, is somehow ‘completed’, Greek 
suntelesthêi, in the Tamid.” Ibid., 79. It is sacrificial praise that brings the kosmos to completion.  
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building in the ancient Near East, and the specific priestly interconnection between 
Genesis 1 and Exodus 25-40 as it has been described in recent studies,196 one might well 
expect to find that the temple is rich with iconic, cosmic features. This expectation is 
heightened given the profound attention to detail expressed in the priestly texts on the 
construction of the tabernacle in Exodus, or the analogous way in which Ezekiel 
exhaustively describes exact temple measurements (Ezekiel 40-42); it seems clear that 
every room and piece of furniture is of utmost significance. It should therefore come as 
no surprise that the early interpretative tradition poured over each aspect of the temple in 
an attempt to understand its cosmic meaning.  
The Psalmist says that YHWH “built His Sanctuary like the heavens, / like the 
earth that He established forever” (78:69).197 For those able to interpret the symbols, the 
temple on Mount Zion is homologous, it has a like structure, to heaven and earth. 
Certainly Philo and Josephus had such vision.198 According to Josephus, if one studies 
the construction of the tabernacle, the priest’s vestments, and the furniture, “every one of 
these objects is intended to recall and represent the universe, as [the observer] will find if 
he will but consent to examine them without prejudice and with understanding.”199 The 
general approach taken by both Philo and Josephus was to observe that the tabernacle or 
temple is subdivided into three areas of increasing holiness—the outer court (altar), the 
holy place (shrine), and the holy of holies (adytum or debir)200—and to correlate this 
                                                 
196 Leviticus 8 and 9 should be included as well. See Gary A. Anderson, “Inauguration of the Tabernacle 
Service at Sinai,” in The Temple of Jerusalem: From Moses to the Messiah: In Honor of Professor Louis 
H. Feldman, ed. Steven Fine (BRILL, 2011), 1–15. 
197 See Levenson’s commentary on this verse: Creation and the Persistence of Evil, 87. 
198 The teachings of Philo and Josephus on the temple are extensively summarized in various places. See 
Hayward, The Jewish Temple, 108–53; Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 114–23. 
199 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities Book 3, Paragraph 7, Line 180. 
200 On the “grades of sanctity in the tabernacle,” see Menahem Haran, Temples and Temple-Service in 
Ancient Israel: An Inquiry into the Character of Cult Phenomena and the Historical Setting of the 
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tripartite structure with the threefold cosmos—earth and sea, the visible heavens, and the 
highest heaven. With this superstructure in place, the fixtures located in each realm were 
symbolically associated with the appropriate cosmic elements. Josephus and Philo focus 
on the shrine (symbolic of the visible heavens), and describe the menorah as a symbol of 
the “seven planets”;201 the twelve loaves of the bread of presence call to mind the twelve 
months of the year, or the signs of the zodiac; and special emphasis was given to the veil, 
in which four colored materials are woven together, representing the four elements which 
make up the universe.202 Modern scholars, using ancient Near Eastern parallels, have 
identified numerous other possible cosmic symbols. As mentioned, the copper basin in 
the outer courtyard is called “the Sea,” and the altar of burnt offerings may well have 
been related to the earth.203 
 Then, of course, there is the symbolism of the holy of holies, that perfectly 
square, windowless, innermost chamber of the temple. In Solomon’s temple, this room 
contained the ark of the covenant with its Kapporet (mercy seat, 1 Kings 6:19), and two 
large cherubim with a wingspan as wide as the room itself (1 Kings 6:23-28; 2 Chronicles 
3:11-13). On the walls of both the shrine and the holy of holies, Solomon instructed the 
                                                 
Priestly School (Clarendon Press, 1977), 175–88; cf. Hundley, “Sacred Spaces, Objects, Offerings, and 
People in the Priestly Texts: A Reappraisal”; Rachel Elior, “The Jerusalem Temple: The Representation 
of the Imperceptible,” Studies in Spirituality 11 (2001): 131–32. 
201 Beale makes an interesting observation: the generic word “lights” (mĕ’ōrōt) is used five times in 
Genesis 1 to identify the lights in the sky, whereas more expected words, like sun and moon, do not 
appear. Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission. Another common suggestion is that the menorah 
represents a “cosmic tree,” or more specifically, the tree of life. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence 
of Evil, 84. 
202 “The tapestries woven of four materials denote the natural elements: thus the fine linen appears to typify 
the earth, because from it springs up the flax, and the purple the sea, since it is incarnadined with the 
blood of fish; the air must be indicated by the blue, and the crimson will be the symbol of fire.” Josephus, 
Jewish Antiquities Book 3, Paragraph 7, Line 183. Emphasis on the veil grows in apocalyptic literature, 
where one perceives in it the entire history of the world. Orlov, Divine Scapegoats, 2014, 44–50; Barker, 
Temple Theology, 27–32; Margaret Barker, The Great High Priest: The Temple Roots of Christian 
Liturgy (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2003), 188–228. 
203 Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission, 33. 
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workers to carve “reliefs of cherubim, palms, and calyxes” (1 Kings 6:29); 2 Chronicles 
also mentions palm trees (3:5), precious stones (v. 6), and chains decorated with 
pomegranates (v. 16). Absolutely everything was overlaid with pure gold. The room, it 
seems, was filled with lush greenery, the fragrance of blooming flowers, and the whirl of 
cherubim in flight. It was the shabbat-space,204 the shalom-place,205 the very throne 
room206 of the glorious God of Israel.  
The imagery of the room undoubtedly calls to mind a peaceful, fertile garden. As 
we saw in the first chapter of this book, readers of Hebrew scripture have repeatedly 
connected this space to the garden of Eden, and there are many parallels that invite and 
justify that connection.207 The temple is the truth of creation in miniature, and at its 
innermost heart—hidden, but nevertheless present—it is paradisiacal. For Margaret 
Barker—who definitely favors a strong mystical theology which she associates with the 
first temple—the high priest who steps beyond the veil, into the holy of holies, steps 
“outside matter and time, and rituals in the holy of holies were deemed to take place in 
eternity…”208 She associates this with “original unity,” which she construes in terms of 
                                                 
204 The connection between holy space and holy time, especially the ideas of sanctuary and Sabbath, is of 
profound importance for early temple theology. For a helpful introduction to this connection, see 
Berman, The Temple, 10–19. 
205 The idea that the holy of holies—and, indeed, the entire temple complex—is the great icon of peace is 
the central argument of this chapter overall. Therefore, the claim found in the Book of Similitudes (1 
Enoch 37-71) is of utmost importance. In the throne room of God, an angel says to Enoch, “[YHWH] shall 
proclaim peace [shalom] to you in the name of the world that is to become. For from here proceeds peace 
[shalom] since the creation of the world, and so it shall be unto you forever and ever and ever.” (1 
Enouch 71:15, emphasis added) 
206 Analogous to an intimate private “bedchamber”: Michael B. Hundley, “Before YHWH at the Entrance of 
the Tent of Meeting: A Study of Spatial and Conceptual Geography in the Priestly Texts,” Zeitschrift Für 
Die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 123, no. 1 (2011): 22. 
207 Levenson, “The Temple and the World,” 297–98; Levenson, Sinai and Zion, 128–33; Beale, The Temple 
and the Church’s Mission, 66–80. For a recent study that does an exceptional job of emphasizing this 
idea, see Morales, Who Shall Ascend the Mountain of the Lord?, 2015. 
208 Barker, Temple Theology, 24. 
  Barker is one of the most fascinating and unconventional voices in modern biblical scholarship. 
Crispin Fletcher-Louis, in a recent account of his intellectual debts, says his thought includes “a 
sprinkling of Margaret Barker (a muse to many of us…)” Jesus Monotheism : Volume 1: Christological 
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“the One”—at this point her work moves in an overly monistic direction—but it is 
valuable to recall that Eden is indeed where the all-unity of love was broken, where 
Adam and Eve were made incapable of the Tree of Life, by a clinging desire to take what 
had not been given. Abraham and Isaac exemplify the exact opposite way of being, the 
route to true life through freely handing oneself over in a bond of trust. This at last points 
humanity back toward what is most original, and thus it is fitting that (again, according to 
the priestly Chronicler) the mountain of the Akedah would become the site of the temple, 
and that the central, most sacred precinct of the temple would once more be a garden 
sanctuary where God and his creatures might live together in joy, peace, and oneness. 
This notion of dwelling together raises one other central feature of the temple that 
                                                 
Origins: The Emerging Consensus and Beyond (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2015), xiii. That’s well 
said. Barker is something of a muse, one who is attractive for her bold, paradigm shifting vision, but who 
also raises concerns with some of her idiosyncratic or brazenly unorthodox beliefs. Therefore, many who 
work with Barker feel compelled to make some kind of statement about her highly original perspective. 
Here’s mine.  
  Those who minimize the importance of priestly theology reduce the polyphonic richness of the 
Bible. To her credit, Barker has been way out in front of the movement to give temple theology the 
respect and esteem that it very much deserves. Before it was popular, she emphasized the centrality of 
temple themes in both canonical and extra-canonical works, Jewish and Christian. However, in her own 
way Barker exemplifies similarly divisive tendencies. Like so many biblical scholars—as we’ve seen and 
will continue to see—her reading of the scriptural text is highly partisan; as if separating the goats from 
the lambs, she deems large blocks of the Bible unsatisfactory due to the influence of later, ostensibly 
decadent theological movements, while other textual strands are isolated, scrubbed of corruption, and 
celebrated as the true theology of early Israel. (You might say she is Wellhausen in mirror image.) What 
sets Barker apart is that, for her, it is the ancient temple traditions that are retrieved as profound and 
fruitful—those texts that can be traced back specifically to the practices of the pre-Josiah first temple (as 
she reconstructs it)—while the villain in her account is the Deuteronomists who set themselves against 
the vibrant, cosmic, symbolic, and ancient faith of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and in its place impose the 
grim, philosophical, and novel “‘Moses’ religion”. Barker, Temple Theology, 6, cf. 78. The glorious 
world of first temple theology can and must be reconstructed only with help of those texts that the 
Deuteronomists, later rabbis, and then “orthodox” Christians, have suppressed. Ibid., cf. 9. Therefore, 
while Barker is often delightfully provocative, and while her black-and-white approach has the advantage 
of being clear and forceful, the systematic marginalization of huge swaths of biblical material, 
exemplifying utter disinterest in the notion of a shared “canon,” cannot finally represent a way forward 
for Christian theology. At best, she makes us aware of voices in the Bible that have been inadequately 
understood or appreciated, but these voices still must come into dialogue with other biblical traditions, 
including the Deuteronomists and redactors. Scholars such as Levenson and Sommer model a far more 
subtle and nuanced approach to minority biblical traditions. For a similar critique of Barker, see D. 
Stephen Long, Hebrews. ; Belief: A Theological Commentary on the Bible. (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2011), 153–56; cf. Stratford Caldecott, All Things Made New: The Mysteries of the 
World in Christ (Angelico Press, 2011), 201–6.  
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has been largely neglected: the priests themselves, and especially the high priest. After 
all, human beings were not typically admitted to God’s private chamber in the old 
covenant, except for the high priest, and then only once a year on Yom Kippur. Israel 
enters into God’s most intimate space in the holy of holies only through the mediation of 
the high priest, and thus appreciation for the significance of this office is an important 
aspect of temple theology. In fact, insofar as the instructions for building the tabernacle 
and its furniture, designs for priestly garments, rubrics for priestly ordination, and 
guidelines for the sacrificial rites are completely intertwined in Exodus 25 through 
Leviticus 9, it must be said that the office of the priesthood and the institution of the 
temple are interpenetrating realities.209  
 This concept can be seen by reflection on his vestments. From the biblical 
perspective, the correct design and usage of the priestly vestments is crucial, and the 
parallels between the High Priest’s garments and the tabernacle itself are very 
significant.210 As Gary Anderson points out, because only priests were allowed in the 
inner sanctuaries of the tabernacle, the rest of Israel did not have direct visual access to 
these spaces, but when they saw the high priest adorned in glory—his turban with the 
                                                 
209 As Leigh Trevaskis says, “…the holiness of the high priest and the sanctuary share a degree of 
interdependence so that to remove one detracts from the holiness of the other.” Holiness, Ethics and 
Ritual in Leviticus, 222; cf. 226. Crispin Fletcher-Louis has pushed even further in arguing for an 
inextricable relationship between temple and high priest. He says, “In the temples of the ancient Near 
Eastern antiquity the idols play a role without which a temple cannot properly function….The symbolism 
of their place, attire and activities is inseparable from the belief that their temples are maps of the 
cosmos. If, as is usually thought, Israelite religion is utterly aniconic then its cult is, in terms of the 
history-of-religions, an oddity….I suggest that P’s challenge to contemporary patterns of religious 
behavior is more radical than odd because in Israel’s Temple (and Tabernacle) the role of the cult statue 
is played by the high priest who is the visible and concrete image of the creator within the Temple-as-
microcosm.” Fletcher-Louis, “God’s Image, His Cosmic Temple and the High Priest,” 89, emphasis in 
original. 
210 Brant Pitre puts this especially clearly: “…it is critical to note here that in ancient Judaism, there was 
one person who was viewed as embodying in himself both the Temple and the cosmos. That person was 
the Jewish High Priest, whose liturgical vestments were meant to replicate both the Temple and the 
universe.” Brant Pitre, “Jesus, the New Temple, and the New Priesthood,” Letter & Spirit 4 (2008): 61. 
114 
 
name of YHWH written on a gold plate, his breastplate with its many precious gems, his 
clothing woven from the same materials, with the same cosmically significant colors, as 
the temple’s sacred veil211—they reacted with awe and joy: “To catch sight of the High 
Priest is to glimpse the inner recesses of the divine chamber.”212 In other words, the high 
priest, resplendently vested, mediates to Israel the inner mysteries as the temple, even as 
he personally signifies all Israel, and indeed all creation, to God in the holy of holies on 
Yom Kippur.213 This latter view is clearly expressed by Philo, for whom the priest also 
“represents the world” and is a “small cosmos.”214 The high priest and the temple 
interrelate in profound ways, perhaps pointing toward and requiring one another. 
One additional microcosm theme which finds expression in biblical and early 
Jewish literature bears mentioning; this theme is something of a corollary to everything 
we have discussed in this section. For ancient Israel, the temple was truly the center—the 
“navel”—of the universe, it is the axis that unites the spheres, it is the “foundation stone” 
that secures cosmic order. There is no second temple text that more clearly expresses this 
theme than Jubilees: “And [Noah] knew that the garden of Eden was the holy of holies 
                                                 
211 See Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission, 39–45. According to the description of the high priest 
in Wisdom of Solomon, “on his long robe the whole world was depicted, and the glories of the ancestors 
were engraved on the four rows of stones, and your majesty was on the diadem upon his head” (18:24, 
NRSV, emphasis added). 
212 Anderson, “As We Have Heard So We Have Seen,” 55; cf. Anderson, “Inauguration of the Tabernacle 
Service at Sinai,” 14. The intense language used to describe visions of the high priest is most striking, 
especially in the Hebrew version of Sirach (The Wisdom of Jesus Ben Sira), which uses an immense 
range of natural and cultic imagery to describe the high priest: “When he covered himself with the 
garments of glory / And clothed himself in garments of beauty.” Sirach 50:11, translated by Hayward, 
The Jewish Temple, 42. Equally incredible is the “astonishment” of Aristeas when he sees the high priest 
Eleazar, “both as regards the form of his robe and his splendor which consisted in the dress which he 
wore, a tunic and the precious stones upon it.” Paragraph 96, translated by Ibid., 29. Aristeas then 
describes the “royal diadem” on the priest’s head, upon which God’s sacred name was embossed, and he 
concludes, “The overall appearance of these things created awe and confusion, so as to make one think 
that he has come close to another man from outside the world…” Paragraph 99, Ibid., 30. 
213 Fletcher-Louis, “Jesus’ Divine Self-Consciousness: A Proposal,” 4. 
214 Philo, Life of Moses, 2.135. Quoted in Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission, 47. Elsewhere 
Philo also says that each rational soul is a temple; Hayward, The Jewish Temple, 110–11. 
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and the dwelling of the LORD. And Mount Sinai (was) in the midst of the desert and 
Mount Zion (was) in the midst of the navel of the earth.”215 This idea likely goes much 
further back in the priestly tradition than Jubilees, at least as far back as Ezekiel, where 
there are references to Jerusalem as “the center (ךְוֹ  תְב) of the nations,”216 and even “at the 
very navel (רוּ  בַט) of the earth.”217 To associate this location with the navel points to its 
centrality, yes, but also to the idea that it is the place from which creation originated, the 
true source of our world. The same theological community that saw Zion as the source of 
the world would also celebrate this Judean hill as a mountain of unmatched elevation; 
thus, Mount Zion truly was the source and summit of Israel’s spiritual life.  
There was nothing more crucial, for Israel, than to maintain good order at the 
microcosmic center. The priests were convinced that they had a vocation, on behalf of the 
whole people, to carefully fulfill their ritual duties, believing that the entire cosmos was 
protected and sustained by their work. According to Levenson, their successful efforts 
were considered the ultimate “bulwark and guarantee against chaos,”218 and failure would 
thus be devastating for heaven and earth. As Fletcher-Louis says, “There is much to 
suggest that they thought that temple service was ‘sacramental’ and that because it 
guaranteed the stability of its symbolic referent, the real physical world, its destruction 
                                                 
215 Charlesworth, “Jubilees,” 8:19. Other extra-biblical examples include Sibylline Oracles 5.249-51; 1 
Enoch 26.1; Aristeas 83; Philo’s Legatio ad Gaium 294; and Josephus’ War of the Jews 3.52–5, which is 
another nice clear text: “The city of Jerusalem lies at its very centre [of Judaea] for which reason the 
town has sometimes not inaptly been called the ‘navel’ of the country.” For a general review of this 
material, see P. S. Alexander, “Jerusalem as the Omphalos of the World : On the History of a 
Geographical Concept,” Judaism 46, no. 2 (1997): 147–58; Fishbane, “The Sacred Center,” 14; 
Levenson, “The Temple and the World,” 282–84. 
216 For a defense of the translation of bĕtôk as “in the very center of,” see Levenson, “The Temple and the 
World,” 284. 
217 Ezekiel 38:12. For a defense of the rare word ṭabbûr as “navel,” see Levenson, Sinai and Zion, 115–17.  
218 Ibid., 154.  
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would logically mean the real destruction of that world.”219 And so they would return, 
day and night, to Mount Moriah, continually grafting themselves in to the self-giving 
faithfulness of Abraham and Isaac through their sacred rites, convinced that by this 
humble work they were establishing for Israel and for the world a lasting cosmic peace.  
By interrelating the phenomenon of the temple with the mystery of creation itself, 
priestly theology invites a conversation between philosophy and theology. Here there is 
already a meditation on how creaturely truth may point toward a yet deeper divine truth. 
The temple is a complex symbol that shows how different cosmic orders relate to one 
another, all pointing toward and centered in the immanent presence of God. In the 
outermost sphere, the courtyard, there were symbols of land and sea. This is the realm 
where priests moved freely, performing their everyday work, the regular rhythms of 
guarding and keeping the sacred space, fueling the fire, and offering sacrifices. The holy 
place was next, one sphere closer to the center, and it included symbols associated 
(originally or eventually) with light, cosmic trees, nourishing bread, the four elements, 
the seven planets, and the twelve months. Priests of the house of Zaddok also performed 
rituals in this space—keeping the lamps lit, the bread fresh, sprinkling blood before the 
veil—but less frequently, more solemnly. This sphere came to represent cosmic order, 
indicated by the references to the heavenly bodies which teach Israel how to properly 
keep Sabbaths and festivals. At the very center of the (micro-)cosmos is the paradisiacal 
peace and perfect unity of Israel’s one God. This space was open to the high priest alone, 
                                                 
219 Fletcher-Louis, “Jesus, the Temple and the Dissolution of Heaven and Earth,” 2002, 128. Similarly, 
Rachel Elior says, “The Temple was the earthly embodiment of cosmic order and cyclicity; hence the 
guardians of the sanctuary, the priests, discharging their duties, maintained as macrocosmic and 
microcosmic order in which the laws of nature were harmonized with sacred time, sacred place, and 
sacred service.” Elior, The Three Temples, 3. 
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and only once a year. Yet even though this realm was hidden—veiled—it was by no 
means neglected or forgotten. Every action performed in the temple was directed toward 
the throne room where the God of Israel dwelled, and thus what was most hidden was 
also most real in the theological imagination of the ancient Jews.  
Notice that, according to the microcosmic interpretation of the temple, God’s 
immanent presence in creation is highlighted. One passes from sphere to sphere, closer 
and closer to God, who is invisibly present in the holiest sphere of creation. Granted, we 
have already alluded to the fact that in the priestly system the presence of God is not 
simply inevitable; God’s presence is contingent on the maintenance of order. Cosmic 
order, represented by the symbols of the shrine, was like a “bridge” between the inmost 
presence of God, the holy of holies, and quotidian life, represented by the earth and sea of 
the outer court. Understanding the importance of “order” also helps clarify the theology 
of purity and impurity: like the God who separates light and darkness, land and sea, Israel 
is called to distinguish pure and impure. Only that which is pure—untouched by “dirt,” 
by death or decay220—can draw near to the temple, a place thoroughly aligned with 
Edenic life. Humanity’s vocation on earth is to carry forward God’s creative work of 
preserving life-sustaining order, and in so doing maintain creation as a suitable sanctuary 
for God. As noted above, Jonathan Klawans sees two “organizing principles” behind 
temple and sacrifice, one of which is “concern with attracting and maintaining the 
presence of God within the community.”221 The idea of preserving (micro-)cosmic order 
in the temple was, within this mode of thought, essential to maintaining a place suitable 
for and attractive to God.  
                                                 
220 See discussion in the next chapter. 
221 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 48. 
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Therefore, the temple was a sophisticated aid toward philosophical reflection on 
the inner truth of creation, one in which the mind is drawn, by reflection on well-ordered 
cosmic realities, toward the God who dwells in glory at the inmost center of all creaturely 
being. In the first section of this chapter, on the theological aesthetics of the biblical 
temple, one of the major questions we asked was, what form does this space take? And 
also, how does the temple express itself in a way that points toward further depths, or 
greater heights, such that it invites a journey into greater and greater mysteries. The 
reflections in this section have, I hope, helped to fill out possible answers to those 
questions. With respect to the second section of this chapter, the theme of “temple as 
microcosm” also includes an implicit ethic: the role of humanity in creation is to maintain 
and embody the order necessary for life to flourish and for God to dwell peacefully with 
his creation. This includes sacrificial practices that show a continual re-commitment to 
the openheartedness of the Akedah. 
After looking at this traditional understanding of temple theology, one can 
conclude that, overall, the emphasis is on a God who is wholly descended. That’s the 
strength, and also the weakness, of the tradition of seeing the temple as a microcosm. If 
this were the only paradigm for understanding the temple, if God’s throne were located 
within the cosmos, in one sphere among others222—albeit one of unparalleled holiness—
God is nevertheless diminished, limited, made finite. At least two problematic 
                                                 
222 Which, Sommer indicates, was an early priestly view. See Bodies of God, 74–77. Furthermore, 
according to Sommer, there is no suggestion in priestly texts that after descending to dwell in the 
tabernacle, God remains also in heaven; Ibid., 98. Unsurprisingly, one can find alternative readings of P. 
Compare, for example, Robert S. Kawashima, “The Priestly Tent of Meeting and the Problem of Divine 
Transcendence: An ‘Archaeology’ of the Sacred,” The Journal of Religion 86, no. 2 (2006): 226–257. 
  None of this should suggest that those sources which develop the microcosm tradition much later—
Philo and Josephus above all—had a view of God as strictly immanent. That is clearly not the case. As I 
will emphasize below, all later interpreters in the Jewish tradition drew from a canon that included texts 
that emphasize both immanence and transcendence. 
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understandings of God could result from this view; each stems from an interpretation of 
how the holy of holies relates to the other spheres in the temple. The first sees the holy of 
holies as the highest sphere: just as the macrocosmic sky is higher than earth, so also is 
God’s heaven higher than the sky. Problematically, this picture accentuates the way that 
the microcosm tradition can easily imply that God’s realm is merely a privileged place 
within the universe—perhaps more perfect, perhaps superior, but nevertheless in univocal 
continuity with the rest of creation.223 This is a polytheistic ontology, or what David 
Bentley Hart calls “monopolytheism” because it involves “a view of God not 
conspicuously different from the polytheistic picture of the gods as merely very powerful 
discrete entities who possess a variety of distinct attributes that lesser entities also 
possess, if in smaller measure….”224 With this frame of mind, “heaven” is a spatial 
location in the cosmos where the gods live—or, what is more pathetic, where the sole god 
and his created angelic servants live—and from which they (or he) interact with human 
beings. By correlating the areas of the temple with earth, sky, and “highest heaven,” the 
microcosm tradition suggests an ontologically horizontal understanding of the 
relationship between the domain of the god and the domain of humanity, with the former 
existing perhaps just beyond the firmament.225 
The second, more sophisticated application of the divine immanence implied by 
                                                 
223 This has been called “metaphysical monism” where “a single continuum, the cosmos, comprises 
everything.” Kawashima, “Priestly Tent of Meeting,” 238. 
224 David Bentley Hart, The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss (New Haven ; London: Yale 
University Press, 2013), 127. 
225 See J. Edward Wright, The Early History of Heaven (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 55–57. 
Wright sees the ancient Canaanite religions, including early biblical traditions, taking the architecture of 
the tripartite universe—here depicted as netherworld below, earth, and heaven above—quite literally. 
With such reconstructions of ancient cosmology, however, it seems appropriate to refer back to Klawans 
critique of modern scholarship, which underestimates the ability of early cultures to think metaphorically, 
shoehorning all data into evolutionist narratives.  
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the cosmic symbolism of the temple is based on a picture of sacred spheres as more and 
more intimate, more and more interior, easily leading to a pantheistic perspective that 
ultimately sees the world as an expression of God. According to Przywara, “Pan-the-ism” 
means “proceeding fundamentally ‘from below to above,’ the all becomes God.”226 
Aspects of Margaret Barker’s temple mysticism—which, she claims, faithfully reflects 
the first temple theology—seem to fit this category. For her, the holy of holies signifies 
“Day One,” which was remembered by the rabbis “as the Day (or the state) in which the 
Holy One was one with his universe. Day One was thus the state of unity underlying 
(rather than preceding) all the visible creation…Those who entered the holy of holies 
understood how the original unity had become the diversity of the visible creation.”227 
Elsewhere she says, “It was not ‘the first day’ [in Genesis 1:5] but the state beyond the 
temporal and material world; it was the eternal present. Just as the holy of holies was in 
the midst of the temple, so too the eternal presence of God was in the midst of 
creation...The holy of holies behind the veil symbolized God in the midst of creation.”228 
The unity of Day One is the invisible, veiled divinity, the state that underlies the entire 
visible creation. This conception of a hidden divine unity beyond the veil of material 
creation serves as a foundation for various esoteric traditions, and one can certainly see 
why the ancient priestly tradition became so enamored with number mysticism as a way 
of passing through the material toward the inner ‘holy of holies’ of God’s immanent 
presence. Closed off from this view, it would seem, is the true freedom of God in relation 
                                                 
226 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 2013, 165. 
227 Barker, The Great High Priest, 24–25. For parallel ideas in Philo and 2 Enoch, see Martha Himmelfarb, 
Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 84–
86. 
228 Margaret Barker, Temple Mysticism: An Introduction (London: SPCK, 2011), 56. 
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to the world, and the otherness of God and creation which is the condition for genuine 
revelation and relationship. It’s no surprise that Barker is antagonistic to the 
Deuteronomists “historical covenants,”229 strongly favoring immutable cosmic mysticism 
coupled with primal temple mythology, which she associates with the priestly tradition. 
But does Parmenidean stasis really capture the truth of divine and creaturely being? 
The concept of temple as microcosm has many advantages. By highlighting the 
intimacy of God and creation and the theological relevance of the ‘book of nature,’ and 
even by developing a style of mysticism that foreshadow Proclus, the use of temple 
symbolism to contemplate the mysteries of earth and heaven has had a lasting, positive 
effect in Judaism and Christianity, one that is sometimes neglected in some academic 
circles, especially at times of narrow historicism. Then again, the sardonic words of God, 
recorded by Isaiah and cited by St. Stephen the martyr, must not be forgotten: “Yet the 
Most High does not dwell in houses made by human hands; as the prophet says, ‘Heaven 
is my throne, / and the earth is my footstool. What kind of house will you build for me, 
says the Lord, / or what is the place of my rest?’” (Acts 7:49-49; cf. Isaiah 66:1). The 
philosophy of the temple as microcosm is finally inadequate to capture the relationship 
between divine and human truth, and in fact, on its own it can only be a distortion. 
                                                 
229 For example, “The priestly theology saw the pattern of history as a whole, revealed in the holy of holies 
as past, present, and future. It was the Deuteronomists who made ‘history’ an interpretation of the past 
events, made Moses the centre of their scheme…” Barker, Temple Theology, 36. The second temple 
priests were also corrupted, and they botched the account of creation: “They turned the myths of the 
temple into history, and thus the myths lost their power.” Barker, Temple Mysticism, 37. Again referring 
to P and D: “The one appeals to the natural order of things, living in harmony with the pattern of 
creation, and the other to history.” Ibid., 38. See footnote 208 above for more on Barker’s hostility to 
alternative biblical traditions.  
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Mirror of Heaven 
There is a second strain of thought which, as mentioned above, is substantively 
distinct from the idea that the temple is a microcosm. While the priestly writers, along 
with late figures like Josephus and Philo, extensively develop the idea that the temple is 
the microcosm of the world, others draw attention to an idea that—at first—may seem to 
be quite opposite: the Jerusalem temple and the temple cult are earthly imitators of a 
transcendent heavenly temple.  
As I’ve mentioned above, when historians of biblical literature or ancient Judaism 
come across a new theological concept, they often attempt to explain the idea purely in 
terms of some then-contemporary controversy, some societal crisis, as if all religious 
reflection is, at its root, a sectarian reaction to the daily headlines. Everything comes 
down to acrimonious political posturing. If ancient people were anything like modern 
politicians, or modern academics, then a perpetually discordant setting for theological 
reflection is not unthinkable. Still, historians do not always adequately appreciate how 
theological ideas grow and develop not only through war, but also through dialogue and 
reflection, by contemplating the perennial theological mysteries in continuity with one’s 
forbearers.230 The idea that the earthy temple mirrors a heavenly temple may indeed 
reflect a crisis or dispute: the Babylonians have reduced the holy temple to rubble, or a 
                                                 
230 For example, Tryggve N.D. Mettinger quotes R.P. Carrol: “dissonance gives rise to hermeneutic.” The 
Dethronement of Sabaoth: Studies in the Shem and Kabod Theologies (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1982), 17. 
This is surely true. But shouldn’t it be said that the human spirit aspires to reflective interpretation and 
understanding in diverse circumstances? Doesn’t prayer give rise to hermeneutic? Conversation? Love 
and happiness? Dissonance may be a powerful motivating factor, but so are “moments of experienced 
fullness, of joy and fulfillment,” as Charles Taylor puts it. A Secular Age, 1st edition (Cambridge, Mass: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 5. For a critique of the interpretive/dating 
presuppositions of Mettinger and others, see Sommer, “Dating Pentateuchal Texts and the Perils of 
Pseudo-Historicism,” 85–94. See also the previous discussion of this issue in footnotes 104, 111 and 131 
of this chapter. 
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faction has been bitterly excluded from the temple, or purists have removed themselves, 
believing that this temple (and/or the priesthood that ministers in this temple) has become 
apostate and therefore must be rejected.231 Without a doubt, such fracturing occurred in 
ancient Israel—as in probably any human community of two or more thoughtful people. 
But it is also quite possible that the idea that the earthly temple mirrors the heavenly 
temple could develop in a more irenic setting.  
Benjamin Sommer has summarized the notable distinction between the Priestly 
interpretation of God’s presence in the tabernacle and the Deuteronomic interpretation. 
As emphasized in the previous section, according to Sommer’s study of the priestly 
tradition, God himself (God’s own glorious body) fully comes to rest in the tabernacle 
over the ark of the covenant. God is intimately and assuredly present to his people. For 
whatever reason—perhaps stemming from perfectly legitimate theological concerns over 
limiting God in time and place—the Deuteronomists articulated a different vision for 
God’s relation to the tabernacle. They insisted, according to Sommer, that God does not 
descend to earth, but remains always enthroned exclusively in heaven, and rather makes 
the divine Name (shem) dwell in the temple. Sommer says, “So insistently do 
deuteronomic traditions maintain that God is not on earth that it becomes clear that for 
them the shem is only a sign of divine presence, not a manifestation of God himself.”232 
                                                 
231 For example, Barker emphasizes the Josiah-Deuteronomistic reforms in her account of how ancient 
priestly theology was marginalized. Others will find a more proximate historical setting in the 
Maccabean displacement of the Zadokites.  
232 Sommer, Bodies of God, 62. Sommer’s interpretation of “Name theology” is neither idiosyncratic nor a 
consensus. An early advocate of a similar view is von Rad, and his arguments have been developed and 
supported by many scholars of the book of Deuteronomy. Mettinger’s articulation of “Name theology” is 
especially clear and well-known; The Dethronement of Sabaoth, 38–79. More recently, however, a 
number of dissenting studies have been published which argue that the lack of divine “presence” in the 
temple in D has been overstated, and a false dichotomy between transcendence and immanence has been 
imposed. See Ian Wilson, Out of the Midst of the Fire: Divine Presence in Deuteronomy (Scholars Press, 
1995); Sandra L. Richter, “The Place of the Name in Deuteronomy,” Vetus Testamentum 57, no. 3 
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The parade example of this phenomenon is Solomon’s speech in 1 Kings 8, which is 
consistently directed toward God in heaven (vv. 22, 23, 30, 32, 34, 36, 39, etc.), where 
Solomon says repeatedly that the temple is for God’s shem (vv. 16-20, etc.), and where 
he famously exclaims, “But will God really dwell on earth? Even the heavens to their 
uttermost reaches cannot contain You, how much less this House that I have built!” (v. 
27) If God is uncontained by even the highest heaven, claims of God’s immanent 
presence in the temple are quickly tempered. The concept of an uncontained God “in 
heaven” certainly bursts through any concept of heaven as a discrete inter-cosmic sphere.  
One therefore finds in the Deuteronomists a “theology of transcendence,”233 and 
thus symbols of the temple find a less theophanic, more historical, interpretation in D. 
For example, rather than seeing the ark of the covenant as God’s throne or footstool, the 
site of God’s indwelling glory, the Deuteronomic school sees it as a chest which stores 
the covenant tablets (1 Kings 8:9). The ark thus serves as a reminder of the Mosaic 
covenant, it is “educational,” “it now houses symbols rather than divinity.”234 Generally, 
this perspective highlights the fundamental discontinuity between God and the world, and 
according to Sommer, it bears some resemblance to what we today call nominalism.235 
                                                 
(2007): 342–66; Michael Hundley, “To Be or Not to Be: A Reexamination of Name Language in 
Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic History,” Vetus Testamentum 59, no. 4 (2009): 533–555.  
  For Sommer’s response to some of these critiques, see Bodies of God, 218 n.47. In this section I am 
following the scholarship of Mettinger and Sommer while recognizing that there are no “ideal types.” 
Just as there are ample resources within priestly theology to prevent the immanence of God from 
becoming domestication, there are resources within the D tradition to prevent transcendence from 
becoming absence. Nevertheless, Mettinger and Sommer make essential observations about the distinct 
trajectories of thought which are carried forward in later temple theology.  
233 Sommer, Bodies of God, 64.  
234 Ibid., 100; cf. Mettinger, The Dethronement of Sabaoth, 50–51. For a more extensive analysis of the ark 
as either throne or chest, including consideration of how the ark and the kapporet are distinct, see Haran, 
Temples and Temple-Service in Ancient Israel, 246–59.  
235 Sommer says, “The shem is merely a name in the sense that Western thinkers regard names: a symbol, a 
verbal indicator that points toward something outside itself.” Sommer, Bodies of God, 65. Again, for an 
alternative view, see Hundley, “To Be or Not to Be,” 547–51. 
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God is transcendent, and the temple is more a pedagogical conduit of prayer, helping to 
draw the worshiper into relationship with the otherworldly God of the Sinaitic covenant. 
Here we have one tradition celebrating God’s immanence, and another celebrating 
God’s transcendence. Wonderfully, these traditions did not live out their days in opposing 
war camps, but were brought together in a single name: Moses. None of the ancient 
commentaries we have speak of Priestly and Deuteronomic sources. They speak of 
Moses, who communicates to Israel the word of God. This drawing together of profound 
theological perspectives in a single peaceful household has been a catalyst for reflection 
that has continued for millennia.236 Believers have read that God is truly present in the 
tabernacle, and they have read that God dwells in heaven, and they have contemplatively 
pondered how these affirmations relate to one another.237  
It thus seems plausible that the idea of a transcendent heavenly “temple,” an 
ontologically distinct divine reality upon which the earthly temple is analogically 
patterned, could develop in this fertile dialogical soil, without strictly requiring an acute 
historical crisis or bitter factional hostility to the Jerusalem cult or its priesthood. As 
Sommer says, the problem of immanence and transcendence is a perennial philosophical 
and theological problem, and thus it is not necessary to locate a sectarian or sociopolitical 
setting to understand how it is a single complex theological symbol—the temple—came 
                                                 
236 On the theological significance and veracity of the “Mosaic authorship” of the Pentateuch, see Brevard 
S. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Fortress Press, 1979), 132–35; and similarly 
Duane Christensen and Marcel Narucki, “The Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch,” Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 32, no. 4 (1989): 465–71. Jon Levenson argues that what is ultimately 
intended in the ancient affirmation of Mosaic authorship is “the unity and divinity of the Torah” in “The 
Eighth Principle of Judaism and the Literary Simultaneity of Scripture,” The Journal of Religion, 1988, 
208. Levenson arrives at a position analogous to Childs’ by defending the “simultaneity of all parts of the 
Bible” through an awareness of “divine authorization,” Ibid., 213. 
237 Levenson points out that, insofar as the Torah includes different perspectives, it is “bipolar” and “the 
tension between perspectives yields a spiritual dynamic that neither perspective alone could have 
produced.” Levenson, “The Jerusalem Temple in Devotional and Visionary Experience,” 37.  
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to be a locus for reflection on both God’s truth in creation, and God’s truth beyond 
creation.238 This is not to say that individuals or groups who were separated from the 
Jerusalem temple—either due to the temple’s destruction by Babylon or divisions within 
the community—did not gravitate toward the claim that the earthly temple is a pale 
reflection of a much greater reality—certainly, this idea could be very useful in holding 
the community together during exile, and useful also for polemicists, giving them a way 
to swear continued fidelity to the (eternal) temple while rejecting the earthy institution. 
Still, the important thing is, whether or not one gravitates first and last toward a narrowly 
historical explanation for how these ideas originated, the theological insight is still 
significant, and its significance persists to this day. 
Like the idea that the temple is a microcosm, the ancient belief that the Jerusalem 
temple mirrors the heavenly temple has received extensive scholarly attention in recent 
years.239 Because the material is well covered, I will only review some of the key primary 
                                                 
238 See Sommer, Bodies of God, 96–97, 240 n.66; Sommer, “Dating Pentateuchal Texts and the Perils of 
Pseudo-Historicism,” 91, 101–8. To take a more specific example, for arguments that 1 Enoch—which is 
at the headwaters of much later reflection on the heavenly temple—is not sectarian, see Fletcher-Louis, 
All the Glory of Adam, 21–25. 
239 See Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 128–38; Hayward, The Jewish Temple, 10–13; 
Himmelfarb, Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses, 9–28; Martha Himmelfarb, 
“Apocalyptic Ascent and the Heavenly Temple,” Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers, no. 26 
(January 1, 1987): 210–12, 216; Elior, The Three Temples, 14–15, 29–31, 63–66, 71; Clements, God and 
Temple, 65, 68; John J Collins, Jerusalem and the Temple in Jewish Apocalyptic Literature of the Second 
Temple Period (Ingeborg Rennert Center for Jerusalem Studies, 1998), 13–16; Levenson, Sinai and Zion, 
122–25, 140–41; Weinfeld, “Sabbath, Temple, and the Enthronement of the Lord,” 505–6; Anderson, 
“Introduction to Israelite Religion,” 278.  
  In the context of a dispute with Carol Newsom on the proper interpretation of the Qumran 
community’s Songs of Sabbath Sacrifice, Crispin Fletcher-Louis is less confident in the existence of a 
pre-Christian temple cosmology that affirms the existence of a “temple above” which is to be mirrored in 
the “temple below.” Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam, 254–56, 267–73. It seems that his primary 
concern is to rule out the modern scholarly assumption that for the ancient Jews there are “two spheres of 
existence heaven and earth each of which is qualitatively homogenous within itself.” Ibid., 472–74. 
Fletcher-Louis’ opposition to such pure equivocity is very well taken. But with his focused emphasis on 
temple-as-microcosm, he can go so far as to say, “The Temple was far more than the point at which 
heaven and earth met. Rather it was thought to correspond to, represent, or, in some sense, to be, ‘heaven 
and earth’ in its totality”, Ibid., 62, emphasis in original. Fletcher-Louis is right to temper the use of the 
word “to be” with the qualifier “in some sense,” because as I argued above, the besetting sin of the 
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texts in this tradition briefly. Without a doubt, the prophet Ezekiel’s chariot vision has an 
unparalleled influence, and it may represent an early example of what happens when 
priestly and deuteronomic theology come together. If the priestly tradition asserts that 
God has established his (mobile) throne here on earth, located at the heart of Israel in the 
holy of holies,240 and if the Deuteronomists focus on God’s heavenly dwelling place 
while also affirming Jerusalem as God’s chosen city,241 what happens when these views 
come together? Risa Levitt Kohn argues that Ezekiel uses terms and concepts drawn from 
both priestly and deuteronomic sources, and that “Ezekiel fuses P and D material to 
create a unique synthesis.”242 Perhaps this fascinating synthesis can be seen in the first 
                                                 
temple-as-microcosm tradition is univocity. There is plenty of evidence elsewhere that Fletcher-Louis’ 
interpretation of heaven and earth is not univocal, as when he says in reference to a passage from 
Jubilees: “it means a real ontological transfer from one realm of being to another. The new realm of 
being is characterized, in particular, by ‘glory’…” Ibid., 16. His primary purpose is to show that these 
“realms” are not wholly isolated, and more specifically, that human beings can (according to the Qumran 
community) undergo divine/angelomorphic transformation, especially through the community’s liturgical 
rites. From this perspective, Fletcher-Louis criticizes what he calls a “dualistic cosmology,” and he 
especially doubts that the existence of two corresponding cults—heavenly and earthly, angelic and 
priestly—is clearly affirmed in Second Temple material. It seems to me, however, that a growing 
appreciation for divine transcendence is no threat to a growing sense of the possibility of deification, but 
is in fact the presupposition for any acceptable doctrine of deification in a monotheistic setting. 
Therefore, I will follow Himmelfarb and others who say that the distinction between the heavenly and 
earthly is emphasized in many apocalyptic texts, and that this need not be understood as a claim that 
heaven and earth are ultimately two “qualitatively homogenous” spheres of existence. Again, something 
more sophisticated and more delicate is developing, something which theories of pure immanence or 
pure transcendence cannot comprehend.  
240 In a useful schematization, Sommer analyzes different biblical theologies of divine presence using 
Jonathan Z. Smith’s two major categories: (a) the locative or centripetal and (b) the utopian or 
centrifugal. According to Sommer, the early Zion-Sabaoth tradition, articulated for example in those 
psalms that emphasize God’s royal presence in Zion, and even Zion’s inviolability, express the locative 
view of God’s presence in the temple—this is a view that “underscores and celebrates that which is 
primeval and central.” Sommer’s interpretation of JE (where the one God, YHWH, can be fluidly present 
in multiple bodies in multiple place) represents the centrifugal tradition well; here divine presence “flees 
from the center or, more precisely, refuses to acknowledge that there is any one center.” Sommer, Bodies 
of God, 83. The priestly theology of divine presence does not fit squarely into either of these categories; 
the ark is undoubtedly the site of God’s bodily dwelling, and it is at the center of the camp, and yet it 
moves with the wandering Israel. Sommer calls this perspective “locomotive: There is a center, but it 
moves.” Ibid., 87–90. 
241 Sommer says, “D, on the other hand, mixes a locative worldview (which one normally would associate 
with immanence) with a theology of transcendence: There is one Center [Jerusalem]. Nonetheless, that 
unique Center is not sacred in the sense of being directly touched by divinity. It is merely chosen.” 
Sommer, Bodies of God, 101. 
242 Risa Levitt Kohn, “A Prophet Like Moses? Rethinking Ezekiels Relationship to the Torah,” Zeitschrift 
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chapters of Ezekiel’s book, where he portrays the divine throne both in heaven and on 
earth, both transcendent and locomotive. 
As the book opens, the exiled Ezekiel, abandoned in enemy territory along a 
Babylonian canal, looks up and sees: “the heavens opened and I saw visions of God” 
(1:1). What follows is an elaborate account of God’s heavenly dwelling place, with 
special emphasis on the “living creatures”—later identified as cherubim (10:20)—all 
portrayed using terms traditionally associated with the glory of God: fire, lightening, 
clouds, radiance, fear, and awe. The chapter culminates with a description of the throne, 
and what’s more amazing, of the one who is enthroned. Ezekiel says, “Above the expanse 
over their [e.g. ‘the living creatures’] heads was the semblance of a throne, in appearance 
like sapphire; and on top, upon this semblance of a throne, there was the semblance of a 
human form…” (1:26). With the heavens opened, as if a veil has been pulled aside, 
Ezekiel is given visual access to the eternal holy of holies.  
This is not the first time God’s heavenly throne room has been described in the 
prophetic literature; already in Isaiah there is a description of the Lord “seated on a high 
and lofty throne; and the skirts of His robe filled the Temple” (6:1). Here God is 
surrounded by six-winged seraphs who sang “holy, holy, holy!” (v. 3). In this vision 
temple iconography has become animate and Isaiah sees the living realities that they 
convey, but it is not clear that Isaiah is visualizing anything more than the reality of 
God’s presence in the earthly temple.243 In other words, the book of Isaiah does not 
necessarily indicate that the prophet enjoys a vision of a heavenly temple which 
                                                 
Für Die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 114, no. 2 (2006): 247. Of course, to enter this conversation is to 
plunge into the tense debates over how to date P, Deuteronomy, the Deuteronomic history, Ezekiel, and 
proposed redactions of each of the above.  
243 Cf. Levenson, Sinai and Zion, 123. 
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transcends the earthly. 
This is why the revelation to Ezekiel is so significant. According to Martha 
Himmelfarb, “Ezekiel’s visions of the chariot throne mark the beginning of a trend to 
dissociate God’s heavenly abode from the temple in Jerusalem.”244 There is truth in this, 
but maybe we can nuance the point in this way: while Deuteronomic theology had 
already dissociated God’s heavenly abode from the temple,245 Ezekiel begins the process 
of imagining the—so to speak—“two temples” together. In his first chapter, Ezekiel 
locates God firmly and resplendently in heaven, but in chapter 8 the prophet is brought, 
in a vision, to the Jerusalem temple, to the inner courts, and “the Presence of the God of 
Israel appeared there, like the vision that I had seen in the valley” (v. 4). Unfortunately, 
Ezekiel’s tour of the Jerusalem temple is not a happy one; he is confronted with 
numerous abominations in the holy space, and thus in the tenth chapter Ezekiel sees God 
depart from the temple, here again enthroned above the cherubim, carried aloft in a 
wheeled angelic chariot. Notice: the priestly teaching that the kabod YHWH dwells 
immanently in the temple is reaffirmed by the fact that, according to Ezekiel himself, 
what he saw in Jerusalem was like what he had seen in heaven. Similarly, God’s 
“locomotive” presence is also reaffirmed; God is free to abandon Zion. But then, the 
Deuteronomic insistence on God’s transcendent heavenly dwelling is also supported by 
the opening vision. Undeniably, these two traditions together create an ever more 
complex theological symbol; it has inspired mystical theology ever since.  
When it comes to reflection on the heavenly temple, Ezekiel is groundbreaking 
and unavoidable, but the classic biblical text for the later tradition comes much earlier in 
                                                 
244 Himmelfarb, Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses, 11. 
245 As Himmelfarb fully recognizes:  Ibid., 12. 
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the canon, in a bizarre comment within an otherwise straightforward genealogy: “All the 
days of Enoch came to 365 years. Enoch walked with God; then he was no more, for God 
took him” (Genesis 5:23-24). Every other entry in the genealogy, from Adam to Lamech, 
father of Noah, ends with the words “and he died” (ת ֵֹּֽמָׁיַו), but Enoch lives 365 years (note 
the cosmic significance) before being taken (ח  ַק ָׁל) by Elohim. This caught the attention of 
ancient readers, to say the least. With Deuteronomic and prophetic texts, as well as a 
number of psalms (viz. Ps. 11:4, 103:19), speaking of God enthroned in heaven, and now 
with some prophets also recording detailed revelations of God enthroned in the holy of 
holies, increasingly intimate knowledge of heavenly realities were described, and Enoch 
was the most logical narrative vehicle for such journeys, precisely because Genesis can 
be read to suggest a heavenly rapture.  
And thus the phenomenon of the Book of Watchers (1 Enoch 1-36) emerges in 
Hebrew religious literature by at least the third century BC.246 The story of the fall of the 
watchers, and especially the account of Azaz’el’s punishment, will be significant for our 
understanding of Yom Kippur in the next chapters. In our current context, however, the 
fourteenth chapter of the book is most important, because here Enoch describes his 
visionary journey to heaven. Many familiar theophanic motifs are used in describing 
heaven: fire, ice,247 clouds, lightening, cherubim, immensity, fear, desire, and of course, 
glory. As Enoch travels through the heavenly landscape, he passes through three houses 
which, it has been noted, seem to correspond to the three increasingly holy sections of the 
                                                 
246 Chapter and verse references below are from James H. Charlesworth, ed., “1 (Ethiopic Apocalypse of) 
Enoch,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, trans. E. Isaac, vol. 1 (New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1983), 5–89. 
247 The peculiar relationship between fire and ice in the heavenly house says something about the 
unparalleled nature of the place: “And I entered into the house, which was hot like fire and cold like 
ice…” (1 Enoch 14:13). 
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earthly temple.248 Enoch ultimately approaches the inner house, build “with tongues of 
fire” (14:15) and excelling in “glory and greatness” (v. 16). And then: 
I observed and saw inside it a lofty throne—its appearance was like crystal and its 
wheels like the shining sun; and [I heard] the voice of the cherubim; and from 
beneath the throne were issuing streams of flaming fire. It was difficult to look at 
it. And the Great Glory was sitting upon it—as for his gown, which was shining 
more brightly than the sun, it was whiter than any snow. (vv. 18-20) 
 
Here, for the first time in the extant record, there is an unambiguous visionary tour of 
heaven. Enoch’s description of the three houses insinuate that the heavenly temple has 
roughly the same structural form as the earthly equivalent, and he reconfirms the vision 
of Isaiah and Ezekiel when he describes God enthroned in glory.  
In another early Enochic text, The Book of Similitudes (1 Enoch 37-71), Enoch’s 
vision of the heavenly temple is even further developed. Here again Enoch “ascended 
into the heavens,” but now there is a greater emphasis on esoteric knowledge: “[the angel 
Michael] showed me all the secrets of the extreme ends of heaven…” (71:4). There is 
also much more attention to the presence of the angels, dressed in white garments (v. 1), 
along with the “seraphim, cherubim, and ophanim249—the sleepless ones who guard the 
throne of his glory” (v. 7), thus reinforcing the importance of the cherubim in the holy of 
holies. Enoch sees “the Antecedent of Time,” whose clothing is indescribable (v. 10), and 
in response, “I fell on my face, my whole body mollified and my spirit transformed. Then 
I cried with a great voice by the spirit of the power, blessing, glorifying, and extolling” 
(v. 11). The vision of God in the holy of holies causes the worshiper to respond with 
humility and to undergo a spiritual transformation that culminates in joyful praise.250  
                                                 
248 Himmelfarb, Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses, 14–15. 
249 Ophanim or Ofanim is the Hebrew word for the “wheels,” which are emphasized in Ezekiel 1, cf. Elior, 
The Three Temples, 63–64. 
250 For more on the increasingly important theme of spiritual transformation through heavenly ascent, see 
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After the temple in heaven and the temple on earth were distinguished, the next 
obvious question is, how do these temples relate? Early on a passage from the book of 
Exodus became indispensable in reflecting on this question. In the twenty-fourth chapter 
of Exodus, Mount Sinai seems to be divided into three zones. At the bottom of the 
mountain a sacrificial altar is built around which the whole people gather and commit 
themselves to the covenant. Then Moses, Aaron, Aaron’s sons Nadab and Abihu, along 
with the seventy elders, are told to ascend the mountain. At a certain point they see God 
above but are instructed to go no further. Only Moses is invited to continue toward the 
top, to the cloud-covered peak, where the “Presence of the LORD abode on Mount Sinai” 
(24:16); on the seventh day God appears as a “consuming fire” (v. 17) and speaks. One of 
the primary instructions God gives is the design of the sanctuary: “Exactly as I show 
(mar’eh, ה ּ֣  אְרַמ) you—the pattern (tab̲nît̲, תי ִּ֣נְבַת) of the Tabernacle and the pattern (tab̲nît̲) 
of all its furnishings—so shall you make it” (25:9; cf. 26:30, 27:8). It is entirely possible 
that the earliest intention for the word “pattern” was simply the equivalent of a modern-
day blueprint.251 Nevertheless, as the heavenly temple was gradually distinguished from 
the earthly temple, commentators returned to the word “pattern” to help clarify the 
relationship between heaven and earth.252  
                                                 
Himmelfarb, Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses, 29–46; Christopher RA Morray-
Jones, “Transformational Mysticism in the Apocalyptic-Merkabah Tradition,” Journal of Jewish Studies 
43, no. 1 (1992): 1–31; DeConick, “What Is Early Jewish and Christian Mysticism?,” 18–24; Fletcher-
Louis, All the Glory of Adam. 
  For additional visions of the holy of holies in early Judaism, see Apocalypse of Abraham 18:1-3, 
12-14; The Life of Adam and Eve in Greek, chap. 33; The Testament of Levi 3:4-7, 5:1. Each of these 
texts were preserved and, to varying extents, edited by Christians, which illustrates the importance of the 
heavenly temple in early Christianity; cf. Revelation 11:1-2, 19.  
251 Cf. Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam, 267 f; Levenson, Sinai and Zion, 140–41; Klawans, Purity, 
Sacrifice, and the Temple, 129. 
252 Klawans insists on a sharp distinction between two “temple in heaven” approaches. In the first, there is a 
temple in heaven in which the angels participate in ongoing worship, and the person on earth imagines 
this temple and its rites. In the second, the seer experiences a heavenly ascent in which she or he journeys 
to heaven and is shown the heavenly temple so as to model the earthly temple after it. Klawans calls 
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The idea that God gives a “pattern” or “form” for the temple reoccurs in scripture. 
It is mentioned again in 1 Chronicles 28, where David charges his son Solomon to build 
the temple. We find, starting at verse 11 and running through verse 18, a massive run-on 
sentence in which David describes the temple and its furniture. The sentence begins, 
“David gave his son Solomon the plan (tab̲nît̲)…the plan (t̲ab̲nît̲) of all that he had by the 
spirit…” (28:11, 12). At the very end of the long sentence, it says, “...and the gold for the 
figure (t̲ab̲nît̲) of the chariot—the cherubs—those with outspread wings screening the 
Ark of the Covenant of the LORD. [David says to Solomon:] ‘All this that the LORD made 
me understand by His hand on me, I give you in writing—the plan (t̲ab̲nît̲) of all the 
works” (vv. 18-19). It is incredible to think that this use of the relatively rare word t̲ab̲nît̲, 
specifically in the context of temple building, is coincidental. Here we have the claim that 
the pattern was given to David in the spirit, and that he passes it on to Solomon. This 
includes the crucial details for the chariot throne, which was by this time, as we have 
seen, especially associated with heavenly realities. Later, the writer of the Wisdom of 
Solomon goes even further when he has Solomon say, “You have given command to 
                                                 
these views “vastly different,” and then says, “The two motifs are, to be sure, explicitly linked together—
possibly for the first time—in Hebrews 8:1-5…but the linkage is  not inherently necessary, and it is 
improper, based on the appearance of one of these two ideas to presume the presence or influence of the 
other. It is also improper to assume that one idea develops from the other.” Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, 
and the Temple, 129. Within the tradition of reflection on the temple in heaven, there are certainly 
different tendencies and emphases, and I recognize that they do not necessarily all reduce into a single 
concept. At the same time, the “two distinct ways” Klawans wants to differentiate do not seem so entirely 
distinct to me, especially when compared to the clear difference between temple as microcosm and 
temple in heaven traditions. Furthermore, sure, it is not “inherently necessary” that these ideas should 
come together, and when dealing with symbolic theology it is rarely possible to show clear causality, one 
concept leading directly to another, especially since the primary sources are limited and scattered. But I 
find it hard to imagine that some communities affirmed heavenly angelic temple worship without 
inquiring into the connection between the heavenly and earthly realities. In fact, one of the strengths in 
Klawans is that he himself refuses to pit the heavenly against the earthly, or to imagine that these ideas 
were opposed in the minds of the ancient Jews; in this way he improves on many other commentators. 
Therefore, while the connections I make in this section run afoul of Klawan’s distinctions, I do not think 
they are unwarranted.  
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build a temple on your holy mountain…a copy (μίμημα) of the holy tent that you 
prepared from the beginning” (9:8). From here it is a short step to the teaching of 
Hebrews, in which the author explains, “They offer worship in a sanctuary that is a 
sketch (or figure, ὑποδείγματι) and shadow (σκιᾷ) of the heavenly one; for Moses, when 
he was about to erect the tent, was warned, ‘See that you make everything according to 
the pattern (τύπον) that was shown you on the mountain’” (8:5; cf. Heb. 9:23-24).253 
Finally, in a Jewish work written soon after the fall of the second temple, God explains 
that the Temple was with him “from the moment that I decided to create paradise” (2 
Baruch 4:3).254 God showed this temple to Adam, then to Abraham, and finally to Moses 
“on Mount Sinai when I showed him the likeness of the tabernacle and all its vessels. 
Behold, now it is preserved with me…” (vv. 5-6). The earthly copy may crumble, but the 
heavenly tabernacle does not fail. 
In these texts we see an effort to conceptualize a relationship between two 
interrelated dwellings, one heavenly and the other earthly. Various Hebrew and Greek 
words are used to describe the relationship: tabnîtt (plan, form, figure), mímēma 
(imitation, copy), hupodeigma (model, figure, sketch), skia (shadow), typos (type, copy). 
Also, the LXX translates the Hebrew word tabnît in Exodus 25 and 1 Chronicles 28 as 
παράδειγμα, paradeigma (pattern, model, paradigm). All of these metaphors, drawn from 
different fields, point in the direction of a relationship of dependence. The heavenly 
reality is more actual, more essential, and the earthly structure is shaped by its heavenly 
counterpart, which is the “true” (cf. Hebrews 8:2, 9:24). Is this Platonism? Certainly the 
                                                 
253 Also in the New Testament, see Acts 7:44, where Stephen says that Moses built the tabernacle 
“according to the pattern (τύπον) he had seen.” 
254 From James H. Charlesworth, ed., “2 (Syriac Apocalypse of) Baruch,” in The Old Testament 
Pseudepigrapha, trans. A.F.J. Klijn, vol. 1 (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1983), 5–89. 
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Greek words listed above have platonic resonance, but it is possible to see an authentic 
priestly/deuteronomic trajectory of thought which leads in the same direction, thus 
creating a very comfortable space for fruitful dialogue between Moses and Plato.  
Here we stand at the origins of a movement that will always after remain 
profoundly influential in Jewish theology; it will shape later apocalyptic, Merkavah, 
Hekhalot, and Kabbalistic approaches to the mystery of God. The conviction that there is 
an inviolable heavenly temple was a crucial support for Israel after the Jerusalem temple 
is destroyed in 70 AD. For our purposes, what is most important is to see how the 
theological symbol of the temple facilitated reflection on the relationship between divine 
and creaturely truth. The creaturely reality was increasingly understood as a reflection of 
what is unchanging and most holy, the eternal sphere of God’s presence. Using 
philosophical terms, the “essence” of the temple is beyond its creaturely “existence” in 
Jerusalem, just as, analogously, God is beyond creation. God is transcendent. 
Appreciation for the true transcendence of God opens possibilities for participatory 
metaphysics: creaturely being—and the temple before all else—does not subsist in itself 
but imperfectly manifests eternal Truth.255  
In its most pure form, this philosophical perspective would imply a wholly 
transcendent understanding of truth: Truth belongs to heaven, not to the creature, and 
thus it must “come down” to us from without. There is something inescapably alien about 
divine truth, and thus we can only await what we do not innately possess. The temple is 
given by God on Mount Sinai, or the prophet is chosen by God and ascends in the spirit 
                                                 
255 According to Jon Levenson, “In short, what we see on earth in Jerusalem is simply the earthly 
manifestation of the heavenly Temple, which is beyond localization. The Temple on Zion is the antitype 
to the cosmic archetype. The real Temple is the one to which it points, the one in ‘heaven,’ which cannot 
be distinguished sharply from its earthly manifestation.” Sinai and Zion, 140. 
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to the heavenly throne, but in either case the gift is unanticipated and seemingly detached 
from the here and now. The response, again and again, is that the seer falls on her or his 
face, overwhelmed by the splendor of God’s uncreated light; if she or he is to survive the 
encounter with God, there must be a spiritual transformation. Put more strongly, the 
worshiper must, through grace, become more like God to withstand God’s all-holy, 
wholly-other presence in the heavenly realm. Returning to the two “organizing 
principles” articulated by Klawans in reference to temple theology and sacrifice, a strong 
understanding of God as transcendent can encourage, perhaps counterintuitively, an 
imitato dei theology (or, at least, imitatio angeli256). The implicit ethic suggests that the 
temple community (or the eccleisa) must receive from heaven a mode of being that is 
perhaps, by the world’s standards, foolishness. Liturgically, then, it is not a surprise that 
the worshiping community sometimes came to see itself as raptured, joining the heavenly 
choir, imitating and being initiated into an eternal reality that surpasses the limitations of 
time and space.257 
From a Christian or Jewish perspective, which so strongly emphasizes the fact 
that God’s love is unmerited and that grace is a free gift, the advantage and theological 
value of this approach is obvious. But there are also definite drawbacks. Just as we saw 
that the understanding of temple as microcosm could result in either (mono)polytheism or 
pantheism, there are at least two significant errors that could result from this alternative 
trajectory of thought if it is unchecked. First, while God’s glory is rightly celebrated as 
wholly other, the danger remains that God will become entirely extrinsic to creation, that 
                                                 
256 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 143. 
257 Cf. Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam; DeConick, “What Is Early Jewish and Christian 
Mysticism?,” 23–24. 
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the relationship between creature and creator will be seen as arbitrary and imposed. The 
total otherness of God eventually becomes the irrelevance of God, opening the way to 
deism, culminating in atheism.258 
Alternatively, second, the earthly temple could become, not a symbol of joy, but 
of despair: so pale and pathetic is the imitation when compared to the 
heavenly/eschatological reality that the earthly institution is despised in favor of the 
otherworldly. Himmelfarb calls this a “desacralization of the earthly temple in favor of 
the heavenly…”259 The emphasis on divine Truth—which is unmarred by time, 
impermanence, the dustiness of earth—can become so absolute that it eclipses all else, 
and creaturely truth becomes devalued or annihilated. It is not hard to see how such an 
attitude could promote pietistic sectarian movements like the Essene community. In 
Przywara’s terms, this is the danger of “Theo-pan-ism.” He says, “‘Theo-pan-ism’ means 
that, proceeding fundamentally ‘from above to below,’ God becomes the all.”260 Such a 
pessimistic, otherworldly, starkly dialectic theology might encourage believers to 
abandon their worldly responsibilities, and thus provoke a reaction-formation (for 
example, political theologies that move headlong in the opposite direction). Acclaiming 
God’s transcendent glory may start as a celebration of God, but runs the risk of ultimately 
collapsing into hatred of God’s good creation. Once again, the theology of temple as 
mirror of heaven is finally inadequate to capture the relationship between divine and 
human truth, and in fact, on its own it can only end in distortion. 
                                                 
258 For reflection on the negative effects of such “extrinsicism, see Henri De Lubac, “Internal Causes of the 
Weakening and Disappearance of the Sense of the Sacred,” in Theology in History, trans. Englund Nash 
Anne (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 223–40. 
259 Himmelfarb, Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses, 13. 
260 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 2013, 165. 
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The Concrete Analogy: First Draft 
The two tendencies we have investigated in this section—temple as microcosm 
and temple as mirror of heaven—represent distinct modes of thought. Once again, 
Przywara provides some guidance for understanding each of these “poles,” and what is 
fascinating, as I have suggested on a few occasions, is how closely the different temple 
traditions correspond with Greek philosophical movements. Przywara schematizes this as 
two interpretations of the prefix in ana-logia. It could be read as the Greek word ἄνω, 
which means “from the above and back to the above,” or it might imply the word ἀνά, 
which means “intrinsically ordered.”261 Each of these understandings of analogia finds a 
champion in Greek philosophy in Plato and Aristotle. 
According to Przywara, Plato and Aristotle each attempt to avoid the extreme 
positions represented by Heraclitus—for whom everything is change—and Parmenides—
for whom change is illusion and everything is one. Thus, Plato and Aristotle seek to 
critique the extremes and instead put “fundamental emphasis upon the μεσον [middle] 
between them.”262 Simplifying Przywara’s account of Greek philosophy, he essentially 
says that for Plato, the formula “archetype and image” helps to guide the philosopher 
toward the “in-between” which is the “‘in-stantiation’ of the archetypes in nature.”263 The 
real in this system, Przywara says, comes “from above” because the image mirrors the 
timeless archetypes264—it is a philosophy, in other words, of icons which make present 
“the radiance of what lies beyond the heavens: figurality as participation.”265 A major 
                                                 
261 Ibid., 238–39. 
262 Ibid., 239. 
263 Ibid., 239–40. 
264 Ibid., 241. 
265 Ibid. 
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problem for Plato, however, is that he “does not actually aim at the ideal ‘through’ the 
real, but ‘away from’ the real,”266 and this problem goads Aristotle. It is one of the 
inspirations of the latter’s own attempt to mediate between Heraclitus and Parmenides. 
Aristotle wants to highlight the “inner completeness of the world of sensible particulars,” 
arguing for not “participation” but “indwelling” which “unites idea and reality.”267 One 
finds the “middle,” for Aristotle, “within” the order of nature. 
Przywara celebrates the insights of Aristotle and Plato, but he also shows how 
each of their philosophies reach a limit beyond which they come undone. Neither is able 
to find peace on its own terms. The problem, he says, is that “they betray a ‘desperate 
longing’ for the divine: a variously accented ‘delirium,’ reeling between intoxicated unity 
with the divine and defiant distance from it…”268 This is where the parallel Jewish 
understanding of ἄνω and ἀνά makes its greatest contribution, because now the themes of 
indwelling and transcendence were developed in relationship with the covenantal God 
whose name was revealed to Moses, and whose personal love and concern was repeatedly 
encountered in history. Drawing the covenantal faith together in a single cultic center also 
helped to make otherwise abstract philosophical discussions not just personal but 
concrete: this one institution represents both the summary truth of creation and the 
highest truth of heaven. Somehow the longing of the intrinsically ordered creation finds 
its answer in the blazing revelation of heavenly glory: in this one theological symbol the 
greatest transcendence finds its most intimate indwelling. Both immanence and 
transcendence find concrete expression in a single, complex, unified theological mystery.  
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267 Ibid., 246. 
268 Ibid., 259–60. 
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The temple was the subject of two distinct discourses, but these discourses never 
fully came together in second temple Jewish theology. From one perspective, the temple 
represented the perfection of creation, the Edenic purity that God called into being from 
the start, and from the other perspective the temple represented the splendor of the 
uncreated heaven, the place from which the angels eternally cry out in delight, “Holy! 
Holy! Holy!” From one perspective, the temple was a monument to humanity’s great 
vocation and dignity, our calling to partake in the creative ordering of the world, and 
from the other perspective the temple was the place where the visionary is overwhelmed, 
falls down in worship, and experiences his unworthiness before God. From one 
perspective, the temple is the locus of God’s free and immediate indwelling at the very 
heart of creaturely being, and from the other perspective it only vaguely mirrors a reality 
that so far surpasses creaturely competence that the prophet is reduced to ecstatic 
stammering about palaces of fire and ice. For one, the truth of God is found most 
intimately in and through the peaceful order of the good creation, for the other God’s 
truth is an apocalyptic interruption that shakes the foundations of the world. Hospitably, 
the temple hosts both modes of reflection, and there are even premonitions that the two 
views are called to recline together like lion and lamb, but the path toward this harmony 
is not yet known.  
Przywara’s great contribution is the understanding of the analogia entis as the 
suspended tension between poles. Balthasar insists that the analogia entis is not merely a 
philosophical rule, but it is revelation proper to Christian theology: because Jesus Christ, 
the incarnate Logos, is the “ultimate union of divine and created being,” Balthasar says 
that he “must constitute the final proportion between the two and hence must be the 
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‘concrete analogia entis’ itself.”269 Especially in light of the definitions of Nicaea—which 
affirms that there is difference in divine unity—and Chalcedon—where Christ’s divinity 
and humanity are undivided and unconfused—Christians have a long tradition of 
reflection on how the infinite might fully and peacefully come to expression in the finite 
without the destruction of either. The claims made about Jesus of Nazareth were, 
undoubtedly a stumbling-block for many ancient Jews, but from the perspective of 
temple theology, it must be said that this reflection on the ontological relationship 
between divine and creaturely truth was not unanticipated.   
To introduce a topic that will be the focus of the fourth chapter: in the New 
Testament, Jesus Christ is the fulfillment of the temple. This affirmation is now receiving 
greater attention, catalyzed by researchers associated with what is sometimes called the 
“third quest” in New Testament scholarship, which has sought to interpret the biblical 
accounts of Jesus of Nazareth within a Second Temple Jewish context. N.T. Wright has 
led the way in this research, arguing that Jesus understood his vocation in terms of finally 
enacting a “real return from exile,”270 the long-awaited realization of “the great healing, 
the great restoration, of Israel,”271 which is inseparable from the idea of “the return of 
YHWH to Zion.”272 Jesus does this by “a necessary reordering of Israel’s symbolic 
universe”273—including symbols like temple and Torah—“reconstituting” these symbols 
                                                 
269 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Vol. 3: The Dramatis Personae : 
Persons in Christ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 222. 
270 N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 127. In the background 
here is Wright’s claim that there was a widespread conviction in the Second Temple period that the 
Babylonian exile never truly ended, that Israel was never fully restored and even now awaited a new 
exodus. Cf. ibid., 126–31. 
271 Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, 1996, 130. 
272 Ibid., 612. 
273 Ibid., 472. 
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around himself.274 As Wright points out, “Jesus acted as if he thought he were the reality 
to which the Temple pointed, or even the one who had authority over the Temple…”275 
Ultimately, Wright says, the themes of “the return of YHWH to Zion, and the Temple-
theology which it brings into focus, are the deepest keys and clues to gospel 
christology.”276 
Insights like these have encouraged other scholars to focus on the centrality of the 
temple as they reread the gospels and other early Christian texts.277 In some crucial 
verses, Jesus does not merely replace the temple, he is the temple. Consider these two 
passages from the opening pages of the Gospel of John. “And the Logos became flesh 
and tabernacled (ἐσκήνωσεν) among us and we beheld his glory (δόξαν), glory as the 
only begotten from the Father” (1:18).278 As many have pointed out, by drawing together 
a key LXX word for God’s indwelling in the temple and the theme of divine glory, this 
passage undoubtedly associates Jesus with the priestly tabernacle. Then, in the next 
                                                 
274 Ibid., 473. 
275 Ibid., 647. 
276 Ibid., 653. 
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chapter, while actually standing in the Jerusalem temple, Jesus announces: “Destroy this 
temple, and in three days I will raise it up” (2:19). The gospel writer then clarifies that 
Jesus was speaking of “the temple, which is his body” (v. 21).279 The big question here is, 
of course, whether Christ is replacing his temple-body with the Jerusalem temple, or 
whether he is suggesting a more organic “fulfillment,” one in which the truth of the 
temple is elevated through its non-contrastive relationship with Christ. As it will become 
clear in forthcoming chapters, I read the texts in the latter sense; the fate of the temple 
and of Jesus Christ are intermingled, the type and the antitype conspire, they breath 
together, in such a way that when one gives up his spirit (Matt. 27:50), both do (Matt. 
27:51).280 In the overall narrative arch of the synoptics, Jesus journeys toward Jerusalem 
and the temple, but in the overall arch of the Christian biblical canon, Jerusalem and the 
temple journey toward Christ. Like the high priest but more so, Jesus is the personified, 
vivified, and enfleshed recapitulation of the most holy sanctuary in its whole history from 
Eden to Moriah, Sinai to Zion.281  
Over many years, Christians have reflected on the notion that Jesus is the truth of 
the Father who both descends from heaven as an unanticipated gift and gathers up, 
orders, and perfects all creation from the bottom up. It is not uncommon to hear that this 
                                                 
279 Ibid., 144. 
280 Cf. Pitre, “Jesus, the New Temple, and the New Priesthood,” 63. 
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type of Christology is a Hellenistic intrusion, but in fact these ideas are profoundly 
anticipated in temple theology, and insofar as Jesus associates himself with the truth of 
the temple, the themes of temple as microcosm and temple as mirror of heaven 
immediately become available for interpreting the mysterious identity of the Nazarene. In 
fact, it may be the case that the rules of faith established by the ancient church represent 
the legitimate continuation of temple reflection in a new key, one in which the two 
strands of temple theology explored in this chapter are perichoretically interrelated for the 
first time, thus opening the way for significant philosophical and theological 
development.  
Conclusion: To God, My Joy and My Delight 
Throughout this chapter we have focused primarily on priestly theology, but of 
course Zion and its house of worship was also a royal institution. Again and again it is 
emphasized: David was the favored one. According to the book of Psalms, he was the 
poet who wrote songs of praise, melodies that could be heard in Jerusalem for hundreds 
of years as awe-struck pilgrims climbed the mountain of God. David is the one who 
brought the ark at last to Jerusalem, leaping for joy before God and making sacrifice. 
David was the one who came to the threshing floor, saw the angel standing between 
heaven and earth, and fell to the ground in repentance. He knew that this was holy land, 
so he bought it from Ornan the Jebusite at full price, and he intended to build the house of 
God. David was the favored one, he was beloved, and yet he was not allowed to fulfill his 
dream and build the temple. Why?  
According to the Chronicler, God came to David and said: 
You have shed much blood and fought great battles; you shall not build a House 
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for My name for you have shed much blood on the earth in My sight. But you will 
have a son who will be a man at rest, for I will give him rest from all his enemies 
on all sides; Solomon (ַָּ֙֙הֹמלְש) will be his name and I shall confer peace (םוֹ  ל ָׁשְו) and 
quiet on Israel in his time. (1 Chr. 22:8-9).  
 
It was not fitting that the house of God should be built by a man of war. In fact, as 
Levenson points out, in the book of Exodus, “an old law forbids the altar in any shrine to 
be made of dressed stone, ‘for you have struck your sword against it and thus profaned it’ 
(Ex. 20:25).”282 No wars, no swords: the temple was to be an icon of peace, sabbath, and 
life. 
As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, one of the leading goals has 
been to push back against the common assumption that the temple was a place of 
violence, punishment, and death. Whatever modern Western theologians or sociologists 
might think, this assumption could not be more different from the presuppositions which 
formed the foundation of early Jewish temple theology. In the minds of those who 
actually worshiped in this space, who revered it and loved it, Zion really was perfect in 
beauty, and to approach the altar of God was to personally encounter surpassing joy and 
delight. Even in a time of sin, especially in a time of sin, the people would crawl back to 
the one place where they knew they could find forgiveness and new life. Here was the 
hope of resurrection, established at the very heart of the nation. 
I have argued that the temple is, in the ancient covenant, an uncommonly 
powerful theological symbol that draws together and correlates many aspects of Jewish 
religious life. It is an icon that in both its complexity and simplicity best captures what it 
means “to be” Israel. To best appreciate the theological mode of “being” specific to Israel 
and exemplified by the temple, I have meditated on this mystery in terms of its beauty, its 
                                                 
282 Levenson, Sinai and Zion, 96. Cf. Berman, The Temple, 73–75. 
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goodness, and its truth. In the first section, therefore, the emphasis was on the idea that 
for ancient Israel, the temple was the site of God’s indwelling glory, the place where 
divine splendor took form and allowed itself to be perceived. Visitors to the temple were 
invited to contemplate the structures of Jerusalem as an icon of God; this God wholly 
surpasses finite representation, but nevertheless makes himself available to the 
worshipers’ loving gaze in the sacrament of his dwelling place. The nation’s response to 
this great splendor was to be drawn forward in praise and worship. In other words, it was 
the place of communal and personal conversion and sanctification in God’s light.  
In the next section, the mystery of Zion was approached again, but this time in 
terms of “the action” that caused the mountain to be renamed YHWH-yireh, “The LORD is 
seen.” The drama of Genesis 22 really comes down to the meaning and the challenge of a 
single word: hinneni. When God calls Abraham, Abraham responds with that one word 
which implies openness, readiness, and freedom before God. Hearing this word, God 
effectively asks, “Will you live out this identity? Will you carry it through to the end? 
Would you even offer back the gift that I have given you, your only hope in the world, 
that which you love best, your very son Isaac?” It is a difficult and sobering story, but no 
narrative in the Hebrew Bible better communicates the radical claim that God makes on 
his people, that they must finally let go of every clutching desire, that they must truly and 
fully die to self, if they want to know the true meaning of life. Israel has nothing unless 
Israel gives up everything, unless Israel learns to again stand naked before God. In the 
narrative, God also reveals again that he is the God of life and superabundant, 
extravagant grace. Here is the basic truth of the Jewish covenant put into astonishing 
action: YHWH is the God who is seen where there is mutual self-giving in love. 
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In the last section, the mystery of the temple was approached a third time, but 
now with a focus on the way temple theology addresses the question of truth, the problem 
of the relationship between God’s logic and creaturely logic. What we discovered is that 
the temple was the focal point for two distinct ways of conceiving the relationship. On 
the one hand, the priestly tradition especially emphasized God’s immanent presence in 
the temple,283 and also the idea that the temple is a microcosm, the place where all 
creation was gathered and re-presented in ideal harmony. The sense, then, was that the 
indwelling presence of God was intimately hidden at the heart of creaturely being, and 
humanity was called to help order, sustain, and protect the good creation. On the other 
hand, influenced by the Deuteronomic school, a second perspective emphasized that God 
is wholly other, utterly transcending the created world, and that the temple represents, or 
perhaps participates in, God’s heavenly dwelling. From this perspective, the revelation of 
God interrupts creation, and human beings are in need of a transformation that comes 
through an ascent beyond worldly finitude. Taken together, these views imply a 
“suspended middle,” God beyond-and-in creation, the creaturely rooted in a Truth what 
fully surpasses it.  
Having contemplated the temple from each of these three perspectives, one final 
clarification is in order. According to Balthasar, “Truth, goodness, and beauty are so fully 
transcendental properties of being that they can be grasped only in and through one 
another.”284 As Balthasar says in the first volume of the Glory of the Lord, without beauty 
and splendor, the call to the good—the hinneni form of life—can appear brutal and cold, 
                                                 
283 But, again, see Sommer’s point that this emphasis is not without nuance. Even within P, there is an 
implicit critique of divine immanence. Cf. Sommer, Bodies of God, 119–20. 
284 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic, Vol. 1: Truth of the World (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 
225. 
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and the demonstration of truth can become impersonal and irrelevant.285 But then, 
without goodness the eros of beauty can degrade into self-absorbed covetousness and 
lust, and the logic of truth lacks personal concern and moral direction. Finally, without 
truth—without appreciation for the analogous nature of creaturely being suspended 
between logical poles—beauty can be reduced to either a univocal symmetrical order or 
the equivocal sublime, and goodness might be reduced to either a univocal categorical 
imperative or equivocal divine volunteerism. Each “transcendental” protects its fellows 
from disfiguration, and thus all three sections of this chapter must be read together.  
Therefore, the beauty of the temple is in the way it communicates to the 
worshiper the goodness of covenantal grace and the goodness of self-giving, and also in 
the way it reveals the truth of the God who dwells most intimately in creation and draws 
creation toward transcendent life. The goodness of the temple is driven by that Glory who 
shines fearfully and wonderfully upon the sons and daughters of Abraham, ecstatically 
moving them to set out toward a way of being that is both different from the nations and 
is the hope of the world. The goodness of the temple is also clarified by the truth that 
creaturely being is suspended in God, that the reason why self-abandonment in God is 
good for the human being is because it corresponds to the reality of what it means to be a 
creature. Finally, the truth of the temple is clarified by the realization that Zion is the 
hinneni-place, the fountain of beauty. This truth ultimately points toward an ontology of 
love. The grades of holiness, the diverse liturgical practices, the profound symbolism of 
the furniture, the Edenic holy of holies, the chariot throne; all of it serves to draw Israel 
more and more into relationship with YHWH, a relationship that transfigures the people of 
                                                 
285 Cf. Balthasar, GL1, 1982, 19. 
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God and culminates the great cosmic liturgy, the heavenly doxological song. 
“Holy, holy, holy! 
The Lord of Hosts! 
His presence fills all the earth!”286 
 
 
  
                                                 
286 Isaiah 6:3 
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Epilogue: An Empty Howling Waste 
Tragically, that’s not all.  
How good and lovely it would be, that the creation were spoken into existence, 
the temple constructed in obedience, and that God should dwell with the people in 
harmony forever.  But any cursory look at biblical geography since Genesis 3—or any 
passing familiarity with “current events” at any point in human history—will remind us 
that Mount Zion is not the only topographical marker. In fact, Israel is surrounded on all 
sides by its antithesis: wilderness, chaos, death. It is a vicious space always storming the 
gates. In the biblical story, Israel’s position is precarious, vulnerable to the darkness, and 
sometimes she even abandons herself to the night. To speak at such length—as I have 
done—about the beauty, goodness, and truth of the temple, to celebrate its status as 
perfect peace and rest, may come across as willful ignorance or a massive deception. Is it 
not the case that the temple is very small compared to the wilderness, which stretches in 
every direction, as far as the eye can see? Is it not the case that the most characteristic 
situation for Israel is not paradisiacal peace, but judgment, and even exile? What place is 
there for such idyllic fairy tales in the chaos of this world, this abyss of ruined lives, 
compounding miseries, where no two stones are left one upon the other?  
Balthasar himself might be critical of some aspects of the temple theology that I 
have developed in this chapter, especially those sections that draw upon extra-biblical 
second temple literature. In the sixth volume of the Glory of the Lord, his Theology of the 
Old Covenant, Balthasar refuses to look away from or gloss over one of the central 
themes of the Hebrew Bible: God’s judgment on Israel and his just wrath.287 As Balthasar 
                                                 
287 See, for example, Balthasar, GL6, 218, 301. 
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says in the introduction to this volume,  
It is not possible to enjoy a reposeful aesthetic contemplation of the divine glory, 
a contemplation that would consider God ‘in himself’ and thus could dispense 
with the opposition between God’s holiness and the unholiness of the world, of 
which the contemplator is the mathematical exponent, as it were. Glory is the 
intruding lordliness of him who comes to confront the world, both judging it and 
gracing it. It is this that distinguishes the biblical reality from the epiphanies of 
gods outside the Bible.288 
 
Keeping this in mind, one can understand the reserve Balthasar shows for late second 
temple literature, especially the extra-biblical apocalypses. These texts, he says, fall 
under a category made infamous by Luther: they are “theologia gloriae, theologies of 
glory.” It is not a compliment. Balthasar believes that in the second temple period the 
prophets vanish and God falls silent. Confronted with this “long twilight,” some attempts 
were made to force the return of lost glory. This is how Balthasar interprets (1) messianic 
literature (which promote glory in history through political revolution), (2) 
intertestamental apocalyptic (for example, the books of Enoch), and (3) Hellenizing 
wisdom literature (like Sirach or the Wisdom of Solomon). Balthasar’s negative 
assessment of these texts is not absolute—he recognizes that this literature is an 
indispensable “mediator” without which the New Testament would be impossible to 
conceive—but on a hierarchy of theological value, Balthasar is much more appreciative 
of the canonical prophets of old.  
The main problem for theologia gloriae is stated directly: “it is a theology that has 
somehow put the nights and terrors of the judgment behind itself, without integrating 
them in depth.”289 In this context, Balthasar is consistently negative toward apocalypses 
like 1 Enoch. It is not the case that such texts simply ignore evil: in fact, personified evil 
                                                 
288 Ibid., 14. 
289 Ibid., 304. 
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forces play a major role. Nevertheless, unlike the proclamations of the great prophets, 
which were “double-sided” offering both “judgment and salvation”290 to the same 
community, on Balthasar’s reading the non-biblical apocalypses often suggest blithely 
that the allegiance with evil is a problem for “them,” the damned masses, while the 
minority of unstained chosen ones is saved. The lines are neat and clean, black and 
white.291 This is very different from the biblical crisis of God’s wrath—which rips 
through Israel itself and is not reserved only for “the nations,” nor does it bypass a 
spiritual elite.292 
 This point is crucial because it also marks the difference between the covenantal 
faith in which sin is an infidelity that strikes at the heart of Israel, and the ancient 
mythologies of the surrounding cultures. As we have seen, in these creation myths, the 
world is established as the result of a cosmic battle in which the creator god defeats an 
evil power, a chaos monster often depicted as a sea god. Here the “us vs. them” duality 
seems to be written into the foundations of the created world: good and evil are absolutes 
                                                 
290 Ibid., 339. 
291 Cf. Ibid., 339–43. For further reflection on Balthasar’s positive and negative approaches to apocalyptic 
literature, see O’Regan, Anatomy of Misremembering, 2014, 87-91, esp. 383-394. 
292 A critical note on Balthasar’s approach to second temple literature: to his credit, he takes the idea of the 
biblical canon seriously. As illuminating and helpful as non-canonical texts may be, and while the 
deuterocanonical books have authority, he certainly prioritizes the foundational biblical texts in 
interpreting the theo-drama of ancient Israel. In this way, Balthasar is simply a Catholic theologian. He 
also quite rightly points out some real theological weak points in these books. Nevertheless, without 
allowing the apocalyptic or pseudepigraphal texts to become a substitute canon (pace Margaret Barker), 
it is not necessary to read second temple literature blandly or dismissively, which is sometimes the case 
in Balthasar. This is one area in which recent scholarship—including biblical research by Jewish 
theologians, and the nuanced studies catalyzed by E.P. Sanders—can help to overturn bad habits too 
often found in previous generations of academic theologians. Sometimes it seems that Balthasar over-
emphasizes the weaknesses of these books, perhaps partly to highlight the novum of Christ Jesus. For 
Catholic theology, the novum is not in doubt, and as we see in the theology of the saints, it is not 
necessary to denigrate one good (like second temple Jewish theology) to recognize the surpassing 
perfection of another (Jesus Christ). Balthasar knows this well, of course, but when reading his 
interpretation of some texts in GL6, the point is worth emphasizing. In any case, it seems to me possible 
to read a text like The Book of the Watchers as an entirely licit and illuminating theological meditation 
on biblical themes without ignoring the ways in which the text nevertheless falls short; I will offer such a 
reading below. 
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and they are locked in violent confrontation. Levenson discerns echoes of this old myth 
throughout the Hebrew Bible; for him, the result is a theodicy in which chaos has not yet 
been fully conquered, God’s absolute sovereignty is unproven, and thus God must be 
roused again and again to action through prayer. When God is deprived of a worthy 
cosmic opponent, as in theologies of creatio ex nihilo, when evil becomes mere privation 
of the good, as in developed metaphysical traditions, Levenson believes that the battle 
imagery loses its potency.293 This loss makes it harder to understand the vitality of 
priestly theology, where the priests are on the front lines of the cosmic war, YHWH’s 
primary soldiers in a liturgical battle to again defeat the chaos demon and to help protect 
the throne of YHWH against all pretenders.  
 There are indeed understandable reasons why Levenson’s approach to the 
problem of evil has found supporters in contemporary theology. But despite any 
advantages that may accrue by giving up ideas like divine omnipotence, Balthasar says, 
“there is no possibility of seeing evil as rooted anywhere in the divine sphere: neither in 
Yahweh himself, since he is all-holy, nor in any divine powers hostile to him, for no such 
powers exist…”294 From this perspective, evil instead emerges from within the struggle 
to maintain the covenant, thus it is an interpersonal drama between God and his people. 
There are real benefits here. For primeval mythologies about the divine triumph over 
chaos, the victory is merely a matter of power, which is actually not that interesting. The 
                                                 
293 As Levenson says, “[YHWH’s] victory is only meaningful if his foe is formidable, and his foe’s 
formidability is difficult, perhaps impossible, to imagine if the foe has long since been vanquished.” 
Creation and the Persistence of Evil, 27. Again, Levenson intends to employ these marginal biblical 
traditions in developing a modern theodicy; one gets a sense for his motivation when he says, “I might 
add that I find it especially odd that scholars who lived through the years of the Holocaust and other 
unspeakable horrors of our century should have imagined that the Hebrew Bible consistently upheld a 
doctrine of God’s uniform, uninterrupted kingship, in spite of ample textual evidence to the contrary.” 
Ibid., xxiii. 
294 Balthasar, GL6, 215. 
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more mighty force wins every time. But in biblical theology, the problem of wilderness 
and chaos is not “out there,” it is a problem for each human heart. The biblical struggle is 
therefore fundamentally different and more precarious: it’s the struggle of freedom and 
love. It is the easiest thing in the world to kill an opponent, and the hardest thing to bring 
the enemy into a relationship of mutual loving-kindness.  
 At the same time, the imagery that Levenson alerts us to remains illustrative: 
Israel is in fact engaged in a struggle against what is fundamentally opposed to God’s 
good creation: “disorder, injustice, affliction, and chaos”—and we could add exile, 
darkness, and above all else, death—“which are, in the Israelite worldview, one.”295 As 
we will see in the next chapter, Israel is aware of the fact that such evil has an existence 
of its own, one which must be confronted and overcome by the power of life and light. 
Such evil was represented in Israel by a series of theological images, and perhaps not 
surprisingly, given the importance of “the land” in biblical theology, many of these 
symbols are geographical. Thus the concepts of wilderness, desert, pit, and sea often 
represent the forces which oppose the treasured priestly concept of “life-sustaining 
order.” The primary Hebrew word that is translated “wilderness,” or sometimes “desert,” 
is ר ָׁבְדִמ, midbar. In various places, this wilderness is described as “vast and dreadful” 
(Deut. 1:19, 8:15), “an empty howling waste” (Deut. 32:10), a place where there is no 
water (Deut. 8:15) but only desolation (Isaiah 64:1, Jer. 12:10, Joel 2:3). The wilderness 
is the place of abandonment and destruction (Num. 32:15), it is where frightening wild 
beasts such as “seraph serpents and scorpion” roam (Deut. 8:15), and where the people 
are exposed, “ungathered and unburied” (Ezekiel 29:5). Finally, the wilderness is 
                                                 
295 Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, xix. 
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associated with hardship and death, as seen in the people’s protest that they have been 
brought “to die in the wilderness” (Exodus 14:11; cf. Numbers 21:5, 32:13-15).296   
 This geographic imagery has the advantage of clearly distinguishing the 
wilderness from the theological meaning of Jerusalem. In fact, the difference between 
Zion and wilderness could not be greater. These two geographical markers remain 
irreducible, and actually, incomparable. But with respect to Balthasar’s concerns, this 
obviously does not mean that “wilderness” is no longer a problem for Israel. 
“Wilderness” is always looking for a weakness so as to penetrate the holy city, and that 
the chaos of sin is in fact successful in breaching the gates of Jerusalem is undoubted. But 
the breach does not destroy the distinction between Zion and wilderness. Israel’s position 
foreshadows the paradoxical complexity that will be a hallmark of the church as well: 
Israel gathered around the temple is already the salvation of the world, the personification 
of God’s loving order, the real presence of life, beauty, goodness, and truth. But it is 
precisely in light of this exalted identity that Israel’s sin is so great.297 This is the problem 
of chosenness; the God who reveals himself actually expects greatness from his people, 
defined in terms of justice and love. He expects them to leave the wilderness behind, 
completely and forever.298 That Israel fails—running after finite idols, treating the poor 
                                                 
296 Cf. Robert Barry Leal, “Negativity towards Wilderness in the Biblical Record,” Ecotheology 10, no. 3 
(2005): 368–75. It is significant that many of the most starkly negative depictions of wilderness come 
from the Deuteronomist. The importance of Jerusalem as God’s chosen city is emphasized in D, whereas 
P’s tabernacle tradition speaks more of a “wandering center,” as Sommer often puts it. This perhaps 
makes priestly theology especially well-suited to contemplate the strange interaction of holiness and sin 
in the sacred house of YHWH, the fruit of which is the theology of Yom Kippur.  
  For the theme of wilderness or ‘the pit’ in other ANE sources, and then in second temple Jewish 
pseudepigrapha, see  Paul Hanson, “Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel, and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 Enoch 6 -
11,” Journal of Biblical Literature, Rebellion in Heaven, 96, no. 2 (1977): 204–13.  
297 According to Balthasar, “The glory of the God who disclosed himself always reveals his holiness as 
well…and thus it also discloses the full unholiness of the person beholding the glory,” Balthasar, GL6, 
13. Similarly, “for Israel, the central concept of evil…is derived from its fundamental experience of God 
and concept of God.” Ibid., 215.  
298 I think of Lewis’ sobering line: “If we insist on keeping Hell (or even earth) we shall not see Heaven: if 
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unjustly, refusing to embrace the call to holiness and communion—provokes the great 
national tragedies that the prophets must confront.  
 The problem of exile is so profound precisely because it is the impossible, 
catastrophic victory of wilderness over God’s holy city. Babylon succeeded in destroying 
heaven and earth when it unleashed its chaos on Mount Zion. Consider the starkness of 
the book of Lamentations. “Alas! The Lord in His wrath has shamed Fair Zion, has cast 
down from heaven to earth the majesty of Israel. He did not remember His Footstool on 
His day of wrath” (2:1). Here and elsewhere there is some ambiguity about God’s 
involvement in the destruction, but wrath is often associated with abandonment, removal 
of protection, the loss of the life-sustaining order resulting in death and decay.299  Life 
without God, excluded from the tree of life, the holy of holies, is simply a living-death. It 
is hell. When you appreciate the positive theology of the temple, and the theological 
distinction between temple and desert, the full horror of the exile comes into stark relief. 
Nothing worse could happen to Israel.  
The words “exile” and “death” are interchangeable; this is plainly stated in many 
places, and it is especially clear in the book of Deuteronomy. Kenneth J. Turner’s study 
of exile in the book of Deuteronomy focuses on how the words דַב ָׁא (destruction, to 
perish, to be destroyed) and דַמ ָׁש (destruction or annihilation) are frequently used to 
                                                 
we accept Heaven we shall not be able to retain even the smallest and most intimate souvenirs of Hell.” 
C. S. Lewis, The Great Divorce, New edition edition (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2009), viii–ix. 
299 It is also surely true that in this verse and many others, God’s wrath is portrayed as not simply the 
passive allowance of evil, the removal of protection, but God’s active punishment. The major question is 
whether this represents a change in God or merely a change in humanity. This question is far too large to 
say anything significant about it here. Let this brief comment suffice: it may be the case that Israel, when 
she is secure in covenantal grace, is blessed by the encounter of God’s blazing glory, but when the 
covenant is broken by infidelity, that same glory that was a blessing becomes a curse. The discussion of 
the sin of Nadab and Abihu in the next chapter will shed some light on this issue.  
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denote exile. 300 For example, the author writes,  
When you have begotten children and children’s children and are long established 
in the land, should you act wickedly and make for yourselves a sculptured image 
in any likeness, causing the Lord your God displeasure and vexation…you shall 
soon perish (ָּ֙ ןוּד  בֹאת ד ֹּ֣ב ָׁא) from the land that you are crossing the Jordan to possess; 
you shall not long endure in it, but shall be utterly wiped out (ןוּ ֵּֽד  מ ָׁשִת ד ָ֖  מ ָׁשִה). 
(Deuteronomy 4:25-26) 
 
Notably, the same root words are used in Leviticus 26, the passage from the priestly 
Holiness Code that articulates the blessings and curses associated with obedience or 
disobedience to God’s commandments, but here there is a greater emphasis on the 
destruction of the cult site: 
I will destroy (י ִַּ֞תְדַמְשִהְו) your cult places and cut down your incense stands, and I 
will heap your carcasses upon your lifeless fetishes. I will spurn you. I will lay 
your cities in ruin and make your sanctuaries desolate, and I will not savor your 
pleasing odors…[You] shall perish (ם ָ֖  תְדַבֲאַו) among the nations; and the land of 
your enemies shall consume you. (Leviticus 26:30, 38) 
 
It is not the case that every single Israelite dies on account of the exile, just as it is not the 
case that Adam stopped breathing the moment he sinned. But removal from the land, and 
for priestly theology especially, the loss of the tabernacle, was to undergo annihilation as 
a covenant people. Exile is death. 
 The interaction between wilderness and Zion is complex. The eschatological ideal 
is the final triumph over wilderness and death, a time when all nations will be gathered in 
worship at Zion. At this point, wilderness will no longer be a threat to the life of God’s 
people. At the other extreme, the word “exile” describes the period in which the temple is 
overrun by wilderness, desecrated, and utterly destroyed.  It is the triumph of ugliness, 
evil, and lies; it is the undoing of creation. Most of the time biblical Israel lives between 
                                                 
300 Kenneth J. Turner, The Death of Deaths in the Death of Israel: Deuteronomy’s Theology of Exile 
(Eugene, Or.: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2010), 47–61. 
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these poles, ordered toward that final peace which is “now and not yet,” while also 
struggling with the ever-intrusive threat of wilderness.  
Reflecting on the contrast between eschatological peace and worldly turmoil, it is 
clear that the Chaoskampf, the struggle against the anti-order of sin, is not a skirmish that 
is limited to the edge of society—if only sin were such a marginal problem for 
humanity!—but rather, sin must be confronted from the inside out.301 The prophets never 
stop insisting that the line of sin runs right down the middle of Israel, and if it runs down 
the middle, it hits the center: the temple is not undisturbed by sin. If the world is affected, 
so is the microcosm in Jerusalem.302 The work of “atonement” in the temple is therefore 
necessary, and this work is both offensive and defensive. It is offensive insofar as it 
reaffirms and reestablishes the eschatological reality of peace that the temple already 
makes present in the world. It is defensive because it rebuilds the boundaries, 
distinguishing and vigorously separating the temple from its opposite, the wilderness. 
I have focused primarily on the temple as a symbol of joy in response to the 
dismissive and negative treatment of the temple that is so common in Christian theology. 
Plus, it is surely not wrong to find our orientation in that symbol of life and light, for 
these realities are true in a way that death and darkness never can be. It is possible to 
overplay the importance or power of violence and evil;303 as the psalmist says, “Weeping 
may last for the night, but a shout of joy comes in the morning” (Psalm 30:5, NASB). 
                                                 
301 There is, of course, a problem with using battle imagery to speak of the “conflict” between holiness and 
sin; is it not necessary for holiness to be non-violent? This is a special problem for the Christian book of 
Revelation. I will only note the problem here without fully exploring it, but notice how the great issue of 
“judgment,” and Balthasar’s insistence that judgement not be prematurely set aside, is certainly at issue. 
If wilderness is not just an illusion, how does Love engage it? Can non-violence “confront” violence non-
violently, yet mightily? 
302 Barker makes this point as well, Temple Theology, 62–63. 
303 This is where the privation theory of sin is most helpful, and Hart is especially persuasive on this point, 
as we will discuss in chapter five. 
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Nevertheless, this afterword is also necessary to prevent imbalance. For the biblical 
writers, the temple is not merely an untouched oasis, a resort to which one might flee to 
“get away from it all.” The temple, in fact, while remaining the icon of life and hope, is 
ground zero in the struggle against sin. That is precisely why Yom Kippur is necessarily. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DAY OF ATONEMENT 
As David Fagerberg said, “Liturgical theology is the faith of the Church in ritual 
motion…[it is] a genuine theology, but one manifested and preserved in the rite as lex 
orandi even before it is parsed systematically.”1 Up to this point I have spent all my time 
on the “systematic side”—the theological discoveries that emerged from God’s revelation 
to Israel and Israel’s life of prayer—surveying the mystery of the temple three times, 
from the perspective of beauty, goodness, and truth. Now we must emphasize again that 
this sacred space is liturgical space: the temple was not just contemplated as an abstract 
symbol, but it was alive in ritual motion. The last chapters of Exodus, which describe the 
physical structures in detail, and the first chapters of Leviticus, where rubrics for the 
sacrificial rites are outlined, are interrelated. This is important; as I’ve mentioned, it is not 
difficult to find studies of Israel’s sacred space that overlook the sacrificial rites, and vice 
versa. Academics specialize—that’s inevitable—but still we must be attentive to the fact 
that the theology of the temple undoubtedly emerges from Israel’s ancient liturgical 
practices, even as this life of prayer was further enriched by the various schools of 
theological reflection.  
 Our focus therefore now shifts to the holy mountain as liturgical space, with an 
emphasis on the most sacred of the holy rites performed on Mount Zion. To quote 
Fagerberg again, “The starting point for liturgical theology must be real liturgies, and 
they do not exist in the abstract. Actual liturgies exist.”2 Yes, actual liturgies exist, both 
today and three millennia ago, but unfortunately our knowledge of ancient temple 
                                                 
1 Fagerberg, Theologia Prima, ix. 
2 Ibid., 40. 
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liturgies is relatively sparse. The Bible is not silent on the matter, but it is taciturn. 
Leviticus 16 stands out as an unusually detailed description of a specific temple liturgy. 
With Yom Kippur, we have the Bible’s most elaborate and detailed liturgical rubrics.3 
Therefore, anyone interested in the relationship between lex orandi and lex credendi in 
ancient Israel generally, and in priestly temple theology specifically, must spend some 
time with this unusual text. On this holy day, the theology of the temple is lived, it is put 
into living practice, even before systematic theologians have a chance to reduce it to 
definitions.  
If the only goal were to understand temple theology, then attention to the liturgy 
of Yom Kippur would be a vital component of any comprehensive study. But our interest 
is more precise. Christians routinely claim that Christ’s cross effects atonement, but this 
affirmation is not always paired with an adequate appreciation for the fact that the word 
“atonement”—the Hebrew רפכ, k-p-r—is inextricably linked to temple theology, and 
especially, to priestly temple theology. If our treatment of the temple in the last chapter 
seemed like overkill, I can only respond with this: any theology of “atonement” requires 
“total immersion” in temple modes of thought. Given the fact that the Jerusalem temple 
was destroyed almost two millennia ago, and that seismic cultural differences separate us 
from this ancient institution, it is necessary to plunge ourselves into the most recent 
scholarship so as to appreciate the meaning of the temple as sympathetically as possible. 
                                                 
3 As Daniel Stökl Ben Ezra says, it is “the most detailed description of any ritual in the Bible.” The Impact 
of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity: The Day of Atonement from Second Temple Judaism to the Fifth 
Century (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 18.  
  The nature of the relationship between this text (as a text) and the actual liturgy that occurred in the 
temple (as a ritual) is widely debated. For discussion and literature reviews, see James W. Watts, Ritual 
and Rhetoric in Leviticus: From Sacrifice to Scripture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
27ff; Michael B Hundley, Keeping Heaven on Earth: Safeguarding the Divine Presence in the Priestly 
Tabernacle (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 17ff; Leigh M. Trevaskis, Holiness, Ethics and Ritual in 
Leviticus (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Phoenix Press Ltd, 2011), 27–39.  
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Now that we see that the temple is the center of Israel’s life of praise and the 
place where she is glorified in God’s Glory, now that we have considered that the 
theological foundation of the temple is hinneni-life, and now that we have reflected on 
the strange truth that the temple is simultaneously the microcosm of creation and the 
mirror of heaven, a new question emerges: what becomes of this place when it is 
entangled in lies, besieged by evil, and disfigured by ugliness? Does the priestly 
theological tradition deny that even the sacred mountain is vulnerable to such corruption? 
To the contrary! Addressing the unique vulnerability of Zion was constantly at the 
forefront of priestly concern. The Levites were given the vocation to “serve and protect” 
this mountain (cf. Gen. 2:15), and this charge led to a spiritual confrontation with all 
things unholy. On the Day of Atonement, everything came to a head: the forces of life 
and light engage in a great liturgical battle against the powers of death and darkness. The 
survival of the temple, the survival of the world, stood in the balance.  
In this chapter we will begin by turning to the biblical narrative that is identified 
as the immediate impetus for the first Day of Atonement, the sin of Nadab and Abihu, 
before considering the problem of sin and impurity more broadly. After gaining a better 
understanding of the nature of the “problem,” from the perspective of temple theologians, 
we will then consider the detailed liturgical solution which is prescribed in the sixteenth 
chapter of the book of Leviticus. Here we will encounter the theology of the two goats, 
one serving as a spotless “purification offering,” the other serving a sin-bearing goat. The 
distinction between these vocations, as we will see, is crucial. Much of the focus in this 
section will be on the work of the high priest and the two goats, but one should not think 
that this is private activity: we will also see how all Israel joins in the work of atonement.  
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Nadab and Abihu 
If you were to ask any Christian familiar with the basic doctrines of the faith—or 
indeed if you were to ask anyone familiar with Western culture generally—about the 
origin of sin according to the biblical narrative, nearly everyone would blame the tragic 
newlyweds, Adam and Eve. (Worst honeymoon ever.) Because modern scholars assign 
this disheartening story to the Yahwist source, perhaps we could say that the priestly 
account of Genesis 1 ends on a much more positive note: “And God blessed the seventh 
day and declared it holy…” (Genesis 2:3). The “very good” creation is left in restful 
peace; doesn’t this imply an optimistic anthropology, in welcome contrast to the Adam 
story with its curses and exiles, and especially in contrast to the subsequent interpretive 
tradition with its dogmatic focus on original sin?  
The question is, does creation really reach its end, according to priestly 
theologians, in the first verses of Genesis? In the last chapter we explored why the answer 
to that question must be “no.” Recall how the building of the tabernacle parallels the 
creation of the world in priestly theology. This discovery was made after biblical 
researchers started focusing on the similarities and differences between the creation story 
in the priestly tradition and the analogous myths of neighboring cultures, especially the 
Enuma Elish. In that Mesopotamian myth, we saw how the Babylonian temple was built 
to celebrate the victory of Marduk over the chaos demon; the consecration of the temple 
and the beginning of sacrifices to the enthroned god was the capstone of that victory, the 
beginning of a blessed period of peace and prosperity. Despite the stark differences 
between Genesis 1 and the story of Marduk, we also saw some similarities between the 
divine work of creation in Genesis and divinely commissioned tabernacle building in 
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Exodus 25-40, all of which suggests that it is actually the building of the sanctuary that is 
the culmination of creation, or maybe better said, the recapitulation of cosmic creation in 
a way that engages human freedom.  
Therefore, the purpose of creation, from this priestly perspective, is to draw 
human freedom into God’s just ordering of the world, or even, to draw human freedom 
into the life-giving cycle of glory and praise. It is thus easy to understand Gary 
Anderson’s argument that, “According to the theology of P, once the tabernacle and its 
altar had been consecrated by Moses, the preparatory work of the liturgy was finished. 
And this point must be underscored: when the daily sacrifices began (Exod. 29:38-42 = 
Leviticus 9) the goal of all creation would be consummated.”4 God had a reason for 
speaking into existence globes of dirt to whirl around spheres of fire; it was not an idle 
science experiment. The purpose was to breathe life into the dust and invite it into the 
communion of love through songs of praise. The Sabbath described in the passage from 
Genesis is not wholly consummated until humanity freely enters such rest, and this, 
Anderson argues, is what finally occurs when the sacrificial pyre is lit and the morning 
and evening Tamid begins. In a way never before possible, it can now be said, “there was 
evening and there was morning,” an eighth day,5 and it was good.  
                                                 
4 Anderson, The Genesis of Perfection, 202. Benjamin Sommer makes the same claim. He says, “These 
eight days of dedication, described in Exodus 40-Leviticus 10, represent Israel’s true beginning. For P, 
the Israelites became a nation, truly deserved the name Israel, only when God arrived in their midst and 
they responded accordingly—that is, when the tabernacle was complete and they initiated their 
worship….We can go one step further. The events at the beginning of the first month of the second year 
represent the culmination of creation, for until then the world had been incomplete…” Emphasizing the 
cosmic significance of this moment, Sommer says this section in Leviticus represents the “inaugural 
ceremonies for the world itself.” Sommer, Bodies of God, 111. 
5 According to Leviticus 9:1, the inauguration of the tabernacle takes place on the “eighth day,” after a 
week of preparation during which the Aaronic priesthood and the tabernacle are consecrated and the new 
priests wait before the Lord in obedience (Lev. 8). The eighth day is a new first day, one that is both 
“integrally connected with the previous seven” and yet “not like the previous seven.” Milgrom, Leviticus 
1-16, 1991, 571. This sense of both continuity and newness applies to the relationship between Leviticus 
8 and 9, but following Anderson’s suggestion, the theological interpreter would do well to also see this 
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If this were the Enuma Elish, the enthronement of the god in the temple would 
usher in a period of uninterrupted peace and victory. When the gods finished building his 
house, Marduk says to them, “This, too, is your House. Take your seats and enjoy its 
pleasures!”6 This they gladly do, swearing oaths of fidelity to Marduk, and curses on all 
traitors. With reference to ancient Near Eastern stories like this one, Anderson says, “the 
moment of temple building always ushers in an age of peace and tranquility.”7 And at 
first, something similar seems to occur in Leviticus 9. After a series of offerings were 
made to God, the chapter concludes with Aaron blessing the people. And then, “the 
Presence of the LORD (הָ֖ ָׁוהְי־דוֹבְכ, kĕbôd-YHWH) appeared to all the people. Fire came forth 
from before the LORD and consumed the burnt offerings and the fat parts on the altar. 
And all the people saw, and shouted [for joy8], and fell on their faces” (Lev. 9:23-24). 
Now the tabernacle has been constructed, the priests have been vested, all has been 
consecrated, all as God has commanded. At long last, with the concluding verses of 
Leviticus 9, the great work which began in Exodus 25—or perhaps even, the great work 
begun at Genesis 1:1—comes to its apogee: the tent blazes with the glory of God.9 As the 
offerings are accepted in a burst of divine brilliance, the people shout with joy and fall in 
worship. On this eighth day, one would not be surprised if the angelic choir sang once 
more the ancient refrain, “The heaven and the earth were finished, and all their array” 
(Genesis 2:1).  
                                                 
eighth day as the epitome of the seven days of creation from Genesis 1-2:3. 
6 Matthews and Benjamin, Old Testament Parallels, 20. 
7 Anderson, The Genesis of Perfection, 202. 
8 Cf. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 591. 
9 This is not the only account of God’s glorious descent to the tabernacle; a similar narrative can be found 
at the conclusion of Exodus 40. The question of how to relate these two texts has been a topic of 
conversation since rabbinic times. For a modern reflection on the problem, see Anderson, “Inauguration 
of the Tabernacle Service at Sinai.” 
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Within the next two verses, the sanctuary is profaned and Aaron’s eldest sons are 
dead. This is the unbelievable honesty of the Hebrew Scriptures; in a book written by 
priests, celebrating priestly service, immediately upon the tabernacle’s sacred 
inauguration, the high priest’s own family defiles it. According to the text, “Now Aaron’s 
sons Nadab and Abihu each took his fire pan, put fire in it, and laid incense on it; and 
they offered before the LORD alien fire, which He had not enjoined upon them. And fire 
came forth from the LORD and consumed them; thus they died at the instance of the 
LORD” (Lev. 10:1-2). There is no millennium of peace or time for feasting in God’s warm 
presence; the revelation of glory is instantaneously coupled with human sin, and with sin, 
death.10 From this vantage point, who could say that the P source is more optimistic than 
J? In fact, just the opposite: while for Genesis 2-3, the sin of the first humans is provoked 
by the tempter, in Leviticus the first sin after the completion of heaven and earth (the 
tabernacle) appears without any prompting whatsoever.  
While many modern readers are uncomfortable with the story of Adam and Eve—
wondering why God would even make the commandment against partaking of the tree of 
knowledge, and further questioning why there would be so severe a punishment for such 
a seemingly minor sin—the story of Nadab and Abihu might cause even greater 
discomfort if it were widely known. What does it mean? What is an “alien fire,” and why 
                                                 
10 Anderson suggests that the “immediacy” of this sin may be the result of the work of a redactor, and that 
the initial narrative spanning from Exodus 19 to Leviticus 9 may have more in common with the 
significantly more triumphant creation myths of the surrounding cultures. Cf. Anderson, The Genesis of 
Perfection, 205–7. The same impulse to highlight the immediate threat of sin that caused one redactor to 
add the story of Nadab and Abihu, Anderson says, may have inspired yet another redactor to add the 
narrative of the Golden Calf immediately after God gives Moses the covenant tablets in Exodus. With 
each redaction, the propensity to sin is emphasized more and more. Other commentators have also 
emphasized the connection between the Golden Calf and the sin of Nadab and Abihu; for example, Mary 
Douglas draws parallels between the stories to suggest that “the unholy fire [is] a low-key inverted 
version of the story of the golden calf.” Mary Douglas, Leviticus as Literature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 205. 
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was the divine response so shockingly lethal? One answer—perhaps the wisest one—is 
simply to echo Anderson: “We are left completely in the dark about the motivation of 
these two wayward priests and the specific nature of their sin.”11 All that is certain of is 
that this story underscores the fact that God’s indwelling presence is not just a source of 
blessing—what Bonhoeffer might call “cheap grace”—but it also introduces high risk.12 
The demands are greater and the margin for error is much narrower.13 Certainly the fate 
of Nadab and Abihu would have communicated that message to the nation of Israel as it 
gathered around the tent of meeting. 
Other commentators, however, have attempted to understand exactly what went 
wrong on the eighth day. For as long as there has been biblical commentary, a range of 
possible liturgical and moral errors have been discussed.14 Recently, James Watt has 
emphasized the rhetorical goals of the priestly author: the author specifically wants to 
convince the hearer of the absolute importance of obedience or compliance to the divine 
command. Watts points out that “after two chapters [Lev. 8-9] of repeating ka’ăšer 
                                                 
11 Anderson, The Genesis of Perfection, 204. Anderson has recently elaborated on this answer: “‘Through 
Those Who Are Near to Me, I Will Show Myself Holy’: Nadab and Abihu and Apophatic Theology,” 
Catholic Biblical Quarterly 77, no. 1 (January 2015). 
12 Sommer especially excels at emphasizing this point. He argues that this narrative serves as a valuable 
self-critique in priestly theology; while P does indeed advocate a vision of divine immanence (as we 
discussed in the last chapter), priestly writers were not ignorant or flippant about the difficulties of this 
view, and the “alien fire” of Nadab and Abihu only serves as a reminder of the strangeness of the priestly 
conviction that God truly dwells in the tabernacle. Sommer says, “Yet precisely at the moment in which 
the domestication of the kabod climaxes, and specifically among those who have direct access to that 
divine presence, it becomes brutally clear that holiness cannot be contained.” Sommer, Bodies of God, 
120. Ancient Jewish theology—including priestly theology—is sophisticated and capable of the nuance 
required in any lasting theological system. For another worthwhile meditation on the danger and 
ambiguity of the cult; Bryan D. Bibb, “Nadab and Abihu Attempt to Fill a Gap: Law and Narrative in 
Leviticus 10.1-7,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 26, no. 2 (2001): 83–99. 
13 As Wenham says, paraphrasing Moses’s speech about God glorifying himself through the priesthood, 
“the closer a man is to God, the more attention he must pay to holiness and the glory of God.” Gordon J. 
Wenham, The Book of Leviticus (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1979), 156. 
14 Many articles review these options as they are discussed in ancient literature. See, for example, Robert 
Kirschner, “The Rabbinic and Philonic Exegeses of the Nadab and Abihu Incident (Lev. 10: 1-6),” The 
Jewish Quarterly Review, 1983, 375–393; Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 633–35.  
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tsiwwāh YHWH, ‘as YHWH had commanded,’ 10:1 announces that Nadab and Abihu did 
ăšer lō tsiwwāh, ‘what had not been commanded.’ The intrusion of the negative, lō, ‘not,’ 
in the familiar refrain comes like a thunderclap…”15 According to Watts, the implicit 
claim of the priestly rhetorician is that the very fact that this lethal outbreak of divine fire 
has not occurred since Nadab and Abihu is proof that the priests are doing their job well, 
and must continue in their diligent obedience.16  
As is so often the case, Watts helpfully draws our attention to the way words are 
being used to persuade. From this perspective, the possible motivations of Nadab and 
Abihu are basically irrelevant; the whole point is simply that priests are charged with the 
task of perfect obedience, which they have since observed. But as theological readers, the 
story demands more,17 and the historical-critical and redactional discoveries outlined 
above provide an excellent opportunity for theological interpretation. Narratively and 
theologically, within P, as we have seen, this story follows immediately upon the 
completion of creation, and thus within this frame of thought it really is “an event of 
cosmic scope.”18 Canonically, however, the story arrives long after the creation accounts. 
The redactor puts the narrative of Adam and Eve immediately after the priestly account 
of creation, which serves in its own way to communicate the crisis themes of 
disobedience, death, and exile. Bringing all of these strands together, it seems very 
                                                 
15 Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 106. 
16 Cf. ibid., 111–12. 
17 In saying this, I acknowledge that faithful exercise of ritual rubrics is, from an ancient Near Eastern 
perspective, important in and of itself. As Michael Hundley says, “correct performance of a ritual is 
much more important than understanding how or why it works.” Keeping Heaven on Earth, 66. This does 
not mean for Hundley, however, that the rituals are wholly without “underlying rationale.” Ibid., 36. An 
adequate analysis of Biblical ritual neither rips away the liturgical husk to get to the pure spiritual kernel, 
nor assumes an allegedly primitive “empty ritualism.” See the analysis of these debates in the last 
chapter. 
18 Sommer, Bodies of God, 112.  
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appropriate for theological readers to understand that there is a genuine parallel, or at 
least echo, in the diverse stories of “Original Catastrophe.”19 My interpretation of Nadab 
and Abihu will therefore consider whether these corresponding stories communicate 
something similar about human nature.  
Watts is certainly right that, at some level, the issue of obedience is prominent in 
both stories, and that disobedience leads to crisis. If we were to follow a divine command 
theory, it might be adequate to stop here: “because God said so” would be an acceptable 
explanation for why a certain action is sinful. For those who are persuaded that divine 
law is ordered toward participation in God through growth in holiness and love, however, 
there will always be an attempt to better perceive where the human actors went wrong. 
Because the drama of Nadab and Abihu depicts not just individual disorder, but the 
source of cosmic-temple disorder, it becomes especially critical to consider whether this 
was only a failure to follow the jots and tittles. Even though Leviticus 10:1-3 is concise—
much more so than Genesis 2-3—both stories seem to operate under a common warning: 
“as soon as you eat of it, you shall die” (cf. Gen. 2:17). What is this devouring sin that 
leads so instantly to death? 
A number of modern scholars suggest that the sin of Nadab and Abihu is a form 
of idolatry. According to Jacob Milgrom, the text is designed to oppose the syncretistic 
“private incense offering,” which he argues was a common and often idolatrous practice 
among the ancient Jews even after sacrificial worship was isolated to the Jerusalem 
                                                 
19 As Sommer describes the story of Nadab and Abihu, Ibid. In fact, Sommer’s reading of Adam and Eve is 
more ambiguous than the story of Nadab and Abihu; cf. Ibid., 112–18. Compared to Sommer, Anderson 
is more straightforward in drawing the comparison.  
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temple.20 Milgrom translates “alien fire” as “unauthorized coals,”21 which are coals not 
taken from the tabernacle altar. By eliminating the use of unauthorized coals, the priestly 
writer is in effect removing the possibility of private incense offerings. More recently, 
Richard Hess has drawn attention to ordination texts from the ancient Amorite city of 
Emar which indicate that on the final day of the ordination of the priestess to the storm 
god, Addu, a “torch” is among the offerings. It may be the case, therefore, that Nadab and 
Abihu—following the example of surrounding cultures—try to add an offering of 
“strange fire” to the ordination rituals described in Leviticus 8-9, and are thus punished 
for following these foreign examples, effectively repeating the sin of the Golden Calf.22   
These explanations suggest that the narrative is designed to support the larger 
goals of centralizing worship in Jerusalem and maintaining the distinctions between 
Israel and her neighbors. Again, on the level of a strict historical reconstruction, these 
theories appear plausible. Even still, there is reason to believe that there is yet more to 
say. One hint comes from Leviticus 16, the chapter on the Day of Atonement, which 
begins with these words: “The Lord spoke to Moses after the death of the two sons of 
Aaron who died when they drew too close to [ם  ָׁתָ֤ בְר  קְָּ֙ב, bĕqorbātām, encroached upon]23 
the presence of the Lord” (v. 1). In other words, the guidelines for Yom Kippur are 
understood very explicitly as an emergency response to the tragedy that occurs on the 
eighth day, and that tragedy is described in terms of the way Nadab and Abihu “drew 
near.” 
                                                 
20 Cf. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 628–33. 
21 Ibid., 598. 
22 Richard S. Hess, “Leviticus 10: 1 Strange Fire and an Odd Name,” Bulletin for Biblical Research 12 
(2002): 187–198. Similarly, though more generally: John E. Hartley, Word Biblical Commentary: 
Leviticus (Word Books, 1992), 131–33. 
23 “Encroached upon” is Milgrom’s illuminating translation; Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1011–12. 
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The word that Milgrom translates as “encroach” in this context is already familiar 
to us: the root of bĕqorbātām, q-r-b, is the verb qarab, “approach, draw near.” As we 
discussed in the last chapter, the nominal form of the same stem, qorbān, is often 
translated “an offering,” and the overall connotation of these words is that we are dealing 
with questions about how human beings are to draw near to God. As we saw, the entire 
book of Leviticus opens with a description of the ‘olah, the burnt offering, as one 
mode—perhaps the most fitting mode—of drawing near to YHWH. Now with Nadab and 
Abihu, there is another mode, a kind of “drawing near” that is not commanded and causes 
immediate death: both Leviticus 10:1 (וּב ִ֜  רְקַָּ֙יַו)24 and Leviticus 16:1 (ם  ָׁתָ֤ בְר  קְָּ֙ב) depict the sin 
of Nadab and Abihu as an inappropriate drawing near to the Lord.  
The rabbis explored this problem from all angles and developed a long list of 
possible sins committed by Nadab and Abihu. One of their concerns was precisely the 
brothers’ mode of approaching God. It is important to remember that, according to the 
broader biblical narrative, Nadab and Abihu already enjoyed a privileged relationship 
with YHWH. Exodus 24 describes how Moses, Aaron, Nadab, Abihu, and the seventy 
elders ascended Mount Sinai, where they “saw the God of Israel” (v. 10). With this story 
in mind, the Leviticus Rabbah reports,  
R. Joshua of Siknin in the name of R. Levi observed: Moses did not feed his eyes 
on the Shechinah and derived benefit from the Shechinah.…Nadab and Abihu, 
however, fed their eyes on the Shechinah and did not derive benefit therefrom, as 
may be inferred from the following: And Nadab and Abihu died before the 
Lord.25 
 
                                                 
24 This instance of the word is almost always translated “they offered,” but Baruch Schwartz prefers 
“presented, ‘brought near’.” Baruch J. Schwartz, “Leviticus Introduction and Annotations,” in The 
Jewish Study Bible. Tanakh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 227; cf. Baruch A. Levine, The 
JPS Torah Commentary: Leviticus, 1st edition (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 2003), 59. 
25 Leviticus Rabbah 20:10, cited in Orlov, Divine Scapegoats, 2014, 89. 
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The Exodus Rabbah gives the same commentary, adding a little more detail: “Nadab and 
Abihu uncovered their heads and fed their eyes on the lustre of the Shechinah…”26 Those 
inclined to see rabbinic exegesis as fanciful could easily dismiss this claim as remote 
from what can be positively shown in the slender verses that describe Nadab and Abihu’s 
actions. But consider: in the last verse of Leviticus 9 the divine glory appears and “all the 
people saw, and shouted, and fell on their faces” (v. 24). The entire nation falls before the 
awesome splendor of God. Based on biblical expectations, one cannot imagine a more 
appropriate or promising response than this. But the very next word in Hebrew shatters 
the scene immediately: וּ ּ֣חְקִיַו, “and they took.” The root word is laqach, and it is a very 
common word, but perhaps it is theologically illuminating to notice how the word is used 
in Genesis 3. The famous verse reads, “When the woman saw that the tree was good for 
eating and a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was desirable as a source of wisdom, she 
took (ח  ַקִתַו) of its fruit and ate…” (v. 6). This was, undoubtedly, an unauthorized taking, 
the attempt to seize a good that would have otherwise been freely given. Something 
delights the eyes and seems to hold the promise of human happiness, and the 
instantaneous response is “take.” 
Nadab and Abihu had already been blessed with a vision of God on Mount Sinai, 
and now with the rest of their people they are blessed again. But when everyone falls 
down in reverence, they take up their fire pans. The usual interpretation is that they take 
their fire pans to offer something, which seems well-meaning even if misguided. But 
Baruch Schwartz has provided another interpretation that brilliantly unlocks the rabbinic 
insight that they “fed their eyes,” and also unlocks the parallel with the other great fall 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
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narrative of Adam and Eve. Schwartz agrees with Milgrom that the word typically 
translated fire (ש ָ֔ א, ’ēš) should be translated “coals”—hence, “each took his pan, put coals 
in it, and laid incense on it; and they offered before the Lord unauthorized coals.”27 But 
while for Milgrom, who puts the emphasis on an illicit incense offering, these are 
understood to be live coals, Schwartz argues that the word should be interpreted as 
“kindling material” which Nadab and Abihu placed in their pans “in order to attract the 
divine fire to light them.” Therefore, while “God intended that the manifestation of His 
presence would ignite the altar fire, marking His acceptance of His people’s devotion, 
[Nadab and Abihu’s] intent was for the divine fire to ignite their own pans; that is, they 
were attempting to arrogate control of the deity to themselves.”28 If this interpretation has 
merit, it corresponds beautifully with the rabbinic concern that the brother’s illicitly “fed 
their eyes” on the glory of God; in other words, rather than opening themselves to receive 
God with humility and joy, they sought to reach out to domesticate God as their own. 
This is the great priestly temptation, and the brothers are at special risk because they have 
been so abundantly blessed. 
In the last chapter I meditated at length on some of the key words from Genesis 
22, the story of the binding of Isaac. In our current context, one more word can be added 
to the mix. When God gives his command in the second verse of the chapter, it begins, 
“־חַק, take.” “Take your son…” This is a fundamentally different kind of taking, one 
stemming from total openness and presence before God. I have called it “hinneni-life,” a 
form of being exemplified in Abraham and Isaac that represents a reversal of the 
grabbing of Adam and Eve, and thus a return to Edenic peace. Nadab and Abihu 
                                                 
27 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 595. 
28 Schwartz, “Leviticus Introduction and Annotations,” 227. 
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represent a parallel tradition describing the origin of cosmic disorder; here again sin is 
introduced into “the heavens and the earth,” the tabernacle. It is much shorter than the 
drama of the patriarch and matriarch, and because it is heavy with cultic terminology, it 
does not feel as universal. But it nevertheless communicates something all too familiar: 
the instantaneous desire to “take,” even to reach out to possess God himself. Perhaps a 
Christian parallel can be found in John’s warning about the things of “the world,” which 
are “lust of the flesh, lust of the eyes, and pride of life” (1 John 2:16). Such distorted, 
egocentric desire is the way of death, something that Nadab and Abihu discovered with 
unusual swiftness.29  
After sin, Adam, Eve, and the serpent, each receive their respective curses. In the 
midst of the curses, there is also the well-known protoevangelium, the first hint of the one 
to come who will crush the serpent’s head. Nadab and Abihu also receive their curse—
they are struck, so to speak, by the angel’s flaming sword as they approached the new 
Eden30—and this leads to a number of chapters that describe purity laws and the disposal 
of impurity. Then, finally, the liturgy of Yom Kippur is described in great detail, and it is 
narratively placed immediately after the death of the brothers. This is the good news of 
Leviticus, the promise of forgiveness and purification in the time of sin. As Anderson 
says, after the cosmic catastrophe of Nadab and Abihu, “the Day of Atonement served to 
                                                 
29 Gary Anderson explores the aporia of Nadab and Abihu from a different direction, pointing out, as I 
mentioned, that after millennia of reflection there is no consensus on where the eldest brothers went 
wrong on the eighth day. Anderson uses this fact to argue that this account provides narrative support for 
the apophatic approach to theology. As he says, “There remains an infinite gap between creature and 
Creator, and no matter how much cultic law one might master, God will not be reduced to an object 
subject to human control. Lest the priesthood become inebriated by the power God has conferred upon it, 
the radical otherness of God’s majestic glory breaks out and reestablishes God’s utter transcendence.” 
Anderson, “Through Those Who Are Near,” 16–17. While I have attempted to say more about what 
might have gone wrong, my conclusion is ultimately not unlike Anderson’s: the story of Nadab and 
Abihu reminds us that God is God, and that humility is key to the proper response to God.  
30 Cf. Trevaskis, Holiness, Ethics and Ritual in Leviticus, 95. 
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set creation aright.”31  
The Wages of Sin: A Multifaceted Crisis 
Therefore, we start with the premise that the goal of Yom Kippur is to restore 
creation after Nadab and Abihu introduced corruption. The central liturgy described in 
Leviticus 16 has two fundamental moments: an ascetic moment that removes sin, and a 
unitive moment that restores covenantal harmony. Before describing these moments (or 
movements) which bring restoration, the nature of the crisis within the Jewish theological 
imagination must be clarified, because the ancient cultic perspective on these issues will 
be foreign to most contemporary readers of the Bible. From a modern, more 
individualistic perspective, once Nadab and Abihu received their punishment—once they 
had died before the LORD—it seems that the problem is solved. Justice is satisfied: there 
is sin, there is punishment. If the sin is the failing of the individual, then the problem of 
this person’s sin is resolved upon his or her death. What more could possibly be required? 
What good is “atonement” in this situation? 
A close reading of the text of Leviticus 16 creates problems for those committed 
to an individualistic understanding of sin and atonement. After describing how blood is 
sprinkled in the holy of holies (see below), the priestly writer makes the motive for this 
action explicit, and it is not what we would expect: “Thus he shall purge (ר ּ֣  פִכְו, weḵipper) 
the Shrine of the uncleanness and transgression of the Israelites, whatever their sins; and 
he shall do the same for the Tent of Meeting, which abides with them in the midst of their 
uncleanness” (Lev 16:16). Who is the object of this “purgation”? It is not, in the first 
                                                 
31 Anderson, The Genesis of Perfection, 204. 
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place, the Israelites, but the tabernacle itself! For the modern reader, it makes no intuitive 
sense to say that a tent should be the subject of purgative rites when the Israelites sin—
especially not the holy of holies, which no human has yet entered. What is the theo-logic 
behind this ritual? 
To approach this subject, let us return one more time to the tragic fall of Nadab 
and Abihu. Even though the text says that the divine fire “consumes” them, their corpses 
nevertheless remain: “Moses called Mishael and Elzaphan, sons of Uzziel the uncle of 
Aaron, and said to them, ‘Come forward and carry your kinsmen away from the front of 
the sanctuary to a place outside the camp’” (Leviticus 10:4). Two things to notice: first, 
sin creates a “something.” In this case, the “something” is especially vivid: it is the 
human corpse, dead weight, the tragic remainder of sin. Second, that remaining 
“something” pollutes the sanctuary and must be removed from the camp. Death is the 
ultimate impurity, and it is in principle antithetical to the life of the tabernacle and the 
One who dwells therein. The purgation of the tabernacle of any pollutants, impurities, or 
sins is therefore the urgent priority of the priests who, as we saw, stand on the front lines 
in the conflict between Life and death.  
Recent research has made rapid progress in understanding the theological 
background behind the two convictions that undergird the Jewish priestly theology of the 
Day of Atonement: (1) sin is a “something” and (2) sin pollutes the sanctuary. 
Summarizing these recent findings will make it possible to more fully appreciate the 
work of the two goats.  
The “Thingness” of Sin 
In his recent book, Sin: A History, Gary Anderson argues that to understand a 
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theologians’ soteriology it is essential to pay attention to the imagery she or he uses for 
sin. The images used to describe the problem generally correlate with the terms used to 
describe the solution. Thus, he points out that “stained hands are cleansed, burdens are 
lifted, and debts are either paid off or remitted.”32 Through metaphor, words and images 
are given on loan to abstract subjects like “sin” so that we might discuss what is 
unspeakable. Building on this observation, Anderson tracks the main images for sin 
within the Bible itself, showing that the concept of sin in scripture has a history, it 
undergoes change. Therefore, Anderson shows that there is a transition from an earlier 
emphasis on the concept of sin as a burden to a latter emphasis on the concept of sin as a 
debt. This shift was due in part to the growing influence of Aramaic in the Second 
Temple Persian period; the earlier Hebrew idiom “to bear [the weight] of sin” over time 
gave way to the parallel Aramaic idiom, which is literally “to assume a debt.”33  
Because we are dealing with relatively early priestly material, our focus is on 
Anderson’s description of the most ancient biblical images for sin. Anderson says, “What 
is most striking is the frequency of the idiom ‘to bear [the weight of] a sin’ within the 
Hebrew Bible; it predominates over its nearest competitor by more than six to one. For 
Hebrew speakers in the First Temple period, therefore, the most common means of 
talking about human sin was to compare it to weight.”34 Most people, Anderson says, are 
surprised when they learn that this idiom is so common. The Hebrew words nāśā’ (to 
bear)‘ăvōn (iniquity) present problems for translators, and thus they often settle for 
translations that obscure the weightiness of the words. The difficulty is that the very same 
                                                 
32 Anderson, Sin, 2010, 4. 
33 Ibid., 27–28. 
34 Ibid., 17. 
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phrase, nāśā’ + word for sin (whether it is ‘ăvōn, or, elsewhere, ḥaṭṭā’t [wrongs] or peša‘ 
[transgressions]) appears in two seemingly opposite contexts: one which emphasizes the 
culpability of the guilty party, and the other which suggests that the sinner is forgiven. 
Anderson draws on the work of Baruch Schwartz35 to show that there is logic in using the 
same phrase to communicate both culpability and forgiveness: it all comes down to who 
is bearing the sin. When the sinner himself bears the sin, when he carries the weight, he 
suffers on account of the sin, but when another party, such as God, bears the sin, the sin is 
thus carried away from the sinner, he is relieved of the burden—in other words, he is 
forgiven. In either case the imagery is that of bearing loads, but this is usually obscured 
because the Hebrew phrase “to carry away (the weight of) sin” (nāśā’ ‘ăvōn) is rarely 
translated literally. Instead, translators render it simply “to forgive a sin.” This more 
abstract translation of the phrase again camouflages the density of the Hebrew words. 
According to Anderson, “Crucial to this discussion is the notion that sin in biblical 
thought possesses a certain ‘thingness.’ Sin is not just a guilty conscience; it presumes, 
rather, that some-‘thing’ is manufactured on the spot and imposed on the sinner.”36 
Anderson’s findings also build on Jacob Milgrom’s earlier studies into ancient 
priestly terminology. Jacob Milgrom (1923-2010) was an American rabbi and long-time 
professor of Near Eastern Studies at University of California, Berkeley, who retired in 
1992 and lived the rest of his life in Jerusalem in a beautiful home located almost exactly 
one mile from the Temple Mount, the site of the sacred rituals he had spent his entire 
academic career studying. It was Milgrom who led the way in clarifying the ancient 
                                                 
35 Baruch J. Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin in the Priestly Literature,” ed. David Pearson Wright, David 
Noel Freedman, and Avi Hurvitz, Pomegranates and Golden Bells: Studies in Biblical, Jewish and Near 
Eastern Ritual, Law, and Literature in Honour of Jacob Milgrom, 1995, 3–21. 
36 Anderson, Sin, 2010, x. 
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understanding of sin and impurity.  
One of Milgrom’s most important claims was that priestly theology presupposes 
that wrongful acts generate a dangerous pollution. Beginning in the early-1970s, Milgrom 
published a series of articles that reconsidered the purpose of the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ sacrifice (ה ָׁא ָׁטַח; 
cf. Leviticus 4:1 – 5:13), which is one of the five major types of sacrifice cataloged in the 
early chapters of Leviticus, and which is also the primary offering required on Yom 
Kippur (Leviticus 16:6, 9).37 One thing that distinguishes these sacrifices from other 
ancient Israelite temple rituals was the fact that they usually featured rites of blood 
manipulation. In other words, rather than dashing or pouring the sacrificial blood directly 
on the sides of the altar (which was the practice for burnt offerings—cf. Lev. 1: 5, 11, 15; 
Lev. 8:19—well-being offerings—cf. Lev. 3:2, 8, 13—and guilt offerings—cf. Lev. 7:2), 
the “purification offering”38 alone requires that the victim’s blood be either sprinkled 
toward, or rubbed on, the cultic furniture itself. On Yom Kippur, the high priest takes the 
blood of two ḥaṭṭā’ṯ offerings, a bull and a goat, and sprinkles it on the kappōret, which is 
the “solid gold slab…atop the Ark.”39 Then, in another phase of the ritual, the blood is 
apparently sprinkled in the shrine,40 and then it is both rubbed on the “horns” of the burnt 
                                                 
37 For all five types of sacrifice described in Leviticus, see chapter two, page 72. 
38 This is the most common translation for ḥaṭṭā’ṯ in modern scholarship, see footnote 202 below for 
reasons why Milgrom and others prefer this to the traditional translation, which is “sin offering”  
39 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1014. Older translations called the kappōret “the mercy seat,” a 
translation Milgrom rejects.   
40 Leviticus 16:16, after describing the rituals in the Holy of Holies, says “…[Aaron] shall do likewise for 
the Tent of Meeting…” Milgrom is comfortable claiming that this is in reference to the “shrine,” the 
space before the holy of holies that contains the incense altar, menorah, and the table for the bread of the 
Presence. Support for this view is found in Exodus 30:9-10, which suggests that “once a year” the 
incense altar is purified through the application of blood to its horns, and Leviticus 4:7 and 4:18 describe 
a similar ritual. The view that the incense altar is purified on Yom Kippur was unambiguously held by 
the time of the Mishna Yoma (cf. mYoma 5:5). Joshua Vis has recently argued, however, that Leviticus 
16 is one of the earliest texts in Leviticus, that it predates Leviticus 4:7, 4:18, and Exodus 30:10, and that 
the same “Tent of Meeting” is not envisioned by both texts; cf. “The Purification Offering of Leviticus 
and the Sacrificial Offering of Jesus” (Ph.D. diss., 2012), 180–84. This historical-critical note becomes 
important for Vis’ interpretation of the development of the purification offering, an interpretation which 
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offering altar in the courtyard41 and sprinkled toward the same altar (Lev. 16:18-19; cf. 
Lev. 4:25, 30, 34). The question for Milgrom is, what is the significance of these unique  
and elaborate blood manipulations?  
Milgrom’s answer is ultimately rooted in a sophisticated understanding of two 
key words: ḥaṭṭā’ṯ (again, traditionally translated “sin offering”) and kipper (often 
translated “atonement”). Milgrom argues for a clean break from the conventional 
translations and argues that the words mean “purification offering” and “purgation.” 
Below we will explore the reasons why Milgrom opts to translate ḥaṭṭā’ṯ and kipper as he 
does, but right now, let’s assume his translation is correct. Milgrom’s idea was that, when 
the blood is smeared and sprinkled on the cultic furniture, the priest is purging and 
decontaminating the holy space with the blood. Yet again, this is counterintuitive; why 
should the ark of the covenant, or the incense altar in the shrine, or the altar of burnt 
offerings in the courtyard, need to be purified? These items are each known for their 
outstanding holiness.  
To answer this question, Milgrom provides a window into the theological 
convictions of the ancient Near East. As we saw in the last chapter, ancient temples were 
often considered centers of cosmic warfare: monuments to the victorious god but also the 
main battleground where the victory is continually being won against demonic 
opponents. For the surrounding cultures, a sophisticated demonology accompanied these 
ideas. David P. Wright, in The Disposal of Impurity, collects a spectrum of Hittite42 and 
                                                 
differs from Milgrom’s, and which will be mentioned below.   
41 Ancient near eastern altars characteristically featured “right-angle tetrehedra projecting from the four 
corners,” these protrusions resemble animal horns. The Hebrew word qeren refers both the horns of an 
animal and this architectural feature found on both the incense altar and the burnt offering altar. See 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 234–36. 
42 David P. Wright, The Disposal of Impurity: Elimination Rites in the Bible and in Hittite and 
Mesopotamian Literature, 101 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1987), 45–60. 
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Mesopotamian43 ritual texts that provide guidelines for removing and banishing demonic 
forces from both individuals and sacred spaces.44 A key aspect of the rituals collected by 
Wright is that the evil forces to be exorcised have personal, preternatural vitality, insofar 
as they are demonic. Milgrom, analyzing similar sources, says that these texts “are 
grounded in the axiom, common to all ancient Near Eastern culture, that impurity is the 
implacable foe of holiness wherever it exists; it assaults the sacred realm even from 
afar.”45 The priests and priestesses of the ancient world were watchmen, charged with the 
responsibility of protecting and purging the sacred realm from wild impurities that lay in 
wait, ready to storm the gates and ransack the temple.  
Looking at priestly theology against this backdrop, Milgrom recognized that the 
ancient Israelites matched their neighbors in their level of concern for purging the sacred 
precincts from impurity. And yet, even with this common concern, an even greater 
difference appears: by the time the Levitical priestly texts were written, the demon-gods 
had already been exorcised from the temple, and from the world, not by rites, but by 
shifts in doctrine. Levitical monotheism left no space for the possibility that there are 
columns of chaos monsters on the march against Zion.46 The priestly theologians needed 
to develop a new understanding of impurity and sin, one which was consistent with both 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 60–72. See also Hundley, Keeping Heaven on Earth, 124–34. 
44 Wright points out that there are more examples of rites for removing demonic impurity from individuals 
than from sacred spaces in the surviving ANE literature, but that both types of removal were nevertheless 
known and practiced. Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 276. The best example of the latter is the 
purification of the temple on the fifth day of the Babylonian Akītu festival: Ibid., 62–65.  
45 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 257. Milgrom’s claims in this area have been newly bolstered by Yitzhaq 
Feder’s research into Hittite and Israelite parallels. He says “Hittite oracle and ritual texts make frequent 
reference to various forms of depersonalized evil such as curse…, bloodshed…, oaths…, and 
impurity….” Blood Expiation in Hittite and Biblical Ritual Origins, Context, and Meaning (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 111. 
46 There is no doubt that Milgrom’s view is indebted to the interpretive tradition of Yehezkel Kaufmann, 
who as briefly mentioned in the last chapter, argued that Hebrew biblical theology was consistently and 
thoroughly monotheistic. For example, see Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 42–43, 258–61. For the 
debate over Kaufmann’s thesis, see chapter 2, footnote 180.  
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Israelite monotheism and long-standing convictions about the importance of purgative 
cultic rites to protect the temple, which is to say, to protect the cosmos.  
The result is what has been called the “miasma theory” of impurity and sin. As 
early as 1971, Milgrom explained that within priestly theology “sin is a miasma which 
whenever committed is attracted to the sanctuary.”47 Sin, therefore, is conceived as a 
polluting vapor that is drawn toward the tabernacle, contaminating the holy space. 
Milgrom’s overall theory was fully articulated for the first time in his groundbreaking 
1976 article, “Israel’s Sanctuary: The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray’.” Here Milgrom 
expands and clarifies his earlier claims. He says that “for both Israel and her neighbors 
impurity was a physical substance, an aerial miasma which possessed magnetic attraction 
for the realm of the sacred.”48 Similarly, impurity is a “dynamic and malefic power,” and 
it is “the implacable foe of holiness wherever it exists; it assaults the sacred realm even 
from afar.”49 Then, in his celebrated three-volume Leviticus commentary, the first 
volume of which was published in 1991, Milgrom repeats and again expands on his 
theory. Impurity is analogous to “electromagnetism” where the “minus charge of 
impurity is attracted to the plus charge of the sanctuary…”50 From this perspective, the 
greater the impurity or sin, the more profoundly it pollutes the temple because “sancta 
contamination varies directly with the charge (holiness) of the sanctuary and the charge 
of the impurity…”51  
                                                 
47 Jacob Milgrom, “Kipper,” Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971, 1040. The uncommon word miasma is defined 
as a “noxious vapour rising from putrescent organic matter…which pollutes the atmosphere…” Oxford 
English Dictionary, Third edition, 2001. 
48 Jacob Milgrom, “Israel’s Sanctuary: The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray,’” Revue Biblique 83 (1976): 
392; this essay is reprinted in Jacob Milgrom, Studies in Cultic Theology and Terminology (Leiden: Brill 
Archive, 1983). 
49 Milgrom, “The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray,’” 1976, 392–93. 
50 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 270. 
51 Ibid., 980–81. 
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As mentioned, the surrounding cultures understood such dynamic, airborne 
impurity to be demonic. The Jewish Bible scholar Yehezkel Kaufmann, who believed 
that Israel was fully monotheistic, saw only discontinuity between Israel’s priestly cult 
and the neighboring presuppositions. In 1960 he argued that “‘the domain of impurity’ is 
a state of being or a situation, and not ‘an active force’”52 On the other side of the 
spectrum, Baruch Levine argued that ancient Jewish cultic beliefs were in greater 
continuity with the neighboring cultural norms of the time. Writing in 1974, Levine said 
that for ancient priestly theology, to become impure—which for him includes becoming 
impure through sin—introduces “a kind of demonic contagion into the community.”53 
Furthermore, the “forces of impurity” were “unleashed by the offenses committed”;54 
apparently each offense weakens the community’s defenses, making it vulnerable to 
demonic attack. The emphasis on actual demons is obviously notable here: Levine 
accepts the idea that sin and impurity denote literal demonic activity against the residing 
god.  
Milgrom’s own perspective on impurity and sin in ancient Israel charted a narrow 
path between these two views. First and foremost, with Kaufmann, he is adamant that 
impurity is not demonic. Israel’s monotheistic convictions are so strong by the time 
Leviticus is finalized, the demonic has been “expunged” from its thought-world.55 With 
                                                 
52 Levine summarizing Kaufmann’s view in Baruch A. Levine, In the Presence of the Lord: A Study of Cult 
and Some Cultic Terms in Ancient Israel (Leiden: Brill Academic, 1974), 79. 
53 Ibid., 75. 
54 Ibid., 78. Jon Levenson also promotes the anti-Kaufmann view that evil retains demonic vitality for 
ancient Israel; Creation and the Persistence of Evil. See also Hundley, Keeping Heaven on Earth, 124–
25. 
55 Milgrom, “The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray,’” 1976, 397; Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 259–60, 
289, 766, 976–77, 981–82, 1068–69. Wright took the same position as his teacher Jacob Milgrom, The 
Disposal of Impurity, 50, 273. Mary Douglas provides a concise overview of the role of demons in 
ancient religion, ultimately agreeing with Kaufmann and Milgrom that such demonic activity is 
conspicuously absent in the Hebrew Bible: Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 10–11, 147–48.  
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that said, Milgrom then challenges Kaufmann’s belief that impurity is “completely 
devitalized”56—this pushes things too far in the opposite direction. Like Levine, he 
believes that sin and impurity are dynamic and dangerous. To hold these views together, 
Milgrom argues that the priestly writers advanced a revolutionary idea: 
The demons have been expunged from the world, but man has taken their place. 
This is one of the major contributions of the priestly theology: man is 
‘demonized.’ True, man falls short of being a demon, but he is capable of the 
demonic. He alone is the cause of the world’s ills. He alone can contaminate the 
sanctuary and force God out.57 
 
It is humanity and God, face to face, and those impurities and sins that pollute the temple, 
even from a distance, are “generated”58 by human beings, by human actions. “Anti-God 
forces,” Milgrom insists, “do not inhere in nature”59—thus, they are a pollution 
emanating from us, endangering God’s presence as they gather in the sanctuary, like 
nitrous oxide attacking the ozone.  
Since introducing the idea of sin and impurity as “miasma,” Milgrom’s theory has 
been widely discussed in the secondary literature. He has supporters and detractors. An 
important early supporter is Baruch Schwartz, an Orthodox Jewish scholar who earned 
his doctorate at Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1988 while Milgrom was hard at work 
on his Leviticus commentary a few miles away. When it came time to honor Milgrom 
with a festschrift in 1995, Schwartz’s contribution was listed first on the long table of 
contents; the article, “The Bearing of Sin in the Priestly Literature,” is a milestone in the 
reception of Milgrom’s work. As it pertains to the concept of sin or impurity as a 
                                                 
56 Milgrom, “The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray,’” 1976, 397. 
57 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 260, cf. 982, 1068-69. 
58 Ibid., 1069. 
59 Milgrom, “The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray,’” 1976, 82; cf. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 260. 
Hundley agrees; Keeping Heaven on Earth, 193. 
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“something” generated by human beings, Schwartz expands the range of terms used to 
describe what the ancient priests may have had in mind. He refers to this “something” as 
“a sort of metaphysical spontaneous generation. Though invisible, defilement is believed 
to be quite real; though amorphous, it is substantive.”60 Again, for Schwartz, “The entire 
priestly system of impurity and its disposal rests on the postulate that impurity is not 
simply a condition, a ritual ‘state’; it is the defilement itself. It is real.”61 He refers to it 
elsewhere as “objectified” transgressions, as “odious, foul objects that come into present 
existence,”62 and precisely because it has this bizarre existence, or an “independent 
nature,”63 the priestly writers insist that sin must be intentionally removed from the 
sanctuary. 
The problem is, the means by which such a “metaphysical” object is generated 
from creaturely impurity or sin is never explained.64 As we saw earlier, Anderson claims 
that the “thingness” of sin is “manufactured on the spot”—he elsewhere suggests that, 
when it comes to the burden of sin, “we must presume that the offending item has been, 
as it were, manufactured ex nihilo upon completion of the forbidden act.”65 An obvious 
                                                 
60 Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 5. Later in the same article, Schwartz calls “objectified sin” a 
“metaphysical” object. Ibid., 19. In a similar way, Hundley calls impurity a “stain” and says that the stain 
“is perceived to be real. As in the ANE, it is a malevolent force that harms whatever it comes into contact 
with and thus must be removed.” Keeping Heaven on Earth, 179. Joshua Vis also supports and defends 
Milgrom’s concept of sin and impurity as a “material reality,” one which “materialize as stains on the 
sancta.” Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 9. 
61 Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 5, emphasis in original. 
62 Ibid., 7. 
63 Ibid., 19. 
64 The lack of clarity about how Milgrom’s miasma theory actually works is one of the critiques raised by 
Hyam Maccoby, who is generally unpersuaded by the idea that impurity pollutes the temple from a 
distance. See Hyam Maccoby, Ritual and Morality: The Ritual Purity System and Its Place in Judaism 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 169ff. Milgrom offers a comprehensive answer in 
“Impurity Is Miasma: A Response to Hyam MacCoby,” Journal of Biblical Literature 119, no. 4 
(January 1, 2000): 729–46. See also Klawans’ critique of Maccoby: “Rethinking Leviticus and Rereading 
‘Purity and Danger,’” AJS Review 27, no. 1 (April 1, 2003): 98–99. 
65 Anderson, Sin, 2010, 19. 
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follow-up question would be, who is “manufacturing” this burden from nothing? It would 
seem that such creative power would have to come from God, but does this mean that 
God (together with human beings?) creates this metaphysically weighty sin? That would 
be a hard pill to swallow. Mary Douglas, while remaining generally supportive of 
Milgrom’s approach to sin and impurity, cautions that “one can notice that the language 
of dirt and ablution is unnecessarily materialist.”66  
Perhaps so, but one might also call it helpfully “fleshy,” keenly aware of the 
physical effects of our crooked actions. When it comes to sin, the priestly perception of 
its “thingness,” the way it can hang around long after the action itself is forgotten, the 
way in which this ugly “reality” demands an equally concrete response, is a theological 
insight worthy of continued consideration. And yet, it is also right to acknowledge that 
there are many outstanding questions about the nature and origins of the “metaphysical” 
something that burdens the sinner and invades the temple in priestly thought. All we 
know at this point is that the priests were concerned about it, and that it was perhaps 
considered vital but not (strictly speaking) demonic. One does not expect the ancient 
priests to have answers to all the questions we might want to ask about substantive sin, 
but those questions nevertheless deserve answers if temple theology is to have 
contemporary relevance. Here we will continue to explore the fine points of ancient 
priestly thought on the miasma of sin so as to understand the background of the Yom 
Kippur liturgy with as much nuance as possible, but in the fifth chapter we will need to 
                                                 
66 Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 148. Roy Gane also critiques Milgrom for being unnecessarily focused 
on physical considerations. Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 159–60. Gane prefers to say impurity is “quasi-physical,” and 
accepts the idea of miasma as a metaphor “provided it is clear that in our ritual context they do not refer 
to literal physical substances subject to physical constraints in the material world…” Ibid., 160. I would 
be surprised if Milgrom didn’t accept this qualification.  
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directly wrestle with the immense metaphysical difficulties created by this biblical idea.  
Distinguishing Sin and Impurity 
In the previous section, when discussing the pollutants that attack Israel’s all-holy 
sanctuary, I referred to the “thingness” of impurities and sins interchangeably. To fully 
appreciate the richness and the sophisticated of priestly ethical thought—and also to fully 
appreciate how thoroughly the Day of Atonement restores creation—this should be 
clarified. In priestly thought, while impurity and sin are analogous concepts, they are not 
synonymous. In fact, the failure to distinguish between the two has weakened Christian 
interpretation of Jewish purity laws and, correlatively, the temple cult; it is important that 
we not repeat those errors here.  
This Body of Death: Impurity 
Jonathan Klawans has traced the history of anthropological approaches to purity 
laws in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century. Pioneering scholars such as William 
Robertson Smith and James Frazer were inclined toward “antiritualism,” “the common-
place critique of ritual as empty formalism,”67 and thus their interpretations of biblical 
purity laws were largely critical. According to Klawans, Mary Douglas was the one to 
provide a badly needed intervention, arguing that “purity rites should not be understood 
as empty vestiges or irrational obsessions,”68 and instead showing how Jewish purity 
laws ultimately promote a sophisticated symbolic / theological system.69 Emboldened by 
                                                 
67 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 19. 
68 Ibid. 
69 In Purity and Danger, Douglas (as Klawans’ summarizes her) showed (1) “avoidance behaviors” are not 
“inherently or distinctively primitive,” (2) purity laws should be looked at “systematically” within their 
own cultural context, (3) these rituals should be interpreted as “symbolic expression,” and finally (4), for 
188 
 
her work in social anthropology, Milgrom articulated his own interpretation of priestly 
purity codes, showing that the concern for purity was intended to reinforce perhaps the 
central theme of the Hebrew Bible, which the Deuteronomist expressed with special 
force: God says, “I have put before you life and death, blessing and curse. Choose life—if 
your offspring would live—by loving the Lord your God, heeding His commands, and 
holding fast to Him.” (Deut. 30:19-20). Choose life. In the last chapter we discussed the 
way in which the temple was the summit of Israel’s life, the place where Life himself 
dwelled among his people, and where Israel would gather to hold fast to the true source 
of life.70 Zion was ultimately the main battleground where the forces of life and the forces 
                                                 
Douglas, “purity symbol systems serve identiﬁable social functions. Far from being meaningless 
vestiges, these rules serve not only to express an idea but also to impose or reinforce it.” Ibid. Klawans 
goes on to show how Jacob Milgrom, under the influence of Douglas, articulated his own “systematic” 
interpretation of the priestly purity system, which we will summarize in this section. Ibid., 28–29. 
Klawans is supportive of this aspect of Milgrom’s work, even though he modifies some of Milgrom’s 
claims. See Ibid., 56–58. 
  Of course, more symbolic and systematic interpretations of purity laws are not universally 
embraced. As surely as Douglas and Milgrom revolutionized interpretation of priestly theology, there has 
been some push back. T.M. Lemos provides a recent example. She is critical of scholars who would 
search for “the rationale, the single unifying system behind Israel’s purity laws.” “Where There Is Dirt, Is 
There System? Revisiting Biblical Purity Constructions,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 37, 
no. 3 (March 1, 2013): 266. She points out that, when we take into consideration biblical literature 
generally (not just the P source), we find a diversity of approaches to impurity, and that no one “system” 
could encapsulate all of these sometimes conflicting conceptions. Noting differences and complexity 
across the material is welcome, and I appreciate her desire to understand how these laws developed 
organically in ancient societies. I would not think that Milgrom intended to suggest that the priests sat 
down one day, first articulated theological principles, then developed symbolic laws that might further 
those theological principles. Surely she is right that, however these laws came to be many thousands of 
years ago, they were not written “systematically” the way a committee might draw up bylaws for a new 
club, but rather they grew in a non-linear way out of the “lived experiences of people.” Ibid., 293. 
Nevertheless, in my opinion, it remains essential to recognize that the priestly writers in fact had 
theological concerns, and indeed that many of these guidelines were specifically about how to approach 
the temple, the place of God’s presence, the place indisputably associated with the themes of life and 
peace. From that perspective, to leave out consideration of the symbolic significance of the temple, 
wilderness, holiness, impurity, life and death, and the ways in which purity laws interact with these 
overarching priestly themes, would also be an inappropriately narrow reading. Therefore, while Lemos is 
well within her rights to raise questions or doubts about the specifics of how Douglas or Milgrom 
interpret the laws, to lose appreciation for the theological dimension, or more specifically the theological 
symbolism, in the background of priestly thinking, would be detrimental to adequately interpreting the 
material, and it would be a step backward for biblical studies.  
70 Levenson captures the way life and temple were identified: “Psalm 133 and its kindred literature offer a 
paradigm that is spatial: death is the norm outside Zion and cannot be reversed, but within the temple 
city, death is unknown, for there God has ordained the blessing of eternal life. To journey to the Temple 
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of death met; with the sound of the shofar, the whole nation Israel took its position on the 
mountain of God, ready to engage the enemy under the banner that read, “Choose Life.”71  
For Milgrom, the purity laws were all about this great battle between life and 
death, it was all about this basic command to choose life. After all, the first step in 
choosing is distinguishing; in our world the forces of death are everywhere, like tares 
among the wheat. Purity laws train the chosen people to remain vigilant. They are honest 
about the world: it is in fact true that in our daily lives, our “quotidian” existence, there is 
both death and life as surely as there is night and day. At present, it is impossible to avoid 
death and its co-conspirators; the wisdom of Koheleth is not denied.72 But even in this 
setting, especially in this setting, Mount Zion represents an offer and an opportunity. It 
says, choose life. Return again to YHWH, the source of hope, the one who breathes life 
into dust. For Israel, the final victory over death has not yet appeared, yet it is 
sacramentally offered in anticipation on Mount Zion, the place of Edenic presence and 
promise.  
To approach this place, therefore, requires self-reflection and preparation. As a 
kingdom of priests, a holy nation, each person is called upon to distinguish between the 
forces of life and death in their own lives, an assessment which includes an inventory first 
of moral actions, certainly, but which also does not exclude the inevitable ways in which 
                                                 
is to move toward redemption, to leave the parched land of wasting and death for the fountain of life and 
the revival and rejuvenation it dispenses.” Levenson, Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel, 92. 
Purity laws are meant to symbolically reinforce this theological landscape.  
71 As Reuven Hammer points out, “life” is the central theme of the High Holy Days overall: “Indeed, life 
and death are the overriding concerns of these days. Rosh Hashanah emphasizes life and its renewal; 
Yom Kippur deals with death and renunciation, but only so that we may return to life purified and 
reinvigorated.” Entering the High Holy Days: A Complete Guide to the History, Prayers, and Themes 
(Philadelphia, Penn.: The Jewish Publication Society, 2005), 36. 
72 “That is the sad thing about all that goes on under the sun: that the same fate is in store for all. (Not only 
that, but men’s hearts are full of sadness, and their minds of madness, while they live; and then—to the 
dead!)” Ecclesiastes 9:3.  
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our bodies are vulnerable to the intrusion of death. The thing that must be underlined is 
this: the second category need not imply moral condemnation. It is expected that every 
human being, from the best to the worst, will face the forces of death in their body from 
time to time as they journey through life. Israel does not look away from this bodily 
reality, and Israel also recognizes that our fragility distinguishes us from the holy God 
who is the source of all life. In this context, “unclean” (א  מ ָׁט) was a word that identified 
the basic human truth that we are ensnared by death. It did not mean disgusting, and it 
was not shocking.73 It was usually not even avoidable. “Unclean” did not make you 
wicked,74 it did not make you a social outcast. It was just a reminder that, alas, we are 
dust and to dust we will return. Someday, even I will be the corpse that makes another 
unclean, and there will be evening and morning, there will be bathing and waiting, and all 
those who plant my poor flesh in the ground will—in due time—gather once again on 
Mount Zion believing that Life is greater than death. There is a honesty to the impurity 
system, recognition of the sorry truth of this world, and confidence in the yet greater truth 
of the one who brought Israel out of the land of Egypt once before and, someday, once 
again.  
Therefore, in a way analogous to the priest in the temple, the everyday Jew was 
                                                 
73 This point is clearly emphasized by Jonathan Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 23–24; Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 53–55. Mary 
Douglas also says, “Unclean is not a term of psychological horror and disgust, it is a technical term for 
the cult…” Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 151. Or again, “It may prove more helpful to explore the 
possibility that ritual impurity has a relationship to the emotion of awe, rather than disgust.” Maccoby, 
Ritual and Morality, 48. This need not mean that it is wholly insignificant whether one is ritually clean or 
unclean. It is still better to be in God’s more immediate presence, which is not possible while in a state of 
impurity, but in any case, one does not have a “right” to the temple; as Leigh Trevaskis points out, 
graduated access to God’s presence is the universal rule. Only the high priest is invited to the Holy of 
Holies itself, and even this invitation is scrupulously regulated. Trevaskis, Holiness, Ethics and Ritual in 
Leviticus, 89 n. 176. Moderation and mediation is the rule for Israel after Eden, and thus there is a 
tolerance for and realism toward quotidian ambiguity. Israel is not puritanical or pietistic (in the worst 
sense of those words). 
74 As Milgrom succinctly says, “contracting impurity is no sin!” Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 298. 
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called upon to make distinctions in their own lives, separating the clean and unclean, and 
engaging in the appropriate rites when the normal rhythms of life bring them face to face 
with the reality of their own mortality. This, in any case, is Milgrom’s general 
interpretation. He admits seeking a “comprehensive theory” that explains the impurity 
laws as “a system governed by a priestly rationale,”75 and his ultimate conclusion is this: 
“The bodily impurities…focus on four phenomena: death, blood, semen, and scale 
disease. Their common denominator is death.”76  
In priestly texts, the most obvious example of this symbolic attentiveness to death 
is the first phenomena mentioned by Milgrom, the uncleanness that comes from corpses 
and carcasses themselves. Numbers 19:11-22 describes how those who touch a corpse, or 
enter the tent where a person has died, or who touches a human bone, or even a grave, are 
unclean for seven days. Of course, in ancient society it would be nearly as hard to 
completely avoid all contact with corpses as it would be to prevent becoming a corpse. 
Even though uncleanness is associated with dead bodies, priestly law also requires that 
human remains be treated with respect and reverently buried, not avoided at all costs out 
of fear off uncleanness. This is true even for priests; while those who serve the temple 
were generally encouraged to avoid impurity, making sure that close family members are 
properly buried takes precedent in the Holiness Code (Lev. 21:1-4).77 The woman or man 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 46. 
76 Ibid., 1002; cf. 46-47, 732-33. For a good overview, Jacob Milgrom, “Rationale for Cultic Law: The 
Case of Impurity,” Semeia 45 (1989): 103–9. Schwartz agrees: “The Bearing of Sin,” 4–5. Milgrom is 
not the very first to associate impurity with death; for precedent, see Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the 
Temple, 57. For a good overview of various “rationale” for impurity laws, including Milgrom’s 
suggestion, see Joe M. Sprinkle, “The Rationale of the Laws of Clean and Unclean in the Old 
Testament,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 43 (December 1, 2000): 637–57. 
77 The high priest is the exception; he is not allowed to touch any corpse, even if it is close family. This 
certainly suggests how the high priest, like the sanctuary itself, is held to the very highest standard of 
holiness. See Leviticus 21:10-12. 
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who becomes unclean by touching human corpses is unclean for seven days and must 
perform a bathing rite on the third and seventh day to be made clean. Because of the 
impurity, the person would not be able to visit the tabernacle (or later, the temple), and 
thus you might say they suffered a kind of exile in solidarity with their deceased loved 
ones.78 Nevertheless, again, these moments of abstinence from the tabernacle were a 
“normal” part of life, insofar as death is, unfortunately, still the norm for this world.79 
Because Milgrom believes that each of the phenomenon that make men and 
women impure symbolize death, he must also explain the connection between death and 
skin disease (Lev. 13-14), semen (Lev. 15:1-18), menstrual blood (Lev. 15:19-33), and 
blood loss during childbirth (Lev. 12). The first connection, death and skin disease, is 
probably the easiest to justify. The disease described in Leviticus 13 and 14 apparently 
caused the skin to lose color and become scaly, making the victim look like a living 
corpse.80 Milgrom says, “The main clue for understanding the place of ṣāra‘at [scale 
disease] in the impurity system is the fact that it is an aspect of death: its bearer is treated 
like a corpse.”81 As evidence, Milgrom points to Numbers 12, where Aaron and Miriam 
murmur against Moses, and Miriam is afflicted with ṣāra‘at as punishment, becoming 
“white as snow.” Aaron pleads with Moses, saying, “Let her not be like a corpse” (v. 
                                                 
78 Trevaskis explores the connection between impurity and post-Edenic exile. See Trevaskis, Holiness, 
Ethics and Ritual in Leviticus, esp. 101-106. 
79 Contact with animal carcasses also brought impurity, but such impurity only lasted until evening. See, for 
example, Leviticus 11:59.  
80 This disease (Heb: ṣāra‘at) was first translated as “leprosy” in the Septuagint, but commentators agree 
that it is not the disease today known as Hansen’s disease, and it may be an illness that is unknown in the 
modern world. Cf. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 816–18. Milgrom calls it “scale disease.” While I will 
focus here on ṣāra‘at in human flesh, it is notable that the same word is used for mold or fungus in 
fabrics (Lev. 13:47-58) and on building materials (Lev. 14:33-53) that apparently had a similar 
appearance. Even inanimate objects are susceptible to the forces of death, and thus these objects can also 
carry and transmit impurity.   
81 Ibid., 819. 
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12).82 Therefore, it seems that the connection between “scale disease” and death is 
straightforwardly suggested in scripture.   
Milgrom recognizes that the link between, say, delivering a child and death, or 
between other phenomenon associated with reproduction (semen and menstruation) and 
death, is counter-intuitive. But in defense of his “comprehensive theory,” Milgrom 
argues, “The loss of vaginal blood and semen, both containing seed, meant the 
diminution of life and, if unchecked, destruction and death…[I]n the Israelite mind, blood 
was the archsymbol of life (Lev. 17:10-14; Deut. 12:23…). Its oozing from the 
body…was certainly the sign of death.”83 This includes also the parturient, the new 
mother, who in the course of delivery loses a large amount of blood. Thus, in Lev. 12 the 
period of impurity after childbirth seems related to such extreme blood loss (surely the 
                                                 
82 Ibid. Milgrom also points to Job 18:13 as further evidence: here, with apparent reference to Job’s 
“malignant boils” (Job 2:7; cf. Lev. 13:18-23), it says “Death’s firstborn consumes his limbs.”  
83 Ibid., 766-767, 732–33, 1002. The French use the idiom le petite mort for orgasm suggests that Milgrom 
may not be entirely off base, and that the connection between the sexual act and death is not a cultural 
phenomenon isolated to the ancient Jews. 
  Nevertheless, weaknesses have been identified in Milgrom’s theory on this point in particular, and 
therefore his approach has been amended by other scholars. To illustrate the weakness, it is noted that 
one does not become ritually impure if he loses pints of blood through, say, severing a limb. Blood loss is 
impure only in association with the reproductive organs, which raises the question of whether sex itself is 
associated with impurity. Therefore, a number of scholars have argued that symbolic death alone is 
inadequate to explain the various impurity laws, but rather, “both death and sex ﬁgure in the ritual purity 
system of ancient Israel, and that the system serves to highlight the differences between persons and 
God.” Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 57–58; see 266 n.39 for references to other scholars 
who earlier argued for something similar, including Tikva Frymer-Kensky and David P. Wright. See also 
Gane, Cult and Character, 201. In other words, the fact that we both die and that we sexually reproduce 
distinguishes us from God, and therefore the symbols of these realities make us less suited to the perfect 
intimacy with God realized in the heavenly sanctuary. A major point of emphasis throughout Klawans’ 
work is that the priestly theology of holiness and sacrifice is shaped by the goal of imitatio Dei. As 
evidence, he points to the principle that is mentioned a few times in Leviticus, where God says “you shall 
be holy, for I am holy” (Lev. 11:45, cf. Lev. 19:2). Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 58. (On 
the general importance of imitatio Dei in priestly theology, Milgrom is in agreement: Leviticus 1-16, 
1991, 731]. 
  If this dual model for interpreting impurity is correct, one might say that the temple foreshadows 
the evangelical counsels, and in this case especially celibate chastity. Certainly sex was not forbidden in 
ancient Israel, nor denigrated, but the temple represented an even higher form of life which might be 
called heavenly, angelic, or divine. This proposal would be worth pursuing, but for simplicity’s sake, in 
this chapter I am going to stick with Milgrom’s explanation, which is powerful in itself and which does 
not necessarily contradict the emendations of Frymer-Kensky, Wright, and Klawans.  
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association between delivering a child and death was stronger in the ancient world when 
delivery was so great a risk to mother and child).  
In any case, the association between these perfectly natural human processes—
and indeed, with reference to the blessing of new life through delivery, something that is 
commanded (“be fruitful and multiply”) and celebrated—again illustrates that to be 
“unclean” was not to be wicked or disgusting,84 but it was an ordinary feature of life in 
this world. It represented a moment of exile from the more perfect form of existence 
exemplified by the glorious temple, and this temporary exile was soon relieved through 
the purification that normally comes through rest, adulation, and sacrifice. In each home, 
in each heart, the reality of death is both acknowledged and confronted through the 
regular rhythms of priestly purity law. Therefore, priestly theology did not ignore death, 
as if the reality of God’s indwelling presence in the temple immediately actualized the 
final peace envisioned by the prophets (for example, Isaiah 11), nor did it obsess over 
death, as if despair is the final word, but rather it soberly acknowledged the weakness of 
the flesh while returning again and again to the source of life. 
Now, for Milgrom, not every instance of impurity has the power to automatically 
create defilement in the sanctuary; one knows that the sanctuary itself has been polluted 
by an impurity if a purification offering (ḥaṭṭā’t) is required at the end of the cleansing 
process. According to Milgrom’s theory, impurity affects the sanctuary in a “graded” 
way: first, less severe pollution contaminates the outer courtyard (which is the place of 
the burnt offering altar); second, more severe pollution has enough malevolent power to 
                                                 
84 It is unfortunately true that traditions developed around the biblical text in which menstruating women 
were treated harshly and cruelly. Milgrom says that compared to these extra-biblical traditions, priestly 
theology is “remarkable” in its moderation. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 952–53. 
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push through to the shrine (which houses the altar of incense, the menorah, and the 
showbread table); and third, the most wicked evils penetrate the holy of holies itself (the 
place of the ark of the covenant, God’s very dwelling place).85 When one is a victim of, 
or comes into contact with, uncleanness, this seems to produce a “defilement” that has the 
potential—depending on its severity—to pollute the sanctuary.86 Therefore, after a certain 
period of time, and sometimes after mandated washing rituals, the Israelite was required 
to bring a purification offering to the temple to purge the sanctuary of the major 
defilement. For example, according to Leviticus, the woman who has given birth must 
bring a pigeon or a turtledove as a purification offering after her period of uncleanness 
(Lev. 12:7); the cleansed victim of scale disease must bring a ewe lamb as a purification 
offering (Lev. 14:10, 19); and men and women who have suffered abnormal genital 
discharges must bring a pigeon or a turtledove, again as a purification offering (Lev. 
15:14-15, 28-30). It is also sometimes necessary to bring purification offerings for less 
severe impurities if the person has forgotten to perform the required purification rites.87 
Everything we have discussed thus far deals with the problem of ritual defilement 
and the need for purification, both for the individual and for the sanctuary. But this is 
                                                 
85 See Ibid., 254-261-985; Milgrom, “The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray,’” 1976. Milgrom uses the 
analogy of Oscar Wilde’s novel The Picture of Dorian Gray, about a handsome libertine who engages in 
the full spectrum of sin. His external appearance remains pristine, but a hidden portrait of him becomes 
more disfigured with every transgression. As Wilde says, “It was true that the portrait still preserved, 
under all the foulness and ugliness of the face, its marked likeness to [Dorian Gray]…” Oscar Wilde, The 
Complete Works of Oscar Wilde: Stories, Plays, Poems & Essays (New York: Harper Perennial Modern 
Classics, 2008), 111. For Milgrom, in an analogous way, the sins of Israel scar and deface the sanctuary, 
making it foul and ugly, and less and less suitable to for Israel’s all-holy God.  
86 Lev. 15:31, for example, “You shall put the Israelites on guard against their uncleanness, lest they die 
through their uncleanness by defiling My Tabernacle which is among them.”  
87 See Lev. 5:2, 3, 5-6. This occurs when a person touches the carcass of an impure animal, or touches (for 
example) a bed that has been made unclean by genital discharge, and the person does not perform the 
required purification rite. For these more minor impurities, the purification rite is generally as simple as 
bathing in water, but if the person forgets to perform the rite, they produce a more serious defilement in 
the sanctuary because “prolonged impurity will increase in its vitality…” Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 
310–11.  
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only half of the problem. Let us turn again to the key verse from Deuteronomy: “I have 
put before you life and death, blessing and curse. Choose life…by loving the Lord your 
God, heeding His commands, and holding fast to Him.” (30:19-20) Here we see a special 
emphasis put on obedience, on moral action—in other words, the Deuteronomistic 
command puts us in the realm of sin. But as Milgrom put it, “contracting impurity is no 
sin!”88 Generally, ritual impurities, these symbols of death, are a “normal” part of life, at 
least in the world as we know it.89 But there is a second kind of death that is avoidable, 
and that the covenantal people in fact are obligated to avoid, and that occurs when the 
will is turned toward sin.  
Choosing Death: Sin 
The purification offering in ancient Israel had the ability to decontaminate the 
sanctuary of both pollution from ritual impurity and the pollution of sin itself. In fact, the 
problem of sin in the sanctuary is the main focus of Leviticus 4, the chapter that describes 
the purification offering in greatest detail. But it will surprise many modern readers that 
the problem addressed in Leviticus 4 is actually unintentional, or inadvertent, sin. 
According to Milgrom, an inadvertent sin can occur in two ways: first, if the person 
intends to follow the law but breaks it accidently (say, unintentional homicide), or 
second, when the person did not know the law when they acted in violation of the law. 
Thus, inadvertent sins are due to “negligence or ignorance.”90 Traditional Catholic moral 
                                                 
88 Ibid., 298.  
89 A more complete discussion of the priestly system would include analysis of the dietary laws, which 
occupy a middle position between unavoidable impurity and sinful acts. The literature on the possible 
symbolic meanings of dietary laws is a library unto itself, but in any case, dietary laws do not figure 
heavily into the logic behind the high priest’s actions on Yom Kippur.  
90 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 228. The word translated “unintentional” is ה ָׁג ָׁגְש; see Nobuyoshi Kiuchi’s 
overview of various translator’s views: The Purification Offering in the Priestly Literature: Its Meaning 
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theology would say that an act is not a “mortal sin” if it is unintentional or if one is 
unaware of its wrongness,91 and therefore the expansive Jewish concern for inadvertent 
sin may seem misguided.92 However, given the overarching goal of “choosing life” that 
animates priestly theologians, the value and even the wisdom of this concern can be 
defended even today, and actually there are noteworthy analogies in modern moral 
theology.  
For example, an analogy might be drawn between “inadvertent sin” and the recent 
attention to social or structural sin. Structural sin, for the individual, is typically a matter 
of ignorance or negligence—sometimes a mix of both. Often one does not intend to 
participate in such sinful arrangements, and corporate sins are usually so pervasive that 
one can hardly avoid being compromised in one way or the other, whether it be racism, or 
pornographic culture, or indifference to the poor, or consumerism and materialism, or 
dehumanizing crudeness and meanness, or sexism, or cynicism, or any other communal 
                                                 
and Function (Burns & Oates, 1987), 25–31.  
91 The Catechism of the Catholic Church unambiguously states that sins committed in ignorance or without 
complete consent of the will are not mortal sins. CCC 1859. 
92 Ephraim Radner points out that the priestly category of “inadvertent sin” has a remarkable parallel to the 
Catholic concept of venial sin, which was developed in medieval theology. Ephraim Radner, Leviticus 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2008), 59 n. 1. Thomas Aquinas points out that the word “venial” 
comes from the word “pardon” (Latin: venia)—these are sins that are pardonable. This, for Aquinas, is 
analogous to disease and death: a person sick in bed can be healed, a person dead in a casket cannot. 
Some sins are a sickness in the soul, others are death for the soul. For Aquinas, sins are venial when the 
sinner is not fully and personally responsible for the act; for example: “a sin committed through 
weakness or ignorance” (ST 1-2, q. 88, a. 2). This is very similar to Milgrom’s “inadvertent sin.”  
  Another fascinating parallel can be seen when, in the same article, Aquinas quotes Ambrose: 
“penance makes every sin venial”—in Catholic theology, mortal sins are also certainly pardonable 
through the grace of Christ in the sacraments. Milgrom argues that in ancient priestly theology, “there 
can be no sacrificial expiation for the brazen sinner” Jacob Milgrom, “The Priestly Doctrine of 
Repentance,” Revue Biblique 82 (1975): 186—in medieval Catholic terms, such a sinner’s acts are not 
“venial” (that is, forgivable). However, with remorse and verbalized confession, the brazen sinner 
“reduces his intentional sin to an inadvertence, thereby rendering it eligible for sacrificial expiation.” 
Ibid., 199. This interesting parallel deserves greater attention. In any case, unfortunately, according to 
Radner, medieval commentaries on Leviticus did not develop the connection between the theology of 
mortal and venial sin and the biblical concept of intentional and unintentional sin in Leviticus. 
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sin.93 How should the individual respond when they are made aware of such ubiquitous 
and unintentional sins, including even his or her own inadvertent participation in these 
sins? It seems appropriate that the response should be different from one’s response to 
“brazen sin”—what the Catholic might call mortal sin—since unintentional sins are in 
fact unintentional; to feel profound personal guilt and remorse may prove to be a 
debilitating distraction, especially when we are also victims of structural sins insofar as 
we are inevitably born into broken cultures. At the same time, for someone to rest 
comfortably in one’s previous negligence or ignorance would be to fail to take 
responsibility for the ways in which each person in fact perpetuates systemic sin, whether 
or not it is intentional. We are responsible for each other, and when we tacitly allow 
social sin to shape our own secret thoughts and resulting behaviors, we have in fact 
contributed to the brokenness of this world—again, intentionally or not.   
The priestly theology of unintentional sin seems to be another facet of a 
sophisticated investigation into the complex and inexorable ways in which we are 
ensnared by death. It isn’t just the death that comes “naturally” to our bodies in this fallen 
world, but it is also the innumerable subtle ways in which we find ourselves shaped by 
the forces of death in our presuppositions and misguided actions due to unintentional sin. 
Such sin is real, it is damaging to social peace and justice, it is degrading, and it requires 
(in addition to other things) a theological response, because even inadvertent sins are an 
affront to the God of love, justice, and peace.94 Unsurprisingly, for the priestly 
                                                 
93 Milgrom made a similar point in his more popular commentary on Leviticus which he wrote for the 
“Continental Commentary” series: Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics (Augsberg 
Fortress, 2004), 32–33. 
94 Radner’s theological discussion of inadvertent sin is valuable and in many ways consonant with what I 
have argued in this section. Leviticus, 59–65. 
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theologians, the right response is to accept responsibility for one’s own contribution to 
the polluted moral community, to positively “choose life” precisely at the moment when 
the reality of one’s own inadvertent alliance with moral death becomes apparent, and to 
therefore draw near to God again in the temple. Only through this continual 
commitment—individually and collectively—to drawing near to the God of life again 
and again will these structures of sin start to wobble and fall.95  
Not every sin, of course, can be explained by ignorance or negligence. There is 
also the brazen sin, the most horrifying reality of all because here the member of the 
covenant community freely chooses “death” in their actions toward God and neighbor. In 
priestly theology, this kind of sin is identified with the words ‘āwōn (ןוֹו ָׁע) and pesă‘ 
                                                 
95 Priestly theologians are also attuned to the fact that there are varying levels of responsibility for 
unintentional sin. Thus, priests and chieftains, the religious and political leaders, who have greater 
responsibility for a just and harmonious society, also have greater culpability when they are guilty of 
inadvertent sin. In Leviticus 4:3-12 the priest who sins inadvertently must bring an unblemished bull as a 
purification offering, the most valuable of the offerings. The blood of this animal is then used to purify 
the shrine by sprinkling the blood before the curtain that separates the shrine and the holy of holies. 
According to Milgrom’s theory, this means that the pollution generated by the high priest’s sin penetrates 
more deeply into the temple—these inadvertent sins are severe. 
  Leviticus 4:13-21 gives instructions for what “the community” as a whole should do if it 
inadvertently sins: it must also bring a bull, and the bull’s blood is again brought into the shrine. Milgrom 
explains that this section is linked with the previous section on the priest; the communal sin mentioned 
here stems from the fact the community has followed the ignorant or negligent priest into inadvertent sin. 
An example of this might be ritual mistakes—say if the whole community celebrated Passover on the 
wrong day because the priests made a mistake in following the lunar calendar. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 
1991, 241–42. 
  In verses 22-26 of the same chapter, the chieftain must bring an unblemished male goat, but its 
blood is applied to the altar of burnt offering in the outer courtyard, which would suggest (again, for 
Milgrom) that the mistake is not as severe as the priest’s. The “commoner,” finally, must bring a female 
goat or lamb without blemish, and its blood is again applied to the altar of burnt offering. It is true that a 
female goat was worth more in ancient Israel than a male goat because female goats were far more 
economically valuable (since they could bear kids and produce milk). Thus, it is at first surprising that 
the chieftain brings a male and a commoner brings a female. Milgrom gives a plausible explanation for 
this unexpected requirement. The sacrificial animal was typically one year old; poorer families would not 
support many male goats to that age, but they would support many one year old female goats. In this 
sense, the male goat is more valuable, suggesting the greater severity of the chieftain’s sin given his role 
in the community. Cf. ibid., 252. 
  This gradated response to unintentional sins shows that the priests believed that those with greater 
responsibility for leading Israel—especially the priests themselves—also have greater power to endanger 
Israel through their sin. 
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(עַש ֶּ֫ פ). These two words come together in an important Yom Kippur verse, one that we 
will analyze more fully later in this chapter: “Aaron shall lean both of his hands upon the 
head of the live goat and confess over it all of the iniquities (‘āwōn) and transgressions 
(pesă‘) of the Israelites, including all of their sins, and put them on the head of the 
goat…”96 These are the sins that the much later Christian tradition will call “mortal”—
they are grave and they are intentional. They are listed, according to Milgrom, in order of 
seriousness. To describe the first type of sin listed, he says, “The rabbis define ‘iniquities’ 
as zĕdônôt, deliberate wrongdoing…, whose gravity is one notch below that of 
‘transgressions’.”97 
For Milgrom, then, “transgression”—pesă‘—is the word for the gravest 
conspiracy with death humanly possible. Notably, this is not a word that calls to mind 
general human wrongdoing, but it points very specifically to covenantal violation. The 
word means “rebellion”; Milgrom says, “Its usage originates in the political sphere, 
where it denotes the rebellion of a vassal against his overlord (e.g., 1 Kgs 12:19, 2 Kgs 
1:1; 3:5, 7; 8:20, 22); by extension, it is transferred to the divine realm, where it denotes 
Israel’s rebellion against its God (e.g., Isa 1:2; 43:27; Jer 2:8; 33:8).”98 The connection 
between the sins of vassals against their suzerains and the sins of Israel against YHWH 
certainly calls to mind the way in which ancient Jewish covenant theology parallels 
Hittite suzerainty treaties.99 These covenants established a personal relationship, with 
personal obligations, between unequal parties. Violation of the terms of the covenant was 
                                                 
96 Leviticus 16:21, translated by Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1010..  
97 Ibid., 1043. Compare Kiuchi, The Purification Offering in the Priestly Literature, 50. Other interpreters 
favor “culpability” for ‘āwōn: Hundley, Keeping Heaven on Earth, 167; Gane, Cult and Character, 101–
2, 294. 
98 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1034. 
99 Levenson, Sinai and Zion, 26ff. 
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indeed rebellion.100 If such an intimate personal context is implied by the use of pesă‘ in 
Leviticus 16, it seems that the sin that pierces the heart of the sanctuary most deeply is 
Israel’s cold violations of its covenant promise to the Lord—or in Milgrom’s words, 
“open and wanton defiance of the Lord.”101 
Impurity and Sin: An Analogous Relationship 
Priestly theology, therefore, depicts a broad spectrum of ways in which human 
beings encounter the forces of death. To venture outside of ancient Jewish categories in 
an attempt to capture the full breadth of the problem, one might say that the priests worry 
about the incursions of death in both being and act. In other words, these theologians 
were aware of the fact that, simply by virtue of the fact that we are beings in the world, 
we are subject to the powers of death. To communicate this fact, to “raise awareness” we 
might now say, the books of Leviticus and Numbers articulate a complex symbolic 
system of purity laws. The purity system also reinforced the great truth that we are not 
God, that God is holy, and that Zion, the mountain of Life, can have no association with 
the valley of death.  
Of course, the kingdom of death has not just won territory in the realm of material 
being, but yet more fearfully in the realm of our very actions. Well aware of this, the 
                                                 
100 Admittedly, the word pesă‘ does not refer exclusively to covenant unfaithfulness in biblical literature. In 
Amos 1-2, for example, the same word is used to describe the sins of “the nations.”  
101 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1034. The Holiness Code, Leviticus 17-26, is identified by historical-
critical biblical scholars to be a priestly text that is written in a different time period than Leviticus 1-16 
(the early claim, stemming from Wellhausen, was that the Holiness Code is earlier, but Milgrom and 
many more recent scholars argue it is later than Leviticus 1-16; for discussion, see Ibid., 13ff.). In the 
Holiness Code, one finds an inventory of the types of sins that the author of Leviticus 16 may have had in 
mind when he spoke of “iniquities and transgressions.” As Klawans summarizes it, “These defiling acts 
include sexual sins (e.g., Lev. 18:24-30), idolatry (e.g., Lev. 19:31; 20:1-3), and bloodshed (e.g., Num. 
35:33-34). These three sinful behaviors are also frequently referred to as ‘abominations’ (תובעות).” 
Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 26. 
202 
 
priestly theologians therefore engage in a brilliant, comprehensive investigation into the 
ways in which our actions can be corrupt. They do not limit themselves to the egregious 
sins—those towering evils forbidden by the Ten Commandments—but they dwell instead 
on our “unintentional” failings, the ways in which the power of death weasels its way 
unannounced into our everyday dispositions and habits, the varieties of brokenness that 
become apparent only in retrospect. In many ways, it is the slow approach of a culture of 
death that has the greatest power to undo creation. Therefore, Leviticus trains the chosen 
people to turn again and again toward the temple to combat those unintentional sins that 
endanger the nation.  
At the lowest rung of this great chain of un-being, there are the brazen sins, the 
horrifying possibility of human beings freely choosing death over life. These are the 
moment of rebellion, where men and women take up arms against the good creation, 
where men and women willingly enlist on the side of chaos. As Milgrom says, in priestly 
theology, it is no longer the demons who attack the divine realm—who needs demons 
when humans are willing to be demonic? It is us, it is I, who generate the sins that fly 
screaming toward YHWH’s dwelling place, desperate to drive God from the world, eager 
to watch the whole thing burn. As we have seen, this confrontation takes place on Mount 
Zion: here is the true axis of creation. If the forces of evil can drive God from the holy of 
holies, they have driven God from all creation. Zion is the true site of this great drama: 
life and death, light and darkness, true God and false.  
This section opened with the claim that dual pollutants that attack the sanctuary—
physical impurities and sins—are related but different. There is now a vast secondary 
literature attempting to express the similarity and difference between these two “realities” 
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which attack the sacred space.102 In contemporary research, Klawans has been a leading 
voice; he has clearly articulated the differences between what he calls “ritual impurity” 
and “moral impurity.”103 One major clue that we are dealing here with two different 
phenomenon is the fact that sacrifices intended to address ritual impurity result in 
“purification” (to be made clean, ר  ה ָׁט, taher), while sacrifices meant to combat sin result 
in “forgiveness” (חַל ָׁס, salach).104 But while it does seems that these two kinds of 
pollution are distinct, they are not wholly separable phenomenon. As David P. Wright has 
pointed out, both kinds of impurity are intimately connected to the life of the temple, and 
both potentially require a purification offering for final healing.105 But without denying 
the connection, Klawans remains eager to highlight the distinction, because it is 
important to avoid conflating the two spheres of pollution into a “single symbolic 
system”—which had occurred with Hellenistic Jews like Philo: for understandable 
apologetic reasons, ritual impurity laws were justified as always ultimately ethical. Such 
a monochromatic interpretation, however, drains the fine details from priestly 
                                                 
102 For a literature review of different approaches taken to the relationship, and/or the distinction, between 
sin and impurity, see Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 4–20. Here one finds a summary of 
the approaches of Adolph Büchler, Gedalyahu Alon, Mary Douglas, Jacob Neusner, Hannah K. 
Harrington, E.P. Sanders, David Z. Hoffmann, Jacob Milgrom, Tikva Frymer-Kensky, and David P. 
Wright. A more recent literature review can be found in Lemos, “Where There Is Dirt, Is There 
System?,” 274–83. She includes Klawans’ own work in her overview, and some subsequent critiques, 
such as those put forward by Thomas Kazen and others.  
103 These are not biblical terms, he acknowledges. But Klawans argues that they are better than other 
attempts to label the distinction, such as Levitical vs. spiritual/ritual defilement (Büchler), “contagious 
pollution” vs. “danger beliefs” (Frymer-Kensky), and tolerated vs. prohibited defilements (Wright). See 
Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 5–17. 
104 Milgrom, “The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray,’” 391–92; Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 7; John 
Dennis, “The Function of תאטח Sacrifice in the Priestly Literature,” Ephemerides Theologicae 
Lovanienses 78, no. 1 (2002): 121; Jay Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement: The Priestly 
Conceptions (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2005), 1; Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient 
Judaism, 36–37. Thomas Kazen also points to ways the two systems overlap: Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric 
in Leviticus, 134–35; Hundley, Keeping Heaven on Earth, 140. 
105 Wright summarized by Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 36–37. Thomas Kazen also 
points to ways the two systems overlap: “Dirt and Disgust: Body and Morality in Biblical Purity Laws,” 
in Perspective on Purity and Purification in the Bible, Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 
474 (New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 44, as does Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 149.  
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engagement with the forces of death. Klawans believes it is important not to reduce the 
ritual to the moral, or vice-versa, and he therefore insists that these are “two distinct but 
analogous conceptions of contagion.”106 For Klawans, the two must not be conflated, but 
they also cannot be wholly divided, because they are together related to a common story 
of cosmic woundedness, and because these two forces of decay surely influence each 
other in diverse ways. 
Before moving on to the question of how Yom Kippur actually addresses human 
brokenness as described in Jewish priestly theology, one final clarification is in order. We 
must return one more time to the “something” that pollutes the sacred space as a result of 
ritual impurity and sin. Now that these two types of impurity have been distinguished, we 
can clarify how the sanctuary is affected by their corresponding pollutants. On this 
question, the breakthrough article was written by Schwartz. In “The Bearing of Sin in the 
Priestly Literature,” Schwartz points out that these alleged metaphysical substances, these 
“miasma,” which pollute the sanctuary, are often seen as equivalent, as if ritual and moral 
impurity generate the same kind of contamination. But a close reading of Leviticus 16 
                                                 
106 Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 38, emphasis in original. Cf. Schwartz, “The Bearing of 
Sin,” 7, 21; Hundley, Keeping Heaven on Earth, 180. 
  Klawans use of the word “analogous” brings to my mind Erich Przywara’s own fascinating 
interpretation of the relationship between the “ontic” and the “noetic”—being and consciousness. From 
this perspective, perhaps we could say that ritual impurity points to a “privation” in being, or material 
brokenness, especially if we follow Milgrom in saying that impurity relates to death. But then, moral 
impurity, or sin, points to a “privation” in act, or spiritual brokenness. The latter has some precedent: 
Klawans points out that one of the early biblical critics to distinguish the two kinds of impurity, David 
Zvi Hoffmann (1843-1921), saw the second kind of impurity as “the defilement of the soul.” Impurity 
and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 13–14. 
  For Przywara, being and act are distinct and yet not separate, they are ordered toward each other, 
and each always already entails the other. While it is methodologically inappropriate from the 
perspective of historical-critical research to use a twentieth century Catholic philosopher (who is himself 
shaped by a Greek philosophical vocabulary) to clarify ancient Jewish priestly theology, nevertheless I 
wonder if Przywara’s observation about being and consciousness-in-act might clarify what Klawans has 
discovered: that there are two analogous conceptions of impurity, one which is not sinful but which is 
associated with bodily decay, and the other which is sinful and which is associated with misdirected acts.  
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suggests that this is not actually the case. Verse 16 of that chapter reads: “Thus he shall 
purge the adytum of the pollution (miṭṭum’ōt) and transgressions (pĕšā‘im) of the 
Israelites, including all of their sins…”107 For Schwartz, it is important to notice that two 
different categories of pollution are identified here: the first indicates “bodily impurities” 
(or ritual impurity) and the second, sin (or moral impurity). Meditating on the fact that 
two categories are here mentioned, Schwartz concludes that the high priest is combatting 
two analogous phenomenon through his blood manipulations in the sanctuary. Schwartz 
says, “Only bodily impurities generate defilement; sin does not. When the Israelite sins, 
what penetrates the realm of the sacred is not defilement but rather the transgressions 
themselves; on Purgation Day [Yom Kippur], both are expunged by the blood of the goat 
of purification.”108 
This difference is further illustrated in verse 21, which describes how sins are 
transferred to the Azazel-goat. The heart of this verse generally mirrors v. 16, but there is 
an important change which makes a big difference. Again, the verse reads, “Aaron shall 
lean both of his hands upon the head of the live goat and confess over it all of the 
iniquities (‘āwōn) and transgressions (pesă‘) of the Israelites, including all of their 
sins…”109 Notice that there is no longer reference to “pollution”—the problem of ritual 
impurities has disappeared, and now both words point to the problem of brazen sins. 
Reflecting on this change, Schwartz argues that the reason ritual impurities are not 
                                                 
107 This is Milgrom’s translation; Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1010. Schwartz says the holy of holies is purged “of 
the Israelites’ impurities and of their transgressions, among all their sins.” “The Bearing of Sin,” 6. NJPS 
says, “Thus he shall purge the shrine of the uncleanness and transgressions of the Israelites, whatever 
their sins…” Clearly there is disagreement about how to translate the last word, lĕkol-ḥaṭṭō’tām. Milgrom 
calls this a “catchall phrase” for Israel’s sins. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1034. For Schwartz, the 
word underlines that, among all the sins Israel has committed, it is the “transgressions” that are purged 
from the adytum. “The Bearing of Sin,” 18–19.  
108 Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 7. 
109 Leviticus 16:21, translated by Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1010..  
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mentioned is because they were eliminated instantaneously by the blood manipulation 
ritual in the sanctuary. But then, sins, as an analogous yet different kind of substance, are 
not simply destroyed by the blood; they are merely released from the sanctuary and must 
still be removed from the temple. Schwartz says,  
Only after having purged the adytum, shrine, and altar of the impurities and sins 
may the priest place the latter on the head of the scapegoat….The inference is 
clear: the sins can be transferred to the scapegoat at this point and not before, 
because only now has the priest acquired them himself. They have been 
accumulating in the adytum and the shrine, and he has just released them: now he 
transfers them to the head of the goat in order to dispose of them for good.110 
 
This idea is extremely important. The defilement created by ritual impurity dissolves 
immediately through the blood ritual. Schwartz says the blood “eradicates” them.111 Why 
this should be the case will be discussed later, but for now it is important to simply see 
that such impurities are no longer a factor, and that such impurities are not relevant to the 
Azazel-goat ritual.112 The “something” of sin, however, is a different type of problem. It 
is not simply destroyed or eradicated by the blood ritual; for whatever reason, the 
metaphysical density of sin—whatever that might mean—is such that it requires a second 
step for its total removal. It must be literally loaded onto a sin-bearing creature and driven 
away. Again, much more will be said about this below, but here the point is simply that 
the complex Yom Kippur liturgy addresses two analogous problems: “eradicating 
impurity and driving away sins” and thus both goats are necessary to fully purge the 
sanctuary.  
                                                 
110 Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 17. 
111 Ibid., 15. 
112 This point was made by Milgrom on numerous occasions. For example, “…the sacrificial animals of 
Lev 16 also suffice to purge the sanctuary [of ritual impurities]. This leaves the live goats (sic) to 
function in an entirely different sphere: the elimination of Israel’s sins….the live goat has nothing to do 
with the sanctuary’s impurities but, as the text emphatically and unambiguously states, it deals with 
‘ăwōnōt ‘iniquities’…” Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1044. 
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A Desecration Where It Does Not Belong: Conclusion 
After this review of recent research into impurity and sin in ancient Israel, the full 
tragedy of the sin of Nadab and Abihu is clear. Whatever the brothers might have done 
wrong, this original sin of priestly theology resulted in an absolute crisis. Immediately 
upon consecrating the most sacred space, immediately upon receiving the ineffable 
blessing of God’s true indwelling presence in their midst, an event occurs that is total 
tragedy and absolute corruption. Not only that, but this tragedy was caused by the eldest 
sons of Aaron himself: for the priests, the blame rested squarely on their own shoulders. 
It was a humiliating moment, one that undoubtedly haunted future generations as they 
heard the story recounted.  
We can now say that it was a cultic crisis for two related reasons. First, the tragic 
sequence of actions directly resulted in two corpses in the sanctuary itself. Now that we 
have seen how serious the ancient Israelites were about protecting this holiest space from 
such defilement, one can better imagine how disturbing it would be to hear about two 
dead bodies lying in the very courtyard of God’s dwelling. Second, as if that were not 
enough, the dead bodies were a direct result of grave sin.113 The perverse action therefore 
produced a “something” that violently attacked the space that was intended to 
communicate life and peace. The physical corpses of Nadab and Abihu are an appropriate 
symbol of the way sin produces a burdensome substance that needs to be physically 
borne from the sacred precincts. Such sins, it seems, cannot be destroyed. Once they 
come into existence, they can only be banished, sent outside the camp, much like Nadab 
                                                 
113 Milgrom makes the same point. He says, “Nadab and Abihu had polluted the sanctuary doubly in life by 
their sin and in death by their corpses.” Ibid., 1011. 
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and Abihu’s corpses need to be physically removed. Ever since this first moment, the 
priests and laypeople of ancient Israel remained aware of their own responsibility for 
keeping the sanctuary free from all stain so that it would remain a suitable dwelling place 
for the God who is creator of the universe and redeemer of Israel. In this fallen world, it 
was impossible to avoid death altogether, and so everyone worked together to stay 
vigilant, “to guard and to keep”114 the new Eden free from the slithering sins that corrupt 
creation.  
There are many ways for modern men and women to read this material. One 
common approach is to see it as a testament to a primitive, magical way of thinking. As 
such, it may be interesting to historians and anthropologists, and perhaps it could be more 
generally educational insofar as it opens our eyes to the primitive superstitions that still 
plague human societies, but it does not have much positive content. With such a mindset, 
one would not be inclined to press priestly theologians with many follow-up questions, 
because one could hardly imagine that these ideas communicate anything substantive or 
edifying. This is certainly the mentality that one finds in Wellhausian scholarship, where 
priestly theology is a detour, a corruption from a more original ethical religion. 
Thankfully, today we find many writers who take the priests much more seriously as 
profound thinkers and true theologians, and in fact genuine contributors to Scripture. 
Therefore, it is now possible to imagine that there is, in fact, a theo-logic in even these 
materials. It is now possible to treat the Levitical priests as great thinkers worthy of hard 
questions.  
                                                 
114 It is widely argued that when God told Adam “to cultivate and to keep” the garden, the words ‘ābad and 
šāmar allude to Adam’s priestly responsibility to serve God and guard/keep the law. See Beale, The 
Temple and the Church’s Mission, 66–70. 
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The priestly materials offer a sophisticated analysis of the problem of sin. It is not 
exactly systematic in the way that St. Thomas Aquinas is systematic in the Secunda 
Secundæ Pars of the Summa, but it is nevertheless sophisticated and elaborate, and 
Milgrom makes a strong case that, far from being an alternative to the prophetic emphasis 
on ethical obligations, Levitical thought anticipates and supports the prophetic impulse. 
In priestly theology, each individual’s sins polluted the sanctuary that stood at the center 
of the nation, thus endangering the entire community should YHWH flee from his 
dwelling place in response to the accumulating pollution. Sin is never an entirely private 
affair, and thus priestly theology developed a doctrine of “collective responsibility.”115 In 
other words, the twelve tribes should understand themselves to be the “keepers” of their 
brothers and sisters; each person has a certain responsibility to the community to pursue 
the shared covenantal goal of being “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation” (Ex 19:6). 
With this in mind, Milgrom says, “It was the genius of Israel’s priesthood, as reflected in 
this sacrificial ritual, to give a national dimension to ethics, to make ethical behavior an 
indispensable factor in determining Israel’s destiny….Israel’s priests are the precursors of 
its prophets.”116 
In Leviticus, we do not simply find a mature reflection on the problem of sin and 
death, but more importantly, we also find the solution that God established: the liturgy of 
Yom Kippur. We now therefore turn our full attention to this great liturgy, the highest 
holy day on the Jewish calendar, to see how the chosen people pursued healing and 
                                                 
115 The revolutionary priestly idea of collective responsibility—and its less popular sister doctrine, 
“collective retribution”—is a theme that Milgrom emphasizes again and again in his various works. Cf. 
Milgrom, “The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray,’” 1976, 398; Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 260–61; 
Milgrom, Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics, 32. 
116 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 231. 
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forgiveness in the midst of sin.  
How Aaron Shall Enter: A Better Way 
The sixteenth chapter of Leviticus describes the most important and the more 
sacred liturgy on the Jewish calendar.117 It is the “acme of all temple rituals,”118 and in 
fact “the inner sanctum of the Torah.”119 This is the day that liturgically conveys and 
realizes the greatest intimacy possible between YHWH and humanity. After recalling the 
way Nadab and Abihu improperly “encroached upon the presence of the Lord,” God says 
to Moses: “This is how Aaron shall enter the adytum…”120 With these words, God invites 
Israel, in the person of the high priest, into the divine bedchamber,121 the most private and 
vulnerable space of God’s dwelling, the “trysting place” of heaven and earth.122 This is a 
terrifying and exhilarating proposal; in this simple verse the full weight of the tremendum 
et fascinosum should be felt, not least of all because, within the narrative, as these words 
are being spoken, two lifeless bodies are being carried away from the tent. And yet the 
psalmist pleads, “One thing I ask of the Lord, only that do I seek: to live in the house of 
the Lord all the days of my life, to gaze upon the beauty of the Lord, to frequent His 
temple” (Psalm 27:4). It may not be safe, but there is nothing better.  
                                                 
117 Hammer, Entering the High Holy Days, 107; Thomas Hieke and Tobias Nicklas, “Introduction,” in The 
Day of Atonement: Its Interpretations in Early Jewish and Christian Traditions (BRILL, 2011), vii. 
118 Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 28. 
119 Gane, Cult and Character, xix. In fact, Leviticus 16 is the middle chapter of the middle book of the 
Torah: Rolf Rendtorff, “Leviticus 16 Als Mitte Der Tora,” Biblical Interpretation 11 (2003): 255. 
120 Leviticus 16:1, 3. Milgrom’s translation: Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1009. 
121 This is Michael B. Hundley’s helpful analogy: “Before YHWH at the Entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” 
20–21. 
122 Cf. Fagerberg, Theologia Prima, 108. 
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Garments of Glory 
“This is how Aaron shall enter.” The text identifies two essential conditions that 
must be met by any high priest who would pass beyond the veil. The first pertains to the 
offerings that he brings, and the second pertains to his vestments. For convenience, let’s 
review the second condition before turning toward a more thorough review of the first. 
The high priest is known for his elaborate, highly ornate vestments, which includes a rich 
blue robe, a multi-colored ephod (similar to an apron), and a golden breastplate with 
shimmering gems representing the twelve tribes. The specifications for these vestments 
are given in Exodus 28 and 39, alongside the specifications for the tabernacle itself, and 
both the vestments and tabernacle are described in similarly precise detail. In Leviticus 8, 
the washing and vesting of Aaron and his sons is the first step in the inauguration of the 
cult. As briefly mentioned in the last chapter, the high priest’s garments are especially 
notable because the very same materials are used in constructing both the tabernacle and 
adorning Aaron. For example, the sash—which is worn by all priests—is woven using 
blue, purple, and crimson woolen threads; these are the same colors and the same style of 
weaving (rōqêm) as the curtain which serves as the outer entrance of the tabernacle.123 
The high priest, however, also wears the ephod, which has the same colors and is woven 
in the same more elaborate style (ḥōšêḇ) as the parochet, the veil through which the high 
priest must pass to enter the holy of holies.124  
In this way, it seems that the garments the priests wear are “indexed” to particular 
sections of the tabernacle.125 Because all priests are called to minister in the shrine, each 
                                                 
123 Compare Ex 26:36 (the curtain) and Ex 39:29 (the sash). See Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 502. 
124 Compare Ex 26:31 (the veil) and Ex 28:6 (the ephod). See Ibid. 
125 For the concept of “indexing,” in relation to other modes of analyzing ritual, see Hundley, Keeping 
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wears vestments which are similar to the curtain that divides the outer courtyard from the 
shrine. But only the high priest wears vestments similar to the parochet because he alone 
is summoned into the holy of holies on Israel’s behalf. The high priest serves as a 
mediator between God and Israel; the whole nation is elevated with him as he ascends to 
the holy of holies, and the glory of God likewise shines through him when he is fully 
vested such that, by gazing upon him, Israel is given a glimpse at the veil that both 
conceals and reveals the indwelling God.126  
In spite of this grandeur that is unique to the high priest, what is most significant 
about the opening verses of Leviticus 16 is that, to enter the holy of holies, Aaron must 
first be stripped of these glorious garments and approach in the simple linen tunic. There 
is an almost kenotic impetus here; for the high priest to stand before Israel in glory, he 
must stand first before God in humility.127 Additionally, however, Milgrom endorses the 
idea that, already in Leviticus, the high priest’s plain white tunic represents angelic 
worship, pointing to Ezekiel 9:2-3, 11, Ezekiel 10:2 and Daniel 10:5 as parallel passages 
where angels are described wearing linen vestments.128 The office of high priest, without 
                                                 
Heaven on Earth, 29–37. 
126 See the discussion in the last chapter (footnote 212), where I mentioned the remarkable way in which 
the worshipers respond to the high priest in the Letter to Aristeas. As a parallel, one thinks of the way 
Moses’ face beamed when descending Mount Sinai in Exodus 34:29-35. Furthermore, Exodus itself 
explains the purpose of the vestments: they “are made ‘for glory and beauty’…” Exodus 28:2, 40, quoted 
by Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam, 44. Much more can be said about the vested high priest as 
mediator and icon, especially when the cosmic and heavenly symbolism emphasized by Josephus and 
Philo is factored into the discussion. For example, Brant Pitre makes the suggestive point that the high 
priest “was viewed as embodying in himself both the Temple and the cosmos.” “Jesus, the New Temple, 
and the New Priesthood,” 61–62. For a sampling of possible approaches, see Beale, The Temple and the 
Church’s Mission, 39–45; Fletcher-Louis, “God’s Image, His Cosmic Temple and the High Priest”; 
Fletcher-Louis, “Jesus as the High Priestly Messiah,” 2006, 158–61; Barker, The Great High Priest, 136–
40.  
127 Milgrom articulates a similar argument. Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1016.  
128 Ibid. For additional second temple reflections on white linen garments as representing an elevation to 
angelic status, see Andrei A Orlov, Heavenly Priesthood in the Apocalypse of Abraham (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 130–33; Ina Willi-Plein, “Some Remarks on Hebrews from the 
Viewpoint of Old Testament Exegesis,” in Hebrews (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 31; Himmelfarb, Ascent to 
Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses, 18. 
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a doubt, is a complex symbol: throughout the Yom Kippur liturgy the high priest moves 
in and out of the different sacred spheres, performing rituals on behalf of different groups 
of people, and changing vestments on a number of occasions,129 all of which highlights 
the fact that the high priest is called upon to simultaneously embody earthly and heavenly 
realities, representing Israel and the whole cosmos in heaven, and representing heavenly 
glory on earth.130  
The Purification Offering 
The other condition of the high priest’s entrance into the holy of holies pertains to 
the offering he must bring. We read: “This is how Aaron shall enter the adytum: with a 
bull of the herd as a purification offering and a ram for a burnt offering…And from the 
Israelite community he shall take two he-goats for a purification offering and a ram for a 
burnt offering.”131 From the theological perspective, these words should again be read in 
the context of Nadab and Abihu’s trespass. While they unquestionably approached in the 
wrong way, while their movement is best labeled “encroachment,” this does not mean 
that God intends for there to be a inviolable barrier between his Presence and his people. 
Much to the contrary. But this begs the question: how should Israel approach her God? 
The message of Leviticus 16, therefore, becomes more positive, despite its tragic setting: 
to articulate the appropriate way of drawing near to the LORD, and from the perspective of 
                                                 
129 In Leviticus 16 he changes his clothing once, but by the time of the Mishna Yoma, the high priest is 
depicted as changing garments numerous times. See footnote 198 for more on the Mishna Yoma. 
130 With respect to the latter, an especially important part of the high priest’s wardrobe is the gold “plate” 
that is fastened to the high priest’s turban/mitre. This plate is inscribed with the words “Holy to the Lord” 
( ֵַָּּֽ֙לָּ֙ש  ד ָֹ֖קה ֵּֽ ָׁוהי ), and according to Exodus 28:36-38, the inscribed plate was related with the high priest’s 
ability to bear sins. Cf. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 623–24; Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 16. That 
the high priest wore the divine name on his forehead (a point emphasized by Aristeas 98-99 and Philo in 
Life of Moses II.114) became increasingly important in later Jewish mystical traditions. See Andrei A. 
Orlov, Divine Scapegoats: Demonic Mimesis in Early Jewish Mysticism (SUNY Press, 2015), 25–34. 
131 Leviticus 16:3, 5 translated by Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1009, emphasis added. 
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the priestly authors, this is ultimately a question about appropriate sacrifices.  
With that in mind, it is striking that the high priest is instructed to draw near with 
two offerings: with a purification offering and a burnt offering. This sequence is repeated 
twice—the first offering is for the priests the second is for the whole community—but in 
each case the purification offering and burnt offering go together. This is actually 
surprising, and it has not been emphasized enough in the existing literature. Aaron is told 
to enter “with a bull…for a ḥaṭṭā’ṯ and a ram for a ‘ōlāh,” yet when entering the holy of 
holies, the high priest brings only the blood of the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ. The ‘ōlāh ram has not yet been 
slaughtered, and even after it is slaughtered its blood is never brought into the tent. Why 
does the author of Leviticus suggest that the purification offerings are paired with burnt 
offerings, and how is it that the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ and ‘ōlāh are together related to the high priest’s 
movement toward God? 
The ḥaṭṭā’ṯ is the only offering described in Leviticus that involves red-handed 
blood manipulations on or toward cultic furniture. The blood of the burnt offering is also 
separated from the body, but it is dashed or drained upon the sides of the altar,132 
signifying the fact that life is being given or returned to God via the altar. In this section, 
I will argue that the purifying use of the blood in the context of sin, signified by the blood 
manipulations, is the significant difference between the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ and the ‘ōlāh, but 
otherwise the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ draws on the same theological concepts as the ‘ōlāh, and is ordered 
toward and completed in the ‘ōlāh. The implication of this is that both of these sacrifices 
are rooted in the underlying theological principles articulated in the previous chapter’s 
meditation on the offering of Isaac. In other words, my most important claim is that it is 
                                                 
132 For a full investigation of the ‘ōlāh blood rite and its various interpretations, see William K. Gilders, 
Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible: Meaning and Power (JHU Press, 2004), 61–84. 
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finally the blood of Isaac, the life of Isaac, that overcomes the impurity and sin which 
pollutes the temple.  
I admit at the outset that this is a canonical and theological interpretation. Many 
critical scholars have done outstanding work tracing the (possible/plausible) historical 
evolution of the priestly texts, and many have also issued strict warnings against 
imposing symbolic interpretations on ritual texts.133 As we saw in the debate between 
Klawans, Watts, and Milgrom about the possibility of symbolically or theologically 
interpreting biblical sacrifices,134 priestly ritual texts are quite austere when it comes to 
theological explanations for the rites they describe: very little is stated explicitly, and 
therefore to answer the “why” questions requires us to import ideas from elsewhere. But 
profound respect for the particular—particular authors, particular texts, particular times 
and places—makes it difficult for some to accept interpretive strategies that bring in ideas 
from other contexts. While such restraint is surely appropriate for strict historians, it may 
artificially limit the full theological truth that is in fact communicated by these texts. 
After all, we know with theological certainty that these texts are part of a most unique 
genre: inspired scripture. For that reason alone, tracing the ways in which the Spirit might 
be drawing together truths from originally isolated historical moments in the history of 
Israel is, in itself, theologically justifiable. We can avert to Przywara’s helpful 
epistemological rule: “truth in-and-beyond history.” As creatures, we do not have access 
to an unmediated Truth-beyond-history, or Truth-beyond-creatureliness, but at the same 
time, history is not fragmentation and isolation and meaninglessness. When considering 
our consciousness, and in a special way when considering the history of revelation, the 
                                                 
133 A good summary of such concerns can be found in Ibid., 2–11. 
134 See the discussion in chapter two beginning on page 73. 
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proper rhythm of truth made present in history must be maintained, and thus a unifying 
Logos that brings peace, and not destruction, to the diverse logoi of creation and the 
diverse logoi of biblical texts. Historical criticism on its own, if given a historicist 
inflection, finds a single meaning in each text or fragment—the meaning intended by the 
author at the time of composition—but there is no unifying element across the fragments; 
everything becomes compartmentalized, it becomes so particular that is loses meaningful 
value. Thus, Przywara gives us a framework for understanding how it is possible to insist 
with maximal robustness on the two “extremes” that are often pitted against each other in 
popular theological discourse: historical-critical and theological interpretation. 
What’s more, it has also been argued that an analogical mode of reasoning is 
especially appropriate to priestly theology. For example, William Gilders has noticed that 
“many biblical scholars seem intent on identifying a single authoritative meaning, a one-
to-one referent, for each discrete symbolic act or object” which is imprudent because 
“ritual acts are characteristically multivocal symbols, with multiple levels of 
meaning…”135 Similarly, Mary Douglas’ research also encourages us to think about 
priestly theology in a more integral and imaginative way. At the beginning of Leviticus as 
Literature she stresses the fact that this theology is aesthetic, analogical, and 
mythopoetic. In contrast to linear, discursive (Deuteronomistic) logic, Douglas argues 
that  
Leviticus’ literary style is correlative, it works through analogies. Instead of 
explaining why an instruction has been given, or even what it means, it adds 
another similar instruction, and another and another, thus producing its highly 
schematized effect. The series of analogies locate a particular instance in a 
context.136  
 
                                                 
135 Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 3. 
136 Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 18. 
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This is, for sure, a more aesthetic way of reasoning. It is the skill of seeing how 
apparently disparate ideas correspond in an elaborate tapestry of interconnected spheres. 
Therefore, without ignoring or disrespecting the pre-history of these different texts—their 
most original setting, the possible identities and motivations of the original authors, the 
way they evolved through redaction, etc.—there is something about priestly theology that 
especially invites and encourages drawing reasonable connections, and that resists 
artificial constraints on the text, as if it’s meaning is univocal. As a result, I freely 
acknowledge that the interpretation found in these pages is open to supplementation from 
other valid interpretations.  
Even with those admissions and caveats, I have tried to prioritize the shape of 
“truth in history” here, and I hope to remain as close as possible to recent critical 
discoveries, to allow those discoveries to serve as the steel frame for broader theological 
reflections. In fact, returning to my main point it this section, there are outstanding 
historical and textual reasons for associating the purification offering and the burnt 
offering. As we saw with reference to Leviticus 16, vv. 3 and 5, the purification offering 
and the burnt offering and are frequently paired (Lev 5:7; 9:2-3, 7; 10:19; 12:6, 8; 14:19-
20, 22, 30; 15:15, 30; Num 6:11, 16; 8:12). When they appear together, the purification 
offering is always performed first, the ‘ōlāh second. That the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ precedes the ‘ōlāh 
could indicate that the first prepares the way for the second. In his description of the 
historical development of the purification offering, Milgrom argues that it in fact emerges 
as a development of the burnt offering. He shows that the burnt offering has varied 
motivations in scripture; it is sometimes given out of joy, other times to entreat, and in 
the earliest texts, to expiate. Based on this, he concludes: 
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The fact that the burnt offering answers every conceivable emotional and 
psychological need leads to the inference that it may originally have been the only 
sacrifice offered except for the šĕlāmîn [the well-being offering], which provided 
meat for the table….With the advent of a tabernacle/temple, however, it became 
imperative to devise specific sacrifices to purge the sacred house and its sancta of 
their contamination and desecration. Thus the purification and reparation 
offerings, respectively, were devised. These two sacrifices, once introduced into 
the sacrificial system, became the expiatory sacrifices par excellence and 
ultimately usurped the expiatory function of the burnt offering for the 
individual.137 
 
 This historical connection between the burnt offering and the purification offering may 
help to explain the various similarities between them. First of all, the ritual structure of 
the two sacrifices are parallel. In each case, an animal “without blemish” is selected. Both 
are initially brought “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting…before the Lord” (1:3, cf. 
4:4). In each case, the offerer must lean his hand upon the head of the animal that he has 
brought, and the animal is then slaughtered. Then there are blood rites followed by rites 
for burning/disposing of the flesh, and it is only here that the rubrics diverge in any 
significant way. 
These parallels are notable, but it is also true that the well-being offering 
(šĕlāmîm) shares many of these same features. There are, however, conspicuous elements 
that set the burnt offering and purification offering apart from the well-being offering.138 
First, one of the hallmarks of priestly literature is the demarcation of graded spheres of 
holiness—we have had occasion to remark on this phenomenon many times already. To 
                                                 
137 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 176; cf. 267-68, 288, 1049, 1083. With this history in mind, Gary 
Anderson says that the burnt offering for expiation, which is mentioned in Leviticus 1:4 and 16:24, is “a 
vestigial usage,” Sacrifices and Offerings in Ancient Israel, 878. 
138 The “guilt offering” (described in Leviticus 5:14-26 and 7:1-7)—which Milgrom labels the “reparation 
offering”—is also similar to the ‘ōlāh and ḥaṭṭā’ṯ in many respects. The blood rite for the reparation 
offering is like that of the burnt offering, and the treatment of the animal’s flesh is like that of the 
purification offering—in this sense, it might be called a hybrid of the two. This final offering would 
receive further attention in a full analysis of priestly sacrifice, but for our purposes here, I will focus on 
just the ‘ōlāh and the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ. 
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distinguish the different spheres, the priests use the words “holy” and “most holy.”139 The 
well-being offering falls into the first category, while the ‘ōlāh and the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ are in the 
second, more rarified category.140 In fact, Trevaskis argues that “the ‘burnt offering’ is 
P’s ‘most holy’ offering par excellence,” and thus the purification offering’s holiness is 
measured against the standard of Israel’s most precious sacrificial gift.  
Additionally, in the description of the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ ritual, the author insists that the 
animal “shall be slaughtered at the spot where the burnt offering is slaughtered before the 
Lord” (Lev. 4:24, cf. 4:29, 33; 6:18). Recall that this “spot” is identified as the 
“northside” of the altar in Leviticus 1:11, which the rabbis whimsically revocalized as 
“hidden before God” when associating the burnt offering’s life with the life of Isaac.141 
The ‘ōlāh and the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ thus share the same “space,” both in terms of physical location 
and degree of holiness.  
With this in mind, it is finally and most importantly worth noting that, unlike 
other sacrifices, the offerer him- or herself receives no material benefit from either the 
burnt or purification offering. In both cases, the worshiper relinquishes the gift 
completely. This is different from the well-being offering, where the offerer receives 
back a large portion of the meat to enjoy with family and friends. As we have seen, the 
burnt offering was considered the characteristic Jewish sacrifice because it ritually 
expressed a most complete selflessness in love. The entire gift was submitted to the altar 
of the Lord. With the purification offering, there is a similar sense of total abandonment. 
                                                 
139 For this phenomenon, see Philip Peter Jenson, Graded Holiness: A Key to the Priestly Conception of the 
World (Sheffield, England: JSOT Press, 1992); Hundley, “Sacred Spaces, Objects, Offerings, and People 
in the Priestly Texts: A Reappraisal.” 
140 For a defense of the claim that the burnt offering is “most holy,” see Trevaskis, Holiness, Ethics and 
Ritual in Leviticus, 251–61. The purification offering is specifically called “most holy” (Lev. 6:17).  
141 For further reflection on the meaning of “northside”: Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 164–65. 
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Whether the offering is bought by a priest or layperson, the blood is used to purge the 
tabernacle, and the excess blood is poured out at the altar’s base. Then certain holy parts 
of the animal (the fat, the kidneys, the loins, etc.) ascend through immolation. What 
remains of the animal has one of two destinations. If the animal is offered on account of a 
priest’s sin, the remains are carried “to a clean place outside the camp, to the ash heap, 
and burn it up in a wood fire; it shall be burned on the ash heap” (Lev. 4:12). But if the 
offering is brought by a layperson, then the priest who performs the sacrifice “shall eat of 
it; it shall be eaten in the sacred precinct, in the enclosure of the Tent of Meeting” (Lev. 
6:19-23).  
The disposal ritual for the sin offering is, therefore, both similar and different 
from the burnt offering. The important similarity is that nothing is retained by the offerer; 
both have a fundamentally ascetic, open-handed orientation. For the priest and the 
layperson who must bring a sacrifice due to their own sin, neither gets to partake of the 
meat that results from their twisted actions.142 At the same time, perhaps because there is 
something inevitably mournful about the sin offering, its remains are not given the 
dignity of total immolation in the temple’s divine fire. Instead, the vivid ritual requires 
that the animal’s poor body be removed from the tabernacle, removed entirely from 
camp, and burned at an ash heap—albeit in a “clean” place. By combining the sorrowful 
image of the sacrificial body carried beyond the walls and the dignified concept of a 
clean place, the text suggests the fundamental ambiguity of this offering, which both 
partakes of the Edenic holiness of the burnt offering, but which nevertheless is instigated 
by modes of being that cause our exile. The liminality of a “clean ash heap” outside the 
                                                 
142 As Douglas points out: “a person may not profit from his ill-doing.” Leviticus as Literature, 76. 
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camp is a perfect expression of the tragic yet sacred nature of this offering.143 
In the time before the tabernacle was constructed, before the introduction of the 
                                                 
143 For less severe sins or impurities, especially for purification offerings brought by individual laypersons, 
the meat is consumed by the priest who performs the sacrifice. This eating must take place “in the sacred 
precinct, in the enclosure of the Tent of Meeting” (Lev 6:19). As others have argued (see citations listed 
below), the reason for this consumption need not be overly esoteric: with the blood manipulations, the 
priest has performed a service for the offerer and for Israel, a service which should theologically be seen 
as an inconvenience. It is a sacrifice that inevitably indicates the world’s brokenness; the service that the 
priest here performs is not the ideal for the tabernacle. That the sacred space is polluted with sin and 
impurity is always an abnormality, even if it has become a commonplace in this world. If we recall the 
Chaoskampf theme from the last chapter, and the notion that the priest is a warrior on the front lines, 
defending against evil encroachments, then the fact that he will require sustenance to strengthen him for 
this work is understandable. The meat—which is in fact “most holy” (Lev 6:22) and thus worthy of 
dignified disposal in a holy place, even the digestive “fire” of a holy person—helps to invigorate the 
priests for their essential work, without in any way rewarding the sinner.  
  This explanation is entirely compatible with Watt’s suggestion that when Leviticus was composed, 
the “sin offering” was an innovation which the author was seeking to rhetorically introduce. Watts, Ritual 
and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 82–96. By continually asking “whose interests this rhetoric may have served” 
(93), Watts identifies historical settings in which there were financial incentives to generate new “temple 
revenues” (94), and so the benefit of adding the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ was great. That there could have been self-serving 
motivations from some priests, at some times, perhaps even from the start, would not be surprising. This 
historical hypothesis, however, does not destroy the theological possibilities articulated above. It is also 
important to emphasize, as Sanders does, that in the main priests took their obligations seriously and 
genuinely pursued holiness on behalf of the entire nation. Sanders, Judaism, 188–89.  
  My interpretation here of the disposal rites associated with the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ differs from some 
interpretations in recent secondary literature. Some argue that the impurity or sin, which the blood of the 
ḥaṭṭā’ṯ purges, is itself transferred to the sacrificial carcass, and that this transfer of pollution necessitates 
the elimination of the now contaminated flesh—either by removing it from camp or consuming it. This 
view is defended by citing Leviticus 10:17, where Moses criticizes Aaron for not consuming the sacrifice 
after the death of Nadab and Abihu. While this passage could be read to suggest that the eating is an 
aspect of removing the guilt, such a reading is unnecessary (see Kiuchi’s argument, cited below), and it is 
theologically untenable. The problem is that this interpretation requires commentators to say that a sin-
infested carcass is simultaneously “most holy” and polluted with sin, a sin which is eliminated precisely 
when the (holy) priests consume it! It similarly implies that priestly theology would send an animal’s 
polluted remains to a “clean” place outside camp. If the animal’s flesh is riddled with impurity and/or sin, 
why would its destination be specified as clean, and even more astonishingly, how could it be called 
“most holy”!? This theory suggests a mingling of the holy and the impure that is fundamentally at odds 
with the vocation of those men whose most sacred mission is to “distinguish between the sacred and the 
profane, and between the unclean and the clean” (Lev 10:10). It is true that the most pure temple is 
miasmically attacked by what is most corrupt (the something of sin). In priestly theology, this is a tragic 
fact of life. But their role is to untangle these realities and restore—as often as necessary—the 
unspeakable purity of God’s dwelling. That this untangling should occur by means of an intentional 
mingling or confusion of holy and polluted things seems impossible from a priestly theological 
perspective.  
  For discussion of the idea that the flesh of the offering becomes impure, and that priestly 
consumption of the flesh is an elimination rite, see Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 131–33; Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 622–25; Gane, Cult and Character, 91–105. Similar positions to my own have been 
articulated by Kiuchi, The Purification Offering in the Priestly Literature, 46–52, and more recently, 
with persuasive force, Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 243–47. See also the additional 
scholarship cited by Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 94–95. 
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ḥaṭṭā’ṯ as a distinct offering, when the ‘ōlāh performed “double duty” as a joyful gift and 
as expiation for sin, there was inevitable ambiguity over the nature of sacrifice. Is Israel’s 
cultic duty merely an accommodation to sin, a regrettable payment to an angry god? The 
fact that priestly theology comes to clearly distinguish the ‘ōlāh from the new ḥaṭṭā’ṯ is a 
theological advance of profound importance. After this distinction, the fundamentally 
positive and thankful (eucharistia) nature of the burnt offering is reinforced,144 and the 
secondary nature of sacrifice in response to sin is clarified. This clarification within 
priestly theology should correct the typical Christian interpretation. As James Watts says, 
“Early Christian rhetoric depicted the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ and the ’āsām offerings of Leviticus 4-5 as 
paradigms of Israel’s whole system of worship….Christian interpreters regarded 
atonement for sin and guilt as the essential goal of all Jewish offerings.”145 This mode of 
thought, by accentuating what is secondary, lost the overarching positive orientation of 
the Jewish cult.146 
The fact that the burnt offering is not intrinsically associated with sin is similarly 
suggested in the narrative tradition, and here we should turn again to the Akedah of 
Genesis 22. The story as we have it today does not even hint at the notion that God 
requires the life of Isaac on account of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The narrative only 
serves to establish what is good—the proper way of being, the proper way of drawing 
near to and seeing God on Moriah—not to respond to what is evil. The purification 
                                                 
144 See Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 71–72 and references at 271 note 118. 
145 Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 79. 
146 In this context, I think of the helpful distinction made by Andrew Louth between two arches, a “greater 
arch” that stretches up from creation to deification, and a “lesser arch” from the fall to redemption, which 
is ultimately intended “to restore the function of the greater arch.” “The Place of Theosis in Orthodox 
Theology,” Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian 
Traditions, 2007, 35. The purification offering belongs to the “lesser arch,” but the burnt offering is 
characteristic of the “greater arch” in priestly theology.  
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offering, then, is a burnt offering forced into a strange new world, one in which death 
lurks like a lion, corrupting every aspect of our lives. In such a context, it would be naive 
or even deluded to carry on as if we remain in paradise still. No, in this world it is 
necessary to take concrete steps to guard against evil, intentionally choosing life over 
death. When there is sin and death, the ‘ōlāh assumes a new form: it is the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ, where 
life is not only freely given, but it is re-applied specifically to purge the stain of sin. This 
is still primarily a positive movement toward God, but one intended to combat the 
impurities and sins emanating from human brokenness.  
But the Yom Kippur liturgy poignantly suggests that where there is a purification 
offering, the burnt offering is implicitly present. That is why, to return to the text that 
prompted this reflection, Aaron enters the holy of holies “with a bull of the herd as a 
purification offering and a ram for a burnt offering”—despite the fact that the ram is not 
yet slaughtered and its blood is never literally brought into the adytum. The ḥaṭṭā’ṯ 
already contains, and points toward, the ‘ōlāh, which is its historical and theological 
origin and goal. In spite of everything else, the openhearted freedom of Isaac remains 
Israel’s most basic truth, and in the moment of crisis, her only hope.  
The Life of Isaac on Yom Kippur: The Theological Context 
A Controversial Word 
After the preparatory comments on the priest’s vestments and the description of 
the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ-‘ōlāh offering—the means of which Aaron “shall enter”—Leviticus 16 turns 
its focus on the purification offering itself, which includes the bull offered for the priests, 
and the two goats offered for all Israel. The text specifies the purpose of these offerings: 
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“wĕḵipper,” which Milgrom translates “to effect purgation” (v. 6). Here we have arrived 
at the word kipper, a word that has launched a thousand interpretations. Watts explains 
why this word is so crucial and controversial: “the priestly writers of Leviticus give 
virtually no interpretation of the rituals they describe and prescribe. There is however, 
one exception to this generalization. The P writers offer one explanation, or rather one 
word of explanation, rather frequently. The word is kipper, and it appears forty-nine 
times in Leviticus.”147 Because the purpose of the entire ritual is shaped by the 
interpretation of this one difficult word, a few comments are in order.  
In general, Milgrom has been my starting point throughout this chapter, and I will 
continue that precedent here. In a short essay on the word kipper—the concluding article 
of his massive commentary on Leviticus 1-16—Milgrom explains why he moves away 
from the common translations of “atone” or “expiate,” favoring “to purge” instead.148 
Philology is at the heart of his argument. Milgrom believes that the most likely Semitic 
cognate for the Hebrew kipper is the Akkadian kuppuru.149 This latter word in Akkadian 
ritual texts refers—in the more literal sense—to the action of “rubbing off” or “wiping,” 
                                                 
147 Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 130. 
148 See Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1079–84. This article is an adaptation of the much earlier 
encyclopedia entry: Milgrom, “Kipper.” Without a doubt, contemporary Christian theological skirmishes 
stand behind some of these interpretive debates and influence interpretations on all sides. For example, 
questions about the distinction between “expiation” and “propitiation” with respect to Christian 
atonement were very contentious in the twentieth century, and continue to be so today. Schwartz 
provides a very helpful overview of the debate in Protestant scholarship, especially between Charles 
Dodd and Leon Morris, which largely shaped the discussion in the 20 th century. “The Prohibitions 
Concerning The ‘eating’ of Blood in Leviticus 17,” in Priesthood and Cult in Ancient Israel (Sheffield, 
England: JSOT Press, 1991), 53 n. 3. 
149 With this, Milgrom continues the trend of critiquing earlier commentators who tried to link kipper to an 
Arabic cognate kafara, meaning “to cover over.” For those interested in arguing that the blood “covers” 
the sins, this is an appealing option, but Milgrom cannot find a clear example where the blood is “rubbed 
on” (in the sense of “cover”) in the Biblical texts, and numerous other arguments have been raised 
against using a relatively late Arabic word to interpret the earlier Hebrew. See Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 
1991, 1080–81; Schwartz, “The Prohibitions Concerning The ‘eating’ of Blood in Leviticus 17,” 54 n.1; 
cf. Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 56–60; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 44 note 2; 
Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 130–31; Feder, Blood Expiation in Hittite and Biblical Ritual 
Origins, Context, and Meaning, 168. 
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and then—as an “abstraction of the literal meaning”150—to the general action of purging 
or purifying. Milgrom provides examples of this word being used in Akkadian “wiping 
rites,” rites which involved wiping a small area to symbolically represent general 
cleansing. In other words, if your goal was to remove all the dust from your home, you 
would physically wipe down every exposed surface, but these ancient rites were often 
content to apply the purging agent to “key locals” that symbolized the whole according to 
the principle “pars pro toto”: a part taken for the whole. This is very much like the 
phenomenon of applying blood simply to the horns of an altar, or sprinkling it toward key 
locations, rather than meticulously scrubbing every square inch of sacred space. 
Akkadian and Hebrew ritual acts are rooted in concrete analogies (such as the physical 
action of wiping a contaminated space to clean it) but they nevertheless remain rituals, 
meaning they communicate something that is more-than-merely-physical.  
In any case, Milgrom follows the tradition of scholarship151 that hears an 
Akkadian accent in the verb kipper, suggesting that the physical act of “wiping” 
something off is in the earliest background of the developing priestly theology of temple 
“purging.” Simply stated, the sins accumulating in the temple needed to be purged with 
the blood of the purification offering; this blood somehow removed the sins through the 
action of rubbing the blood onto the contaminated sacred objects. Milgrom believes that 
from this most ancient etymological starting point, the word kipper continued to evolve to 
take on additional figurative meanings. In fact, the consonantal root of the verb kipper is 
                                                 
150 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1080. 
151 Milgrom did not originate this reading; the discussion dates back to the early 20 th century. See 
references in Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 56–57; Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 131, 
note 2; Yitzhaq Feder, “On Kuppuru, Kippēr and Etymological Sins That Cannot Be Wiped Away,” 
Vetus Testamentum 60, no. 4 (January 1, 2010): 535–36. The latter article provides arguments against 
Milgrom’s general proposal that kipper emerges from an Akkadian setting, arguments that Milgrom’s 
defenders with expertise in ANE rituals will need to engage. 
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K-P-R (רפכ), which is also the root of the noun kopher, which translates “ransom.” The 
two ideas are linked (in Milgrom’s reconstruction) by the fact that, in ancient cultic rites, 
it was very important to properly eliminate the “wiping material” after it “absorbed the 
impurities,” and thus the now-contaminated wiping material became—so to speak—a 
substitute through which the evil was removed. From there the concept of ransom is only 
a relatively short step away: one thing is lost, a price is paid, that life might be (re-) 
gained. God’s wrath is averted by substitution of some kind.152 In the very last stage, 
Milgrom says, the word becomes a general theological principle, analogous to the 
English word “atonement.”153  
Aspects of this theory seem unlikely to me from the perspective of the priestly 
material: I do not consider “ransom” to be an operative concept in these rites, for reasons 
that will become clear at present. And yet, Milgrom has been criticized for understating 
the importance of the concept of “ransom” in properly interpreting the priestly term 
kipper. This is much more than a debate about etymology; at its heart, this is a debate 
over whether the “purification offering” of Leviticus is fundamentally punitive, and 
whether the sacrifice ultimately has its “power” because it delivers a required death. If 
the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ is significant because it provides the punitive death that God allegedly 
requires, if God is appeased by the cessation of life, and if it is God’s will that such death 
occur on his holy mountain, then the entire symbolism of Mount Zion discussed 
throughout this book is overturned. The temple is then the site of wrath and punitive 
                                                 
152 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1082. 
153 The English word “atonement” was created in the early sixteenth century to express the state of restored 
“at-one-ment” between God and humanity. Thus, for Milgrom, the meaning of the word shifts from the 
priestly action—purifying polluted spaces—to the result of the purification—at-one-ment, renewed 
communion, with God.  
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death, and everything Edenic, beautiful, good, and true about this place is compromised 
by the claim that violence is ultimately needed to overcome violence.  
The view that kipper should be interpreted with reference to “ransom” has been 
recently articulated by Jay Sklar. In his book, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement: The 
Priestly Conceptions, Sklar basically argues that Milgrom is correct in affirming a 
purgative element in the verb kipper, but that the concept of “ransom” is equally 
important for an accurate interpretation of the priestly term, and that both elements must 
be held together.154 Sklar ultimately translates kipper as “to effect [kofer]-purgation”—in 
other words, the object that purges the sacred space (generally, blood) is effective 
because it pays an acceptable price, it appeases God’s anger. There are a few steps in this 
argument. First, Sklar establishes a “sin-disaster connection” in biblical theology. Sklar 
explores the various types of “disaster” that might result from sin according to Leviticus, 
and these include death (as in capital punishment), kārēt,155 sin-bearing, and guilt-
bearing.156 Sklar reads each of these in terms of “punitive consequences” for sin. This 
may or may not be correct in every case, but overall the most important point is that each 
                                                 
154 For a more concise summary of his argument, see Jay Sklar, “Sin and Impurity: Atoned or Purified? 
Yes!,” in Perspectives on Purity and Purification in the Bible, ed. Baruch J. Schwartz (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 2008), 18–31. 
155 Which means “to be cut off”—this may mean “excommunication,” or it may point to the person’s death. 
For a full discussion, see Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 15–20. Sklar has some 
disagreements with Milgrom, whose own position was articulated in Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 457–60. 
156 Sklar offers an extensive analysis of both nāśā’ ‘ăvōn (sin-bearing) and nāśā’ ’āsām (guilt-bearing). For 
the former, Sklar accepts “to bear punishment” as a translation, and for the latter, he prefers “to bear the 
consequence of guilt.” See Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 20–41. Sklar has the tendency to 
associate these states very closely with punishment, whereas his Jewish interlocutors in these section—
including Schwartz and Milgrom—tend to see these as states of being that may or may not always 
involve punishment. It is not necessary for me to unpack the various arguments here, although in general 
I think it will become clear that I find Sklar focuses too narrowly on the theme of punishment at the 
expense of the—to speak imperfectly—more “ontological” aspects of sin in priestly theology, which I 
defend in the earlier sections of this chapter. The dramatic tragedy of sin here is about much more than 
administering the proper punishments, even though punishments are obviously not excluded from the 
story (as anyone who has read the Torah knows!). With this in mind, I find Joshua Vis’ comments on 
Sklar persuasive: “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 164–70. 
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of these realities are anathema to the fundamental truth of the temple, which is Life. Each 
of the “disasters” mentioned are associated with the mournful state of exile, the grey-land 
beyond the gates, symbolic of chaos and death. In my view, the civil penalties articulated 
in various biblical sources have lasting spiritual significance (especially for Christians) 
only to the extent that they are markers that give insight into the theological landscape 
which is the “stage” for the basic drama of Israel. Otherwise such law has mere 
antiquarian interest in the manner of Hammurabi’s code. 
The second step of Sklar’s argument is an analysis of the word kofer, which is 
generally translated as “ransom” or “appeasement.” To reach his definition of kofer, Sklar 
engages in a close reading of various texts; one of the most important is Exodus 30:11-
16, partly because it is one of the few texts that use kofer that is actually from the P-
source, and partly because it is a text where the noun kofer is related to the verb kipper. 
Here God says that when Moses performs a census, the people being counted must pay a 
“ransom” (kofer) of “half a shekel” (30:12-13) so that they might “make atonement” 
(kipper) for themselves (v. 15, 16). It does seem that the author is implying that this 
monetary payment to the priests somehow protects Israel from the negative effects of a 
census. Yet at the same time, it is not clear that sin has been committed in this case; in 
fact, in another place (the opening verses of Numbers) God commands Israel to take a 
census.157 Similarly, as Vis points out, in this passage “there is no objectified guilt and 
                                                 
157 Sklar assumes that the action of census taking is somehow sinful: “While it is not as clear as in Exodus 
2l [the case of the goring ox] why the deed is wrong (reasons of pollution? infringement upon the 
property of the LORD?), the end result is the same: one party has offended another and is liable to severe 
consequences at the hand of the offended.” Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 53. But again, the 
text itself seems rather to imply that the census is permissible yet dangerous, and thus requires an extra 
layer of protection; the concepts of sin and offense appear extraneous here.  
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the context is not sacrificial.”158 Therefore, however kipper is being used,159 there is 
reason to doubt that this passage illuminates the cultic meaning of kipper in Leviticus.  
Other texts analyzed by Sklar are even more specifically in the realm of civil 
legislation. They deal with the possibility of payments or punishments to resolve tensions 
between humans (in other words, they are “horizontal” in nature). One text that heavily 
influences Sklar’s analysis is the (non-P) legislation in Exodus 21 addressing what 
happens in response to a fatal ox goring. If there is previous evidence that the ox was 
prone to this kind of behavior, its owner could be put to death, according to this law. The 
injured party (it is not clear exactly who, in this case, since the goring was fatal) can, 
however, demand a monetary payment in exchange for the ox owner’s life: “If ransom 
[kofer] is laid upon [the owner], he must pay whatever is laid upon him to redeem his 
life” (Ex. 21:30). While this passage does help to clarify the concept of kofer, it does not 
establish a link between ransom and temple theology. In yet another text (attributed to H), 
the possibility of ransom in the case of murder is precluded: “You may not accept a 
ransom for the life of a murderer who is guilty of a capital crime; he must be put to 
death” (Num. 35:31). After this stipulation, the text shifts into an explanation of how the 
                                                 
158 Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 177. 
159 For Milgrom, as we saw above, when kipper is used in the context of “ransom,” it is a “denominative” 
use of the word—that is, the verb kipper is here being derived from the noun kofer, and thus in these cases 
it means not “to purge” but “to ransom.” This would be a secondary definition of the verb, one that may 
not be wholly separate from the primary sense (to purge, from the Akkadian), but one which is nevertheless 
“sharply distinguished” from the cultic understanding of the word. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1082–
83. Levine speaks of this distinction as kippēr I and kippēr II. Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 67ff. 
The distinction is emphasized even more strongly by Schwartz, who says, “…it seems most likely that the 
previously held view, that [kofer] ‘ransom’, and [kipper] ‘purge’, are etymologically and/or semantically 
related with each other, is false—these are unrelated homographs.” Schwartz, “The Prohibitions 
Concerning The ‘eating’ of Blood in Leviticus 17,” 54. Sklar reviews and responds to these kinds of 
arguments in Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 4-7 cf. 47 n.14. He is arguing that it is generally 
not “purge” or “ransom,” but both elements are in each use of kipper. The reason why ransom is so 
important for him is because of his understanding of the relation of sin and punishment. As I say, he sees 
the temple as the site where punishments are carried out. My disagreement with this view will become 
increasingly clear in what follows. 
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spilled blood “pollutes the land,” and that this polluting blood can be “purged” (ר ַָ֗פֻכְי, ye-
ḵuppar) only by the blood of the murderer—in other words, capital punishment (cf. Num. 
35:33-34). Here again, it seems unlikely that this text explicates the meaning of cultic 
sacrifice, for numerous reasons. First, it is almost certainly later than the main body of 
Leviticus 1-16, and thus the priestly concept of kipper was already established. Similarly, 
while this passage is playing with the concepts of pollution and purgation (and certainly 
there are inter-connections between land and sanctuary in H), it is impossible to imagine 
that this law is intimately connected to literal cultic practice. To isolate just one problem: 
Leviticus repeatedly requires that the sacrifice be “unblemished.” Could a murder’s life-
blood ever be associated with that term? Such a criminal could never be seen as an 
acceptable offering to God (even leaving aside the issue of human sacrifice), and there 
are obviously no rites associated with the blood of a murderer. Thus, it is far more likely 
that the established cultic language of kipper is being extended to analogously support an 
“eye for an eye / life for a life”-type logic (cf. Lev 21:19-21). Further still, the discussion 
here seems rather remote from the statement, a couple verses earlier, that a murderer 
cannot be ransomed. Isn’t it possible that the use of the term kofer followed by the shift to 
the concept of kipper is done for stylistic reasons (repetition of homographs) without 
implying a profound theological connection between words? 
After reviewing these texts (and a few others from outside the Torah), Sklar 
defines the biblical concept of kofer as: 
…a legally or ethically legitimate payment that delivers a guilty party from a just 
punishment that is the right of the offended party to execute or to have executed. 
The acceptance of this payment is entirely dependent upon the choice of the 
offended party [to accept] a lesser punishment than was originally expected, and 
its acceptance serves both to rescue the life of the guilty and to appease the 
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offended party, thus restoring peace to the relationship.160 
 
Thus, kofer includes the concepts represented by the English words “ransom” and 
“appeasement.” Ransom, insofar as a price or penalty is set that must be met to save 
someone who is (in this case, justly) imperiled—this penalty may be painful, but it is 
more desirable than the alternative. Appeasement, insofar as kofer reflects a situation 
where one party has been offended and rightly demands propitiation.161 For Sklar, then, 
this is a legal arrangement in which an offended party accepts a “mitigated penalty...in 
place of a much harsher, yet deserved, penalty” so as to restore a broken relationship.162 It 
is precisely this type of arrangement that, Sklar argues, stands behind the Levitical 
theology of kipper. Thus, when we read Leviticus 16:6—“Aaron shall bring forward his 
own bull of purification offering to effect purification for himself and for his 
household…”—Sklar would say that the blood has the power to purge because sacrificial 
blood is the kofer-payment demanded by God in exchange for one’s life.163 To put it 
more plainly, God demands the life of the animal (read: death) as the ransom-payment 
required in place of the life (read: death) of the sinner. At the very heart of this argument 
is the question of what sacrificial blood symbolizes, and thus the debate largely boils 
down to competing interpretations of Leviticus 17:11. 
Life is in the Blood 
 Just as the word “kipper” must bear the burden of being the monological 
                                                 
160 Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 60. This is the “positive” definition of the word. There is 
another “negative” definition, meaning bribe, which Sklar does not associate with the cultic kipper. 
161 For the weakness of any single term in describing kofer, see Ibid., 67ff. 
162 Ibid., 83. 
163 The concept of a “ransom payment” is mentioned frequently throughout Sklar’s text. To give just one 
example, see Ibid., 139. 
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explanation for the goal of the purification offering, Leviticus 17:11 is the primary text 
for understanding the meaning of blood in the temple cult. This passage is ascribed to the 
Holiness Code, and thus it was very likely written after Leviticus 16,164 and yet it has 
been argued that this text makes explicit theological principles that are in fact inherent in 
earlier priestly tradition.165 If this is right, then Leviticus 17:11 is a key text for 
understanding the theo-logic of temple ritual. It reads: “For the life of the flesh is in the 
blood,166 and I have assigned it to you for making expiation for your lives167 upon the 
altar; it is the blood, as life, that effects expiation”168 (NJPS). A number of sticky 
interpretive issues have arisen around this sentence. First, is this verse offering an 
interpretation of sacrificial blood generally, or that of the well-being offering narrowly 
(cf. 17:5)? What is intended by the Hebrew word “nephesh” here (frequently translated 
“life” in this context), and then—of course—what about kipper? Understanding this verse 
will help us to assess the argument of those who insist that the punitive element is a 
central feature of the priestly purification offering.  
 In the discussions of Leviticus 17:11, these three questions are interrelated. This 
becomes clear in reviewing Jacob Milgrom’s argument for a narrow reading of the verse. 
He claims that it is dealing only with the well-being offering—the joyful type of sacrifice 
                                                 
164 Throughout this book I have assumed the dating promoted by Milgrom, along with Israel Knohl, which 
has won wide support in subsequent scholarship. See Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 13–35. 
165 A good example of such an interpretation is Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 204ff.  
166 ָּ֙ אוִה ם ּ֣ ָׁדַב  ָּ֙ ר ָׁש ָׁבַה ש פּ֣  נ, nep̄eš habbāśār baddām hî 
167 ם ָּ֑  כי  תֹשְפַנ־לַעָּ֙ר ָ֖  פַכְל, leḵappêr ʿal-nap̄šōṯêḵem… Schwartz dislikes the NJPS translation here, and says that 
this second clause of the verse is meant to communicate God’s assertion that “It is not you who are 
placing the blood on the altar for me, for my benefit, but rather the opposite: it is I who have placed it 
there for you—for your benefit.” Schwartz, “The Prohibitions Concerning The ‘eating’ of Blood in 
Leviticus 17,” 51. This is an appealing reading; it seems to recalls Abraham’s response to Isaac: “God 
will provide the lamb.” 
168 ר ֵּֽ  פַכְיָּ֙ש  פ  נַב אוּ ָ֖הָּ֙ם  ָׁדַה־י ִֵּֽכ, kî-haddām hū bannep̄eš yeḵappêr. Similarly, see also Lev. 17:14, “For the life of 
all flesh—its blood is its life. Therefore I say to the Israelite people: You shall not partake of the blood of 
any flesh, for the life of all flesh is its blood. Anyone who partakes of it shall be cut off.” 
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that provides meat for the table (cf. Lev. 3)—which is mentioned explicitly a few verses 
before the text in question (v. 5). As evidence for this interpretation, Milgrom points to 
the fact that verse 11 is giving a rationale for the command decreed in the previous verse: 
you shall not “eat” an animal’s blood (v. 10) because the kippering life is in the blood (v. 
11). Because the well-being offering alone is consumed by the offerer, it makes sense to 
say that the priestly legislator must have that type of sacrifice in mind.  
 But wait a minute: if this verse is about the well-being offering, why does it use 
the verb kipper at all? The well-being offering (šĕlāmîm), after all, has nothing to do with 
purging the temple. To explain this ambiguity, Milgrom must argue that the very act of 
killing an animal for meat is, implicitly, a type of wrongdoing (cf. vv. 3-4). It is a kind of 
murder! Such wrongdoing is acknowledged and addressed when the blood of that animal 
is placed on the altar: the “murderer’s” life—the one who has killed the animal for 
food—is “ransomed”—that is, rescued from God’s wrath—by the blood of the animal. 
Notice that while Milgrom argues consistently that kipper means “to purge” in Leviticus 
1-16, he believes that the same word must mean ransom (now derived from kofer) in 
Leviticus 17, because “purge” wouldn’t make any sense in the context of the šĕlāmîm.169 
This view is further supported by the fact that when the phrase “leḵappêr ʿal-
nap̄šōṯêḵem” is used elsewhere, it clearly means “to ransom your lives”;170 in each case 
something has occurred to stir God’s wrath, and therefore a ransom must be presented to 
assuage God.171 Milgrom reasons that killing animals must spark divine anger and thus a 
                                                 
169 See Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 707–13; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 1474–78. 
170 The verses identified are Exodus 30:15, 16. Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, 1474. Schwartz (among others) 
also points to Numbers 31:50. “The Prohibitions Concerning The ‘eating’ of Blood in Leviticus 17,” 55 
n.1. 
171 Or, so the argument goes—but see the doubts I raised in footnote 157 above with reference to the census 
in Exodus 30. 
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ransom is required to save the offerer’s life. The approved ransom price is the blood of 
the animal.  
 By restricting the interpretation of Leviticus 17:11 to the context of the šĕlāmîm, 
Milgrom attempts to make a very precise argument: the word kipper in Leviticus 17 must 
be translated “ransom,” and thus it must derive from kofer, because this is the only way to 
understand why the verb kipper would be used in the context of worshippers partaking of 
the meat. However, ransom does not make sense in the context of the purification 
offering (as described in Lev. 4-5), because there blood acts as a “ritual detergent” and 
not as a ransom. Thus, Leviticus 17:11 must not be a general statement about the nature 
of sacrificial blood, but rather it surely refers only to the well-being offering; it is, in other 
words, an isolated case.172 Milgrom seeks to segregate the more common priestly concept 
of blood as purifying agent and the more innovative “Holiness Code” development of 
blood as ransom. Schwartz supports Milgrom in depicting the argument in Leviticus 17 
as idiosyncratic. He says, “It is the only place in the Priestly code, or for that matter in the 
Bible, in which sacrificial blood is said to be a ransom for human life. This is the only 
place in which the [kipper]-action attributed to blood has the sense of ransom rather than 
purification.”173 By bracketing this verse, Milgrom and Schwartz are protecting their 
more nuanced and sympathetic “Picture of Dorian Gray” theology of Levitical sacrifice 
against typical Christian interpretations that hyper-focus on wrath, punishment, and 
propitiation.174 On the one hand, they’ll allow that ransom is an operative concept in the 
                                                 
172 Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, 1475. 
173 Schwartz, “The Prohibitions Concerning The ‘eating’ of Blood in Leviticus 17,” 55–56. He elsewhere 
calls H’s theory “new and unique,” one that is articulated as an alternative to P’s theory. Ibid., 59. This 
view is supported by Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 170–76. 
174 See footnote 148 above. 
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cult, but on the other hand they’ll insist that the concept is chronologically late, secluded 
to this single text, and relevant to a single offering: the less contested well-being offering. 
It is not relevant to the theology of the purification offering. In other words, and finally, 
this verse is not ultimately relevant to the theology of Yom Kippur! 
 This high-wire balancing act of conceding a “ransom” interpretation of the 
kipper-blood in one case and isolating it from priestly theology more generally has not 
been a great success. The weak link in the argument is the claim that verse 11 addresses 
the šĕlāmîm exclusively; unlike many of Milgrom’s other discoveries, this proposal has 
been frequently critiqued.175 The main problem for Milgrom is that, while the well-being 
offering is mentioned early in the chapter, the immediate context for verse 11 is more 
general. It says, “And if anyone of the house of Israel or of the strangers who reside 
among them partakes of any blood, I will set My face against the person…”176 The verse 
is giving an explanation of why all blood is forbidden, which would include hunted game 
that are not offered at the tabernacle (vv. 13-14). Thus, Sklar gives a persuasive 
interpretation of the scope of v. 11: 
In short, then, v. l0 takes its eyes off of the peace offering to make a general 
prohibition against the consumption of the blood of any animal, sacriﬁcial or not. 
Verse 11 then provides two grounds for this general prohibition: (l) the blood of 
animals contains its life, which may not be consumed, and (2) there is only one 
purpose that the LORD has allowed the Israelites to use animal’s blood for, 
namely, making atonement.177 
 
If v. 11 is not specific to the šĕlāmîm, if it articulates a theology relevant to cultic blood 
                                                 
175 See the list of critical citations Milgrom himself mentions on Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, 1474–75. See 
also Kiuchi, The Purification Offering in the Priestly Literature, 102–3. More recently, Sklar (see 
below), Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 22; and Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 210–
11. 
176 Leviticus 17:10, NJPS, emphasis added. 
177 Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 177–78. 
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rites generally, then the separation that Milgrom tries to create between this verse and the 
rest of priestly theology is substantially weakened. When that dam bursts, suddenly the 
ransom-mentality floods everything else: at least from the perspective of H, the logic of 
ransom is operative in all sacrifice. In fact, this is exactly the approach Sklar takes: by 
undermining the idea that Leviticus 17:11 is an isolated case, but retaining Milgrom’s 
concession that kipper here means “ransom,” Sklar insists that throughout Leviticus the 
purificatory use of the blood works because it operates as a kofer-arrangement. It 
appeases God’s wrath because the animal’s death is an acceptable substitution for the 
offerer’s death. God, as the offended party, consents to accept one punishment in the 
place of another.  
 To reiterate a concern: such a result completely undermines the theology of the 
temple—as summarized in the previous chapter—and in fact it would compromise 
priestly theological insight substantially. It takes a profound affirmation—“it is the blood, 
as life, that effects expiation”—and turns it on its head, suggesting that the meaning of 
the word life is “death”! It is a system in which God must collect his pound of flesh; that 
this represents a lesser punishment may suggest a degree of magnanimity on God’s part, 
but the arbitrariness of God’s penalties is perhaps most frightening of all. For 
unintentional sins, and even for impurities stemming from motherhood, God demands 
death…but will generously settle for the spilled blood of an animal, so long as there is 
death in one form or another? If this is the heart and soul of priestly theology, 
supersessionist attitudes toward the cult really do have aesthetic and moral advantage. 
 In light of these concerns, a recent proposal advanced by Joshua Vis offers 
welcome relief. Vis does not attempt merely to reconstruct the wall between Leviticus 
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17:11 and the purification offering—in fact, Vis agrees with Milgrom’s critics that this 
verse does express the general symbolic meaning of blood in priestly (H) theology—but 
he then takes aim at the scholarly commonplace that kipper in this case idiosyncratically 
means “ransom.” In other words, he thinks Milgrom is wrong on both counts, and thus a 
new interpretation of this key verse is needed. He offers the following translation of the 
Hebrew: “For the spirit of the flesh is in the blood, and I have placed it for you upon the 
altar to purge your spirits; for it is the blood that purges by means of the spirit.”178 For 
our purposes it is important to emphasize that the key choices Vis makes is to translate 
nephesh as spirit and kipper as purge.  
 As for the first word, nephesh is one of those delightfully rich words that defies 
easy translation. Often in the context of Leviticus 17 it is translated “life,” but Vis’ choice 
of spirit is understandable. As Charles Owiredu says, “The range of meanings given to 
the term [N-P-S] expresses the psychophysical unity of the person. Basically it can be 
understood as the ‘principle of life’, the animating force joined together with the body in 
a human being or an animal.”179 In other words, as Vis points out, while the concept of 
“soul” is not in view (if by that we mean a disembodied consciousness), this word does 
point to one’s living essence, dynamic interiority, “animating force,”180 perhaps even—
this is my own suggestion—the spiritual holy of holies at the center of one’s life. From 
this perspective, one can see how the word “spirit” might help to capture aspects of the 
Hebrew that remain untouched by the basic word “life.” Neither is adequate, but both are 
                                                 
178 Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 205. Emphasis added. 
179 Charles Owiredu, “Blood and Life in the Old Testament” (Durham University, 2004), 5–6. Similarly, 
Gilders says, “nepeš indicates the force of vitality, that which characterizes a body when it is alive.” 
Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 18. 
180 Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 204. 
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accurate.  
 For Vis, the important point is that it is this personal “spirit,” this inner essence, 
that is both in the sacrificial blood,181 and which is purged by the sacrificial blood. In 
other words, it is the presence of living spirit in the blood that has the power to purge the 
human spirit who is burdened by sin. Whereas Milgrom, Schwartz, and Sklar all 
understand the second clause182 to say that God gives the sacrificial blood “to 
ransom your lives,” Vis says that God gives the blood “to purge your spirits,” and he 
brilliantly associates this phrase with the culminating passage of Leviticus 16, which is 
also attributed to the author of the Holiness Code. Leviticus 16:30 says, “For on this day, 
he [the priest] shall purge you to purify you of all of your sins; you shall be declared pure 
before YHWH.”183 For Vis, when the blood of the purification offering is manipulated in 
the temple, an effect of this action is to purge the “spirit” of the offerer of the sins that he 
or she bears. The blood of the offering has the power to purge because of the spirit/life 
within it. There are, of course, plausible counterarguments to this reading; the possibility 
that kipper in Leviticus 17 is associated with the noun “ransom” (kofer) is not completely 
eliminated. Nevertheless, Vis has offered a cogent alternative that does not require a 
theological perspective that is idiosyncratic compared with typical priestly doctrine (pace 
Milgrom and Schwartz), nor does it imply that the logic of the purification offering is 
inseparable from a “kofer-arrangement,” which is steeped in a questionable theology of 
                                                 
181 There is an extended discussion of what type of beth (ב) is being used in Leviticus 17:11a: essentiae or 
locale. Vis thinks the “spirit”/life is in the blood, but it is nevertheless distinct from the blood, and thus 
he prefers the locative reading. Milgrom generally interprets the phrase to mean “blood-as-life,” and thus 
he takes it to be a beth essentiae. Either interpretation is apparently possible, and in terms of the 
theological symbolism of blood, it is not clear to me that a definitive choice in one direction or the other 
makes a huge difference. Ibid., 206–9; cf. Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 22, 169. 
182 leḵappêr ʿal-nap̄šōṯêḵem (Lev. 17:11b) 
183 Vis’ translation: “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 224. 
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appeasing God through death (pace Sklar). Instead it affirms that life purifies lives, spirit 
purifies the spirit, and that blood is the theological symbol of the spiritual life that 
overcomes death, not by taking up the strategies of death, but by simply reaffirming the 
commitment to true life.184  
 This is Milgrom’s usual position as well, and it is this insight that makes his work 
so appealing and profound: despite the fact that he finds it necessary to speak of ransom 
in Leviticus 17, when it comes to the theology of P in the early chapters of Leviticus (1-
16), Milgrom is clear: “It has been established that the animal’s blood is the ritual 
detergent in the haṭṭa’ṯ sacrifice…Impurity (ṭum’â) is the realm of death. Only its 
antonym, life, can be its antidote. Blood, then, as life is what purges the sanctuary. It 
nullifies, overpowers, and absorbs the Israelites’ impurities that adhere to the sanctuary, 
thereby allowing the divine presence to remain and Israel to survive.”185 Blood, in this 
eidetic system, is the sacrament of what is most pure and holy, that nephesh shared by 
God and living creatures,186 and thus it has absolute priority over the realm of death, 
                                                 
184 As an aside, I should acknowledge that this point has also been highlighted more and more by Christian 
scholars in recent years, especially in interpreting the book of Hebrews. David Moffitt’s book is a very 
fine example, and really it has been groundbreaking. He draws on a number of studies which show that 
the centerpiece of the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ offering is not the death of the animal but the symbolism of blood as life, 
and he applies this research to Hebrews effectively. This has been massively helpful in advancing 
Christian soteriology. Moffitt does, however, rely in large part on Sklar’s book without noting how his 
ransom theory is in tension with the blood-as-life model. I hope this present work is useful in establishing 
a better foundation for the blood symbolism. See David M. Moffitt, Atonement and the Logic of 
Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews (BRILL, 2011), 256–77; David M. Moffitt, “Blood, Life, and 
Atonement: Reassessing Hebrews’ Christological Appropriation of Yom Kippur,” The Day of 
Atonement: Its Interpretations in Early Jewish and Christian Traditions 15 (2011). Similarly, see 
Christian Eberhart, “Characteristics of Sacrificial Metaphors in Hebrews,” in Hebrews: Contemporary 
Methods, New Insights (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 39–43; Eberhart, The Sacrifice of Jesus, 94–101; Vis, “The 
Purification Offering,” 2012, 256ff. Ina Willi-Pleina is especially clear: the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ sacrifice is successful 
“by application of blood, which means application of (non-guilty) life (Lev 17:11)…So a sin-offering is 
no act of violence, no expiatory killing, and probably even no gift to God, for life has always belonged to 
God. Rather, it is a presentation of life…” “Some Remarks on Hebrews from the Viewpoint of Old 
Testament Exegesis,” 33. 
185 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 711–12. As he elsewhere notes, the equation of blood and life is also 
affirmed by P, with the obvious example being Genesis 9:4. Ibid., 46. 
186 Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 227, 254. 
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which is a usurper that can only weakly mimic the intrinsic authenticity and splendor of 
the beauty, the goodness, and the truth of YHWH’s nephesh.187 In fact, the idea that the 
hosts of heaven wage a great battle against the storming brigand from the outer darkness, 
that the mountain of peace is the site of the Chaoskampf described by Levenson, is also 
recognized by Milgrom. Through the liturgical ministry of the priests, he says, “holiness-
life has triumphed over impurity-death.”188 
 In using the words sacrament and liturgy above, I intend to call into question 
another assumption that is commonly seen: the idea of blood as a “ritual detergent” must 
denote a belief in blood’s magical properties, and thus priestly temple actions are 
ensnared in primitive superstitions.189 In an article that highlights the sacramental nature 
                                                 
187 Contrast this with Gane’s very different interpretation of the sacrificial blood. He argues that in the 
ḥaṭṭā’ṯ offering throughout the year (Lev. 4-5), after the offerer lays his hand on the animal, the 
sacrificial blood actually becomes a carrier of that person’s sin, and then the priest intentionally brings 
this sin-laden blood into the sacred sphere to deposit it there, at least for a time. See Gane, Cult and 
Character, 172–81. For Gane, then, the blood is not simply a detergent (176), but it is a means by which 
“imperfection removed from offerers is transferred to YHWH’s sanctuary” (177) and thus “sacrificial 
purification of the offerer necessarily involves transfer of his/her evil to YHWH” (180). Gane 
unambiguously states that “YHWH mandate[s] the defilement of his sanctuary through outer-altar and 
outer-sanctum purification offerings” (179). The goal is that these evils, brought into the sacred space 
throughout the year, would ultimately be removed on Yom Kippur. Given what I have been arguing in 
this chapter, it is probably clear that I consider this idea quite impossible from the perspective of priestly 
sacramental thought. Just as blood should not be interpreted as a symbol of death, neither should it be 
perceived a carrier of sin or evil. Each of these theories takes priestly symbolic action and reverses their 
meaning: blood becomes a sign of both death and evil!  Therefore, Milgrom is right when he calls Gane’s 
interpretation simply “untenable.” “The Preposition ןמ in the תאטח Pericopes,” Journal of Biblical 
Literature 126, no. 1 (April 1, 2007): 162. For Gane’s response to Milgrom, see Roy E. Gane, “Privative 
Preposition ןמ in Purification Offering Pericopes and the Changing Face of ‘Dorian Gray,’” Journal of 
Biblical Literature 127, no. 2 (July 1, 2008): 220–22. See also Vis’ critique at “The Purification 
Offering,” 2012, 189–91. 
188 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 47. 
189 For the claim that some Levitical cultic rituals rely on a belief in magic, see Levine, In the Presence of 
the Lord, 55–56, 90–91. Even more polemically, Christian theologian Stephen Finlan frequently uses the 
word “magic” in describing priestly cultic theology as part of his argument that such sources represent a 
primitive theology that should be overcome. Finlan defines magic as “the physical manipulation of 
metaphysical forces or spiritual conditions.” Stephen Finlan, Problems with Atonement: The Origins Of, 
and Controversy About, the Atonement Doctrine (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2005), 35. 
Ironically, he uses the word almost like a curse or a hex that he applies to practices or beliefs that he 
considers primitive or incredible. For example, “manipulative and magical ideas are inherent in the 
genetic ancestry of the cultic and redemption metaphors” Ibid., 84. Or, “Gese and Hofius end up 
affirming a magical concept of salvation” Ibid., 89., or in response to Walter Wink’s claim that Jesus 
defeats the “Powers” on the cross, “This is a magical statement.” Ibid., 101. 
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of priestly theology, Crispin Fletcher-Louis points out that “in her worship, her sacrifices 
and her construction of sacred space and time, Israel shares ancient Near Eastern 
assumptions about the efficacy of ritual and the need for signs that mediate the divine 
presence.”190 He later refers to priestly theology as an “iconographically rich and 
sacramentally centered world…”191 If a participatory and incarnational concept 
analogous to Christian sacraments can be detected in the Hebrew Bible, then the question 
becomes: what is being “made present” in the temple’s sacrificial rites? I argue that the 
purpose of the temple, and especially of the sacrificial rites, is for Israel to be (re-)grafted 
into the life of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob by (re-)presenting the self-giving that is at all 
times the foundation of Israel’s existence. Jacob-Israel (father of the twelve) is already 
present in Isaac on Mount Moriah, and Isaac is the twice given son, the superabundance 
of God’s grace.192  
                                                 
190 Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, “The Image of God and the Biblical Roots of Christian Sacramentality,” in 
The Gestures of God: Explorations in Sacramentality, ed. Geoffrey Rowell and Christine Hall (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 73–89. 
191 Ibid., 86. Consider also Sommer’s suggestion that P’s theology is analogous to Catholic sacramental 
theology: Sommer, Bodies of God, 135, 256 n.57. 
192 In using the word “sacrament” or “quasi-sacrament” here and below, I am admittedly relying on 
Christian theological concepts in an attempt to better understand the mysteries of Jewish temple rites. A 
full analysis of this use of the word “sacrament” would require a much longer treatment. Some brief 
comments are possible. 
  In the context of Christian theology, there is precedent for the concept of the “sacraments of the 
Mosaic law.” In this tradition, these sacraments are in reference to Christ, even though they precede him. 
Augustine explains the “sacraments of the Old Testament” in his debate with Faustus. At one point he 
says “it is proved that [Christ] did not destroy, but fulfill [the sacraments of the law and the prophets], 
because the prophecies of His birth, and passion, and resurrection, which were represented in these 
ancient sacraments, have ceased, and the sacraments now observed by Christians contain the 
announcement that He has been born, has suffered, has risen.” Contra Faustum XIX, 16) Aquinas makes 
similar arguments about the sacraments of the Old Law. He says, “before Christ’s coming there was need 
for some visible signs whereby man might testify to his faith in the future coming of a Saviour. And 
these signs are called sacraments.” (ST III, q. 61, a. 3c) He adds, “Christ’s Passion is the final cause of 
the old sacraments: for they were instituted in order to foreshadow it” (ibid. ad. 1). See Matthew 
Levering, Christ’s Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation According to Thomas Aquinas (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 121–22. 
  In these classic Christian approaches to the question, a primary difference between the sacraments 
of the old covenant and sacraments of the new is that the former anticipate Christ and the latter are rooted 
in Christ’s already completed work in his life, death, and resurrection. One possible difference in my 
treatment of these mysteries, compared to the approach taken by Augustine and Aquinas, is that I am 
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 The blood that pulses through Isaac is the very same blood that he will pass on to 
his children. All Israel carries that blood, that graced life, and it is this life which is to be 
given again to the God who was “seen” on Mount Moriah—that is, the true God who is 
known not for destruction but for giving life and giving it in abundance. As I’ve argued, 
had Isaac died physically that day, his life-blood would not continue to run in the veins of 
Israel, but instead he dies sacramentally through the ram so that his blood can, at the 
same moment, give life to the nation and be poured out for God. Through this 
sophisticated symbol, the worshiper pours him- or herself forth without diminishment 
precisely because such self-giving is the greatest possible fullness. Blood truly is the 
sacrament of life, and Israel must see herself as a Blood of Life people. Therefore, she 
understands that she is handed over to God with abandon, with trust, but without loss. 
The sacrament in Isaac makes this theological truth present.193 
                                                 
trying to further trace the theo-logic of the temple rites in their own immediate context, seeing their place 
in the drama of the Abrahamic covenant. It is worth emphasizing (and I don’t think Augustine or 
Aquinas would necessarily disagree) that these rites were not inexplicable before the coming of Christ, 
but temple theology has inner-coherence. This can be said without denying the Christian affirmation that 
they anticipate a fuller revelation.  
193 I appreciate that this particular symbol involves an animal’s physical death, an action that can be out of 
step with modern sensibilities. Many modern men and women, far removed from pastoral life, find it 
difficult to see past the apparent violence. A few reflections. First, even while acknowledging distaste for 
blood sacrifice, we should be mindful of the fact that this attitude is in many ways driven by the fact that, 
in the modern West, we have simply outsourced the task of animal slaughter; this makes the sense of 
moral superiority suspect. Other cultures, including ancient cultures, were forced to be attentive to animal 
life and death in a way that is less common today. That they may not have formed mawkish bonds with 
these creatures, as modern people sometimes do, is partly a reflection of economic realities. That these 
cultures also showed greater respect and care for the flock and herd than modern “factory farm” societies, 
however, seems indisputable. Again, our sentimentality toward these animals is often financed by the fact 
that we have hidden from our eyes the truth about how we get bacon cheeseburgers.  
  Second, there is sometimes a sense that it is wasteful to sacrifice an animal. The best justification 
for such an argument is found in Psalm 50, where God says: “For Mine is every animal of the forest, the 
beasts on a thousand mountains…Do I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of he-goats?” (vv. 10, 13). 
These verses show that the Israelites did not have a simplistic theology about the need to feed God; they 
knew that ultimately everything belonged to YHWH, and that YHWH did not benefit from sacrifices in any 
material way. Yet even with this conviction, they continued to sacrifice! This seems to support the idea 
that such sacrifices really were quasi-sacramental for Israel. If the act became rote, or if Israel ever 
developed the childish notion that God depended on them for sustenance, then the truth of the rites would 
be lost, and the prophets would rightly speak out. As Fletcher-Louis says, “‘Liturgical’ or ‘sacramental’ 
acts are merely ‘magical’ if they are means by which those who invest their faith in them avoid their 
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Lifeblood: Summary and Conclusion 
We can now summarize the major arguments that I have made with respect to the 
symbolism of the first goat’s blood.194 In the previous chapter I defended the 
permissibility of reading Genesis 22 and Leviticus 1 together. I also pointed out that the 
inter-connectivity between these two texts was explicit at least as early as the books of 
Chronicles, and that for Levenson it is plausible to imagine that Zion was already in mind 
when Genesis 22 was written. In this chapter I advanced the argument by pointing to the 
well-established theory that the purification offering historically develops from the burnt 
offering. Whatever theological insights were contained in the earlier offering surely 
                                                 
responsibility to be, themselves, the Great Sacrament.” Fletcher-Louis, “The Image of God and the 
Biblical Roots of Christian Sacramentality,” 87. Even though God does not “need” sacrifice in any 
mythological way, this does not mean the animal is wasted. On the one hand, it must be acknowledged 
that in most cases the meat of the animal was consumed by either the priests or the family and friends of 
the one who brought the offering. But on the other hand, and more importantly, there is a subtle secular 
assumption here that a life set apart for religious purposes is a waste. From Israel’s perspective, the 
animal chosen to be offered to God has a far greater dignity. What more honorable life for a sheep or a 
goat than to be chosen for the Lord? Such creatures were seen as “spotless,” and they would have 
received greater care and attention from their owners on account of their great vocation. Cf. Klawans, 
Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 58–62. But even better, is it preferable to be eaten by a human (or by a 
wolf), or to be life in the temple? Remember again the song of David: “One thing I ask of the Lord, only 
that do I seek: to live in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to gaze upon the beauty of the 
Lord, to frequent His temple” (Ps. 27:4). If this is your mentality, would it really seem so terrible a fate 
for an animal that its life-blood becomes part of the sanctuary, the very dwelling place of God? In sum, 
we must at least entertain the notion that an ancient society’s hierarchy of values differs from our own—
we can discuss whether these values are better or worse, but the difference must first be acknowledged—
and thus what seems like a terrible “waste” for a modern person may be seen as the greatest excellence 
for them. (Admittedly, the animal gets little say either way.) 
  Third, and finally, it is certainly acceptable to acknowledge—from the Christian perspective—that 
the transition to the “unbloody sacrifice” of the Eucharist is a positive theological development for a 
variety of reasons, including the fact that it does not require an animal’s death. But this concession 
should not preclude us from interpreting Jewish sacrificial practices sympathetically and with 
appreciation. A theological development need not—should not—rely on disdain for what came before, 
because in Christ these ancient mysteries are seen in their fullest glory. Correlatively, the more we can 
perceive and value the theo-logic in the ancient cult, the more we will perceive the glory of Christ 
crucified and risen. Therefore, modern distaste for blood rituals mustn’t bar us from seeing what is good 
and profound in temple theology.  
194 It is easy to acknowledge at the outset that a more straight-laced Bible critic may find these arguments 
extravagant. As I’ve said, I do rely on a canonical approach, along with added insight from much later 
rabbinic interpretation. Nevertheless, I have tried to suggest that whatever “leaps” may be required to put 
these different themes together, they are relatively modest leaps. 
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persisted, to some extent, in the latter. While there are a number of similarities and 
differences between the two, the primary difference is that purification offerings require 
far more elaborate blood manipulations. If the burnt offering was recognized as 
quintessential for Israel insofar as it expressed the ideal of total self-giving, and if this 
mode of being was articulated with exquisite eloquence in the primordial action of 
Abraham and Isaac—an action that expressed in principle Edenic peace between God and 
humanity—then the purification offering is that same joyful movement repurposed to 
address the tragedy of sin.195 The purpose, in other words, is to return to the more basic, 
characteristic posture dramatically established by Israel’s father and son, but to fully 
realize this freedom, the flotsam of sin must first be straightforwardly addressed. 
Because, according to Milgrom, sin and impurity creates a “something” that pollutes the 
sacred space, it is not possible to simply return to the burnt offering as if nothing 
happened. The pollution of Nadab and Abihu must be addressed first on the way to full 
enjoyment of the holy burnt offerings.  
 The way those sins and impurities are counteracted is through blood as a “ritual 
detergent” in the sacred spaces, and now we can see that it is the blood of Isaac-Israel that 
sacramentally has this purging power. Again, because the life of Isaac is the very life of 
the offerer (who is in the same chosen and covenantal bloodline), in re-presenting the life 
of Isaac, the offerer presents her or his own life in him. It is a matter of conforming 
                                                 
195 Klawans has put a spotlight on this point: “But the typical understanding of the way daily sacriﬁce and 
grave sin are related is, I believe, backward. It is not that the daily sacriﬁce undoes the damage done by 
grave transgression. Quite the contrary: grave transgression undoes what the daily sacriﬁce produces. 
And the difference between the two formulations is important. What it boils down to is whether sacriﬁce 
is considered, in and of itself, a productive act. Those who argue that expiation is at the core of all or 
most sacriﬁcial rituals ultimately view sacriﬁce not as something productive in its own right but as a 
correction or a reversal of something else that was wrong.” Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 
71–72. For Israel, the movement of Abraham and Isaac is primary, and God is seen (YHWH-yireh) 
through this selflessness. This is the cornerstone of the cosmos, the founding act of the microcosm.  
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oneself again, even in the time of sin, to the pattern of the Akedah, which is the doubly 
graced196 foundation of Israel’s entire existence. Such a way of life overcomes sin and 
death, and it is incomprehensible to sin and death. Therefore, when the priest ritually 
applies blood to the temple furniture, he is applying the blood of Isaac as the one antidote 
to the miasma of death. In doing so, he has taken sides in the cosmic conflict, advancing 
the cause of order and harmony and driving out the forces of chaos and division.  
 In these many pages we have been meditating on the mystery of “how Aaron shall 
enter the adytum” after the illicit encroachment of Nadab and Abihu. This entering is 
double-pronged: (1) it represents the proper mode of qurban, “drawing near” to God, in 
contradistinction to the brothers’ approach, and (2) it serves a new, mournful purpose, to 
remove the sin that now accumulates at the heart of Israel’s sacred space, making the 
dwelling place less and less suitable to an all-holy God. In the extended meditation on the 
wages of sin, we have seen that the realm of death pollutes creation at every level; in the 
priest’s sophisticated system, much of this corruption is unintentional and unavoidable. 
This represents the thoughtful realism of the priests, who recognize that disorder and 
decay is now an ineluctable quotidian reality. But whatever the cause, the cult offers 
Israel an opportunity to return repeatedly to the foundation stone of selfless devotion to 
God, upon which the nation is built. In this way, and in this way only, death is overcome. 
This movement toward God is Israel’s vocation morning and night, but the movement is 
epitomized and made perfect on Yom Kippur.   
                                                 
196 Cf. David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2004), 352. 
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The Two Goats: Making All Things News 
Now having established the basic problem of “substantial” sin invading the 
sanctuary and the notion of life-blood as purifying agent, the theological infrastructure 
for the high priest’s movements on the highest holy day is in place. From here we can 
more specifically contemplate the ritual itself, and especially consider why there are two 
goats rather than just one. Thus, we read in Leviticus 16: “Aaron shall bring forward his 
own bull of purification offering to effect purgation for himself and for his household; 
and he shall take the two he-goats and set them before the Lord at the entrance of the 
Tent of Meeting.”197 Three comments come to mind. First, priestly purification is the 
initial step. The priest, who is called to mediate between God and Israel as he moves 
between realms in the tabernacle, and especially the high priest, who is a complex symbol 
representing the repentant nation before God and heavenly glory before the nation, must 
embody exceptional purity, exceptional holiness. Given this calling, priestly sin 
represents an acute threat to the entire nation. Just as the air in a war camp is still and 
heavy the night before battle, the high priest felt the weight of his sacred responsibility. 
His campaign would be fraught, precarious; the seared remains of priestly sons might 
haunt his thoughts in the hours leading up to his embarkment. The high priest is sent, 
remember, on a journey to the center of the world, to the throne room of heaven, to stand 
as a representative of all creation before I AM. In the process, he would be stripped of his 
beautiful robes, essentially naked before God, with nothing but the blood of life to save 
him.  
Anticipating that moment, the high priest trembles and feels his unworthiness. 
                                                 
197 Leviticus 16:6-7, as translated by Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1009. 
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The traditions associated with Yom Kippur thus describe the solemn preparations in the 
hours leading up to his liturgical expedition. There are seven days of regular sacrifice and 
duties in the shrine, as if he is preparing himself to withstand the weight of glory in the 
holy of holies—and at the same time, to bear the weight of sin away from that place. The 
night before the high feast, his priestly aides-de-camp would ensure that he remained 
awake all night—a vigil intended to prevent an invalidating nocturnal emission—and 
they would read to him from the scriptures, from Job, from Ezra, from Chronicles, from 
Daniel.198 The tremendous gravity of the moment is eloquently expressed in the Mishnah 
Yoma, which describes how the elders of the priesthood would address the high priest as 
the Day arrived: “‘We abjure you by Him who caused his name to rest upon this house, 
that you will not vary in any way from all which we have instructed you.’ He turns aside 
and weeps. And they turn aside and weep” (mYoma 1:5).  
The awe-filled solemnity of this moment reflects the basic joy and trepidation of 
being the chosen people, the ones called to relationship with an all-holy God. The 
relational nature of this crisis—and this is the second point to notice in the passage cited 
above—is expressed in the simple phrase “before the Lord.” In the prayerful presence of 
the whole nation, the priest brings the ox and the two goats “before the Lord.” Drawing 
upon “built environment studies,” Michael Hundley points out that an ancient temple 
                                                 
198 From time to time, I will rely on the Mishnah Yoma for color commentary. These details come from 
Mishnah Yoma 1:6-7 translated by Jacob Neusner, The Mishnah: A New Translation (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988). I will use Neusner’s translation throughout.  
  This rabbinic account of the Day of Atonement was put to paper in redacted form, many think, in 
the early third century AD. There is naturally debate over whether this document reproduces temple 
realities accurately. For a discussion of this issue, see Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on 
Early Christianity, 19–28; cf. Günter Stemberger, “Yom Kippur in Mishnah Yoma,” ed. Thomas Hieke 
and Tobias Nicklas, The Day of Atonement: Its Interpretations in Early Jewish and Christian Traditions, 
2011, 121–37. Stökl Ben Ezra takes the nuanced position that the historicity of the actions described in 
the mYoma need to be assessed case by case. Milgrom finds the details of the high priests preparation 
plausible: Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1015–16. 
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“provides cues to elicit proper behavior, to which people respond automatically and 
appropriately.”199 With this in mind, he suggests that the walls of the tabernacle represent 
spheres of intimacy, leading ultimately to a room analogous to a bedchamber. When the 
author of Leviticus instructs Aaron to bring his offerings “before the Lord,” therefore, 
this commandment is “both a location and an evocative reference point”; it speaks to the 
threshold that distinguishes the divine sphere and the human, which is also the point at 
which the two meet. 
Standing at the threshold, one must be invited into another’s home, and then 
invited into the more private areas within the home. The themes of humility and gift, 
contrasted with pride and plunder, have been fundamental throughout this book, and the 
theology of the temple generally, and the Day of Atonement especially, underlines the 
ways in which—by means of space and time—God prepares his people for personal 
relationship. True relationship includes waiting, listening, being hospitable, and receiving 
hospitality. It is not that Israel is excluded from the holy of holies because God is—
strictly speaking—threatened by her presence. It is not because God is an introvert 
requiring “alone time.” The issue, since the exile of Adam and Eve, since the death of 
Nadab and Abihu, is learning how to be a people “before the Lord,” that is, having the 
openness of heart and the greatness of spirit to be genuinely in Love. Such profound 
intimacy does cause the heart to shudder because it requires absolute vulnerability, which 
is the ultimate risk, but it is also the only true freedom. Israel is invited. She is given a 
place, a time, and even a means by which she might approach, the life of the beloved son, 
the firstborn who dies and, behold, lives even still. 
                                                 
199 Hundley, “Before YHWH at the Entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” 18. 
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This leads to the third point: Israel is invited to take the “two he-goats,” which are 
together described as a ḥaṭṭā’ṯ (v. 5), and set them before the Lord. Here we have arrived 
at a most pressing question: why two goats? Let’s read further: “Aaron shall place lots 
upon the two goats, one marked ‘for the Lord’ and the other ‘for Azazel’” (v.8). With a 
casting of lots, a different purpose or vocation is assigned, each associated with a name, 
each name associated with a place. One is called to the center, the holy of holies, the 
other will be sent out, to the wilderness. Even though the goats will move in opposite 
directions, another tradition clarifies that these two goats were identical in appearance. 
Mishnah Yoma puts it like this: “the religious requirement concerning them is that the 
two of them be equivalent in appearance, height, and value…” (mYoma 6:1). That the 
goats should look alike is also attested in even earlier Christian sources. Barnabas says 
the goats shall be “beautiful and similar”—or again, “similar, beautiful, and equal.”200 
Perhaps because they look so similar and therefore need to be differentiated, another 
early tradition indicates that a “crimson thread” shall be tied upon the horns of the 
Azazel-goat after he receives his lot.201 Therefore, as we proceed to discuss the distinct 
mission of each goat in the next few pages, it is also worth remembering their initial 
correspondence. Each has a unique destiny, but they are together a single ḥaṭṭā’ṯ, a single 
work of purgation, and their roles are interrelated.  
                                                 
200 This is Stökl Ben Ezra’s adaptation of Kirsopp Lake’s 1912 Loeb Classical Library translation of the 
Epistle of Barnabas 7:6a and 7:10a. See Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early 
Christianity, 152–53. 
201 See mYoma 4:2, and also the earlier reference in Barnabas 7:8, 7:11. See Orlov, Divine Scapegoats, 
2014, 26ff for an overview of the tradition of the crimson thread and its relation to the Apocalypse of 
Abraham; and ibid., 90ff. for possible parallels between the crimson thread tradition and the Book of 
Watchers. 
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The Goat for the Lord 
 The Azazel-goat is left standing at the entrance of the tabernacle after it receives 
its lot, and it is momentarily forgotten, because all of the emphasis turns to the 
purification offering blood manipulations for the priests (the ox) and for the people (the 
YHWH-goat). A section of precise rubrics detailing the movements of the high priest in 
the sanctuary comes next, and here we find a reminder of the primary themes we’ve been 
discussing. The section begins: “Aaron shall bring forward (wĕhiqrîb) his own bull of 
purification offering (haḥaṭṭā’ṯ) to effect purgation (wĕkipper) for himself and his 
household…” (v. 11). There is beauty here, as the priest begins his journey into the heart 
of God’s glorious presence, but there is also a mournful quality to this movement, 
because the priest here has a mission to undo what should never have been. The priest 
comes to “de-sin” (ḥaṭṭā’ṯ) the sanctuary, to remove the impurity that pollutes God’s 
dwelling, thus the higher goal of contemplative unity with God in the holy of holies is 
distracted by the immediate demands of purgation (kipper) and re-consecration.202  
                                                 
202 While we have discussed the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ throughout this chapter, we have only alluded to the dispute over 
whether this word should be translated as “sin offering,” which is traditional, or “purification offering,” 
which Milgrom advocates. Ever since the early 1970s, Milgrom has strongly and repeatedly defended his 
choice for “purification offering.” He made a few key arguments. Contextually, he points out that, while 
the verb ḥaṭṭā’ṯ in the basic “Qal” (a verb stem in Hebrew) can mean something like “to sin,” the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ-
offering is prescribed in a number of situations that have nothing to do with “sin” as we understand the 
word in English. He gives the examples of the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ after childbirth, or the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ to consecrate the 
altar. In these contexts and others, the word sin is “theologically foreign.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 
253. Second, there is a grammatical argument. When in reference to the offering, ḥaṭṭā’ṯ is a nominalized 
pi‘el derivative—in Hebrew, the pi‘el is an intensified form of the verb.  Milgrom understands ḥaṭṭā’ṯ to 
be a privative pi‘el, which means the word would more properly translate as “to de-sin, to remove sin,” 
or in Milgrom’s translation, “to cleanse, expurgate, decontaminate.” Jacob Milgrom, “Sin-Offering or 
Purification-Offering,” Vetus Testamentum 21, no. 2 (April 1, 1971): 237. Therefore, the more 
appropriate translation for ḥaṭṭā’ṯ in Leviticus is “purification offering,” not sin offering (a mistranslation 
that goes all the way back to the LXX).    
  A number of scholars have followed Milgrom here. A representative sample includes Anderson, 
Sacrifices and Offerings in Ancient Israel, 879; Schwartz, “Leviticus Introduction and Annotations,” 
212–13; Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 29–32 (who sees the value of “purification offering” 
or “sin offering” depending on context); Gane, Cult and Character, 50–51; Vis, “The Purification 
Offering,” 2012, 20–22. Given that Milgrom’s argument has won wide acceptance, and given its 
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The text mentions in passing that the bull shall be slaughtered,203 but then moves 
quickly along to the rituals that most interest the priestly community: the blood 
manipulations.  After the blood has been collected, the priest makes his first procession to 
the heart of creation, the holy of holies, this time carrying a blazing censor in which he 
                                                 
explanatory power with reference to Leviticus 16, I will generally follow his translation in this book. I 
will continue to call Yom Kippur “the Day of Atonement” rather than “the Day of Purgation” (the latter 
being Milgrom’s choice) because at-one-ment better captures the overall result of the holy day, which 
undoubtedly includes purgation but is not limited to it.  
  That said, over the years there have also been critiques of Milgrom on his translation of ḥaṭṭā’ṯ. I’ll 
raise two issues worthy of further reflection. Watts’ makes the argument that by translating ḥaṭṭā’ṯ as 
“purification offering,” and interpreting this word as a technical term, the rhetorical impact of Leviticus 
4-5 is lost. He says, “These chapters deliberately and repeatedly juxtapose verb, common noun, and 
offering name of the same root, especially ḥṭ’, in patterns that are quite redundant…For example, the 
refrain ‘sin that he sinned…as sin’ appears eight times…” Watts, Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus, 87–
88. Watts believes that ḥaṭṭā’ṯ, because it looks and sounds like a common noun for sin, is highly 
evocative, and it was not chosen as a technical term but for its rhetorical impact so as to spur Israelites 
into bringing this new sacrifice (which, it happens, economically favors the temple priesthood). Future 
research into Milgrom’s discoveries will also need to address Feder’s critiques; see Blood Expiation in 
Hittite and Biblical Ritual Origins, Context, and Meaning, 99–108. His argument is rooted in a 
diachronic reading that differs from Milgrom’s chronology, and which nevertheless sees “purification 
offering” as acceptable for texts where the sancta is the “direct object” of the priest’s sacrificial action, 
texts he judges to be late, but which nevertheless includes the text we are focusing on in this chapter. 
Ibid., 108. Incidentally, Vis argues that Leviticus 16:1-28 is the earliest stage attested in the development 
of the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ offering, so markedly different diachronic assessments are clearly possible among 
contemporary scholars.  
203 Leviticus 16 does not specifically mention the “hand-leaning ritual,” but all agree that the ritual was 
performed. According to the guidelines for the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ, which were described in greater detail in Lev. 4, 
the high priest shall bring the bull forward, “lean his hand upon the head of the bull, and slaughter the 
bull before the Lord” (Lev. 4:4; the procedure is the same for other sacrifices. See Lev. 1:4 for the burnt 
offering and Lev. 3:2 for the well-being offering). As with so many other issues, lack of clarity in the text 
on the meaning of this action has been good for scholar’s curriculum vitae, since it has generated a vast 
debate across many publications. For an especially comprehensive review of the literature, see Trevaskis, 
Holiness, Ethics and Ritual in Leviticus, 178–96. 
  Milgrom argues in favor of those who say that the ritual designates ownership; by leaning one’s 
hand upon the animal, the offerer affirms that the offering is truly his to give. This is in contrast to other 
scholarly approaches, which claim that sin is transferred to the animal and the animal is substitutionally 
punished, or even theories in which the offerer’s soul is united with the animal’s and brought into God’s 
presence through the animal. The issue of rightful ownership was, in fact, quite serious: a primary 
impetus for the prophetic critique of the cult was that stolen goods were being offered. See Klawans’ 
discussion on hand-leaning in the context of prophetic concerns: Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 85. In 
the last chapter we heard David articulate a key principle: “I cannot…sacrifice a burnt offering that has 
cost me nothing” (1 Chron. 21:24). If the paradigm for sacrifice is Abraham and Isaac, if the purpose—
especially in the context of sin—is to be grafted again into their covenant obedience and open-hearted 
mode of being, then to “give” stolen or impersonal goods runs against the goal completely. Attention-
seeking would become the driving motive, and this utterly destroys the sacramental logic, which 
Fletcher-Louis describes as personally becoming “the Great Sacrament” (see above). Ownership may 
seem mundane, but it is integral to the enacted symbolism of the entire liturgy.  
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would add “finely ground perfumed incense,” consisting of frankincense and spices.204 
As with neighboring cultures, incense was held in high esteem, and it seems quite natural 
that beautiful aromatics should be associated with this new Eden.205 Every faculty was 
used to communicate the glory of God’s presence, and the nose is not excluded from the 
lavish banquet of the senses.206  
After the first fragrant approach, the high priest would exit the holy of holies and 
return to the courtyard, where he would receive the blood of the bull, which had been 
                                                 
204 There is a famous debate between Pharisees and Sadducees over when the incense was added to the 
coals. See Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1028–31; Isaac Kalimi, “The Day of Atonement in the Late 
Second Temple Period: Sadducees’ High Priests, Pharisees’ Norms, and Qumranites’ Calendar(s),” 
Review of Rabbinic Judaism 14, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 71–91. For the general theology of incense in 
the ANE and the Hebrew Bible, see See Cornelis Houtman, “On the Function of the Holy Incense 
(Exodus XXX 34-8) and the Sacred Anointing Oil (Exodus XXX 22-33),” Vetus Testamentum, 1992, 
458–465; cf. Hundley, Keeping Heaven on Earth, 105–9. 
205 This is supported by other ancient Jewish texts, such as the Book of Watchers, which describes one of 
Enoch’s journeys: “…there was one tree such as I have never at all smelled; there was not a single one 
among those or other (trees) which is like it; among all the fragrances nothing could be so fragrant; its 
leaves, its flowers, and its wood would never wither forever; its fruit is beautiful…” (1 Enoch 24:4) The 
passage goes on to speak of a tall mountain which is God’s throne, and it further explains that this “tree 
of life” is preserved for the righteous, that it will be planted in the “holy place,” and that the elect “shall 
enter into the holy (place); its fragrance shall (penetrate) their bones…” (1 Enoch 25:6) 
206 There was a growing conviction in the later second temple tradition that the incense was necessary for 
apophatic reasons; the smoke of the incense blocked the priest’s vision of YHWH, saving the priest from 
certain death. This is a plausible reading of verse 13, where Aaron is instructed to “put the incense on the 
fire before the Lord so that the cloud from the incense covers the kappōret that is over [the ark of the 
covenant], lest he die.” This “cloud” has been interpreted as a “smoke riser” (since, in itself, incense 
would not create the necessary amount of smoke). Milgrom adopts this view. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 
1991, 1029–31. It’s certainly true that such concerns are prominent in the Hebrew Bible. For example, 
see Genesis 32:30, Exodus 33:20, Isaiah 6:5. But we’ve also seen, with the help of Anderson and 
Sommers, how anxieties about seeing God develop unevenly in various biblical traditions. I’ve even 
suggested that Moriah receives a theophanic name: YHWH-yireh, “the Lord is seen.” Plus, the 
commitment to beauty is consistent in the priestly tradition, and so the idea that the sweet-smelling 
incense might replace the corporeal stench of death that the human high priest might carry—this poor 
creature clothed in garments of flesh—seems quite reasonable for reasons independent of apophatic 
concerns. 
  The research of Cornelis Houtman helps bolster the aesthetic reasons for the emphasis on incense. 
He draws attention to the prominent but overlooked role of smell in the Hebrew Bible—including the 
deathly stench of corpses—and makes an interesting comment: “…it is plausible that for an Israelite 
odours were not only either pleasant or unpleasant, but also carriers of either life or death.” Houtman, 
“On the Function of the Holy Incense (Exodus XXX 34-8) and the Sacred Anointing Oil (Exodus XXX 
22-33),” 460–61. It might not be an obvious connection for modern people, but perhaps incense and the 
life symbolism of the temple went together naturally, even inevitably. The priest seeks to be holy as God 
is holy as he approaches God’s presence, and thus he is swaddled in heavenly aromatics.  
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slaughtered earlier (mYoma 4:3 further adds, quite realistically, that someone was 
charged with the task of stirring the blood so that it would not congeal). The text of 
Leviticus says, “He shall take some of the blood of the bull and sprinkle it with his finger 
on the kappōret on its east side; and in front of the kappōret he shall sprinkle some of the 
blood with his finger seven times” (v. 14). What does it mean to “sprinkle?” As Milgrom 
notes, the text itself is not clear, but the rabbis explain that the high priest would move his 
hand “like one who cracks a whip,”207 thus flinging blood in the direction of the ark, the 
Lord’s earthy footstool on earth. After this movement was complete, the priest would 
retreat once more to the courtyard where he would slaughter the goat for the community, 
the YHWH-goat, collect its blood, and return yet again to the holy of holies where he 
would repeat the blood ritual. 
At the completion of these back and forth movements between spheres, at the 
completion of the sprinkling ritual for priests and people in the holy of holies, an 
explanation is offered. This passage has been cited a couple times before, but hopefully it 
will be more meaningful now: “Thus he shall purge (wĕkipper) the adytum of the 
pollution and transgressions of the Israelites, including all of their sins…” Milgrom’s 
insights make sense of this passage: when the high priest sprinkles the blood about the 
ark—and then, just after, when he continues the process by performing blood 
manipulations in the shrine (cf. Lev. 16:16b, Ex. 30:10, Lev. 4:3-7) and upon the burnt 
offering altar in the courtyard (vv. 18-19; cf. Lev. 4:30)—that blood purifies the temple 
from the sins and impurities that have accumulated there. The presence of sin, this putrid 
miasma, makes the temple ill-suited for the indwelling presence of an all-holy God, but 
                                                 
207 Mishnah Yoma 5:3. See Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1032–33. 
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when the priest draws near with the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ blood, the ritual detergent of the cult, he 
purifies and re-consecrates (v. 19) the space to fully restore its radiance as the center of 
the Lord’s covenantal presence to Israel. 
The Beauty of Atonement: Summary and Conclusion 
We know from the last chapter that the temple in general, and the holy of holies 
as its epitome, is the physical manifestation of God’s tremendous glory. It was toward 
this place that the desire of Israel was oriented, as the psalms repeatedly suggest, and the 
meeting of desire and pure beauty at Zion opened the door to transformation into new 
life. That said, the temple is not merely a place for stagnantly contemplating the glory of 
God, but for right action that emerges from, and is ordered to, that vision. It is the place 
where human beings learn to say “hinnini” with all their heart, soul, and strength. Such 
readiness before God is the essence of life for those called to communion with the one 
who is Life itself. This indeed is the truth: the truth of God, the truth of creation. Mount 
Zion is the world’s source and essence, it is the microcosm that encapsulates the most 
profound harmony of earth and sky, land and water. Here the proper rhythms are 
measured so that the macrocosm is preserved in peace. The temple is a reminder that 
there is mysterious depth to all creation and that glory dwells most intimately at the heart 
of creaturely being. Then again, this sacred mountain is a mere shadow of heavenly 
Truth; God’s glory is greater still. The temple follows the contours of heaven but cannot 
capture its essence. As the high priest climbs the stairs to the holy of holies, he ascends to 
a realm that is truly other, and thus the apophatic note of later traditions is appropriate.  
Thus the high priest, ministering in the holy of holies, draws near to establish true 
unity between the chosen people and the God of splendor and mystery. But the 
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movement toward the perfect peace which is appropriate to this paradise is obstructed by 
an appalling reality. The gravest wickedness of Israel has pierced the holiest place in 
creation, violence has been unleashed on the earth by human cruelty, and these jolts of 
discord fling themselves upon the mountain of God with one objective: drive out the holy 
one of Israel so that the world might return to the primordial abyss. Therefore, the high 
priest’s mission is not one of pure bliss as he elevates creation and communicates divine 
life, from glory to glory. Instead now the call to unity (at-one-ment) involves struggle 
against powers and principalities. The priest must engage in a movement of purgation, he 
must bear away the transgressions, so as to restore right order to the world. In this 
liturgical battle, most importantly, the high priest does not take up the weapons of this 
world, he does not meet violence with violence. Moriah is indeed named YHWH-yireh, 
both “The Lord is Seen” and “The Lord Will Provide.” It is God who has provided the 
right response to the encroaching death on his holy mountain, it is God who provides the 
antidote. It is God who gives the blood, which is life. It is he who breathed life into the 
dust, he who brought stirrings of hope to Sarah’s barrenness, it is he who provided yet 
again when Isaac was preserved through faith. Blood is the sacrament through which 
Israel draws near, open-heart to open-heart, and it is this form of life that overcomes 
every attempt at destruction.  
When Aaron, the high priest, descends to the holy of holies, the blood he bears 
overcomes the darkling stains simply through its own vitality. Earlier this chapter we saw 
how the pollution in the temple exists in two basic forms. One results from ontological 
decay, the brokenness of the physical world, and thus is associated with the elaborate 
symbolism of Israel’s impurity laws. The other is more terrible, it is spawned from 
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disordered actions—idolatry, murder, lustful sexual acts—and it leaves behind a more 
serious wound in creation. We’ve heard Schwartz call this residue a “metaphysical 
spontaneous generation…though amorphous, it is substantive,” and Gary Anderson says 
the offensive object is “manufactured ex nihilo upon completion of the forbidden act.” In 
Milgrom’s system, this “miasma” is drawn to the sanctuary through a sort of 
electromagnetic attraction; what is least holy impulsively propels itself against what is 
most holy. We have reviewed the evidence that impurity and sin are analogous, creating 
similarly cursed substances, but not identical. Schwartz advances this discovery by 
showing that these two basic types of “death” respond to the healing lifeblood differently. 
Schwartz explains that there is a 
…dual process of eliminating, by means of the purification sacrifice, the two 
distinct types of contaminating substances, sins and impurities, which have been 
accumulating in the sanctuary. Just as the blood of the [ḥaṭṭā’ṯ] purges impurity, it 
removes sins—not from, but of, the community; not of, but from the sanctuary, 
the abode of the divine Presence…208 
 
Here’s the basic distinction: the blood “purges” impurities, it “removes” sins. Schwartz 
later clarifies that “the blood of the [ḥaṭṭā’ṯ] not only removes [impurities] from the 
sancta, it eradicates them. With sins it is otherwise. They need to be driven away even 
after they have been removed from the sancta; purification alone does not eliminate 
them.”209 One further statement helps to accentuate the difference: “Only the deliberate 
sins stubbornly maintain their independent nature, and only they need to be driven 
away.”210 
 From these passages, we can conclude that when it comes to the unavoidable 
                                                 
208 Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 16. 
209 Ibid., 17–18. Milgrom says much the same, cf. Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1043–44. 
210 Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 19. 
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workings of death in material creation itself (impurity), life simply overcomes death. 
When lifeblood is applied to the holy of holies and the outer spheres, it simply eradicates 
impurity. The spiritual life represented in the self-giving love of Abraham and Isaac, 
through which YHWH himself is seen, overcomes the decay of creation—one of the 
curses of Genesis 3—without struggle. With the spirit’s breath, dry bones are ready to 
spring back to life without hesitation. When it comes to intentional sin, however, 
something has been generated that is more difficult to overcome. A severe wound in the 
flesh may heal, but ever after a scar remains. Similarly, when it comes to open rebellions 
against God, when it comes to a man or woman who hear God’s word—“I have put 
before you life and death, blessing and curse”—and freely choose death, something 
demonic has spawned, something that can be overcome but not simply eradicated. In 
such cases, Schwartz explains, the blood (of Isaac) loosens the sin, but a residue remains 
that must be driven away. At this point, the unique mission of the second goat emerges. 
The Goat for Azazel 
The chapter previous to this featured long meditations on the peace and joy of 
Zion, and then at the end—almost as an afterthought—attention turned to the wilderness 
which surrounds and attacks Israel. This was not to minimize sin, or to downplay the 
seeming expansiveness of the surrounding desert, but rather it is a reflection of the fact 
that beauty, goodness, and truth is infinitely more than the darkness, so much worthier of 
contemplation and song. In fact, the wilderness is coherent or describable only to the 
extent that it inversely mirrors goodness, which alone has true being. Nevertheless, in the 
Babylon of our lives, it is not infrequent for us to find the words of King David on our 
lips: “For I know my transgressions, and my sin is ever before me…” (Psalm 51:3, 
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NRSV). With this in mind, it can be said that even though the goat for the Lord, as 
fundamentally positive and joyful, is theologically primary, the goat for Azazel has 
special significance for those who journey through this vale of tears.  
The last time we saw the second goat, it had received the lot “for Azazel,” and 
thus it is “stationed alive before the Lord,” awaiting its sorrowful mission out “into the 
wilderness to Azazel” (v. 10). Before continuing with a meditation on the ritual 
associated with this goat, a few comments about the meaning of the word “Azazel” might 
help to set the scene. The debate over the meaning of the Hebrew word ‘ăzā’zēl (ל זאָׁזֲע) 
has continued since rabbinic times. The most popular position in scholarship today (and 
the one defended by Jacob Milgrom himself) is that in the misty-prehistory of ancient 
Israel—before the doctrine of monotheism solidified, when Enuma Elish style gods and 
demons still roamed the world—there was a demonic power associated with the 
wilderness named Azazel (which may have meant “fierce god”211). Milgrom insists that, 
by the time of priestly theology, the belief in such preternatural beings dissipated in favor 
of strict monotheism. Nevertheless, the name Azazel became something of a place-
marker, referring to the wasteland beyond, “the land of Azazel”…just as even the most 
level-headed materialist might refer to Ireland as the “land of leprechauns” today. In any 
case, Milgrom is quite insistent on a demythologized name: “…Azazel is the name of a 
demon who has been eviscerated of his erstwhile demonic powers by the Priestly 
legislator.”212 Whether or not priests, or the larger Israelite community, actively believed 
                                                 
211 According to David Wright, “though the etymology of the name is not certain, it is best explained as a 
metathesized form of ‘zz-’l meaning something like ‘fierce god’ or ‘angry god.’” The Disposal of 
Impurity, 22; cf. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1021; Hayim Tawil, “Azazel, the Prince of the Steepe : 
A Comparative Study,” Zeitschrift Für Die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 92, no. 1 (January 1, 1980): 
43–59. 
212 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1021. Milgrom follows Kaufmann here. Many have since agreed with 
Milgrom’s position that Azazel is the name of a demon who has been utterly declawed. See especially 
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in the existence of desert demons, the fact that the destination of the second goat was still 
associated with the primordial monsters is adequate to suggest the dreadfulness of his 
mission.  
Back to the text. After the high priest has used the life-blood of the YHWH-goat to 
both purge the sanctuary of impurities and release the sins for removal, ritual attention 
turns fully to the fate of the goat waiting at the tent’s entrance. According to Leviticus: 
When [Aaron] has finished purging the adytum, the Tent of Meeting, and the 
altar, he shall bring forward the live goat. Aaron shall lean both of his hands upon 
the head of the live goat and confess over it all of the iniquities and transgressions 
of the Israelites, including all of their sins, and put them on the head of the goat; 
and it shall be sent off to the wilderness by a man in waiting. Thus the goat shall 
carry upon it all of their iniquities to an inaccessible region.213 
 
There are multiple actions described in this passage, but they can be subsumed into two 
major categories: (1) transfer and (2) release. Under the first category, the high priest 
                                                 
Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 21–25; Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 9–11; Jan Heller, “Der Name 
Asasel,” Communia Viatorum 40 (1998): 126–30; cf. Tawil, “Azazel, the Prince of the Steepe.” Others 
have agreed that Azazel was a demon, but they reject the idea that he has been “eviscerated” of demonic 
powers in Leviticus. For example, Baruch Levine disagrees with Kaufmann’s claim that “‘Azazel was a 
virtual non-entity, a passive recipient of the sins of the Israelites,” and he says to the contrary that the 
demon Azazel would have resisted the coming of the sin-bearing goat, and thus the high priest must have 
exercised “potent powers in compelling ‘Azazel to admit the goat into its domain.” In the Presence of the 
Lord, 81–82. Milgrom finds no evidence that Azazel has “any active role” in the Levitical rite; seemingly 
in response to Levine, he points out that Azazel “neither receives the goat nor attacks it.” Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1021; cf. ibid., 1042–43, for a direct response to Levine’s theory. 
  If it is true that Azazel is demythologized in Leviticus, mythology certainly came roaring back in 
second temple literature. For Asa’el/Azazel in 1 Enoch and the Apocalypse of Abraham, see the 
discussion in the next chapter.  
  As I said, Milgrom’s view is the most widely held today, and the idea that Azazel is the name of a 
demon goes as far back as rabbinic commentaries and beyond. There are other views, however, and each 
has similar ancient pedigree. First, the English word “scapegoat” is most related to the Septuagint and 
Vulgate translation of “to Azazel” (τω αποπομπαίω and caprum emissarium respectively), both of which 
focus on the goat’s movement away. It seems that William Tyndale coined the English word 
“scapegoat,” scape being equivalent to escape in early modern English. This word is not an adequate 
translation of the Hebrew, primarily because the word “escape” is exceptionally ill-suited to describe the 
fate of this lamentable creature. (Now that the word has been appropriated by Girardians to describe 
universal sociological phenomenon, it is even less suitable for translating this very particular Hebrew 
word.) Second, some rabbis translate the word as “‘a rough and difficult place’…referring to the goat’s 
destination.” Ibid., 1020. For a more extensive overview of the different views in ancient and modern 
literature, see Aron Pinker, “A Goat to Go to Azazel,” Journal of Hebrew Scriptures 7 (January 1, 2007): 
3–16; Ralph D Levy, “The Symbolism of the Azazel Goat” (Ph.D. diss., Union Institute, 1995), 26–39. 
213 Leviticus 16:20-22, as translated by Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1010. 
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leans both hands on the goat, confesses sins, and transfers them. Under the second 
category, the goat is sent from the tabernacle to the “inaccessible region.”  
 In an earlier footnote, I discussed the issue of hand leaning. It could be said that 
the nexus of leaning hands and transferring sins, explicitly described in verse 21, has 
spawned the innumerable (inaccurate) interpretations of the sacrificial rites as wrathful 
punishments.214 If you assume that every hand leaning ritual implies the same thing—
transfer of sins—then it may seem that the sacrificial animal’s subsequent death is a 
substitutionary punishment for the imputed sin it now bears. Well aware of this 
misleading interpretive tradition, Milgrom puts great emphasis on the fact that the high 
priest is instructed to lean both hands on the head of the goat, which is different from the 
ritual for offerings, which calls for the pressure of one hand.215 The hand ritual for 
offerings is about establishing ownership—nothing is said about sins or their transfer in 
the sacrificial texts—but the two-hand ritual unambiguously describes the transfer of sins. 
Milgrom insists that it is not accurate to use this verse to interpret the meaning of cultic 
offerings because (a) the ritual movement is different in each case (one vs. two hands), 
and (b) the Azazel-goat ritual is not an example of a sacrificial offering (as we’ll see 
below).  
 Much earlier in this chapter we considered the ‘āwōn and pĕšā‘im, the iniquities 
and transgressions, which Aaron confesses over the goat, and there we defined these 
terms as deliberate wrongdoing and rebellion. These are the great human horrors: the 
idolatries and murders, all cruelty and violence, pride, lust and arrogance, hatred and 
                                                 
214 See footnote 203 above. 
215 Cf. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1041–42. 
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despair.216 Here we have the full parade of human evil, our selfish acts big and small. It 
all weighs upon the high priest as he emerges from the tent. In this context, it is 
fascinating to consider the priest’s pivotal role on Yom Kippur in representing Israel: 
whereas moments before he was light as an angel, a conduit of the selfless life of 
Abraham and Isaac, the same man now quite truly bears the dead weight of the world.217 
With both hands, Aaron presses his weight on the Azazel-goat’s head, and he begins to 
openly confess the evils of the nation.  
 Verbal confession is an important Yom Kippur theme. According to Mishnah 
Yoma, the high priest prayed the following words:  
O Lord, your people, the house of Israel, has committed iniquity, transgressed, 
and sinned before you. Forgive, O Lord, I pray, the iniquities, transgressions, and 
sins, which your people, the house of Israel, have committed, transgressed, and 
sinned before you, as it is written in the Torah of Moses, your servant, For on this 
day shall atonement be made for you to clean you. From all your sins shall you be 
clean before the Lord (Lev. 16:30).218 
  
This supplication alternates between affirmations of the honor and the humiliation of 
Israel before God: this house is both the chosen people of the covenant and a house of 
insubordination, even outright mutiny. Yet as the priest presses all these disgraces upon 
the head of the Azazel-goat, and as a humbled nation joins their prayers to his, the words 
of scripture ring out like joyful bells: “shall you be clean.” Then, as he finishes the 
recitation, the rabbis indicate that a final gift is given to a nation made pure: the divine 
name is pronounced aloud. “And the priests and the people standing in the courtyard, 
                                                 
216 It is worth noting once more, as Schwartz has emphasized, that impurities do not appear in this list 
because ritual impurities dissipate immediately upon contact with the purifying blood. Cf. Schwartz, 
“The Bearing of Sin,” 17–18; Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 17–21; Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 
1043. 
217 Cf. Exodus 28:38, Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 16–18; Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 115–
18.  
218 mYoma 6:2, A-B. 
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when they would hear the Expressed Name [of the LORD] come out of the mouth of the 
high priest, would kneel and bow down and fall on their faces and say, ‘Blessed be the 
name of the glory of his kingdom forever and ever.’”219 This response seems to mirror the 
theophany described in Leviticus 9 when God first tabernacled among his people; with 
hearts made pure, God’s presence is again affirmed as all knees bend at the sound of the 
Name.220 
 As Milgrom points out, the verbal confession and the transfer of sins go 
together.221 By putting these burdens into contrite words, they are released from Aaron 
and placed on the head of the goat. At this point, the second movement begins: the goat is 
driven from the tabernacle. The goat’s destination is described in two terms: miḏbār and 
’ereṣ gezêrāh (cf. Lev. 16:22). The first word we discussed in the last chapter: this is the 
word usually described as wilderness and desert, the place that represents the polar 
opposite of holiness, the polar opposite of “life-sustaining order.” The second Hebrew 
term used to describe this region is even more despairing. While Milgrom translates ’ereṣ 
                                                 
219 mYoma 6:2, C. This line, “blessed be the name…,” is the second line of the Shema, is typically recited 
silently but it is recited aloud on Yom Kippur. According to Reuven Hammer, “Legends grew up to 
explain this anomaly.” For example, according to one charming midrash: “Thus Moses said to Israel, ‘All 
the mitzvoth I have given to you I received from the Torah, but this verse is something which I overheard 
the angels say when they praise the Holy One. I took it from them, therefore say it in a whisper.’ Why 
then is it said aloud on Yom Kippur? Because then they are like angels, wearing white, not eating or 
drinking; nor do they have any sins or transgression for the Holy One has forgiven all their 
transgressions.” Hammer, Entering the High Holy Days, 122–23. This explanation also underlines the 
way in which, for Jews across the centuries, Yom Kippur is indeed a heavenly reality.  
220 The centrality of the pronunciation of the Name grew in heavenly ascent mysticism after the destruction 
of the temple. Hekhalot mysticism was heavily influenced by Yom Kippur themes. See Stökl Ben Ezra, 
The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 135–37. For the often neglected importance of the aural 
in Jewish apocalyptic, see Andrei Orlov, “A Farewell to the Merkavah Tradition” (The Eighth Enoch 
Seminar: Apocalypticism and Mysticism, Milan, Villa Cagnola, Italy, 2015). 
221 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1043. Earlier in this chapter we drew the comparison between “wanton 
sins” and inadvertent sins in Jewish theology to mortal and venial sins in Catholic theology. See footnote 
92 above. As Aquinas notes, venial comes from the word “forgivable,” and thus mortal sins become 
forgivable (venial) when confessed. Milgrom’s words are striking in comparison: “The crucial 
significance of the confession is accurately pinpointed by the rabbinic comment: ‘By confessing the 
iniquities and transgressions, they turn them into inadvertencies’ (Sipra, Aḥare par. 2:6), thus qualifying 
them for sacrificial expiation.” Ibid.  
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gezêrāh as “an inaccessible region,” he explains in his commentary that these words 
literally mean “a land cut off.” This is a place wholly distinct from the new Eden of 
Mount Zion. Perhaps it is no surprise that over time the destination of the Azazel-goat 
was further glossed as a descent into the pit (another common biblical image of a 
hopeless place).222  
 Why was it so important that the Azazel-goat carry the sins into the wilderness in 
the ancient Jewish imagination? The blood of purification was unable to fully eradicate 
the substantive “thing” created by wanton sin. Therefore, the only solution was to drive 
such sins out of the Promised Land. This strategy was in keeping with ancient Near 
Eastern precedent. Through elimination rites in these societies, “evil was banished to its 
place of origin (e.g. netherworld, wilderness) or to some place in which its malefic 
powers could work to benefit its sender (e.g. to enemy territory) or in which it could do 
no harm at all (mountains, wilderness).”223 The goal of the elimination rite on Yom 
Kippur seems most related to point one (“return to sender”) and/or point three (“do no 
harm”). Relating to point one, Milgrom continues to explain that in the ANE the 
wilderness was a symbol of the netherworld, that is, the demonic realm. Despite his 
general emphasis on Jewish monotheism, Milgrom is willing to say that “in Israel, the 
goat for Azazel bearing the sins of Israel, though it is bound for the wilderness, is in 
reality returning evil to its source, the netherworld.”224 
 With that said, Milgrom emphatically states that the goat is not a gift to Azazel 
and that the rite has nothing to do with appeasing Azazel (who, Milgrom continues to 
                                                 
222 Thus, the post-biblical Yom Kippur traditions said that the Azazel-goat was pushed backward into a 
ravine. mYoma 6:6.  
223 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1072. 
224 Ibid. 
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insist, has been “devitalized”). For this reason, we must emphasize that the Azazel goat is 
not a sacrifice. In Milgrom’s words, “the goat sent [to Azazel] is not an offering….an 
animal laden with impurities would not be acceptable as an offering either to God or to a 
demon.”225 In the end, this animal’s role is fairly mundane: “Instead of being an offering 
or a substitute, the goat is simply the vehicle to dispatch Israel’s impurities and sins to the 
wilderness/netherworld.”226 If the blood of the YHWH-goat purification offering is 
symbolic of Israel most fully “in act”—the Yes! of hinneni-life—then at the other end of 
the spectrum the Azazel-goat is most passive: a mere vehicle led by another (by “a man 
in waiting,” v. 21). Cut off from all community, from all civilization, from the source of 
light, the mountain of peace, this most singular goat was abandoned to the primal chaos, 
the world of sin, the final darkness. It is a place that shrinks into a single word, the one 
seemingly impossible word in our good creation: Godforsaken.  
The Sanctuary and the Israelites: Full, Active Participation 
 The focus of our investigation in this chapter has mirrored the focus in the 
sixteenth chapter of Leviticus itself: the key figure is the high priest, who performs the 
sacred liturgy. One might well ask, this many pages in, whether this is a private affair 
between the priest and God? Does the priest here clean up after the sinful chosen people 
like a parent cleans up after a messy toddler? In other words, where are “the people” in 
                                                 
225 Ibid., 1021. Again, remember, it was necessary for offerings to be “spotless”—the idea of gaining favor 
by sending what is most detestable would be incomprehensible. This point once again undermines any 
attempt to suggest that in the course of the usual temple offerings sin is transferred to the victim through 
[singular] hand leaning. Such an idea would completely undermine cultic symbolism. Christian Eberhart 
makes the same point by drawing a comparison to the two birds elimination rite in Leviticus 14. See 
“Sacrifice? Holy Smokes! Reflections on Cult Terminology for Understanding Sacrifice in the Hebrew 
Bible,” Ritual and Metaphor: Sacrifice in the Bible, n.d., 30–31. 
226 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1021. Wright says the same: The Disposal of Impurity, 24. 
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all of this? Are they engaged in the work of purification? And how do these liturgies 
affect their standing with God, or is the liturgy merely focused on cleansing the pollution 
in the temple, irrespective of the souls of the sinners themselves?  
These are crucial questions, and especially after the Second Vatican directive 
insisting that the “full and active participation by all the people”227 is the highest priority, 
they will be some of the first questions modern readers will bring to this famous Levitical 
text. To address the place of Israelite laypeople—that is, those in the “kingdom of 
priests” (Ex. 19:6) who are not themselves ordained—we should approach the topic by 
turning again to the problem of who, or what (!), is really being purified on Yom Kippur. 
Milgrom himself answers this question in a way that many subsequent commentators 
have found unsatisfying. For him, the “miasma” of impurity and sin takes on a life that is 
basically independent of the person from whom it is generated. For this reason, 
addressing the problem of sin in the individual Israelite and addressing the problem of sin 
as a pollution in the temple constitutes two independent processes. The healing of the 
individual’s (inadvertent) sin is accomplished through feeling guilt, repentance, and 
prayer,228 a process that does not necessarily include direct reference to the sanctuary. 
Therefore, a separate process is required to deal with the pollution generated by impurity 
or sin, and this separate process is the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ offering throughout the year, culminating in 
the Yom Kippur liturgy which deals with any impurity that was not otherwise purged. 
The implication of Milgrom’s proposal is that the purification offerings described in 
Leviticus 4-5 and Leviticus 16 do not in fact address the cleansing of the wrongdoer 
                                                 
227 Sacrosanctum Concilium, paragraph 14. 
228 Or, in the case of the most severe intentional sins, where forgiveness is not possible in earliest strata 
priestly thought, the only requirement is administration of the appropriate punishment—in severe cases, 
capital punishment or kārēt.  
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herself, but these sacrifices relate only to the cleansing of the sanctuary from the effects 
of her “substantive” sin.  
 While I will agree with the other scholars who have attempted to nuance or 
reverse Milgrom’s approach here, the advantages of Milgrom’s proposal should not be 
overlooked. First, this theory helps to highlight a distinct aspect of priestly morality, 
which Milgrom labels “the priestly doctrine of collective responsibility. Sinners may go 
about apparently unmarred by their evil, but the sanctuary bears the wounds, and with its 
destruction, all the sinners will meet their doom.”229 For Milgrom, therefore, each severe 
impurity, and each sin—intentional or unintentional—endangers not just the individual, 
but the entire nation; there are no truly private sins because the entire covenant people 
was dependent on God’s presence in the temple. When the sanctuary is polluted, 
everyone is endangered, and thus everyone is responsible for upholding the covenant for 
the sake of everyone else. Milgrom insists that this conviction anticipates the prophetic 
approach.230 
Second, Milgrom’s interpretation of the purification offering draws our attention 
again to the most surprising feature of the rite, and effectively explains it: the purifying 
blood is not applied to the repentant sinner, but to the sanctuary. Recall the bizarre 
explanation of the blood manipulations on Yom Kippur: “Thus he shall purge the Shrine 
of the uncleanness and transgression of the Israelites, whatever their sins…” (v. 16). This 
text unambiguously states that the blood manipulations purge (kipper) the sanctuary 
itself, implying that the object that receives the blood is the object that receives the 
purification. Insofar as the blood is always applied to cultic furniture, never to the 
                                                 
229 Milgrom, Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics, 32; cf. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 260–61. 
230 See page 209, above. Cf. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 231. 
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Israelites, this strongly implies that the goal of this action has more to do with the status 
of the sacred space, and less to do with the status of the offerer.231 
But while accepting Milgrom’s description of priestly theology in its broad 
outline, numerous commentators in recent years have attempted to soften his rigid claim 
that only the sanctuary is cleansed by purification offerings. Is it indeed true that the 
ḥaṭṭā’ṯ played no role in the worshippers’ own status before God? If so, why is the offerer 
declared “forgiven” (sālaḥ) upon completion of the offering?232 Milgrom’s explanation 
seems strained: he must conclude that the person is here being “forgiven” for fouling the 
sanctuary, but that the sin itself had been pardoned before—separately—when the person 
felt guilt and repented.233  
Sensing that Milgrom’s theory is incomplete and/or out of step with more 
straightforward, traditional readings of the texts in question, various alternatives have 
been articulated, but I’d like to turn immediately to my own proposal, which builds on a 
fascinating observation that was made by Baruch Schwartz. He says: “It would appear 
that the priestly writings have developed two distinct conceptions of the outcome of 
transgression: the idea that the sinner bears (carries about) his sin and the belief that sins 
accumulate in the sacred realm and need to be borne (carried away) therefrom…How can 
an object, even a metaphysical one such as an objectified sin, be in two places at 
                                                 
231 In fact, it was not unheard of to manipulate blood on people—one thinks of Moses sealing the covenant 
at Exodus 24:8, or the ordination of the priests at Leviticus 8:22-24—and yet when it came to the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ 
for impurity or for sin, the blood was never applied to the offerer. The belief, therefore, that it is the 
sanctuary itself and not the offerer that is purified was Milgrom’s consistent argument throughout his 
career. See, for example, Milgrom, “Kipper,” 1039–40; Milgrom, “The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian 
Gray,’” 1976, 76; Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 254–58. 
232 This refrain, with slight differences, is repeated six times in chapters 4-5: “Thus shall the priest effect 
purgation on [the sinner’s] behalf, that he may be forgiven.”  
233 See Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 256, but then, also compare his explanation at 245, which is more 
ambiguous on the “forgiveness” here being offered. Sklar effectively highlights the weakness of 
Milgrom’s argument on this point: Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 87 n.23. 
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once?”234 This is a pressing question, and it is never clearly answered by Schwartz. 
Answering this question, though, is the key ingredient in considering how temple 
purification and personal purification may go hand-in-hand in priestly thought. 
I’ve said it before: it is a bizarre fact that two different literatures have developed 
over the last century—one focusing on the theology of the temple itself, the other 
unpacking the meaning of cultic offerings—and that these two fields of research are 
frequently isolated from one-another.235 But as I said above, Mary Douglas’ research 
helps to break down these barriers by pointing out the aesthetic and analogical nature of 
priestly theology.236 Douglas explains that one key that helps unlock this mode of 
thought—a mode which is, obviously, foreign to the modern Western mind—is the idea 
of microcosm. There is not just one microcosm in ancient Jewish thought, but rich 
networks of interlocking microcosms. Mount Sinai, the tabernacle, Jerusalem, the high 
priest, the human being, each with its own constellation of symbols, each related to one 
another.  
I believe that Douglas’ “key” helps us unlock a plausible solution to Milgrom’s 
problem—his dubious claim that the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ blood purges only the sanctuary and not the 
offerer—and it also helps us answer Schwartz’s question about how sin could be “in two 
places at once.” Douglas’s work prompts us to think more creatively about how everyday 
Israelites may relate to the temple in priestly thought. If the temple is the microcosm of 
the world, then what happens in the world must in some sense be copied in the holy 
                                                 
234 Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 19. 
235 Klawans provides the best counterexample to this trend, and indeed his work is forging the way forward. 
Also notable in this respect: Margaret Barker, “Atonement : The Rite of Healing,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 49, no. 1 (1996): 1–20. 
236 See page 216 above.  
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places. If our crooked actions create, in Schwartz’s words, a “metaphysical” something 
that weighs down the sinner’s spirit, then that unwanted something which scars the spirit 
must concurrently scar the sanctuary.237 For this reason, there is no need to say that “sin” 
is in two places at once, since macrocosm and microcosm are always mutually present in 
each other. For the same reason, purgative actions performed in the temple will have 
effect in the wider cosmos. Joshua Vis does an outstanding job emphasizing this very 
point: “…the Israelite and the sanctuary, especially the altars of the sanctuary, are in a 
reciprocal relationship. The sin of the Israelite can stain the sanctuary and the sanctuary, 
through sacrifice offered within it and on parts of it, can purge the Israelite of his/her 
sin.”238 With this concept of a reciprocal relationship in mind, many of the dichotomies 
common in the debate over the regular and Yom Kippur purification offerings break 
down. It is not the case that only the sanctuary is purified, or only the offerer is purified. 
The ritual in the temple is capable of purging the sacred space, and releasing a burden 
from the sinner’s soul, in one liturgical act.  
 This is true with respect to the more private ḥaṭṭā’ṯ offerings throughout the year, 
but it is true in a special way on Yom Kippur. What sets the Day of Atonement apart is 
that it is the atoning work of an entire nation coming before God as one, a covenant 
people mourning their failure to live as a holy nation, a kingdom of priests. Here we turn 
again to the question of the personal participation of the nation in these holy rites. At the 
end of Leviticus 16 there is a short section that most scholars consider a latter addition to 
the chapter, which is typically ascribed to the author of the “Holiness Code”; whatever its 
                                                 
237 Just to reiterate, the question of how to justify the idea of sin as “metaphysical” remains an open 
problem; I will try to address it in the fifth chapter.  
238 Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 203. 
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provenance, these words accentuate how each and every Israelite was called to be fully 
and actively involved in the liturgy that day. The ascetic obligations, the call to turn from 
the grasping self (Adam, Eve, Nadab, Abihu) and to live openheartedly, impinged not 
just on the high priest, but on everybody. The purgation of the sanctuary and the 
purgation of each spirit was a simultaneous action; there was a coincidence between the 
objective liturgy in the temple and the subjective sanctification of the individual because 
the temple and the people live together. And so we read:  
In the seventh month, on the tenth day of the month, you shall deny your spirits 
and shall do no manner of work, neither the native-born nor the alien who resides 
among you. For on this day [the high priest] shall purge you to purify you of all of 
your sins; you shall be declared pure before Yhwh. It shall be a sabbath of 
complete rest for you, and you shall deny your spirits; it is a law for all time.239 
 
In the context of sin, which is conceived as a grasping self-centeredness, any 
recommitment to the way of Life involves a denial of “self” in the mode of Abraham and 
Isaac. Therefore, it makes perfect sense that on Yom Kippur the entire nation passes 
through the purging fire of self-denial through fasting and resting as they gather at Mount 
Moriah to reject sin and take up again the covenant mode of being.240 In this way the 
temple liturgy is a microcosm of the universal healing work of the nation as each person 
enters the holy of holies of their own heart in worship and repentance to make their hearts 
pure and re-consecrate them to God.  
                                                 
239 Leviticus 16:29-31 as translated by Vis, Ibid., 97. Vis’s translation accentuates the use of N-P-S in vv. 
29 and 31 by translating it “spirit,” which is the word that also appears in the centrally important 
Leviticus 17:11, which as we’ve seen stipulates that blood as spirit/life purges the offerer’s spirit/life.  
240 Later rabbinic tradition elaborated on the ascetic practices of Israel on that day. According to the 
mYoma: “On the Day of Atonement it is forbidden to (1) eat, (2) drink, (3) bathe, (4) put on any sort of 
oil, (5) put on a sandal, (6) or engage in sexual relations.” mYoma 8:1. The mournful, ascetic nature of 
this day is not in doubt. However, even later traditions explained these practices in a way that highlights 
the heavenly nature of the day. The Jews were not to eat, drink, or engage in sexual relations because on 
that day the Jewish people “are on a different plane of existence, closer to angelic beings than to 
humans…” and thus, like angels, they have no need for such worldly goods. Hammer, Entering the High 
Holy Days, 123. 
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 We began this chapter with the words of David Fagerberg; his insight into liturgy 
is here again illuminating: “In my language game, the structure of the liturgical lex 
orandi I call liturgical theology, and the process of shaping lives I call liturgical 
asceticism. The liturgy doesn’t just make the thinker think doxologically, or theologize 
prayerfully; it forms a believer whose life is theological.”241 There is not only a liturgical 
theology unfolding in the ritual movements of Yom Kippur, but this theology also shapes 
and transforms the lives of the worshipping nation. Fagerberg calls this “liturgical 
asceticism,” and these words perfectly capture the sense of healing transformation 
enjoyed by Israel on this sacred day. The healing comes through taking up again the 
“yes,” the “readiness” before God that should have characterized the nation from the 
start, and the truth is that for the closed heart, such openness is felt as affliction and a 
kind of death. Nevertheless, the “death to self” through which Israel must pass is the only 
way to “choose life.”  
Days of Awe 
 “Now did they not have another sign? There was a crimson thread tied to the door 
of the sanctuary. When the goat had reached the wilderness, the thread would turn white, 
as it says, Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow.”242  
Goats, as a species, are not known for their theological subtlety. Our two goats 
were unlikely to appreciate the profound liturgical meaning in their twin missions. The 
people of Israel, however, could read the signs. They clearly saw their scarlet lives 
transformed so that they might shine again with the purest light, that the whole world 
                                                 
241 Fagerberg, Theologia Prima, 4; cf. Fagerberg, On Liturgical Asceticism. 
242 mYoma 6:8, E-F. 
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might know the grace and forgiveness of God. This joy is the capstone of the Days of 
Awe, the great liturgical season that began with the shofar’s sounding on Rosh 
Hosanna—at the world’s creation and God’s enthronement—finds a restful peace at the 
close of Yom Kippur—a day of atonement, which is to say, a day of eschatological 
fulfillment as the chosen people enter the holy of holies and definitively cast out and 
overcome the curse of sin and death. In these ten most holy days, Israel liturgically 
embodies the entire history of this cosmos.  
The liturgy on Mount Zion continued again after the thread changed color, but 
now with increasing freedom and joy. The word of forgiveness had been spoken, 
purification achieved, and now attention turns fully toward unbridled worship. It 
begins—as is so often the case—with a change of clothing, signifying a new beginning. 
Aaron removes the simple linen robe, submerges himself in water,243 and takes up once 
more his glorious vestments. Then Aaron begins again where he left off many days 
earlier, before the deadly encroachment of his sons Nadab and Abihu. On that day, “when 
the daily sacrifices began…the goal of all creation would be consummated.”244 
Unfortunately, as soon as creation was consummated, it was desecrated. But God gives 
Yom Kippur to Israel as the means by which they might begin again, and so now that 
creation has been made new, the daily burnt offerings pick up once more: Aaron “shall go 
out and sacrifice his burnt offering and the burnt offering of the people…” (v. 24). As 
Aaron draws near to the indwelling Lord with these two rams—which call to mind the 
ram caught in the thicket by its horns, and which call to mind the great shofar blast ten 
                                                 
243 Milgrom wonders at why he should have to bathe after all sin and impurity has been removed from 
camp. He concludes that “Only one plausible reason remains: to remove the superholiness that he 
contracted by entering the adytum…” Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 1991, 1040. 
244 Repeating the citation from Anderson quoted earlier: The Genesis of Perfection, 202. 
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days earlier—as Aaron draws near on behalf of the house of Israel, all creation is again 
full with peace.
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Part III: The Two Goats and the One Christ 
CHAPTER 4: YOM KIPPUR AND THE MYSTERY OF THE CHRIST 
“Destroy this temple…” (John 2:19) 
 
“Then Jesus cried again with a loud voice and breathed his 
last. At that moment the curtain of the temple was torn in 
two, from top to bottom. The earth shook, and the rocks 
were split...” (Matthew 27:50-51) 
 
For Christians, the mystery of the temple and the mystery of Jesus Christ are 
interconnected. Minimally, in saying this, I wish to align myself with the now sizable 
movement in historical Jesus studies that seeks to interpret the life and ministry of Jesus 
within a second temple Jewish framework.1 As a first century Jew, the temple was an 
unavoidable fixture in Jesus’ religious landscape, and the gospel writers are keen to 
associate Jesus with this institution. Attention to this fact is good historiography.2 As a 
theological claim, however, I intend to say something more. Throughout these pages I 
have sought to appreciate the nuance and brilliance of the priestly writers, whose 
theological landscape is centered in and oriented around the sanctuary of YHWH. Through 
this great sacrament of God’s presence in the midst of the chosen people, the priestly 
theologians contemplated the mysteries of God and creation, with an emphasis on Zion’s 
cascading beauty, goodness, and truth. The first Christians also had a theological 
landscape, but it was centered in and oriented around the person of Jesus Christ. There 
are at least two ways of interpreting this fact: you could say that for the emerging 
                                                 
1  In saying this, I am thinking of E.P. Sanders, N.T. Wright, Richard Bauckham, Larry Hurtado, Richard 
Hays, Crispin Fletcher Louis, etc.  
2 For a recent review of the evidence that Jesus’ attitude toward the Temple was one of reverence and 
devotion, see James H. Charlesworth, “Jesus and the Temple” in Jesus and the Temple edited by James 
H. Charlesworth (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), 145-182. 
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Christian tradition, Jesus replaces the temple as the center of theological focus (the 
supersessionist option), or you could say that the mystery of the temple and the mystery 
of Jesus Christ occupy the same “space”: without being simply identical,3 they are 
analogically one.  
For modern Christian theologians looking to build on the emerging emphasis on 
the Jewish roots of Christian theology, the analogical approach certainly has the most 
promise, and it is also deeply rooted in the Christian theological tradition.4 After all, 
interest in interpreting the phenomenon of Jesus the messiah in positive relation to the 
temple goes back to the earliest days of Christian theology, and it was powerfully 
supported by early Christian hermeneutical methods, as N.T. Wright has recently shown. 
Second Samuel 7 is a key text for a mature temple theology, and when early Christian 
readers of scripture turned to this chapter, they would be fascinated by the way the author 
of 2 Samuel cleverly associates the idea of David building a “house” for God, and God 
building a (messianic) “house” for David. After posing the incredulous question to David 
through Nathan—“Are you the one to build a house for Me to dwell in?” (2 Sam. 7:5)—
God sharply reminds the new king that God never requested such a ponderous structure. 
Then God reinforces who shall be the true builder of Israel:  
The Lord declares to you that He, the Lord, will establish a house for you. When 
your days are done and you lie with your fathers, I will raise up your offspring 
after you, one of your own issue, and I will establish his kingship. He shall build a 
house for My name, and I will establish his royal throne forever. (2 Sam. 7:11-13) 
 
There is already much here to catch the attention of an early Christian interpreter, but this 
passage becomes even more tantalizing in its Greek translation, because the writers of the 
                                                 
3 After all, Jesus says, “I tell you, something greater than the temple is here” (Matthew 12:6).  
4 See chapter two, footnote 277 for a partial bibliography on the connection between Jesus and the temple 
in the New Testament and the early church.  
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Septuagint use the word “anasteso” for “raise up,” and anasteso is the future tense verbal 
form of the noun “anastasis,” the Greek word for resurrection. Therefore, the early 
Christian reader of 2 Samuel 7 sees a promise that God will raise up or resurrect the seed 
who will establish a kingdom, a house, a royal throne. Looking at these overlapping ideas 
in 2 Samuel, Wright says,  
Read this story now with early Christian eyes, and what do we find? That the 
Temple, for all its huge importance and centrality within Judaism, was after all a 
signpost to the reality, and the reality was the resurrected son of David, who was 
the son of God. God, in other words, is not ultimately to dwell in a human-built 
Temple, a timber-and-stone house. God will indeed dwell with his people, 
allowing his glory and mystery to ‘tabernacle’ in their midst, but the most 
appropriate way for him to do this will not be through a building but through a 
human being. And the human being in question will be the Messiah, marked out 
by resurrection.5 
 
Two houses are interwoven in 2 Samuel. You have the “house” built by Israel for YHWH, 
the house of cedar which becomes the (semi-)permanent tabernacling place of the creator 
God. Then you have the “house” built by YHWH for Israel, the Davidic line which is an 
icon of peace and unity for the nation Israel.  
From the perspective of early Christian hermeneutics, these two “houses” 
converge in the child of Bethlehem, the one who became the first born of the dead, the 
resurrected seed of David whose own flesh is the dwelling place of God, whose own 
heart is the holy of holies, whose whole spirit is alive in perfect sacrificial worship, 
whose own blood brings life to the body of creation. Again, to associate this son of Judah 
with the house built by Solomon and the house built by God is a move virtually 
demanded by the logic of early Christian biblical interpretation. To then associate that 
same “house” with the full sequence of offerings proper to that place, in all their liturgical 
                                                 
5 N. T. Wright, The Challenge of Jesus: Rediscovering Who Jesus Was and Is (IVP Books, 1999), 110. 
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specificity (Leviticus 1-7), along with the priesthood that brings the liturgical space to 
life, is also well supported from the early Church’s biblical perspective since (as I’ve 
argued) the temple and its offers were theologically inseparable. 
With this in mind, we can return to an image I mentioned in chapter two. There I 
spoke of “conspiracy,” and I took the word in its most literal sense—“breathing 
together”—thus suggesting a deep harmony of persons. I briefly mentioned that, within 
the Christian imagination, the temple and Jesus conspire, and this is especially clear in 
Matthew’s account of Jesus’s death. For Matthew, the expiration of Jesus, of the temple, 
and of the cosmos happen simultaneously: the final exhale of life on the cross 
corresponds with the tearing and splitting of the cosmos, micro and macro. This strongly 
suggests that Jesus does not displace the temple, but rather the center of his existence 
corresponds to the center of the temple’s existence, which corresponds again to the center 
of the cosmos—heart to heart to heart—and thus all three fall and rise together.6 
Therefore, motivated by Henri de Lubac’s approach to interpreting the two testaments 
symphonically,7 I have defended the idea that temple theology is a precious resource for 
                                                 
6 Cf. Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, “Jesus, the Temple and the Dissolution of Heaven and Earth,” in 
Apocalyptic in History and Tradition, ed. Christopher Rowland and John Barton (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 2002), 117–141. 
7 This is an important point. While de Lubac does recognize a certain dialectical relationship between the 
New Testament and the Old Testament, he puts greater emphasis on the unity between the two if that 
unity is understood theologically and not just historically (in other words, the unity is not merely a 
reflection of the fact that the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament are part of a common historical 
movement, the latter rooted in the former). Thus, de Lubac can say, “Christian thought, entirely directed 
as it is to showing the Fact of Christ in all its dimensions and under all its aspects, is essentially 
dialectical on the subject of mutual relationships of the two Testaments. It contrasts these relationships, 
to the point of making them contradictory…”—but so radical a contradiction does not remain without a 
still deeper recognition of the peace Christ brings: “…and it also unites them, to the point of blending 
them into one.” Henri de Lubac, Scripture in the Tradition (New York: Crossroad/Herder, 2000), 173. 
  Therefore, having drawn the bright line of dialectic, de Lubac seems to have a special enthusiasm 
for describing and celebrating super-eminent unity. Rather than merely acknowledging how the New 
Testament fulfills isolated types, shadows, or trajectories in the Old Testament, de Lubac emphasizes that 
Jesus Christ takes up and fulfills the first covenant in its totality, preserving it and elevating it as a 
whole—the prophetic and the priestly, Sinai and Zion. Thus, de Lubac points out that, in the book of 
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approaching the riches of Christ. Furthermore, insofar as Yom Kippur is the fullest 
liturgical expression of the life of the temple in ritual motion, especially in the context of 
sin, it would seem that any “conspiracy” between Jesus and temple would also involve 
reflection on the shape of the highest holy day as it pertains to the savior’s atoning action.   
It is not, obviously, an entirely novel idea to reflect on Yom Kippur when 
developing a theology of atonement. Many of the contemporary Christian theologians 
who have offered interpretations of the cross refer to the cultic rituals of Leviticus 
generally, and the Day of Atonement specifically. While space does not permit a 
thorough review of these modern works, two points can be made. First, it is frequently 
the case that in these works of Christian soteriology, Yom Kippur is cited only in passing, 
as a small piece of evidence to support an argument constructed on other grounds. This 
tendency is regrettable given the centrality of Leviticus 16 in the Torah, but perhaps 
systematic theologians will, more and more, follow the trends in New Testament 
                                                 
Hebrews, there is an “idealization” of the Old. Ibid., 44. Patristic and medieval interpreters rejoiced in 
finding the “symphony” of the two. Ibid., 46. The continuity is so great that it might be called “flawless.” 
Ibid., 101. De Lubac speaks of a “conversion and exaltation” of the Old in the New, Ibid., 131., and 
insists that if we use the language of “fulfillment” it should be interpreted as “transfiguration.” Ibid., 182. 
In the end, we do not have supersession, but transformation: the same reality beaming with new glory.  
  For de Lubac, at the center of this back and forth between dialectic and continuity stands the cross 
of Jesus Christ: 
 Jesus is Exegete of Scripture pre-eminently in the act in which he fulfills his mission at the solemn 
hour for which he came: in the act of sacrifice, at the hour of his death on the Cross. It is then that 
he says in substance: Behold, I make all things new, Ecce nova facio omnia. It is then that he kills 
the shadow and images, as to their letter, and reveals their spirit, from which those who believe in 
him will live. This is divine alchemy… Ibid., 109. 
 De Lubac is quite clear about the fact that the cross is so great a light that no shadow survives, so 
concrete a form that every partial image surrenders. And even so, this great brilliance that overwhelms 
every shadow is ultimately the Easter light, and thus it is the death that gives life, the spirit that 
illuminates each letter in its permanent integrity. Therefore, the proper vocabulary, when describing letter 
and spirit, must ultimately be one of transfiguration, life-giving, and renewal: “The [spirit] transfigures 
the [letter]. It absorbs it into itself. In a word, it changes the letter of the [Old Testament] into spirit.” 
Ibid., 90. Based on all this, my primary claim is that the history of Israel presents a complex and 
multifaceted form, a rich pattern, that is taken up by Christ and transfigured, but in a way that preserves 
the form in its integrity and does not destroy it. Therefore, careful attention to the shape of history 
clarifies the work of Christ and provides us with the right context for properly interpreting this work. 
This is especially true with respect to the temple, which is such a central symbol in biblical theology. 
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scholarship and become increasingly attuned to the significance of the original Jewish 
context for Christian theology. Second, as I will show below, many of these 
interpretations effectively “conflate” the theological meaning of the two goats, failing to 
see how, in the Jewish theological tradition, the movements of the two goats are distinct 
in crucial ways. This fundamental confusion has had a mischievous effect on Christian 
interpretations of Christ’s cross.  
In this chapter, therefore, we turn our full attention to the earliest Christian 
sources, and it will be quickly apparent that, just as these early Christians associated 
messianic theology with temple theology, the theology of Yom Kippur was also 
foundational in understanding the saving work of Christ both in the New Testament and 
in the church fathers. The question now is whether these authoritative Christian texts 
themselves validate the conflation of the two goats, which is so common today, or 
whether the New Testament and the Church fathers were more sensitive to the 
complexity of Jewish Yom Kippur soteriology than modern interpreters? I hope to show 
that once we achieve greater clarity about the authentic Jewish interpretation of Yom 
Kippur, it is possible to return to the New Testament and patristic texts and find that, as a 
rule, the distinction between the joyful, uplifting movement of the YHWH-goat and the 
mournful, substitutionary movement of the Azazel-goat is consistently maintained, and 
thus any contemporary Yom Kippur soteriology would indeed be more faithful to the 
biblical tradition if it continued to carefully observe the distinction. 
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Yom Kippur: Reconfigurations in Judaism and Christianity 
Yom Kippur in Cosmic Scope: Jewish Apocalyptic 
 While we will find that the New Testament does indeed contain a fair number of 
texts which allude—more or less explicitly—to the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ offering and/or Yom Kippur, 
there is one additional Jewish text from the second temple period that really demands 
attention, because this text suggests how Yom Kippur’s influence on early Christianity 
may be more pervasive than it initially seems. One of the most important non-biblical 
texts for the development of post-biblical Judaism and Christianity is the collection now 
known as 1 Enoch, and especially the first tractate, The Book of the Watchers. This book, 
which emerges from a priestly milieu8 in the third century BC, takes the theological 
landscape of Yom Kippur and enlarges it to eschatological proportions. The early 
chapters of the book interweave accounts of the two leaders of the fallen “watchers” (or 
angels), one named Shemihazah, the other named Asa’el or Azazel.  
The first thread is an expansive retelling of Genesis 6:1-4, the bizarre story of the 
“divine beings” who take the “daughters of men” as wives, and who together give birth to 
                                                 
8 The relationship between the “Book of the Watchers” and the Jerusalem temple—especially the Zadokite 
priests serving the temple—has generated many debates. Some see evidence of different factions, and 
thus interpret Enochic texts as hostile to the official cult. In contrast, James VanderKam defends the 
thesis that “the separation into different types of Judaism, the highlighting of oppositions, is too rigid if it 
does not allow space for the many examples of cross-fertilization attested in the sources.” “Mapping 
Second Temple Judaism,” in The Early Enoch Literature, ed. Gabriele Boccaccini and John J. Collins 
(BRILL, 2007), 20. As we discussed in chapter two, one often finds biblical scholars and historians of 
ancient Judaism interpreting difference as division, implying that interest in heavenly realities suggests 
hostility to earthly institutions. Of course this is possible, but if the earthly temple were understood as an 
icon of the heavenly mysteries—if they were, in Douglas’ way of putting things, in analogical or 
correlative relationship with one another—then re-describing one reality in “higher” terms is not in itself 
evidence of polemics. That others could later use the “higher” to critique the mundane representation 
may nevertheless occur. Cf. Lester L. Grabbe, A History of the Jews and Judaism in the Second Temple 
Period, Volume 2: The Coming of the Greeks: The Early Hellenistic Period (335-175 BCE) (A&C Black, 
2008), 240–42; Himmelfarb, Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses, 22–23, 27–28. 
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the “Nephilim”—the latter are further identified as “the mighty men…the men of 
renown.” Enoch parallels the Septuagint in translating Nephilim as γίγαντες, gígantes—
or in English, giants,9 and The Book of the Watchers dramatically elaborates on the story 
of the watchers and their misbegotten children. Shemihazah is introduced as a leader of 
the lustful watchers, and the giants are depicted as a tragic addition to the world: “They 
were devouring the labor of all the sons of men…And the giants began to kill men and to 
devour them…” (1 Enoch 7:3-4).10  
In an important study, Paul Hanson argues this almost-cinematic re-telling of 
Genesis 6:1-4 has four movements, which are the hallmarks of the “rebellion-in-heaven” 
genre: rebellion, devastation, punishment, restoration. As to the second movement, 
Hanson emphasizes that “rebellion against the order of the Most High unleashes the 
forces of chaos,”11 which is also exhibited in the Genesis account: “The earth became 
corrupt before God; the earth was filled with lawlessness” (6:11). But while the story of 
Shemihazah and the other fallen watchers delivers the narrative of rebellion and 
devastation, Hanson believes that in itself Genesis 6 lacked the threads needed to develop 
the final two themes: punishment and restoration. For these, he says, the writers turn to 
the imagery of Leviticus 16, and thus weaves in material about another arch-demon: 
Azazel.12 This next section of the text therefore begins by working Asa’el/Azazel into the 
                                                 
9 For more on the Hebrew Nephilim and the Greek giants, see Loren T. Stuckenbruck, “The Origins of Evil 
in Jewish Apocalyptic Tradition: The Interpretation of Genesis 6: 1-4 in the Second and Third Centuries 
BCE.,” 2004. 
10 Translations of 1 Enoch in this section are from George W. E. Nickelsburg and James C. VanderKam, 1 
Enoch: The Hermeneia Translation (Fortress Press, 2012), 19–49. 
11 Hanson, “Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel, and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 Enoch 6 -11,” 199. 
12 Hanson gives an interesting explanation of how the connection between Genesis 6:1-4 and Leviticus 16 
was made. In a list of twenty demon’s names given in the Shemihazah material, “Asael” is mentioned in 
passing. Hanson speculates that perhaps the name Asael triggered the association: “the name invited 
comparison with the scapegoat in the textus classicus of yom kippur in Leviticus 16 with the like-
sounding name of Azazel. Since the main theme of the Shemihazah story was the origin of evil and its 
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story,13 suggesting that his activities were also integral to the spread of sin in the world. It 
says that Asa’el introduced instruments of war and lust into human society, and that he 
had illicitly revealed heavenly secrets. All this created immense suffering among humans, 
and caused them to cry out to God for relief. The holy ones of heaven—including 
Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael—received this complaint and brought it to God. They 
point out to God that Asa’el “has taught all iniquity on the earth” (1 Enoch 9:6). 
 In response, God gives the following command to Raphael: “…bind Asa’el hand 
and foot, and cast him into the darkness; And make an opening in the wilderness that is in 
Doudael. Throw him there, and lay beneath him sharp and jagged stones. And cover him 
with darkness, and let him dwell there for an exceedingly long time” (10:4-6). Another 
nearby passage reads, “And all the earth was made desolate by the deeds of the teaching 
of Asa’el, and over him write all the sins” (v. 8). After the whole earth had been 
corrupted by his teaching, all sin has been written over Azazel, and he is cast into the 
darkness of a desert pit. According to the text, the result of this expulsion is a restoration 
                                                 
eradication from the earth, the appropriateness must have seemed compelling for creating an expository 
connection with the community’s primary rite dealing with purgation…” Ibid., 221. Others have more or 
less strongly downplayed the connection to Yom Kippur; cf. George W. E. Nickelsburg, “Apocalyptic 
and Myth in 1 Enoch 6-11,” Journal of Biblical Literature 96, no. 3 (September 1, 1977): 399–404, 
doi:10.2307/3266192; Archie T. Wright, The Origin of Evil Spirits: The Reception of Genesis 6: 1-4 in 
Early Jewish Literature (Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 105–20. For more recent defenses of the connection 
between 1 Enoch 10 and Yom Kippur, see Andrei Orlov, The Atoning Dyad: The Two Goats of Yom 
Kippur in the Apocalypse of Abraham (Boston: Brill Academic Pub, 2016), 49–57; Daniel Stökl Ben 
Ezra, “Yom Kippur in the Apocalyptic Imaginaire and the Roots of Jesus’ High Priesthood : Yom Kippur 
in Zechariah 3, 1 Enoch 10, 11QMelkizedeq, Hebrews and the Apocalypse of Abraham 13,” in 
Transformations of the Inner Self in Ancient Religions (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 351–57; Stökl Ben Ezra, 
The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 85–90; R. Helm, “Azazel in Early Jewish Tradition,” 
Andrews University Seminary Studies 32, no. 3 (1994): 217–22. 
13 The Aramaic manuscript seems to use Asa’el throughout, while the Ethiopic generally uses Azazel. See 
Wright, The Origin of Evil Spirits, 110. As mentioned, there is debate over whether the Asa’el/Azazel 
connection was original; even so, it is clear in other ancient texts that the idea of Azazel as an arch-
demon became prominent it the late-second temple period, whether or not the association is present in the 
earliest strata of Watchers. As Azazel grew in devilish stature, the connection between 1 Enoch’s Asa’el 
and Yom Kippur’s Azazel likely increased in the imagination of readers. For arguments in favor of an 
early connection between Asa’el and Azazel, see Stökl Ben Ezra, “Yom Kippur in the Apocalyptic 
Imaginaire and the Roots of Jesus’ High Priesthood,” 353. 
283 
 
of life to the earth, and the extent of the earth’s purification is suggested later in the same 
section:  
Cleanse the earth from all impurity and from all wrong and from all lawlessness 
and from all sin, and godlessness and all impurities that have come upon the earth, 
remove. And all the sons of men will become righteous, and all the peoples will 
worship (me), and all will bless me and prostrate themselves. And all the earth 
will be cleansed from all defilement and from all uncleanness, and I shall not 
again send upon them any wrath or scourge for all the generations of eternity. 
(10:20-22) 
 
Therefore, after considering various explanations for the advent of sin in the world—
seeing it to be the result of teaching illicit knowledge, or an illicit sexual union between 
heaven and earth, or the product of the misbegotten giants—the text turns to the final 
expulsion of sins and the restoration of creation.  
 The second half of the Book of the Watchers opens with the words, “Before these 
things, Enoch was taken…” (12:1) Thus begins the story of the great scribe Enoch; these 
words are an allusion to the enchanting genealogical note found a chapter earlier in 
Genesis: “All the days of Enoch came to 365 years. Enoch walked with God; then he was 
no more, for God took him” (5:23-24). As I briefly mentioned in chapter two, through the 
keyhole of this passage, many fantastic journeys were taken by later Jewish mystics. 
When Enoch was “taken” by God, the priestly mystics explained, he was taken up into 
the heavenly realm and invited to survey the mysteries of time, space, and eternity. Thus 
he became the tour guide par excellence for those called to higher contemplation. 
Enoch’s great visions of the inner throne room of God helped establish the precedent for 
all future accounts of heavenly journeys.14 In this story, Enoch becomes the mediator 
between God and the fallen watchers; the latter have asked Enoch to petition God to 
                                                 
14 For the way in which The Book of the Watchers represents a transition from earlier prophetic literature to 
later heavenly journeys, see Himmelfarb, Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses, 9–28. 
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forgive their sins. To that end, Enoch makes his unforgettable entrance into the divine 
throne room:  
And look, another open door before me: and a house greater than the former one, 
and it was all built of tongues of fire. All of it so excelled in glory and splendor 
and majesty that I am unable to describe for you its glory and majesty…And I 
was looking and I saw a lofty throne; and its appearance was like ice, and its 
wheels were like the shining sun… The Great Glory sat upon it; his apparel was 
like the appearance of the sun and whiter than much snow. No angel could enter 
into this house and look at his face because of the splendor and glory, and no 
human could look at him…Until now I had been on my face, prostrate and 
trembling. And the Lord called me with his mouth and said to me, “Come here, 
Enoch, and hear my word(s).” (14:15-24) 
 
From inside this great and glorious abode, God gives Enoch instructions on what to say to 
the watchers. It is Enoch’s responsibility to deliver the negative judgment against them, 
culminating with a haunting line: “You will have no peace” (16:4). 
 The chronology and geography of 1 Enoch is not always easy to follow; whether 
that is because it is a composite text or whether it is due to the idiosyncrasies of the genre 
is debatable. In any case, Enoch’s visions of the heavenly throne room (the holy of 
holies) is said to occur chronologically “before” the account of how the rogue watchers 
and the destructive giants are cast out into the desert wilderness. Therefore, the 
overarching narrative, confusing as it is, still seems patterned on Yom Kippur’s liturgical 
stage, now depicted as encompassing the highest heaven—the space of splendor, glory, 
and Presence—and the nethermost abyss—which is depicted as a “chaotic and terrible 
place” (21:1). God invites Enoch to “draw near” to him in the heavenly holy of holies, 
and from that space Enoch receives the responsibility to pronounce judgement on the 
fiendish spirits who have filled the good creation with all manner of violence and evil. 
 Many commentators see this narrative as an alternative etiology for the 
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introduction of evil into the world.15 Rather than the well-known Jewish story in which 
human beings introduce evil through their disobedience (and are called upon to resist evil 
through cultic rites), here humans are the victims of evil, which has been introduced by 
rebellious angels (and thus must wait upon God’s intervention).16 After our review of 
Milgrom’s insights into the nature of sin in priestly thought, which is both rooted in 
human misdeeds and yet “demonically” vital, I wonder if it is really necessary to read the 
Enochic approach as an incompatible alternative to the biblical focus on human 
culpability for evil. Perhaps the Book of the Watchers recounts the typical priestly 
perspective on holiness and sin, but now in a different genre: mythology. Why would 
priestly theologians turn to mythopoetics to supplement their typical historical and cultic 
modes of reflection? Drawing on the work of Ian Davie, Stratford Caldecott offers a 
helpful theory:  
Having distinguished the vertical (ontological) dimension from the horizontal 
(historical, empirical), [Davie] explains that the “vertical” is always best 
expressed in poetry and myth. This leads him to deplore the “demythologization” 
of religion. In a theological context, he says, the word “mythology” means “the 
horizontal (i.e., spatio-temporal) representation of a vertical (i.e., eternal) 
truth…The theological method... is neither one nor the other; neither mythological 
nor historical, but a combination of both. Thus it uses history as a critique of 
myth, and myth as a critique of history; for the whole theological purport of myth 
is to indicate the limits of history, to elicit from the mythological language (which 
it necessarily uses in speaking of events which are transhistorical, in the exact 
                                                 
15 For a clear expression of this view, see Gabriele Boccaccini, Beyond the Essene Hypothesis: The Parting 
of the Ways Between Qumran and Enochic Judaism (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1998), 71–74. 
According to Boccaccini, “The ideology of the authors of the Enoch documents directly opposed that of 
the Zadokites. The catalyst was a particular concept of the origin of evil that portrayed a group of 
rebellious angels as ultimately responsible for the spread of evil and impurity on earth.” Ibid., 72. He 
later adds, “The myth of the fallen angels was not merely a bizarre or folkloric expansion of ancient 
legends; it disrupted the very foundations of Zadokite Judaism. Enochic Judaism directly challenged the 
legitimacy of the second temple and its priesthood.” Ibid., 73–74. 
16 Again, Boccaccini: “For the Enochians, the power that the house of Zadok claims is mere illusion, if not 
the guilty pretentiousness of evil usurpers. Evil and impurity are uncontrollable, and human beings, 
including the proud priests of Jerusalem, are powerless. The only hope is God’s intervention.” 
Boccaccini, Beyond the Essene Hypothesis, 74. Obviously this view is rooted in, and is supportive of, the 
conclusion that Watchers is a polemic against the Jerusalem establishment. I have already raised doubts 
about the obviousness of this proposal. See footnote 8 above. 
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sense that they are limits of history) a sense of what lies beyond history, the 
‘beyond’ of all time.”17 
   
With this in mind, I am reminded again of Przywara’s noetic rule: truth in-and-beyond 
history. In capturing a sense of the “beyond,” many turn to myth in an effort to articulate 
“vertical” realities that so vastly exceed the limitations of our ponderous tongues.  
 Priestly intuitions about the strange ontology of sin—a force that is alien to God’s 
will and God’s good creation and yet substantively active in the cosmos—requires a 
gallery of images that exceed the strictly horizontal. When we take into consideration (a) 
the drama of the watchers, (b) the increasingly bold colors of heaven and hell, and (c) the 
strange possibility of “giants” that are partially of human origin and yet are not quite 
human...when we look at all this fantastic material and tilt our heads to the side, it is 
possible to see The Book of the Watchers as a dramatic retelling of Leviticus 1-16. 
Consider this statement from the Watchers on the fate of the giants after the flood: 
But now the giants who were begotten by the spirits and flesh—they will call 
them evil spirits on the earth, for their dwelling will be on the earth. The spirits 
that have gone forth from the body of their flesh are evil spirits, for from humans 
they came into being, and from the holy watchers was the origin of their 
creation… And the spirits of the giants [lead astray], do violence, make desolate, 
and attack and wrestle and hurl upon the earth and [cause illnesses]…These spirits 
(will) rise up against the sons of men and against the women, for they have come 
forth from them. (15:8-12) 
 
What happens if we read these words in the context of Milgrom’s discoveries about sin 
and sanctuary in Levitical theology? Milgrom, Schwartz and Anderson struggled to find a 
vocabulary for the “reality” of the sins that both weigh down humans and invade the 
temple, but here the Book of the Watchers steps in with the notion of “evil spirits” that are 
                                                 
17 Stratford Caldecott, The Radiance of Being: Dimensions of Cosmic Christianity (Tacoma, WA: Angelico 
Press, 2013), 166–67; Caldecott is quoting Ian Davie, Jesus Purusha: A Vedanta-Based Doctrine of Jesus 
(West Stockbridge, MA : New York, NY: Lindisfarne Pr, 1985), 117–18. 
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not created by God—and that are not beings independent of or threatening to the one 
Creator (in a polytheistic sense)—but rather are products of corrupted flesh that seek the 
destruction of the world. This passage is clear that the misborn “spirits” are at war against 
human kind, trying to bring the world to desolation, which is precisely the problem that 
the liturgy of Yom Kippur is intended to confront: to purge the sanctuary (the micro-
cosmos) of just such evils! Indeed, Watchers and Leviticus 16 agree that the only solution 
for such evil is expulsion, and so in both cases evil is condemned to the abyss. With this 
in mind, the idea that Enoch has an etiology that radically diverges from other Hebrew 
traditions is questionable; perhaps the same “reality” is simply being articulated in 
different theological genres.18 
 As we move toward the nativity of Jesus Christ, it is helpful to see how the 
priestly myth of the watchers accentuates the significance of Yom Kippur soteriology. 
Now it is clear that, within early Jewish theology itself, the high priest’s actions in this 
great liturgy anticipate, and perhaps even participate in, the final judgment, when God 
will cast down the “giants” of our world, the evil spirits that prowl across the earth and 
through our lives, and how—yet more importantly—God will raise all creation to new 
life.19 It is very clear in 1 Enoch that violence and chaos have no future, and that in the 
end all will be peace, glory, praise, and delight. The king shall return to the earth, and his 
judgement shall be sure and true.  
                                                 
18 Therefore, I agree with Hanson when he speaks of a “mythologization and eschatologization of the yom 
kippur ritual” in 1 Enoch 6-11, although I disagree when he says that this is strong evidence of a 
“sectarian point of view” because “the normal means provided by the temple cult for dealing with 
defilement is implicitly judged ineffectual…The locus of purgation is transferred from the temple 
courtyard to the heavenly realm.” Hanson, “Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel, and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 
Enoch 6-11,” 226. Is it not possible that Watchers was written to provide a window into the mystical 
realities behind the temple liturgy, thus investing the liturgy with more honor, not less? Cf. Himmelfarb, 
Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses, 27. 
19 Cf. Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 89–90. 
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Yom Kippur and the Messiah: The New Covenant 
Much more can be said on the various appropriations of Yom Kippur themes in 
the Second Temple period; indeed, much more has been said in recent scholarship, and 
Daniel Stökl ben Ezra’s work is an especially thorough overview of the material.20 
Drawing on his work, I will review a few New Testament texts that apply Day of 
Atonement themes to the saving work of Jesus Christ. The one point that I want to 
especially emphasize—and it seems to me that this point has not been so strongly 
emphasized in previous scholarship—is the need to clearly distinguish the 
complementary work of the two goats in considering how any given passage is drawing 
on Yom Kippur themes. In other words, some texts draw on imagery that is associated 
with the YHWH-goat, while other texts draw on imagery best associated with the Azazel-
goat. When theologians fail to distinguish the two “goats”—each of whom represents a 
unique constellation of symbols—and when they apply the hallmarks of one goat to the 
other, this lack of precision can result in significant theological confusion. 
The fact is that, with respect to some of the most well-known contemporary 
Christian soteriologies, we find that the problem of “conflation” is nearly ubiquitous in 
their interpretations of Yom Kippur, and this fundamental mistake has the effect of 
warping their understanding of Christ’s cross more generally. An excellent example of 
this tendency is found in The Cross of Christ, John Stott’s classic defense of penal 
                                                 
20 Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity. An even more recent collection of 
essays covers much of the same ground: Thomas Hieke and Tobias Nicklas, eds., The Day of Atonement: 
Its Interpretations in Early Jewish and Christian Traditions (BRILL, 2011). For continuing development 
of Second Temple themes in the Jewish mystical traditions, Orlov, Heavenly Priesthood in the 
Apocalypse of Abraham; Orlov, Divine Scapegoats, 2015; Orlov, The Atoning Dyad. See also the 
sections in Stökl that deal with the Apocalypse of Abraham, the Dead Sea Scrolls, Jubilees, and the 
further transformation/interiorization of Yom Kippur themes in Philo and Josephus.  
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substitutionary atonement. In the section where he reflects on the Day of Atonement, 
Stott’s overall goal is to argue that the phrase “to bear sin” in the Old Testament should 
be taken to mean “to endure [sins’] penal consequences, to undergo its penalty”21—that 
is, to suffer the penalty of death. The best example of this, he says, is found in Leviticus 
16. Stott argues that while some interpreters mistakenly drive a “wedge” between the 
goats, T.J. Crawford’s interpretation is more acceptable: “each [goat] embodied a 
different aspect of the same sacrifice, ‘the one exhibiting the means, the other the results, 
of the atonement.’”22 Stott, therefore, certainly does not drive a wedge between the 
goats,23 but to the contrary, he argues instead that both equally express the doctrine of 
penal substitution, both ultimately bearing punishment on behalf of sinners. The only 
differentiation between the two goats it that that one illustrates the nature of the penalty 
(death) and the other communicates the result of that penalty (removal of sin).24 What 
seems clear is that both goats are participants in a single act of (violent) punishment that 
God requires as a condition of divine forgiveness.  
The conflation of the two goats under an umbrella of violent action is by no 
means unique to defenders of penal substitutionary atonement. In fact, many of this 
                                                 
21 John Stott, The Cross of Christ (Westmont, IL: IVP Books, 2006), 143. 
22 Ibid., 144. 
23 And, as an aside, one can certainly agree with Stott that such a radical separation of the goats would 
indeed be inappropriate, both from the perspective of temple theology (since the goats are, together, one 
ḥaṭṭā’ṯ), and thus also deleterious to Christian soteriology. I will make this argument in the next chapter.  
24 This interpretation is certainly not unique to Stott and Crawford. For example, in another essay defending 
penal substitutionary atonement, Charles Hill similarly argues that the two goats are “in reality one 
sacrificial object; the distribution of suffering death and of dismissal into a remote place simply serving 
the purpose of clearer expression, in visible form, of the removal of sin after expiation had been made, 
something which the ordinary sacrificial animal could not well express, since it died in the process of 
expiation.” Geerhardus Vos quoted by Charles E. Hill, “Atonement in the Old and New Testaments,” in 
The Glory of the Atonement: Biblical, Theological & Practical Perspectives, ed. Charles E. Hill and 
Frank A. James III (Westmont, IL: IVP Academic, 2004), 25f. Similarly, Emile Nicole, “Atonement in 
the Pentateuch,” in The Glory of the Atonement: Biblical, Theological & Practical Perspectives, ed. 
Charles E. Hill and Frank A. James III (Westmont, IL: IVP Academic, 2004), 44f. 
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theory’s strongest critics nevertheless agree that ancient Jewish cultic practices have deep 
violent roots. For example, René Girard and his followers, who are certainly not 
advocates of penal substitutionary atonement, nevertheless use the words “sacrifice” and 
“scapegoat” interchangeably, all to designate a violent act of exclusion that helps to 
create a twisted peace in a broken community. Thus, when S. Mark Heim turns to 
Leviticus 16, he says: 
At the center of Israel’s ritual life we find an event bearing all the marks we 
outlined in the last chapter [that is, the key elements of Girard’s sacrificial 
theory]. The community centers its collective violence on a representative 
sacrifice, which is charged with all the guilt and sins that pollute and threaten the 
people, and driven out and off a cliff—the very image of mob violence against a 
human scapegoat. What is striking is that the process is not that it differs from that 
model, but that it is so extraordinarily explicit…25 
 
The primary difference between penal substitutionary atonement theorists and Girardians 
with respect to the interpretation of Yom Kippur is that the former believe that God 
validates and requires the penalty of death, while the latter believe that these sacrificial 
practices are recorded in the Hebrew Bible, not because God endorses them, but to give 
an vivid example of the “scapegoating mechanism” that will ultimately be overcome 
through prophetic critique and, finally, the vindicating resurrection of Christ.26  
Therefore, in some of the most prominent modern interpretations of atonement, 
the two goats are seen as a single symbol of violent death, and thus Mount Zion becomes 
                                                 
25 S. Mark Heim, Saved from Sacrifice: A Theology of the Cross (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2006), 77. Girard himself reflects on the scapegoat ritual most extensively in I See Satan Fall 
Light Lightning, trans. James G. Williams (New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 154 ff. 
26 The thing that makes Leviticus 16 unique, according to the Girardians, is how explicit it is about the 
singular violence of sacrifice and “scapegoating.” From their perspective, sacrificial violence must be 
veiled to succeed long term, but on Yom Kippur the death and expulsion are vividly depicted. Raymund 
Schwager, S.J. explains: “According to Girard this rite has no significance fundamentally different from 
other cult activities except that the hidden function of all rites is shown somewhat more clearly.” Must 
There Be Scapegoats?: Violence and Redemption in the Bible (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 87; Cf. 
Raymund Schwager, Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Toward a Biblical Doctrine of Redemption (New 
York: Crossroad Pub., 1999), 91, 104–5.  
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the mountain of penal substitutionary violence, or the mountain of scapegoating violence, 
or even the mountain of patriarchal abuse and oppression. An additional consequence of 
this conflation is that, when these same interpreters turn to some of the most famous (and 
the most controversial) New Testament texts relating to atonement, and when they find 
Paul or Peter or anyone else using cultic imagery, their imprecise understanding of Yom 
Kippur can skew their reading of the texts. Words associated with one “goat” are 
imported into a context that is, in fact, focusing on Christ’s fulfillment of the work of the 
other “goat,” and thus—I argue—the original author’s meaning is garbled. Therefore, for 
an adequate contemporary Christian soteriology that is rightly attentive to ancient Jewish 
priestly theology and that is simultaneously rooted in the New Testament’s own 
interpretation of Christ’s saving work, it is essential to draw clear and consistent 
distinctions and qualifications.  
With that in mind, we should review the leading images and theological concepts 
associated with each of the two goats, as discussed in the previous chapters. To start, it is 
essential to emphasize and emphasize again that, even though the goats are together 
necessary for final purification, the YHWH-goat alone is an offering to God. The Azazel-
goat, on the other hand, is not an offering in priestly theology, but a mere “vehicle” for 
removing sin. The first goat is spotless, unblemished, while the second goat is fouled 
with all the world’s filth; Milgrom points out that, according to ancient Near Eastern 
assumptions, the latter goat would not be acceptable as an offering, certainly not to an all-
holy God, and not even to a demon.27 The imagery of the YHWH-goat is active, it is 
associated with the positive movement of “drawing near,” while the imagery of the 
                                                 
27 Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. The Anchor 
Bible, 1991, 1021. 
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second goat is passive, it is “led away” by another. In terms of spiritual geography, the 
first is turned toward the holy of holies, the heart of the world, and the second toward the 
outer wilderness, the extreme abyss. While heaven and hell are not prominent themes in 
the Hebrew Bible, the contrast between Eden and exile is clear. As I have argued, through 
the Akedah of Abraham and Isaac, the covenant people have a glimpse at the paradise 
lost in Adam and Eve, and in the Babylonian exile they endure what could essentially be 
identified as Godforsaken damnation. Each of the two goats is associated with either this 
heaven or this hell, a contrast that is subsequently pushed into eternal, eschatological 
scope in the Book of the Watchers. 
We now know that the temple, and the goat associated with the temple, is the 
place of “life-sustaining order,” the source of light, living water, and true freedom. The 
key word, over and over again, is life, and its leading symbol is the flowing blood that 
vivifies the whole body. We also know that the wilderness, and the goat associated with 
the wilderness, is the place of chaos, a vast void of darkness, it is desert, it is crushing 
burden, helpless bondage. The key word here is death, and its leading symbol is dust as 
every vital bond breaks away and scatters. We have seen how—paradoxically from a 
modern standpoint—the biblical concept of freedom is associated with obedience and 
heart-to-heart communion with God, while spiritual oppression is associated with 
rebellion against God and neighbor, the division (diabolos) that ends in despair. 
Even though the offering of the YHWH-goat is adapted to the context of sin, it is 
fundamentally rooted in a surpassing joy and peace, it recapitulates the well-ordered 
creation, and through it the glory of God shines through once more. Of course, this is 
sharply different form the movement of the Azazel-goat, who knows only lamentation,  
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TABLE 1: Distinguishing the Goats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
who shoulders the nonintegrable “remainder” of sin, that which can only be mournfully 
sent away, that which can no longer give glory, but only horror. It is the difference 
between, on the one side, righteousness and holiness, and on the other side, punishment 
Goat for the Lord Goat for Azazel 
An offering Not an offering 
Spotless Sin-bearing 
“Draws near” (active) Led away (passive) 
Holy of Holies Wilderness 
Edenic (Akedah) Damned (Babylonian Exile) 
Peace Violence 
Order Chaos 
Life Death  
Light Darkness 
Freedom Burden/Bondage 
Blood Dust 
Obedience Rebellion 
(Rooted in) joy  Lamentation 
Glory Horror 
Unity Division 
Communion Enmity 
Recapitulation Remainder 
Righteousness Punishment 
Lifted up Thrown down 
Sacramental Substitutionary 
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and loss. Therefore, finally, the first goat is a true sacrament, intended to lift up all 
creation in its fullness and fruitfulness, to draw all creation into the movement that it 
perfects, while the second goat is a true substitute, cast out and cast down, bearing away 
the suffering we’ve created, for our sake and for our salvation.  
Yes, it is essential to distinguish the goats. Concepts like death, punishment, and 
hell are incongruous with the theological symbolism of the YHWH-goat, just as concepts 
like sacrifice/offering, spotlessness, and life are in tension with the theology of the 
Azazel-goat. This is not to say that the two goats are wholly divided, but the unity cannot 
be fully appreciated until the distinction is clearly drawn. Therefore, as we consider a few 
exemplary New Testament soteriological texts, we should remember an analogous 
patristic practice: just as the early church developed a sophisticated hermeneutic when 
considering what was being said with reference to Jesus’s divine nature and what was 
being said with reference to his human nature, without conceding separation between the 
two, we should be similarly careful to associate the different aspects of Christ’s saving 
work with the movements of the two goats. 
The Book of Hebrews 
The New Testament text with the most explicit and sustained use of priestly 
temple imagery generally, and Yom Kippur imagery specifically, is the ninth and tenth 
chapters of the book of Hebrews. The first thing to notice is that these chapters primarily 
deal with Christ’s fulfillment of the pattern specific to the high priest’s YHWH-goat 
offering, and it elaborates on this theme with early Christian reflections on the limitations 
of the ancient cult compared to Christ’s “once for all” offering. Now, the first issue with 
respect to Hebrews, the problem that could immediately sink our efforts at an analogical 
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reading of temple/sacrifice and Jesus Christ, is the major problem of whether the book of 
Hebrews is supersessionism. While we can sideline this question with respect to the book 
as a whole, we can at least say that the author of Hebrews does not deny the value and 
effectiveness of the ancient Jewish cult.28 This section of Hebrews must not be read as 
(so-called) “hard supersessionism.” After all, it says, “For if the blood of goats and bulls, 
with the sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer, sanctifies (hagiázei) those who have been 
defiled so that their flesh is purified (katharótēta), how much more (pósōi mâllon) will 
the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to 
God, purify (katharieî) our conscience from dead works to worship the living God!” 
(Hebrews 9:13-14)29 The suggestion here seems to be that, even as the Levitical cult 
succeeded, the crowning work of the high priest Jesus Christ succeeds that much more in 
sanctifying the whole person. In other words, the underlying Levitical theo-logic remains 
even as the purification found in Christ is more complete from the author’s perspective.30  
 According to the Gospel’s calendar, Christ’s death corresponded with the 
Passover, but in Hebrews, the spiritual reality encompasses more than temporal reality 
                                                 
28 Cf. Joshua Marlin Vis, “The Purification Offering of Leviticus and the Sacrificial Offering of Jesus” 
(Ph.D. diss., 2012), 261–62. 
29 The Greek words translated “purified” are both from the word katharos; the same word is used often in 
the Leviticus LXX passages for ritual purification. An especially striking example comes from the 
Septuagint translation of Leviticus 16: “And he shall sprinkle some of the blood on [the horns of the 
altar] with his finger seven times and pronounce it clean (katharieî) and hallow it (or sanctify it, 
hagiásei) from the uncleanness of the sons of Israel” (Lev 16:19-20, NETS). The words sprinkle, blood, 
sanctify, and purify all also appear here in Hebrews 9:13-14.  
30 Mayjee Philip comes to a similar conclusion: “The author’s rationale regarding Jesus’ sacrifice is 
governed by the OT in general and Leviticus in particular.” Mayjee Philip, Leviticus in Hebrews (Peter 
Lang, 2011), 59–60. Vis says, “The sacrificial system of Israel is subjected to scrutiny and found 
wanting. However, the fundamentals of the system are affirmed.” Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 
261. And again, for Christian Eberhart: “It may be pointed out that throughout this argumentation, the 
general validity of the cult has remained unquestioned. The soteriological concept of Christ‘s sacriﬁce 
and the puriﬁcation it effects are developed in analogy to the Levitical sacriﬁce, which means that the 
latter is taken for granted so that the validity of the earlier can be derived from it.” “Characteristics of 
Sacrificial Metaphors in Hebrews,” 59.  
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can contain. Reviewing a number of other New Testament texts, one scholar has pointed 
out that “early Christians engaged in a process of Yom Kippuring Passover,”31 and so by 
the time Hebrews was written the connection between Jesus’ Passover death and 
resurrection and the priestly rites of atonement was apparently well established. Hebrews 
extends the effort to associate Christ with atonement by performing a complex 
comparison between the “new” and the “old,” structured through a series of sophisticated 
analogies, here called “parables” or “types” (cf. v. 9). These comparisons have been 
characterized in various ways,32 but the main idea is this: just as Yom Kippur (Lev 16) is 
the epitome of Israel’s regular cultic practices (Lev 1-5), so too is the offering of Jesus 
Christ the perfection of Israel’s sacred rites overall. This complex comparison has spatial 
and temporal permutations. Focusing first on the spatial, the ninth chapter opens with a 
brief blueprint of the “earthly sanctuary,” highlighting the furniture of the holy place and 
the holy of holies. The relationship between these two spheres of holiness—one outer, 
one inner; one higher, one lower—will serve as the model for the other distinctions made 
in the chapter. Thus, the author moves right into his first observation about the holy 
place: “the priests go continually into the first tent to carry out their ritual duties” (Heb. 
9:6)—notice, that’s priests plural, duties plural. This first tent is the realm of spatial 
movement and temporal change: people are coming and going, day in and day out. The 
inner tent (the holy of holies) is different: “only the high priest goes into the second, and 
                                                 
31 Jeffrey S. Siker, “Yom Kippuring Passover: Recombinant Sacrifice in Early Christianity,” in Ritual and 
Metaphor: Sacrifice in the Bible, ed. Christian A. Eberhart (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 
65. 
32 For example, Luke Timothy Johnson, Hebrews: A Commentary (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2006), 218–19; Steve Stanley, “Hebrews 9: 6–10: The ‘Parable’of the Tabernacle,” Novum 
Testamentum 37, no. 4 (1995): 385–399. For an alternative view, one which denies the typological 
reading, see Felix H. Cortez, “From the Holy to the Most Holy Place: The Period of Hebrews 9: 6 -10 and 
the Day of Atonement as a Metaphor of Transition,” Journal of Biblical Literature, 2006, 527–547. 
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he but once a year…” (v. 7). Here we find an emphasis on the unity, the oneness of the 
holy of holies, the place where the one Lord and Creator of the cosmos is enthroned in 
glory (cf. v. 5). This oneness is symbolically represented by the fact that the high priest 
alone enters, and this only once yearly.  
Having reflected on the relationship between one and many within Leviticus 
itself,33 the author of Hebrews shifts to the yet greater singularity of Jesus: “But when 
Christ came as a high priest of the good things that have come, then through the greater 
and perfect tent (not made with hands, that is, not of this creation), he entered once for all 
into the Holy Place, not with the blood of goats and calves, but with his own blood, thus 
obtaining eternal redemption” (9:11-12). There is substantial continuity here: Christ is a 
high priest, and like any high priest he enters the most holy place, and again like any high 
priest he draws near through the liturgical symbol of life. It is also clear that the 
immediate reason for this movement is purification from sin, which is exactly what we 
would expect if the author were drawing on Levitical YHWH-goat theology. First of all, 
the positive role of blood is reaffirmed: “Indeed, under the law almost everything is 
purified with blood…” (v. 22).34 But then, the Levitical sense that the sanctuary itself 
needs purification is also implied: “Thus it was necessary for the sketches of the heavenly 
things to be purified with these rites, but the heavenly things themselves need better 
sacrifices than these” (9:23).35 The presuppositions in this verse about the need for blood 
                                                 
33 The possible role of Platonic philosophy in these reflections is much discussed. Luke Timothy Johnson 
himself sees clear Platonic influence, while also showing how the author modifies Platonism in 
fundamental ways: Hebrews, 7–8, 15–21. In chapter two of this book, we also saw how some concepts 
that parallel Platonic cosmology could develop organically in the Jewish tradition of temple theology. 
Similarly, see Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 182–84. 
34 For much more on the meaning of “blood” in Hebrews according to recent scholarship, see chapter three, 
footnote 184. 
35 The word for “purified” in these two verses is katharizó. The word is used often in LXX Leviticus with 
reference to the purification rites, and is prominently featured in the concluding verses of the YHWH-goat 
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to purify the sanctuary are thus identical to the priestly presuppositions identified by 
Milgrom. It is hard to tell whether the author thinks that even the heavenly temple needs 
purification—which would indeed be a radical expansion of Levitical thought, perhaps 
the result of mixing microcosmic and mirror-of-heaven modes of reflection36—or if he 
simply reasons that if there is an “offering” in the heavenly temple it must be even more 
extraordinary than any earthly offerings. In either case, clearly the relationship between 
Father and Son in the eternal holy of holies is presented as the highest possible form of 
interpersonal “drawing near.” Therefore, the author again presupposes the continuing 
importance of the underlying principles of the priestly theological tradition. 
If the differences between traditional Jewish temple theology and the Christian 
book of Hebrews do not revolve around the problem of whether or not the cult itself is 
pointless or corrupt, and if the overarching validity of the Levitical perspective is taken 
for granted, then why does the book take such a seemingly negative tone toward the 
ancient cult? The dispute with the book of Hebrews is actually over more and less perfect 
actualizations within the same theological paradigm, and the main polemical question is 
whether Levitical offerings have the ability to make us “perfect.”37 And so: “Since the 
law has only a shadow of the good things to come and not the true form of these realities, 
it can never, by the same sacrifices that are continually offered year after year, make 
                                                 
ritual of Leviticus 16 (as discussed in footnote 29 above).  
36 Interesting possibilities for interpreting this verse are given by Harold W Attridge, The Epistle to the 
Hebrews: A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989), 260–62. 
One proposal that he mentions (and which he personally rejects) is that this is a reference to the final 
expulsion of the fallen angels. Certainly, as we have seen in the analysis of 1 Enoch, there is precedent 
for linking Yom Kippur with apocalyptic themes. Cf. Gabriella Gelardini, “The Inauguration Of Yom 
Kippur According To The LXX And Its Cessation Or Perpetuation According To The Book Of Hebrews: 
A Systematic Comparison,” The Day of Atonement: Its Interpretations in Early Jewish and Christian 
Traditions, 2011, 230. 
37 Cf. Johnson, Hebrews, 226. 
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perfect (teleiōsai) those who approach” (10:1). Now remember, the author has already 
acknowledged a measure of sanctification through the blood of goats and bulls (cf. 9:13), 
but in chapter ten there is a new emphasis on “once for all” perfection. This “perfection” 
is seen in the way that believers have unimpeded access to the holy of holies (in and 
through the all-purifying blood of Christ the high priest): “we have confidence to enter 
the sanctuary by the blood of Jesus…and since we have a great priest over the house of 
God, let us approach with a true heart in full assurance of faith, with our hearts sprinkled 
clean from an evil conscience and our bodies washed with pure water” (10:19-22). Such 
confidence would indeed have been very challenging for mainstream priestly theology, 
especially considering the trauma of Nadab and Abihu’s shocking deaths.38 For the 
author of Hebrews, this is the awe-inspiring difference that Christ makes. He enters the 
Holy Place “once for all,” and then—the text famously adds—he “sat down” (10:12).39 
Furthermore, unlike the high priests of old who approached with (quasi-) sacramental 
signs, the blood of the New Covenant is the high priest’s very own lifeblood. In other 
words, the high priest in this case pours himself out (cf. Philippians 2:7-8) with an 
intimacy that the Levitical priesthood could only intimate.40 
                                                 
38 For the relationship between the exalted goal of “perfection” and the hope of entering the Holy of Holies, 
see Stanley, “Hebrews 9,” 394–95.  
39 For a fascinating discussion of how this likely means that Jesus “sat down” on the “throne” of the ark of 
the covenant—which yet again accentuates the unparalleled uniqueness of Christ from the perspective of 
the author of this text—see Jody A. Barnard, The Mysticism of Hebrews: Exploring the Role of Jewish 
Apocalyptic Mysticism in the Epistle to the Hewbrews (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 144ff. 
40 There is a debate in recent commentaries over whether this reference to Jesus’ entering the holy of holies 
with his own blood is an allusion to his death or to his resurrection/ascension, a debate which also hinges 
on how the symbol of blood is interpreted. Attridge expresses a traditional scholarly view when he says, 
“Thus ‘blood’ could be the life that Christ offers eternally in heaven, or more likely, the sacrificial death 
that precedes that entry.” Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 248; cf. Johnson, Hebrews, 237. One of 
the great virtues of the most recent scholarship on Hebrews is its focus on the priestly theology of blood-
as-life, thus tilting interpreters away from associating atonement with death. See Willi-Plein, “Some 
Remarks on Hebrews from the Viewpoint of Old Testament Exegesis,” 33; David M. Moffitt, Atonement 
and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 256 ff; David M. 
Moffitt, “Blood, Life, and Atonement: Reassessing Hebrews’ Christological Appropriation of Yom 
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In all of this, my key argument here is that, even if the blood of Christ, through 
the eternal Spirit, opens the way to a deified life previously seen only in misty outline, 
this new possibility still assumes a Yom Kippur shape. It is still articulated in terms of the 
most basic biblical geography, oriented toward the paradisiacal center where the all-holy 
one dwells, and the most ancient rites, drawing near with the sign of life. Yes, the 
author’s major goal is to show, in careful detail, that Jesus Christ himself fulfills the 
positive, unifying movement of the High Priest and the YHWH-goat. 
                                                 
Kippur,” in Day of Atonement (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 218–19; Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 291 
ff.  
  A downside, in my opinion, is that the attentiveness to the theme of life has inspired some to 
dissociate the idea of Christ’s movement into the holy of holies from Christ’s work on the cross, 
preferring to see it instead as a subtle reference to his post-resurrection ascension into heaven. This is one 
aspect of David Moffitt’s outstanding research into the theme of resurrection in the book of Hebrews. In 
a nice summary passage, Moffitt says, “Jesus first suffers and dies. He then arises to his high priesthood, 
ascends into heaven, takes his blood/life into the heavenly holy of holies, and obtains atonement. This 
sequence of events can be correlated with elements in Yom Kippur not because Jesus’ death is the 
moment of his offering…, but because his death puts into motion the sequence of events that results in 
the crucial atoning moment—the presentation of his blood/life before God in heaven.” Moffitt, 
Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection, 2011, 277; cf. 273-78; Moffitt, “Blood, Life, and Atonement,” 
212; 220-222; Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 296 ff. 
  This is not the place for a full review of Moffitt’s proposal. I agree with Moffitt on all the 
foundational points: that the slaughter of the sacrificial animal is not a focal point on Yom Kippur, that 
the blood manipulations in the holy of holies are the real emphasis, that blood is the liturgical symbol of 
life, and that the focus of atonement is positive: divine presence, drawing near, and dwelling together. I 
also value his awareness of the saving significance of the resurrection and ascension of Christ. I do not 
think it is necessary to conclude, however, that in Hebrews the cross is a stage through which Christ must 
pass to achieve atonement elsewhere. The author of Hebrews uses an impressive spectrum of images to 
meditate on the mystery of Christ, and Yom Kippur is prominent in that arsenal. But the precise 
“sequence of events” on Yom Kippur and in Christ’s work do not always map onto one another—which 
is clearly seen at Hebrews 13:10-12, which compares Christ’s death “outside the gates” to the burning of 
the purification offering’s carcasses outside the camp (cf. Lev. 4:11, 21; 16:27-28). This would imply 
that atonement occurs before Christ’s death, since in Leviticus the burning of the animal’s flesh is one of 
the last phases of the rite. The fact that the slaughter of the victim happens at point A on Yom Kippur, 
and the blood manipulations at point B, and the removal of the offering’s flesh from the camp at point C, 
does not mean that the “Alpha and Omega” might not fulfill the theological significance of each “point” 
in an all-embracing moment of love. Therefore, my theological assessment is (a) that the “once for all” 
presence of the Son in the holy of holies is in fact the eternal truth of the relationship of mutual 
indwelling between Father and Son, (b) that the enfleshed reality of this eternal “drawing near” is most 
perfectly embodied in the openhearted love of Jesus on Mount Calvary, and (c) that the ancient symbol 
of blood-as-life therefore finds its most articulate historical expression in that moment, a “moment” 
where the temporal lucidly expresses the eternal Truth. In other words, in his obedience unto death, 
Christ lives out perfect love and “readiness” before the Father, and thus the full reality of the holy of 
holies/the throne of heaven is present on the wood of the cross. 
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Which begs the question: what about the second goat? It has been said that the 
sin-bearing goat is absent from the Christian Yom Kippur theology of the book of 
Hebrews,41 but careful awareness of the terminology associated with each goat makes it 
possible to catch a glimpse of the fleeing profile of the one destined to Azazel. The text 
says that “just as it is appointed for mortals to die once, and after that the judgement, so 
Christ, having been offered once to bear (anenenkeîn) the sins of many, will appear a 
second time…” (9:27-28, NRSV). With the key phrase in the NRSV translation—“offered 
once to bear the sins”—we are confronted here with perhaps the most challenging text 
with respect to my overall argument. While I claim that the two goats must be clearly 
distinguished, the author of Hebrews here essentially brings the movements so closely 
together that perhaps they really are confused or conflated from a New Testament 
perspective.  
While admitting that this is a difficult verse, it is still appropriate to approach it 
from the perspective of the clear teachings of Leviticus, and when we do we find that, 
even here, the two distinct movements are clearly respected. The author of Hebrews is, in 
this slender passage, linking together two aspects of the high priest’s mission on Yom 
Kippur, which are both intensified in Christ. In being the spotless (self-)offering, Jesus 
himself fulfills the work of the first goat with his own blood, which subsequently makes it 
possible for him to personally bear away the world’s sins, thus fulfilling the work of the 
second goat. Remember: in Leviticus, the removal of sin is contingent on the “ritual 
detergent” (in Milgrom’s terms), which is the life-blood that replaces and releases the sin 
                                                 
41 Luke Timothy Johnson, for example, says that Hebrews “leaves out altogether the ritual involving the 
‘scapegoat’ that bears the sins of the people,” Hebrews, 217. Similarly, see Willi-Plein, “Some Remarks 
on Hebrews from the Viewpoint of Old Testament Exegesis,” 30; Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom 
Kippur on Early Christianity, 193. 
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from the sanctuary. This comes first, and it releases the sins from the holy of holies, thus 
making it possible to bear them away; the second movement is dependent on the first.  
It is striking that, even in the NRSV translation, the offering clearly comes before 
the sin bearing, the latter being contingent on the former. A more literal translation of the 
Greek seems to make the dependent relationship even more explicit: “...Christ has been 
offered once for all in order to bear the sins of many [εἰς τὸ πολλῶν ἀνενεγκεῖν 
ἁμαρτίας]...”42 For those who are inclined to “conflate” the goats, it would make more 
sense to say that the sacrificial goat receives the sins first, and then it is “offered” (that is, 
                                                 
42 This is Gareth Lee Cockerill’s translation of Hebrews 9:28 in The Epistle to the Hebrews (Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2012), 419. 
  Many commentators, including Cockerill and Attridge, point out that the most direct parallel text 
for Hebrews 9:28 is the famous suffering servant passage, in which the servant “bore the guilt of the 
many” (Isaiah 53:12). Ibid., 426; Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 266. As many have said, 
however, this prophetic text itself may well be an allusion to the Azazel-goat (compare Isaiah’s ḥêṭ 
rabbîm nāśā to Leviticus 16:21; see Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 
116–17, esp. 117 n.193]. Whether the allusion to Leviticus is direct, or by way of Isaiah 53, the concept 
of sin-bearing for the sake of atonement does trigger Yom Kippur imagery, and that association is even 
stronger given the fact that Yom Kippur is a leading concept in this chapter of Hebrews.  
  I am focusing here on Hebrew 9:28 because both Yom Kippur goats seem to be invoked in a way 
that could be seen as problematic for my overall thesis. However, there are still more verses in Hebrews 
10 that could also be taken to undermine my emphasis on two distinct movements. Thus, we have the 
following verses from Hebrews 10: “For it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away 
(aphairein) sins” (v. 4) and “every priest stands day after day at his service, offering again and again the 
same sacrifices that can never take away (perielein) sins” (v. 11). Two questions come to mind: by 
saying this, is the author rejecting what he implied in the previous chapter, namely that a degree of 
sanctification was achieved through “the blood of goats and bulls” (cf. Heb. 9:13)? And second, by 
saying this, does the author imply that it is in fact the blood itself which carries/carries away sin in 
Leviticus (an interpretation that I have rejected as a confusion)? It seems to me that the main point the 
author is trying to make in this context is that the Jewish offerings were not able to eliminate the root 
cause of sin, or in other words, they were not able in itself to spiritually “perfect” such that the 
inclination to sin is eliminated. Hence, the author says, “For by a single offering he has perfected for all 
time those who are sanctified” (10:14) and then later he admonishes the listener, “For if we willfully 
persist in sin after having received the knowledge of the truth, there no longer remains a sacrifice for 
sins, but a fearful prospect of judgement, and a fury of fire that will consume the adversaries” (vv. 27-
28). In other words, he is not categorically denying the cult’s relative ability to sanctify. Furthermore, I 
do not think the apparent references to “bearing sin” here is an allusion to the Azazel-goat. The Greek 
verb in Hebrews 9:28, which is the main verse I am analyzing, is “anapheró,” which echoes Isaiah 53:12, 
and which itself—in the Hebrew—echoes Leviticus 16. There is, in other words, a “paper trail” (so to 
speak) linking Hebrews 9:28 to Leviticus 16 by way of Isaiah 53. But with the other verses discussed in 
this paragraph, though, different, unrelated verbs are used, and these have less Yom Kippur resonance. 
Thus, it can be fairly concluded that the author’s point here is not directly relevant to the question of 
ritual sin bearing, and not directly relevant to the Azazel-goat. 
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killed, that is, endures the just punishment) because of the imputed sins. But here, it’s the 
opposite: the sacrificial movement (first in order of sequence and in order of priority) 
makes possible the removal (second). This actually seems to support the fact that the two 
“goats” are distinct, and it further reinforces fundamental “shape” of the Leviticus ritual, 
even as it concentrates both movements in a single person: Jesus Christ, the new high 
priest. Therefore, we can conclude that both goats are present in Hebrews, and even 
though the second goat is only mentioned in passing, the fact that the distinct movements 
are represented again reinforces the profound overlap between Yom Kippur theology and 
the work of Christ as described in Hebrews 9-10.  
The Two Goats in Other New Testament Texts 
While the book of Hebrews is singular when it comes to sustained scriptural 
reflection on the relationship between Yom Kippur and Jesus Christ, there are numerous 
other verses, scattered across the New Testament, which imply a relationship. Others 
have tracked the New Testament’s use of sacrificial language in discussing the saving 
work of Christ, and there is no need to rehash their findings.43 The point I’d like to 
underline again, in complementing these previous studies, is that attention to the 
vocabulary associated with each of the two goats (see TABLE 1, above) can help alleviate 
some of the theologically questionable interpretations that have appeared from time to 
time in the tradition. Therefore, I will briefly review some exemplary texts which fall into 
                                                 
43 See, for example, Eberhart, The Sacrifice of Jesus; Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 309–38; 
Stanislas Lyonnet and Leopold Sabourin, Sin, redemption, and sacrifice. A biblical and patristic study 
(Rome: Biblical Institute, 1970); Robert J. Daly, Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-Christian Background 
before Origen (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1978); Frances M Young, The 
Use of Sacrificial Ideas in Greek Christian Writers from the New Testament to John Chrysostom  
(Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979). 
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two major categories: (a) Christ as the “goat for the Lord,” (b) Christ as the “goat for 
Azazel.”44 
Christ the Goat for YHWH 
In the first category we have a series of verses that imply that the (self-) offering 
of Jesus can and should be interpreted in continuity with the theology of Levitical 
purification offerings. Consider the following: 
So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; 
see, everything has become new! All this is from God, who reconciled us to 
himself through Christ, and has given us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in 
Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses 
against them, and entrusting the message of reconciliation to us. So we are 
ambassadors for Christ, since God is making his appeal through us; we entreat 
you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God. [God] made him who knew no sin 
to be hamartían [a “sin” offering45] for us,46 so that in him we might become the 
righteousness of God. (2 Cor. 5:17-21) 
 
If we approach this passage from the perspective of temple theology, a number of 
concepts stand out. To be “in Christ” is to be a new creation: throughout this book we 
have seen how creation, cosmos, and temple intertwine in ancient Jewish thought. The 
primordial creation was conceived as a garden sanctuary, the completion of the 
                                                 
44 In making this inventory, I am identifying texts that exemplify the purification offering/Yom Kippur 
typology. Certainly, there are many other New Testament texts that articulate a theology of the cross 
using non-cultic images and metaphors. These images have been usefully categorized by Stephen Finlan, 
The Background and Content of Paul’s Cultic Atonement Metaphors, 19 (Society of Biblical Lit, 2004), 
5–7; cf. Stephen Finlan, Options on Atonement in Christian Thought (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 
2007), 18–42. Therefore, this review of texts will not be comprehensive when it comes to New 
Testament sacrificial imagery, and it will be even less comprehensive with respect to salvation metaphors 
generally.  
45 The mainstream Catholic tradition has read the noun hamartia here as a reference to the “sin offering” of 
Leviticus 4, and thus Paul is playing with the normal cultic terminology of the Septuagint. See Lyonnet 
and Sabourin, Sin, redemption, and sacrifice. A biblical and patristic study, 250–53; Daly, Christian 
Sacrifice, 236–40. This translation was most common in the patristic and medieval periods; it became 
more controversial after the reformation. Advocates of the translation “sin offering” include 
Ambrosiaster, Augustine, Ambrose, Cyril of Alexandria, and Thomas Aquinas.  
46 I have edited the NRSV here. The NRSV reads, “For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no 
sin…” The Greek says, “τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν”. 
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tabernacle and the inauguration of the cult at Sinai was understood as the capstone of 
creation, and the Babylonian destruction of the temple represented creation undone. For 
Paul, those gathered “in” Christ are gathered to a new creation, which is a renewed, life-
giving order. They have “drawn near” to God’s new dwelling place among us: Christ 
himself. The new creation in Christ is characterized by the word “reconciliation,” which 
is the promise of a restored relationship between God and humanity.47 Recall that in 
ancient Jewish theology it is the temple which definitively embodies all-unity. Thus, 
when it comes time to explain how our relationship with God is restored in Christ, it 
would be natural for Paul to reach for the technical terminology of the cult, since cultic 
offerings were in fact the normal means by which Jews were reconciled to God and 
creation was made new.48 
In the Greek, Paul puts the sinlessness of Christ first: the one who knew no sin, he 
became our purification (sin) offering… Two things are established by the leading 
clause: (a) that Jesus needed no purification offering for himself since he was without sin, 
                                                 
47 The Greek word, used five times in this passage, is the verb katallassó (to reconcile) and the 
corresponding noun katallagé (reconciliation). According to William Barclay, in a secular Greek context 
the word refers to “the change of enmity into friendship.” New Testament Words (Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1976), 165. The word is rare in the Septuagint, and it is, admittedly, not used in passages 
related to the temple cult. Nevertheless, Paul primarily uses the word to describe a new relationship 
between God and humanity (cf. Romans 5:10-11), a new relationship made possible by God himself. 
Such a concept could call priestly imagery to mind very easily.   
48 A number of modern commentaries argue against the idea that Paul has the cultic concept of a “sin 
offering” in mind here. See, for example, Paul Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand 
Rapids, Mich: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997), 314; R. H. Bell, “Sacrifice and Christology in 
Paul,” Journal of Theological Studies 53, no. 1 (2002): 13; Frank J. Matera, II Corinthians: A 
Commentary (Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 143; Raymond F. Collins, Second Corinthians 
(Paideia: Commentaries on the New Testament) (Baker Books, 2013), 125–26. A common argument 
found in these texts is that it seems unlikely to the commentators that Paul would use the same word to 
mean “sin” in one case [“he knew no sin”] and then, immediately after, “purification offering” in the 
other [“made him to be a sin offering”]. However, in both the Hebrew and in the Greek translation, such 
oscillation between meanings is rampant in Leviticus 4. As Watts pointed out, the repetitive and 
evocative use of the word “sin/sin offering” is part of the priestly author’s rhetorical strategy. It is not, 
therefore, a great stretch to think that Paul should be attuned to this peculiarity in Jewish cultic 
terminology, and that he too would draw on it for his own rhetorical purposes.  
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thus implying that his self-offering is on our behalf, and (b) that he was “unblemished,” 
which is itself the vital requirement for temple offerings. Again, this purification offering 
by Christ is to transform us, “that we might become God’s righteousness in him.” It is, in 
other words, a sacramental event which is intended to draw us into the new, healed, 
elevated creation which Christ has established through his offering, by his life-blood. 
This is the movement of God’s reconciling love, and it is in continuity with the priestly 
work of Leviticus, which also sought to realign heaven and earth by means of the sacred 
rites which God had given the Jews.  
 There are many other analogous passages in the New Testament. This Pauline 
example is succinct and powerful:  
For in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell,49 and through him God 
was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by 
making peace through the blood of his cross. (Col. 1:19-20) 
 
Here again is the hope of reconciliation,50 now expanded to include all things in heaven 
and earth, but now reconciliation is associated specifically with Christ’s blood. Although 
many commentators across the centuries have read that word “blood” quite narrowly as 
“death,” we should consider instead that the word is best associated with the YHWH-goat, 
and thus with the theme of whole-hearted life.51 This is the fullness of Life, indeed the 
                                                 
49 Already, with the use of the word “to dwell”—katoikēsai—in association with divinity, temple imagery 
seems inevitable. In the Septuagint, this word is used often, and mostly with reference to human 
dwelling. However, when it is a question of divine inhabitation, Zion is generally the identified location. 
Consider 1 Kings 8:27, 2 Chron 6:18, Psalm 9:11, Psalm 135:21, Isaiah 8:18, Isaiah 33:5; cf. Matthew 
23:21, Acts 7:48, Acts 17:24. Certainly some of these passages question the possibility of God dwelling 
in temples, but the point remains that, when it comes to God, there is an association between the word 
“dwelling” and the Jerusalem Temple.  
50 The word used in Colossians is the intensified version of katallassó, apokatallassó. The idea that the 
word “reconciliation” was thematically associated with cultic realities in Paul’s mind is strengthened by 
the fact that both here and in Romans 5:9-11 a form of the word is paired with an emphasis on salvation 
specifically through Christ’s blood.  
51 Similarly, see Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 327–28. 
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fullness of God dwelling among us, which is characterized above all else by eternal 
Shalom of Mount Zion. In this passage a number of symbols come together in the one 
person of Jesus, including the idea that he is both the new temple and the new 
purification offering, but I have argued that these symbols naturally point toward each 
other even in ancient Jewish theology, since the purification offering (as an adaptation of 
the burnt offering in the context of sin) is the dramatic movement—“the Act”—which is 
the cornerstone of the temple on Mount Moriah. It is by this Act that this great stone 
structure becomes alive as a glorious icon of God’s indwelling presence.  
Clearly in Paul, as in Leviticus, cultic blood symbolizes perfect harmony. Thus: 
So then, remember that at one time you Gentiles by birth…were at that time 
without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the 
covenants of promise, having no hope and without God in the world. But now in 
Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near by the blood of 
Christ. For he is our peace; in his flesh he has made both groups into one and has 
broken down the dividing wall, that is, the hostility between us. (Ephesians 2:11-
14) 
 
It is the blood of the purification offering on Yom Kippur that draws the nation of Israel 
together, near to God, unified in peace. Paul sees in Jesus Christ the great culmination of 
Israel’s hope, because in him the Day of Atonement expands to cross every boundary, to 
draw in even those without hope, even those far off in the wilderness of uncircumcision. 
For Paul, the hope of the Gentiles is, indeed, to be grafted into the commonwealth of 
Israel, and for all to draw near to the Father together by means of Jesus’ own blood. The 
theo-logic of Leviticus remains, even as it is extended in Christ.  
 Many similar ideas are repeated outside of the Pauline epistles. As an example, 
notice the temple images in this passage: 
This is the message we have heard from him and proclaim to you, that God is 
light and in him there is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with 
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him while we are walking in darkness, we lie and do not do what is true; but if we 
walk in the light as he himself is in the light, we have fellowship with one 
another, and the blood of Jesus his Son cleanses us from all sin. If we say that we 
have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our 
sins, he who is faithful and just will forgive us our sins and cleanse us from all 
unrighteousness. (1 John 1:5-9) 
 
This text, at the beginning of John’s first epistle, prompts the listener to make a moral 
distinction between light and darkness, truth and lies, with God identified as pure light 
and pure truth. John calls upon believers to walk in the light, but also to sincerely 
acknowledge and confess their sins. In this context, he brings in unambiguous cultic 
language: the blood of Jesus cleanses us from all sins and culminates in forgiveness. Here 
we see additional New Testament confirmation of Milgrom’s discovery that blood is the 
ritual detergent, and confirmation also of the view of Milgrom’s interlocutors, who insist 
that in cleansing the sacred space, the lifeblood cleanses worshippers from sin as well. 
The temple principles of confession and purification offerings remain, even as they are 
recontextualized in early Christian theology.  
By now it should be no surprise that in the first lines of the Book of Revelation 
we read: 
To him who loves us and freed us from our sins by his blood, and made us to be a 
kingdom, priests serving his God and Father, to him be glory and dominion for 
ever and ever. Amen.  (Rev. 1:5b-6)52 
 
In this opening doxology, the beauty of the YHWH-goat is celebrated with delight. It is a 
theology of love, a theology of freedom, and a theology of glory. Those who come to 
God by means of his blood are elevated into a priesthood ancient and new, and thus they 
are empowered to joyfully sing praises to God in the eternal holy of holies.  
Therefore, throughout the New Testament—from the earliest texts to the latest—
                                                 
52 For an overview of the textual issues in this passage and for further analysis, see Ibid., 333–35. 
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reflection on Christ as the purification offering is surrounded by words of rapture and 
delight. It is a positive movement of love between Father and Son, drawn together in the 
Spirit, to bring the whole world to salvation and harmony.53 One does not find, in these 
texts, an emphasis on death, and there is even evidence of punishment or divine violence. 
Instead, these verses celebrate the new creation, the reconciled world, a new peace, 
drawing the whole earth together, in freedom, to God’s glory. This is the beauty of Zion, 
recapitulated in the self-giving of Jesus Christ.  
                                                 
53 As I mentioned, this section is not exhaustive in its review of possible New Testament allusions to the 
idea that Christ’s self-offering on the cross was a purification offering generally, or that it fulfills the 
work of the YHWH-goat specifically. One other passage that has received immense attention and that 
might have been included here is Romans 3:23-26, which reads: “…since all have sinned and fall short of 
the glory of God; they are now justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption that is in Christ 
Jesus, whom God put forward as a hilastērion by his blood, effective through faith.” Hilastērion is the 
word used throughout the Septuagint to translate the Hebrew word kapporet, which is the cover of the 
ark upon which the blood was sprinkled on Yom Kippur. For many, Paul is suggesting that, through the 
“sprinkling” of his blood, Christ himself becomes that “place” where purification occurs and atonement 
is achieved between God and humanity. As I say, this has been well argued in many places. See Daniel P. 
Bailey, “Jesus as the Mercy Seat: The Semantics and Theology of Paul’s Use of Hilasterion in Romans 3: 
25” (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1999); Bell, “Sacrifice and Christology in Paul,” 17–20; Stökl 
Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 197–205; Markus Tiwald, “Christ as 
Hilasterion (Rom 3:25): Pauline Theology of the Day of Atonement in the Mirror of Early Jewish 
Thought,” in Day of Atonement (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 189–209; Vis, “The Purification Offering,” 2012, 
312–18. 
  Another area text has received sustained attention in recent years is the scene in Matthew 27 where 
Pontius Pilot offers to release either Jesus [the son of God] or Jesus Barabbas [notice: bar-abba, son of 
Abba]. That their names are identical in Matthew is a first clue. The whole story hinges on the notion that 
one of the two Jesuses will be released to the mob, and the other will be sent to be crucified. The crowd 
demands Christ’s death, despite the fact that (in Pilot’s apparent estimation) he has done no evil. The sin-
bearing Barabbas is released among the wicked, and the innocent Jesus is sent to be slaughtered. If the 
logic of Yom Kippur stands behind this story, Jesus is seen as more closely associated with the YHWH-
goat, while an entirely different person represents the Azazel-goat. This type of dichotomy is more like 1 
Enoch, where Enoch is destined for the holy of holies while the demon Azazel is destined for the pit. It is 
significant, in any case, that this story—again, if Yom Kippur imaginary stands behind it—implicitly 
accentuates the connection between Christ’s cross and the Holy of Holies. For more careful analysis, see  
Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 165–71; Daniel Stökl Ben Ezra, 
“Fasting with Jews, Thinking with Scapegoats: Some Remarks on Yom Kippur in Early Judaism and 
Christianity, in Particular 4Q541, Barnabas 7, Matthew 27 and Acts 27,” in The Day of Atonement : Its 
Interpretations in Early Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed. Thomas Hieke and Tobias Nicklas (Leiden: 
Brill, 2012), 179–87; Orlov, The Atoning Dyad, 58–64. 
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Christ the Goat for Azazel 
 There is a second category of texts, and they contain implicit affirmation of the 
fact that Christ, through his saving work, also fulfills the mission of the Azazel-goat. 
While these passages are less prevalent compared with the texts which identify Christ as 
a purification offering, they are nevertheless well known and crucial for a fuller picture of 
New Testament soteriology. Below we will consider clearer examples, one from Paul and 
one from Peter, and then also a more ambiguous reference from the Gospel of John.  
 First, in one of Paul’s earliest epistles, the letter to the Galatians, we find a well-
known passage. Writing in the bold colors which are typical of that letter, Paul proclaims: 
Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us—for it is 
written, ‘Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree’—in order that in Christ Jesus 
the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, so that we might receive the 
promise of the Spirit through faith. (Galatians 3:13-14) 
 
Christ becomes accursed that we might receive the Spirit. The text Paul is adapting here 
is Deuteronomy 21:22-23, a law which specifies that the criminal who has been impaled 
on a stake (which would have occurred after their execution) shall not remain on display 
overnight.54 It says, “…you shall bury him that same day, for anyone hung on a tree is 
under God’s curse [qillaṯ]. You must not defile the land that the Lord your God is giving 
you for possession” (v. 23, NRSV).  
Throughout this book we have encountered ways in which Deuteronomistic 
theology exhibits different nuances compared with priestly theology, but despite all the 
differences in detail, there is a similar theological geography. While the priests worried 
extensively about defiling the sanctuary itself, Deuteronomy puts a lot of emphasis on 
                                                 
54 Cf. J. Louis Martyn, Galatians (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 319; Martinus C. de Boer, 
Galatians (2011): A Commentary (Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 212. 
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protecting “the land” from defilement (this difference is not a contradiction, and the 
priestly Holiness code also cautions against defiling the land; cf. Lev. 18:24-30). The 
word for “curse” in this verse appears a few times in Deuteronomy, often juxtaposed with 
the word “blessing.” The words “blessing” and “curse” represent contrasting futures: 
peace with God in the promised land vs. the wrath of God in exile. In the twenty-ninth 
chapter of Deuteronomy, a devastating fate is anticipated for those who break their 
covenantal promises: “…they turned to the service of other gods and worshiped them, 
gods whom they had not experienced and whom He had not allotted to them. So the Lord 
was incensed at that land and brought upon it all the curses [haqqelālāh] recorded in this 
book. The Lord uprooted them from their soil in anger, fury, and great wrath, and cast 
them into another land, as is still the case” (Deut 29:25-27). This warning is the general 
context for the famous passage from Deuteronomy, which we discussed in the last 
chapter: “I have put before you life and death, blessing and curse [wehaqqelālāh]. 
Choose life…” (Deut. 30:19). Therefore, within Deuteronomistic theology generally, the 
“curse” is associated with death, exile, and divine wrath, while “blessing” is associated 
with life, land, and divine favor. With that in mind, it seems that the criminal who is 
fastened to the tree personally experiences the divine curse which Israel would 
communally experience in the absolute cataclysm of exile. Such a tragic sign is not to 
linger upon the tree; the law of Deuteronomy requires that the lawbroken body—the one 
who breaks the law is broken by the law—be removed before nightfall.  
Remembering these associations, we can return to Paul’s claim that Christ, as one 
hung on a tree, has become “a curse for us” so that the Gentiles might gain access to the 
“blessing of Abraham.” From the perspective of the sections of Deuteronomy that we 
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quoted above, “the nations,” with their “other gods” and grotesque immorality, are a 
people who know nothing but perpetual exile. This is the very opposite of the freedom 
which is intended for Abraham and his children, the hinneni-life which is the foundation 
of Israel’s joy. Paul seems to suggest that, for Jesus to bring the lost Gentiles in, he must 
first go out; he too must endure the curse and exile—and implicitly, even the wrath—of 
those who live the chaos of sin. Unlike the passages in the previous section, which I have 
called “sacramental,” the implication of this text is substitution and exchange: Jesus will 
take the place of the exiled so that the exiled might receive the living Spirit, which is the 
ultimate blessing of intimacy with God. While it is not obvious that Paul had the Azazel-
goat in mind when he drew upon Deuteronomy to describe the saving work of Christ, it 
remains true that the notion of one who endures the ultimate exile to save the community 
from God’s abandonment describes the vocation of the second goat exactly.55  
 Paul is not the only one to perceive this side of Christ’s mission. Consider, for 
example, these words from the first epistle of Peter: 
He himself bore [anēnenken] our sins in his body on the cross [tree, xylon], so 
that, free from sins, we might live for righteousness; by his wounds you have been 
healed. For you were going astray like sheep, but now you have returned to the 
shepherd and guardian of your souls. (1 Peter 2:24-25) 
 
The context immediately preceding this passage is an exhortation to pattern oneself after 
Jesus and to patiently endure even unjust suffering in household relationships. This idea, 
it seems, brings to the author’s mind the imagery of the suffering servant, a comparison 
                                                 
55 Using different pieces of evidence, Stökl also finds an allusion to the Azazel-goat in Galatians 3:13-14. 
See Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 173–76. Emphasis on the idea that 
Jesus freely enters into Israel’s exile is found in the work of N.T. Wright. For example, he says, “The 
way of the servant was to take upon himself the exile of the nation as a whole. As a would-be Messiah, 
Jesus identified with Israel; he would therefore go ahead of her, and take upon himself precisely that fate, 
actual and symbolic, which he had announced for nation, city, and Temple.” Jesus and the Victory of 
God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 608; cf. 133. 
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he develops in verses 22 and 23, and then he shifts further into what seems to be a more 
general soteriological affirmation, which is what we have in verses 24 and 25. Drawing 
on the imagery from Isaiah—“he bore the guilt of the many” (Is. 53:12)56—verse 24 
emphasizes that it is Christ himself who bears (away) sins: it is notable that the imagery 
here, like the imagery in priestly theology, is quite substantial. Sin is effectively 
described as a weight, and because the one who is himself sinless (v. 22) now bears this 
foreign object, sin seems to be a transferrable “something.”57 This passage from Peter 
also uniquely stresses the “location” of that sin bearing: it occurs “in his body” and “on 
the tree.” Somehow Jesus bears our burden away, for the sake of our freedom from sin 
and our freedom for righteousness, all while remaining bound to the wood of the tree. 
(This is analogous to the way in which the “eyes of faith” perceive Jesus entering the 
holy of holies with his own blood, even though, according to our earthly perception, he 
remained pinned on the “altar” of the cross.) In other words, for the author, Christ 
endures the weight of exile in his own body so that we can again enjoy intimacy with 
“the shepherd and guardian” of our souls. By carrying away our corruption, the Azazel-
goat makes it possible for us to dwell in peace. 
There are other possible references to the Azazel-goat that are less certain and less 
clear. The most well-known example of this is found in the Gospel of John. After John 
the Baptist announces the presence of the one who is coming after him, it says: 
The next day [John the Baptist] saw Jesus coming towards him and declared, 
‘Here is the Lamb of God who takes away [airōn] the sin of the world!  (John 
1:29) 
 
                                                 
56 See chapter 4, footnote 42 for the possible relationship between Isaiah 53 and Leviticus 16. 
57 This is also noticed by William Brown, “‘In Him All Things Hold Together’: An Ecology of 
Atonement,” Ex Auditu: An International Journal of Theological Interpretation of Scripture 26 (May 9, 
2011): 9–10. 
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Even though the Greek words used in this passage do not closely parallel clear Yom 
Kippur texts, the fact that the lamb is carrying away “the sin of the world” is 
conspicuous. Then again, the fact that the sin carrier is a lamb is also remarkable, and 
perhaps it represents another challenge to my insistence that cultic offerings are not sin 
bearers. It is likely that a lamb was chosen in this context as an allusion to the Passover 
lamb, especially given the centrality of that Jewish feast in the book of John. Indeed, 
Passover is explicitly mentioned in the next chapter: “The Passover of the Jews was near, 
and Jesus went up to Jerusalem” (John 2:13).58 But does that mean that, for the author of 
this gospel, the Passover lamb somehow carries away sins, thus muddling the clear 
distinction between the two “goats”?  
 The best explanation for this unusual passage is found in an outstanding article by 
Jeffrey Siker. He says: “The temporal connection between Jesus’ death and Passover is 
inevitable since Jesus died in close proximity to this crucial festival. But John appears to 
import into the meaning of Jesus’ death the atoning significance typically associated with 
the observance of Yom Kippur. John thus blurs the distinctions we might make in order 
to make a larger point about the unparalleled significance of the death of Jesus as the 
Lamb of God.”59 Siker then concludes,  
In short, early Christians took the other most significant holy day in Jewish 
tradition, Yom Kippur, and imported its central emphasis on forgiveness of sins 
into the ritual imagination of Passover. Thus, early Christians engaged in a 
process of “Yom Kippuring” Passover, a kind of recombinant theologizing of 
central Jewish rituals in the service of Christian efforts to make sense of Jesus’ 
death in light of Jewish tradition.60  
 
                                                 
58 For a Jewish audience, John’s emphasis on Jesus as “Lamb of God” might also call to mind the morning 
and evening Tamid, the most typical Jewish temple offering, which was an ‘olah. 
59 Siker, “Yom Kippuring Passover,” 75. 
60 Ibid., 76. 
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In other words, like a pair of bifocals, the Baptizer’s concise description brings the image 
of Jesus into focus by simultaneously using two lenses: Passover and Yom Kippur. Jesus 
is the lamb of God who makes possible a new Exodus from the exile of Egypt and into 
the eschatological promised land, and Jesus is the Azazel-goat who removes sin from the 
world and goes into eschatological oblivion. As with other statements we’ve seen, even 
though the early Christian eagerness to speak of Jesus using many biblical motifs all at 
once can make things more confusing, it is not necessary to conclude that the basic 
coordinates of Yom Kippur are fundamentally confused. 
 The overall evidence of the New Testament is clear, even if it is not crystal. The 
idea that the saving work of Jesus Christ is positively related to second temple Yom 
Kippur theology is unambiguous. The book of Hebrews is alone sufficient to establish 
this fact. Looking at other notable texts, especially in the various epistles, generally 
supports this conclusion. First, the general idea that Jesus effects atonement as a 
purification offering is suggested by numerous texts, and even though the exact Levitical 
phrase “goat for the Lord” does not appear, for second temple Jews the connection 
between purifying blood rites and the high holy day of Yom Kippur would be quite 
secure.61 Second, a smaller yet not insignificant number of texts associate Christ’s death 
with the continuing conviction, in Jewish theology, that sin must be removed from Israel, 
and indeed, from the world. The fact that the mission of the Azazel-goat is emphasized 
less often in the New Testament compared with the YHWH-goat may be a reflection of the 
fact that, in the late second temple period, the Aramaic concept of “sin as debt” 
                                                 
61 I have neglected some passages that could provide even further evidence. Matthew (Jesus and Barabas). 
Paul (hilasteron).  
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overshadowed the earlier Hebrew notion of sin as “something,”62 but nevertheless the 
concept of the Savior as sin-bearer and curse-bearer is not wholly absent.  
The question now is, did the Jewish-Christian affirmation of Jesus as the 
fulfillment of Yom Kippur remain relevant in the emerging Christian theological 
tradition? As Christianity spread, venturing further and further from Jerusalem, did Yom 
Kippur soteriology continue to shape post-apostolic Christian interpretation of Christ’s 
saving work, or was it quickly forgotten? 
A Continuing Tradition: Patristic Developments 
There need be no cliffhanger here; the answer to these questions is actually crystal 
clear. When it comes to the relationship between the saving work of Jesus Christ and the 
atoning work of the high priest on Yom Kippur, the earliest Christian theologians took up 
the theological threads from the apostolic generation and continued to weave. Clear 
statements on this subject can be found in the Letter of Barnabas, and in the writing of 
Tertullian, Justin Martyr, Origin, and Hippolytus, thus representing a significant 
soteriological model embraced by Eastern and Western fathers alike. Our goal in this 
section is to consider the shape of these early reflections: are the authors attentive to the 
different missions represented by the YHWH-goat and the Azazel-goat? Do they affirm 
what is broadly suggested in the New Testament, that Christ fulfills the work of both 
goats? And if the answer to each of these questions is “yes,” how are they able to 
maintain the different movements in the work of a single savior?  
What we find in the earliest sources is that theologians were indeed aware of the 
                                                 
62 Which is perhaps the major discovery in Gary A. Anderson, Sin: A History (Yale University Press, 
2010). 
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difference between the Yom Kippur goats, and they do indeed assert that Christ himself 
fulfills the work of both. The earliest extra-biblical example is Barnabas: 
Notice what was commanded: ‘Take two goats, beautiful and similar, and offer 
them, and let the priest take the one as a burnt offering for sins.’ But what are they 
to do with the other? ‘The other,’ he says, ‘is accursed (epikataratos).’ Notice 
how the type of Jesus is manifested: ‘And do ye all spit on it, and pierce it, and 
bind the scarlet wool around its head, and so let it be cast into the desert….What 
does this mean? Notice, ‘that the first (goat) is for the altar, but the other is 
accursed, and that the one that is accursed is crowned.’ Because then they will see 
him on that day with the scarlet (high priestly) robe on his body, and they will 
say, ‘Is not this he whom we once crucified and rejected and pierced and spat 
upon? Truly it is he who then said that he himself was the Son of God.’ But how 
is he like (to the goat)? For this reason: ‘the goats shall be similar, beautiful, and 
equal,’ in order that when they see him come at that time they may be astonished 
at the similarity of the goat. See then the type of Jesus destined to suffer…63 
 
Barnabas is one of the earliest sources for the idea that the two goats are alike in 
appearance. They are “similar, beautiful, and equal,” but paradoxically, this point is so 
strongly emphasized precisely because the two seem so unalike! The first, he says, is a 
“burnt offering for sins”—this itself is a notable phrase, worthy of a brief tangent. 
According to Leviticus, of course, the first goat is not a burnt offering but a purification 
offering, and yet Barnabas apparently finds it easy to confuse the two. It is similarly 
interesting that, in an earlier passage, Barnabas ties together the themes of Christ’s cross, 
the offering of Yom Kippur, and the Akedah: “…[Jesus] himself was going to offer the 
vessel of the spirit as a sacrifice for our sins, in order that the type established in Isaac, 
who was offered upon the altar, might be fulfilled…”64 In this book I have argued for the 
                                                 
63 The translation of the Epistle of Barnabas 7:6-10 is from Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on 
Early Christianity, 152–153, which is itself an adaptation of Kirsopp Lake, The Apostolic Fathers (W. 
Heinemann, 1919), 365–69. For further analysis of Barnabas, see Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom 
Kippur on Early Christianity, 148–55; Orlov, The Atoning Dyad, 73–74. 
64 Barnabas 7:3c. The broader context here is a dense passage that seems related to the third goat (!) of 
Yom Kippur, which was eaten by the priests. Numbers 29:11 alludes to a third goat, and later rabbinic 
tradition explains the necessity of eating its flesh. It seems that Barnabas links this goat to the Christian 
Eucharist. See Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 150–51. 
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theological interconnection of the Akedah, the burnt offering, and the purification 
offering using ancient and modern Jewish sources. The confusions in these passages with 
respect to the burnt offering and the purification offing may be a simple matter of 
imprecision or confusion on the author’s part. But it is also possible that Barnabas 
intuited similar theological connections. On the cross, Jesus simultaneously becomes the 
antitype of both Yom Kippur and Isaac on Moriah. And then, when discussing the Day of 
Atonement, the purification offering becomes a “burnt offering for sin.” Perhaps the 
theological relationship between the ‘olah and the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ was apparent to the earliest 
Christian writers, a fact that would bolster my interpretation of these offerings in the 
previous chapter.  
 Returning from the tangent, as I mentioned: Barnabas highlights the similarity 
between the goats precisely because they are so different. While the one is an offering, 
the other is “accursed.” This word is significant because epikatáratos is the exact word 
that appears in Galatians: “Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree.” By using this word, 
Barnabas reinforces the connection between the exile of the Azazel-goat and the 
Deuteronomistic concept of “the curse.” When Jesus endures mistreatment, his 
humiliation seems to mirror the humiliation of the accursed goat.65 For Barnabas, the 
connection between Jesus and the second goat is quite straightforward at this point: in the 
ordeal of the cross, Jesus fulfills this aspect of the Yom Kippur liturgy. But then, 
Barnabas alludes to the second coming of Jesus: Christ will be seen “on that day” in the 
                                                 
65 As Barnabas spells out the mistreatment Jesus suffered, it resembles the abuse that (unfortunately!) later 
tradition reports against the Azazel-goat as it makes its lonely journey out of the camp. The Mishnah 
Yoma says, “And they made a causeway for it because of the Babylonians who used to pull its hair, 
crying to it, ‘Bear [our sins] and be gone! Bear [our sins] and be gone!’” (6:4). Perhaps drawing on the 
memory of similar activity against the Azazel-goat in the late second temple period, Barnabas describes 
how, like the poor goat, Jesus is pierced and spat upon as he goes. 
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glorious garments of the high priest. Apparently, this second appearance is correlated 
with the YHWH-goat in the mind of the author, but onlookers will gasp when they notice 
that the coming high priest is identical in appearance to the mistreated one! As Christ 
came in humility, and as Christ comes in glory, he will appear “similar, beautiful, equal,” 
despite the stark differences. The two “goats” are one.  
 This method of distinguishing between the goats by dividing between Jesus’ first 
and second “coming” became the leading interpretive move in the earliest patristic 
sources. It is repeated by both Justin Martyr and Tertullian. The former puts it 
unambiguously: 
And the two goats of the fast were ordered to be similar. One of them was the 
scapegoat, the other was to be an offering. They were prophecies for the two 
appearances of Christ. For the first appearance, at which the elders of your people 
and the priests sent him away as a scapegoat, laid hands on him and killed him; 
and for his second appearance, since you will recognize at this very place of 
Jerusalem him who was dishonored by you and [made] an offering for all those 
sinners who want to repent and fast what Isaiah calls a fast…66 
 
The comment on the Azazel-goat is easy enough to follow: Jesus has been effectively 
sent away by those who “laid hands upon him and killed him.”67 This is clearly in 
reference to Christ’s first “appearance.” As for the YHWH-goat, the major themes are 
Jerusalem and recognition. For Justin, Jerusalem will be the site of Christ’s second 
coming and messianic reign. Therefore, the fact that the YHWH-goat is offered in 
Jerusalem (indeed, the purification offering goat is associated with what might be called 
                                                 
66 Stökl’s translation of Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho 40:4-5. See Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of 
Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 155. For further analysis of this passage, see Ibid., 155–56; Orlov, 
The Atoning Dyad, 75–76. 
67 As mentioned above, later Jewish tradition expands the biblical account by instructing that the Azazel-
goat be pushed over a ledge and into a ravine, effectively guaranteeing its death. By linking the death of 
Christ very specifically with the Azazel-goat, the author may have this practice in mind. Then again, I’ve 
argued that the Azazel-goat is synonymous with death, irrespective of the animal’s physical fate, because 
to be exiled from the sanctuary/holy land is to experience a living death.  
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the Jerusalem-of-Jerusalems, the holy-of-holies) is highly significant, and it corresponds 
to the Second Coming, when Jesus will be recognized by all.  
 With Tertullian, there is an interpretation that is both similar and different from 
each of the foregoing theological reflections. He says, 
If I may, moreover, give an interpretation of the two goats, which were offered on 
the fast, do they not also prefigure the two modes of Christ? They were alike, and 
very similar to the appearance of the Lord, since he will not come in any other 
form, having to be recognized by those by whom he had been wounded. One of 
these [goats], however, was bound with scarlet, cursed, spat upon, pulled around, 
and pierced, and driven by the people out of the city into perdition [perditionem], 
being thus marked with the visible signs of the Lord’s passion. Yet the other 
[goat], by being offered up for sin and given to the priests of the temple for food, 
signified indications of the second appearance, when—after sins have been 
expiated—the priests of the spiritual temple, i.e. the church—feast as a sort of 
flesh offering of the Lord’s grace, while the others fast from salvation.68 
 
The context for this passage is a reflection on the “two advents” of Jesus Christ, one 
perceived as lowly, the other as majestic. Beginning with the lowly, Tertullian, like his 
predecessors, straightforwardly associates the Azazel-goat with Christ’s passion. In this 
section, he adds a fascinating gloss: this is the goat that is driven to “perdition,” or to 
destruction. Just as Barnabas showed that he understood basic biblical geography by 
emphasizing that this goat is “accursed,” the association of the Azazel-goat with perdition 
is perceptive. Perhaps you could say that there is, here, a proto-“descent to hell” doctrine 
that is awaiting theological development. 
Then turning to the YHWH-goat, Tertullian emphasizes that he is “offered up,” 
that he is an “oblation” (oblatus) intimately associated with the priesthood. Even though 
the first goat of Leviticus 16 is not eaten by the priests (unlike other purification 
offerings), Tertullian associates this goat with eating so as to make a eucharistic 
                                                 
68 This is Stökl’s translation of Tertullian’s Contre Marcion 3:7:7-8. See Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of 
Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 157. For further analysis of this passage, see Ibid., 156–58. 
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connection, or perhaps an allusion to a heavenly feast which occurs “after expiation” 
(expiation being related to the Christ-the-Azazel-goat in Tertullian’s scheme). Again, for 
Tertullian the YHWH-goat anticipates Christ’s second coming, and thus he is associated 
with majesty and glory. Speaking of the second coming earlier in the same passage, 
Tertullian says, “Then indeed He shall have both a glorious form, and an unsullied beauty 
above the sons of men.”69 It is very interesting that each of the three commentators 
associate the YHWH-goat—more or less clearly—with the second coming of Christ in 
glory. As we saw above, in many recent interpretations it is claimed that the YHWH-goat 
undergoes punishment and wrath, and is thus effectively identical to the accursed Azazel-
goat. For the earliest post-biblical interpreters, however, the imagery could not be more 
dissimilar: when it comes to the YHWH-goat, the explicit emphasis in Tertullian (and the 
implicit emphasis in Barnabas and Justin) is on beauty, grace, glory, honor, majesty, and 
an “everlasting kingdom.”70  
The advantage of these early interpretations of Christ’s relation to Yom Kippur is 
that they clearly specify the difference between the two “movements” which are together 
fulfilled by the one Christ. Christ fulfills the work of both goats, now in his passion, now 
in his return in glory. The biggest disadvantage, however, is that the powerful theological 
symbolism associated with the high priest, the purification offering, and the holy-of-
holies, is disassociated from the self-offering of Christ on the cross, and deferred to his 
glorious return. But as we have seen, the conviction that the self-giving of Jesus on the 
cross is the purification offering of the New Covenant is suggested by numerous biblical 
passages across the New Testament, and therefore it seems more appropriate to 
                                                 
69 Tertullian, Against Marcion, Book 3, Chapter 7.  
70 As is clear in the context of the full chapter in which the “two goats” passage is found.  
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contemplate how, in the mystery of Christ’s one crucifixion, the whole theological reality 
of Yom Kippur is recapitulated.  
 Stökl identifies a passage from Hippolytus of Rome’s commentary on Proverbs 
which represents a different approach. The book of Proverbs (LXX) includes a list of 
things which “move easily,” and the author mentions “the he-goat leading the herd.”71 
Reflecting on this image, Hippolytus says: 
  And a goat as leader of the flock 
  Since, it says, this is 
  who was slaughtered for the sins of the world 
  and offered as a sacrifice 
  and sent away to the Gentiles as in the desert 
  and crowned with scarlet wool on the head by the unbelievers 
  and made to be a ransom for the humans 
  and manifested as life for all.72 
 
In these lines, Hippolytus circles around the image of the ruling goat and finds it to be a 
multifaceted symbol. Without a doubt, many of these lines relate directly to Yom Kippur. 
On the first pass, Hippolytus sees the sacred offering, a victim who overcomes the sins of 
the cosmos (κόσμου). On the second pass, Hippolytus sees the one sent into the desert, 
but in this interpretation there seems to be a missionary impulse. It is the Gentiles who 
live in the wilderness, and thus Christ must go out to them, as if on a rescue mission. The 
theme of “rescue” continues on the third pass, when the goat is seen as a “ransom” 
(λύτρον), a concept not intrinsically linked to Yom Kippur logic (as I argued in the 
previous chapter), but the ransom theme is nevertheless prominent in the New Testament 
(cf. Mark 10:45). Finally, in fulfilling the work of the two goats of the Day of Atonement, 
                                                 
71 Proverbs 30:31 (NETS) 
72 Stokl’s translation of Hippolytus’ Catenae on Proverbs, where Hippolytus is commenting on Proverbs 
30:31. For translation and commentary, see Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early 
Christianity, 158–59. 
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Hippolytus finds that Christ is manifested as “life for all.” While in this passage the two 
goats serve as little more than a jumping off point for various reflections—Hippolytus 
certainly is not attuned to Levitical nuance here—it is notable that he does not use the 
goats to distinguish a first and second coming, but apparently sees them both reflected in 
Christ’s paschal work. Thus, Hippolytus overcomes one weakness found in earlier 
Christian reflection by neglecting to separate the goats according to a first and second 
advent.  
 With Origen of Alexandria, we reach the golden age of patristic biblical 
interpretation. Origen’s two sermons on Yom Kippur (Homilies 9 and 10 in his collected 
Homilies on Leviticus) are the most expansive and multifaceted Christian reflections on 
Leviticus 16 to be found in the patristic period. Such a rich theological work merits a 
comprehensive analysis, but I will limit myself to few highlights. The most significant 
shift that we see in Origen is the way he implicitly incorporates Enochic intuitions into 
his reflection. According to Stökl, “All of Origen’s interpretations have in common that 
they are ‘bipolar’—the scapegoat represents something bad, the sacrificial goat 
something good.”73 True, awareness of this difference has been evident in every text that 
we’ve investigated. But, remember, in the book of Enoch the distinction between the 
Azazel-goat and the YHWH-goat is, you could say, pushed to its most extreme 
eschatological limit. As we turn to Origen, we find that his interpretation is influenced by 
the absolutization of the temple/wilderness landscape which is already so evident in 1 
Enoch and the canonical Book of Revelation.74 Origen pursues various “historical” and 
                                                 
73 Stökl, 266. 
74 Especially in light of the evidence that the grand cartography of the “Book of the Watchers” was 
influenced by Leviticus 16, it is correlatively possible to trace “eschatological Yom Kippur” imagery in 
the twelfth chapter of the book of Revelation: 
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“mystical” interpretations of the priestly text—some more relevant to the work of Christ, 
some more relevant to the sanctification of the believer’s soul—but each reading is 
undeniably bipolar, with one lot representing holiness and life, the other representing sin 
and death. 
Origen opens his reflection with a brilliant observation: if there were no sin, there 
would be only one goat, not two. There would only be the “goat for the Lord,” there 
would only be the pure and holy offering; sin-bearing would be unnecessary. This 
affirmation reinforces the notion that the orientation vis-à-vis God represented by the 
‘olah (and the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ) is an Edenic posture. It is the human being fully alive, and 
therefore it is not ultimately rooted in sin. It is clear that in saying this, Origen has no 
concept of the ḥaṭṭā’ṯ as vicarious punishment; it is not for him the death that God 
demands because of sin. Like other early Christian theologians, Origen knows that such 
offerings are positive expressions of openhearted love, which is the truth of the world 
irrespective of sin.75 
Language quickly shifts from this positive affirmation to something less 
congenial: the two lots now represent two groups of people. One lot is a heavenly people; 
the other lot is damned. Origen is abundantly clear about the hellish nature of the second 
goat’s destination: “‘the wilderness,’ that is, a desolate place—desolate of virtues, 
                                                 
  The great dragon was thrown down, that ancient serpent, who is called the Devil and Satan, the 
deceiver of the whole world—he was thrown down to the earth, and his angels were thrown down 
with him. Then I heard a loud voice in heaven, proclaiming, ‘Now have come the salvation and the 
power and the kingdom of our God and the authority of his Messiah, for the accuser of our 
comrades has been thrown down, who accuses them day and night before our God. But they have 
conquered him by the blood of the Lamb and by the word of their testimony, for they did not cling 
to life even in the face of death. Rejoice then, you heavens and those who dwell in them! But woe 
to the earth and the sea, for the devil has come down to you with great wrath, because he knows 
that his time is short!’ (Rev. 12:0-12) 
75 Origen, Homilies on Leviticus, 1-16 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
2005), 9.3.2 pg. 181. 
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desolate of God, desolate of justice, desolate of Christ, desolate of all good.”76 Drawing 
loosely on Yom Kippur concepts, Origen even says that the latter “lot,” hurled into the 
wilderness, “take upon their heads the sins of those who have repented…”77 On the other 
hand, those “whose ‘lot’ is ‘the Lord’,” die daily. Origen makes fascinating observations 
here. He explains that the sinner does not die because he or she “is of this world”—they 
“live” comfortably in this world, while the man or woman who belongs to God “dies” to 
this world so as to live truly. Although Origen does not make the connection directly, our 
earlier reflections on the Akedah and the paradox of hinnei-life once again comes to 
mind. Origen brilliantly shows how the imagery of the YHWH-goat is taken to exemplify 
a mode of being that is, indeed, truly free.  
While these reflections are interesting, and while they give insight into the 
relationship between Yom Kippur and early reflections on heaven and hell, they do not 
directly address the question of Jesus’ own relation to the two goats. Indeed, it must be 
said that Origen puts less emphasis on this particular issue, and instead associates Jesus 
with the corresponding humans: the high priest on one side, the “prepared man” who led 
the Azazel-goat to the wilderness on the other.78 With reference to the YHWH-goat, 
Origen applies Levitical sacrificial imagery to Jesus in a few places. First, early in the 
sermon Origen embraces the interpretation of the Letter to the Hebrews, underlining the 
singularity of Christ’s offering: “For he did this once when he offered himself as an 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 9.4.1 pg. 182. 
77 Ibid., 9.3.3 pg. 181. 
78 However, Orlov has recently emphasized the important point that the ritual actors and their 
corresponding goats were seen as intimately associated. He explains that it is necessary to acknowledge 
“the intertwining roles of the one who makes the sacrifice and the sacrifice itself—that is, the high priest 
and the immolated goat.” Orlov, The Atoning Dyad, 71. On this principle, perhaps there is a similar 
intertwining between the “ready man” and the Azazel-goat itself.  
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offering.”79 Origen also seems to identify Jesus as the paradigmatic recipient of the first 
lot when he says: “this one indeed, upon whom ‘the lot of the Lord’ falls, is killed and 
dies, that by his blood he may purify the people of God.”80 It is remarkable to note that 
Origen, in full agreement with priestly theology, continues to accentuate the fact that 
blood is the means of cultic purification. Jesus is the Levitical high priest who enters the 
holy of holies of heaven, with his own blood, as the “hilasmos” (the atonement) for our 
sins.81 The positive connection between Jesus and the YHWH-goat/high priest is, 
therefore, clearly articulated. 
Origen is a little less clear on the relation between Christ and the goat which is 
sent away, but what he does say is fascinating. In one section of his homily, Origen 
compares the two goats to the two thieves who flank Jesus on Golgotha. The one who 
“reviled” Jesus, he notes, was sent to the “‘wilderness’ of hell.”82 The Alexandrian 
exegete then loosely quotes Colossians 2:14-15—in his paraphrase, Christ “fastened the 
principalities and opposing powers upon his cross and he triumphed over them”—and 
interprets it by saying, “in this he fulﬁlled ‘the lot of the scapegoat’ and as ‘a prepared 
man’ he led them ‘into the wilderness.’” Along similar lines, Origen adds:  
[Christ] would make ‘the lot of the scapegoat’ the opposing powers, ‘the spirits of 
evil and the rulers of this world of darkness’ [cf. Eph. 6:12] which, as the Apostle 
says, ‘he led away with power triumphing over them in himself’ [cf. Col. 2:15]. 
‘He led them away.’ Where ‘did he lead’ them except ‘to the wilderness,’ to 
desolate places?83  
                                                 
79 Origen, Homilies on Leviticus, 1-16, 9.2.1, pg. 178, emphasis added. Cf. Hebrews 7:27b. 
80 Ibid., 9.3.4, pg. 182. 
81 Ibid., 9.5.8,  187;  cf. 9.10.1, pg. 199. In speaking of Christ as hilasmos, Origen is quoting 1 John 2:1. 
Rufinus’ Latin translation of Origin’s Greek uses “repropitiatio” to render 1 John 2:1, which in English 
becomes “propitiation”—at which point the English passage has become rather remote from the priestly 
theology of purification. For a description of how the Greek hilasmos is likely linked with the Hebrew 
kipper, see Lyonnet and Sabourin, Sin, redemption, and sacrifice. A biblical and patristic study, 148ff; 
cf. Stökl Ben Ezra, The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity, 205–7. 
82 Origen, Homilies on Leviticus, 1-16, 9.5.2, pg. 184. 
83 Ibid. 
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In this interpretation, Jesus is very clearly the designated man who is charged with the 
responsibility of leading the Azazel-goat to the wilderness (and in later tradition, 
ultimately pushing the goat into the abyss). It seems that Origen, here also, depicts the 
Azazel-goat to be the demons themselves—the powers, principalities, and “rulers of this 
world”—which Jesus both fastens to the cross and overcomes in himself. Despite the fact 
that this victory occurs in Christ on the cross, Origen is quick to add that Christ indeed 
leads the evil powers into the barren wilderness, and in fact he emphasizes that just as 
Christ the high priest alone can turn back the flaming swords and bring the repentant thief 
to paradise, so also Christ alone can lead away the evil spirits to the furthest wilderness.  
With this established, Origen continues to surprise. He says: “Therefore, for that 
reason, it was necessary for my Lord and Savior not only to be born a man among men 
but also to descend to Hell that as ‘a prepared man’ he could lead away ‘the lot of the 
scapegoat into the wilderness’ of Hell.”84 Here for the first time the concept of Christ’s 
descent to hell is associated specifically with Yom Kippur soteriology, and yet more 
specifically with the crucial movement of the Azazel-goat who bears away sins. It is not 
that this concept was entirely absent from the foregoing tradition, but Origen—who’s 
landscape is bipolar in a way analogous to Enoch—stretches the argument to its extreme, 
including even a descent to Hell that is not necessarily Hell’s harrowing. The most 
striking difference in Origen, compared to his predecessors, however, is that he seems 
hesitant in comparing the work of Jesus to the Azazel-goat itself, instead comparing 
Christ to the goat’s guide. The reason for this hesitance may be the fact that, as I just 
noted, Origen associates the second goat with demonic spirits; this goat is no longer a 
                                                 
84 Ibid., 9.5.4, pg. 185. 
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lowly vehicle carrying away the wreckage of sin, but it has instead become synonymous 
with fallen angels. Perhaps as the Jerusalem temple became a less vivid memory, and as 
the Church became less attuned to the nuances of Jewish priestly theology, the idea of sin 
as a vital, substantial, but non-demonic “miasma” that pollutes the sanctuary also became 
less comprehensible. The concept of sin-bearing was less easily understood, and so the 
Azazel-goat came to represent actual demons instead.85 When this happens, a very clear 
distinction needs to be made between the all-holy Christ and the second goat, and thus the 
prepared man takes on new importance. Unfortunately, however, this move has the effect 
of separating the work of the Christian savior from an essential element of Yom Kippur 
soteriology: personally enduring the weight of sin, personally experiencing the exile of 
Israel, for the salvation of the world. When only the YHWH-goat is emphasized, the 
danger would indeed be a “theology of glory” which overlooks the sheer horror of 
Christ’s cruciform exile.  
Nevertheless, by the time of Origen in the third century, there are abundant 
theological resources available for the development of a rich and profound Christian Yom 
Kippur soteriology. Of course, with the defeat of Marcionite anti-Judaism, all of the 
resources of the Hebrew Bible remained available to the early church to better understand 
the prototypical means by which YHWH sought to purify the world and draw humanity 
back into perfect communion so that men and women might again walk peacefully with 
God in the cool of the day. On this subject specifically, the deep symbolism and theo-
logic of the priestly liturgies and rituals remained a remarkable resource for the early 
                                                 
85 Then again, I have also argued that already in 1 Enoch the priestly concept of “substantial” sin becomes 
once again “demonized” through Enoch’s grand mythopoetic imagery. Therefore, perhaps the precedent 
is more properly to be found in that profoundly Jewish work.  
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Christians as they meditated on the mystery of salvation. The early Christians also took 
advantage of the endlessly fascinating “inter-testimonial” pseudepigraphal literature—
such as the adventures of Enoch—which itself represents an extraordinary commentary 
on and development of the great biblical mysteries.  
But then there are the diverse, non-systematic meditations of the New Testament 
evangelists and letter writers, whose inspired pens became gushing fountains of 
theological insight. Hopkins famously said that “Christ plays in ten thousand places,” and 
for the New Testament writers, this is nowhere more true than on the pages of their 
ancient Jewish Scriptures. Indeed, they could not help but find the playful traces of their 
Messiah between every line as they pondered their precious Torah in resurrection light. 
Therefore, we find in the New Testament a cascade of insights as the excited authors 
caught glimpses of Jesus—first here, then there—never pausing for long enough to fully 
unpack any particular symbol or type. This great flood of charismatic insight resulted in 
vast, fertile fields—sort of like a new Eden which invites all future generations to “till 
and keep.”  
That’s precisely the task that the earliest generations took up with joy as they 
continued to draw connections and seek the deep theological order in this beautiful 
diversity of images. Still so close to the Jewish roots of Christian theology, these early 
interpreters immediately saw the crucial importance of Yom Kippur in any interpretation 
of Christ’s “atoning” work on the cross. They pursued interpretations that both remained 
faithful to Jewish traditions while illuminating the meaning of Jesus’s saving action. As a 
result of their “tilling and keeping,” they provided future generations with many brilliant 
and creative insights. In the rough draft sketches of Barnabas, Justin, Tertullian, 
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Hippolytus, and Origen, one finds a soteriology of immense potential, ripe for continued 
development. However, as Jews and Christians drifted and divided from one another, as 
the beautiful temple and its profound liturgies fell out of the Church’s memory, Christian 
Yom Kippur soteriology seemed to suddenly go dormant as theologians continued to 
reflect on the work of Christ. For hundreds of years, there was enthusiastic debate around 
words like ransom, satisfaction, exemplar, substitution, propitiation, expiation, 
sacrament, even “scapegoat” …but the temple logic of the two goats seemed long 
forgotten. 
The question for today is, in this period of profound dialogue between Jews and 
Christians, in this springtime of historically nuanced and sympathetic interpretations of 
ancient Jewish priestly theology, at a time when the brilliant “spiritual interpretations” of 
early Christians is again winning respect and appreciation, is it possible to take up once 
more this dormant theological tradition? Is it possible to return to the most ancient 
sources to again discover the original contours of the glorious word “atonement”? Is it 
even possible for modern systematic theologians to learn to appreciate the fathomless 
secrets which have been faithfully kept for millennia by our two humble goats.
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CHAPTER 5: TWO GOATS, ONE SAVIOR: A (MODERN) YOM KIPPUR SOTERIOLOGY 
Two goats: identical, beautiful, perfect. It seems idiosyncratic, or even idiotic, to 
think that an iron-age ritual could be the hidden map we need to navigate contemporary 
Christian soteriology. It is even more incredible to assert that the two beasts who briefly 
appear in Leviticus together keep the deepest mysteries of the cosmos. Of course, for 
Christian theology, it is the Word made flesh who is the mystery of mysteries, the One 
who embodies the mystery hidden in God from the beginning. But his is a Jewish body, 
his is Jewish blood, his is a mission which is inseparable from Israel’s covenantal 
romance, and so one cannot entirely understand the single atonement he realizes apart 
from the double movement of Yom Kippur. Here are the most holy hooves that trod a 
double path—in the temple, in the desert—which will become the good and sorrowful 
way that the messiah himself will carefully follow. Via Dolorosa. To know where he is 
going, to theologically trace his atoning steps, it is absolutely necessary that we should 
see how that very trail was forged over the centuries on the holiest of all holy days.  
This chapter will articulate in outline a systematic theology that contemplates how 
Jesus Christ’s saving work could fulfill the work of both goats in a single movement of 
self-giving love. A major thesis here is that the Christian tradition provides raw materials 
for a highly nuanced theology of Christ as goat for the LORD and also a separate highly 
nuanced theology of Christ as Goat for Azazel. Each of these theological approaches are 
profound and illuminating, and they are each weakened only by their separation from 
each other. The first goal in a Christian Yom Kippur soteriology, therefore, is to collect 
the raw materials needed to interpret each goat perceptively in a Christian context. Thus, 
in the first part of this chapter, we will explore contemporary theologies of the YHWH-
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goat and the Azazel-goat in turn. But the second goal, the more difficult task, is to 
imagine how the identical goats find their place in a single work, which is to say, to 
answer the question: how can Christ both experience the holy of holies and the distant 
wilderness at once? In the second part of this chapter, therefore, I argue that to see both-
movements-in-one requires the type of imaginative and paradoxical thinking that is 
always the hallmark of robust Christian orthodoxy.  
It is a greater appreciation of the cross as an icon of life—as a tree of life—that 
will be the final destination. It is precisely for this tree that we are made, and now as 
flaming swords return to their sheaths, and now as our eyes become more capable of the 
Glory who sits amidst the cherubim, we will fix our sight once more on the first mystery, 
and the last.  
Section One: Christian Yom Kippur Soteriology: A Systematic Outline 
After the extended review and interpretation of Jewish and Christian reflections 
on the ancient priestly theological tradition—which has been the primary work of this 
book—I was able to summarize the key terms associated with each of the two goats in 
mainstream Yom Kippur theology in the previous chapter. This work of clearly 
distinguishing the two symbolic universes then permitted a more sensitive interpretation 
of those New Testament texts which are rooted in classical Jewish temple theology. I 
tried to show that there is a series of texts that speak of Christ’s work as a kind of 
Levitical “offering,” and another series of texts that speak of the same work in terms of 
sin-bearing. Precisely because both expressions are overtly biblical, it is no surprise that 
the subsequent theological tradition saw development along these very different lines. In 
this section, I will show how certain contemporary theologians brilliantly develop 
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theological reflections inspired by each of the two movements in Leviticus 16, and I’ll 
also suggest the limitations in each separate approach.  
The Goat for the Lord in Contemporary Theology: David Bentley Hart 
The major characteristic of the “goat for the LORD” was that it symbolized life, 
and thus it is associated with the temple itself and its most holy center, which represented 
life as it was intended from the beginning. Precisely as the great symbol of “life,” this 
goat is also associated with the ancient Jewish theology of sacrifice, despite the common 
misunderstanding that imagines sacrifice as being in an alliance with death. To the 
contrary, Israel’s priestly offerings sought to re-establish order and harmony by returning 
again and again to the wholehearted, hinneni way of life first established by Abraham and 
Isaac. Therefore, a soteriology that is rooted in the symbolic universe of the YHWH-goat 
will have a fundamentally positive orientation; it will interpret Christ’s work as drawing 
together, restoring, and elevating all things through a genuinely good and meritorious 
movement, a movement that reiterates and perfects life as it was intended at its origin. 
I am not aware of any modern theologian who has captured the essence of this 
positive Levitical vision more profoundly or eloquently than David Bentley Hart, above 
all in his magisterial The Beauty of the Infinite. Hart directly discusses the theological 
meaning of Christ’s crucifixion in a section entitled “The Economy of Violence”; while 
this section is relatively short (only fourteen pages), it is particularly dense insofar as 
Hart here brings together and integrates many of the central themes of the book: the 
competing narratives of the two “cities” (one of violence and one of peace), the 
harmonious nature of distance within the Trinity, the importance of the traditional 
doctrine of divine apatheia, the nature of gift, an anthropological vision rooted in 
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epektasis and deification, the question of sin and evil, and the defense of analogia entis 
as the authentic Christian metaphysic. In other words, to fully appreciate what Hart is 
doing here, one must take into consideration his entire project, which resists summary. 
The best we can do, therefore, is to highlight areas where there is continuity between 
Hart’s Christian soteriology and mature Jewish theology. Happily, it is not difficult to 
identify points of agreement.  
The Two Cities 
Hart follows John Milbank in identifying an underlying “ontology of violence” in 
postmodern philosophy, which emerges from the belief that ontological difference always 
suggests a foundational violence, and in fact, that our world of difference inevitably finds 
itself ensnared in an endless melee of clashing forces. Hart says that this postmodern 
ontology is “nothing other than a version of an ancient pagan narrative of being as sheer 
brute event, a chaos of countervailing violences, against which must be deployed the 
various restraining and prudential violences of the state, reason, law, warfare, retribution, 
civic order, and the vigilantly sentineled polis.”1 To convey this pagan view, Hart takes 
advantage of Nietzsche’s early image of the conflict between Dionysus and Apollo, the 
god of wine with his “indiscriminate violences” and the god of music and poetry with his 
“precisely discriminating violences.” Modern philosophy’s subliminal conviction is that 
these two forces must be balanced. Therefore, from the perspective of the postmodern 
ontology of violence—which again calls to mind the pagan worldview, like the one 
depicted in the Enuma Elish narrative that we described in chapter two, albeit now 
                                                 
1 David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2004), 36. 
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rearticulated with a post-Christian stain—if there is to be any kind of peace, it can exist 
only though a suppression of the antecedent and more basic chaos: “all peace, civility, 
harmony, or beauty is accomplished by limiting a preexisting discord.”2  
To understand Hart’s soteriology, it is necessary to consider his use of the terms 
“totality” and “infinity,”3 terms which are very much related to the ontology of violence 
and the ontology of peace: 
By ‘totality’ I mean the attempt to grasp the being of beings as a whole, immanent 
to and sufficient for itself, and to grasp all things and values—epistemic, moral, 
aesthetic—within the confines of this immanentism; and by ‘infinity’ I mean what 
one desires when one seeks to see the totality as the gift of a true transcendence, 
granting the totality its essences, its existence, its values, and its transcendental 
properties from beyond itself, by the grace of participation and under the ‘rule’ of 
analogy.4 
 
The totalizing disposition, then, sees the world in terms of a closed circle; it is the world 
described by univocal ontology, where “being” is an umbrella category that contains all 
things, including any possible god. Within the circle of “metaphysical totality” we are 
viciously torn between two poles: “the savage equivalence of univocity and equivocity, 
Apollo and Dionysus, pure identity and pure difference.”5 Such a world is a perpetual 
power struggle, with shifting hierarchies of suppression, with the violence of anarchy and 
the violence of order, with the cold tears of oppression and the hot blood of revolution. It 
is a constant effort at properly balancing brutal forces. Conversely, an ontology of 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 40. 
3 Hart here indicates that he is subversively borrowing the totality/infinity distinction from Emmanuel 
Levinas, but using them in a way that corresponds with Milbank’s observations about the two totalities.   
4 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 14. 
5 Ibid., 242. This calls to mind the contrast Przywara draws between Heraclitus and Parmenides. Erich 
Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysics : Original Structure and Universal Rhythm (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 203–7. Even before Hart, along with John Betz, was one 
of the translators of Erich Przywara’s Analogia Entis into English, Hart popularized Przywara’s ideas in 
Beauty of the Infinite, enhancing them through a deeper engagement with the (especially Eastern) church 
fathers, and bringing them into critical conversation with postmodern philosophy. 
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infinity envisions the world as primarily open, obtaining itself from that which is beyond 
itself—ultimately, through participation in God.  
What we have here, then, is a distinction between a non-analogical “totality”—
which tends toward either purely “immanent” eruptions of violence as being forever 
jostles against being in a perpetual power struggle or it tends toward an equally terrifying 
“transcendent” that violently absorbs all difference into “One”—or you have the 
Christian alternative, a Trinitarian analogical “infinite” which is the fullness of being and 
the fullness of peace, where difference is not the enemy of perfect oneness. For the latter, 
the “beings” of creation are from nothing (affirmation of creatio ex nihilo is essential)—
they have no ground in themselves, no independent foundation—and each can be 
understood only in terms of its true participation in the Trinity, but always within the 
“ever greater dissimilitude” between (Triune) Being and beings. This analogical interval, 
Hart argues, is the necessary condition for true peace, deep communion, and perfect 
intimacy between God and creation. 
Throughout his book, therefore, Hart identifies two competing narratives: “one 
that finds the grammar of violence inscribed upon the foundation stone of every 
institution and hidden within the syntax of every rhetoric, and another that claims that 
within history a way of reconciliation has been opened up that leads beyond, and 
ultimately overcomes, all violence.”6 It is right to say that this affirmation is the precious 
inheritance of Christian Trinitarian and incarnational theology, and that the hope of 
overcoming all violence depends on that distinctive theological foundation. In the present 
book, however, I have argued that such hope has antecedents in the Hebrew Bible, and 
                                                 
6 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 2. 
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most profoundly in temple theology. Through a complex historical process, a single site 
became (a) the locus of God’s presence in creation, with divinity intimately dwelling at 
the heart of the microcosm, and (b) the mere shadow of a yet greater perfection. In this 
way, the temple itself becomes an original symbol of creation as a “suspended middle”—
wholly dependent on the “always greater” Glory in which it participates while making 
that Glory uniquely present in this most-central liturgical site.7 Within second temple 
Jewish thought, it is right to say that “a way of reconciliation has been opened up” which 
overcomes “all violence,” and this way is the way of the YHWH-goat, who re-establishes 
the original pattern of creation as doxological praise, as genuine self-giving freedom 
before God, all of which affirms the temple’s unique ontology as a “suspended middle.” 
In this context, on Yom Kippur, the very presence of true life (symbolized by the 
lifeblood) releases or eradicates the miasma of death which had sought to suffocate the 
temple itself. This “life” conquers death by virtue of its own superabundant vitality; death 
is unable to comprehend it, unable to mount any response at all. The YHWH-goat is pure 
reaffirmation of what is most ultimate and true, an edenic work that is victorious by 
virtue of its own divine vitality. 
The Temple and Jesus  
With this in mind, it is possible to return to Hart’s soteriology and see how 
                                                 
7 In one place, Przywara says, “Analogy is, at this highest point, analogy as a dynamic back and forth 
between the above-and-beyond (a transcending immanence) and the from-above-into (an indwelling 
transcendence).” Przywara, Analogia Entis, 2013, 216. This effectively expresses the two approaches to 
the temple in the late second temple period.  
Przywara’s first reference to the “suspended middle” is in the context of his description of the “in-
and-beyond’ quality of his creaturely metaphysics against the concept of “self-enclosed creatureliness” 
(Ibid., 159). The contrast Przywara is sketching here is akin to Hart’s contrast between “infinity” and 
“totality,” and thus promotion of the concept of a “suspended middle” is his own way of overcoming the 
modern “self-enclosed” totality. 
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effectively he applies temple themes in his Christology and his exegesis of Christ’s 
saving work. In our analysis of the temple, it was possible to distinguish three strands in 
contemporary research: the temple as the site of God’s glory (God’s perfect beauty), the 
temple as the model of right action (where “the good” is seen), and the temple as the 
symbol through which Israel meditates on the relationship between heaven and earth (or 
in other words, the problem of how God’s truth and creaturely truth interrelate). Hart’s 
brief Christological treatise covers this same territory, but now centered in the mystery of 
Christ himself. In this Christology, Hart fills pages with virtual hymnody—at once 
profound and wonder-full—in praise of Jesus, who is the coincidence of heavenly and 
earthly perfection. For Hart, Christ is “at once the true form of God and the true shape of 
humanity...”8 As true God, he is also the embodied realization of the transcendentals. 
Thus, the Son is the “the infinite beauty of God’s eternal utterance,”9 and in his 
incarnation he is “divine beauty that becomes visible again,”10 and “the measure of all 
beauty, who restores beauty to what has become formless through sin and death...”11 In a 
great crescendo worthy of a full gospel choir, Hart sings of Christ who is “the beauty of 
the infinite, the shape of God’s desire and object of his love, the splendor of his glory.”12  
In addition to his aesthetic brilliance, Hart also affirms Christ as the 
personification of right action. Jesus is himself “God’s supreme rhetoric,” who at once 
“embodies a real and imitable practice, a style of being that conforms to the beauty of 
divine love, but that is also a way of worldly godliness...”13 Focusing especially on this 
                                                 
8 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 336. 
9 Ibid., 334. 
10 Ibid., 338. 
11 Ibid., 320. 
12 Ibid., 344. 
13 Ibid., 320. 
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“style of being” which encapsulates the creaturely ideal, Hart especially accentuates what 
is perhaps the most ancient Christian soteriological model of all: recapitulation 
(ἀνακεφαλαίωσις). Echoing Paul, Irenaeus, and Athanasius, he affirms that “Christ’s life 
effects a narrative reversal, which unwinds the story of sin and death and reinaugurates 
the story that God tells from before the foundation of the world...”14 In doing so, Jesus at 
once “reestablish[es] the original pattern after which the human form was crafted”15 and 
shows forth God’s own  “goodness, love, and holiness”16 in its eternal perfection. For 
Hart, the absolutely unique form of Christ—the very Word of God, the rhetoric of God in 
incarnate act—is “repeatedly endlessly, in the church, in boundless variety...”17 To know 
“the Good” in Christian reflection is not primarily to study tablets of law, it is not a 
particular form of ethics, but it is a way of being and seeing shaped by the unique drama 
of the savior’s life, death, and resurrection.  
Finally, with equal emphasis, Christ is put forward as the fullness of truth. He is 
the Logos made flesh, which contains every logoi, which heals and elevates the 
innumerable words of the book of creation, “and so restores to the world its truth.”18 This 
one person is the embodiment of Being-itself and of creaturely being: “the Son is himself, 
in a sense, the ontological analogy between God and creation...”19 When the world has 
fallen into every error and into helpless bondage, the Word himself, through the drama of 
his own life, becomes “the true story of the world,”20 and at the same time, he makes 
present Truth eternal.  
                                                 
14 Ibid., 325. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 358. 
17 Ibid., 339. 
18 Ibid., 329. 
19 Ibid., 325. 
20 Ibid., 327. 
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In each of these three areas, Hart is not shoehorning Greek philosophical 
categories into his reflection on the Jewish messiah. Very much to the contrary, he is 
taking what is most undeniably central to the cultic life of the Jewish people and applying 
these Jewish reflections to the messiah himself. But this move—applying the perfections 
associated with a cultic building to a historical person—will surely strike some as 
strained. To associate Jesus with the “new temple,” to see in him the perfections 
originally characteristic of the temple itself, could easily be dismissed as an overzealous 
and unsupported typology. However, in the last chapter, guided by N.T. Wright, we 
reviewed how the early Christians turned to 2 Samuel 7 in the Septuagint and read that, 
while David hoped to build the LORD a “house,” God also promised to build a “house” 
for David by “resurrecting” his offspring. The interplay between these two “houses,” so 
clearly articulated in the text, immediately stimulated theological imaginations, and it 
was not so great a leap for early Christian theology to suggest that the Davidic messiah 
himself would be the truest dwelling place for YHWH. In fact, the profound association 
between Jesus and temple is already articulated in the New Testament, especially in John, 
but not exclusively. Whatever one makes of this phenomenon, it can be found in some of 
the deepest strata of the Christian tradition.  
The only remaining question, then, is whether it would be justified within 
contemporary systematic theology to embrace this pre-modern hermeneutic to develop a 
temple Christology and temple soteriology. My own (qualified21) affirmative answer to 
this question is that contemporary theologians can indeed pursue a Christology and 
                                                 
21 “Qualified” insofar as contemporary theological readings of scripture cannot revert to pre-modern 
hermeneutics, but must also be shaped by the discoveries of modern methodologies, especially historical-
critical research. In the third chapter, I used Przywara’s rule of “truth in-and-beyond history” as a way to 
correlate historical and theological readings. 
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soteriology that takes the Hebrew Bible—in its unique theological and historical shape—
as determinative for a proper interpretation of Jesus Christ. In fact, this is essential for 
contemporary theology if we hope to become more and more attentive to the un-
supersedable Jewish roots of Christian theological reflection. Therefore, when Hart 
interprets the messianic Jesus using temple categories, this is appropriate both with 
respect to the intrabiblical association of temple and Davidic king, and with respect to the 
contemporary need for systematic theology to remain rooted in the Hebrew Bible when 
developing Christology. 
The Purification Offering and Jesus 
When Hart adopts the full vocabulary which is proper to Zion—glory, beauty, 
holiness, perfection, truth, peace, joy, harmony…on and on—and when he applies this 
great litany of praises to the Word-made-flesh, he has followed the biblical evidence. 
Now we must see that, from the perspective of priestly theology itself, it is none other 
than the YHWH-goat who, on Israel’s holiest day, mystically embodies all the perfections 
of the cosmos, of Israel, of Zion, and also embodies the recommitment to living every one 
of those perfections from this day forward, world without end. In ancient Jewish 
theology, as I have interpreted it, the offering of this goat was a recapitulation of the 
orientation that characterized Israel’s life from the start. On this point especially, Hart is 
brilliantly clear. He points out (against a possible danger in Girard) that Christian 
approaches to soteriology must avoid turning to a “Marcionite savior”22 who is divorced 
from the way of atonement so elaborately developed in the Hebrew Bible. From Hart’s 
                                                 
22 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 349. 
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perspective, though, there would be a real concern if the Jewish sacrificial rites were—
like pagan political sacrifices—imagined as acts of violence to secure order within the 
“totality.” As Hart says, the pagan or secular “regime” “belongs principally to a sacral 
order that seeks to contain nature’s violence within the stabilizing forms of a more 
orderly kind of violence….[A]ll secular order as such subsists upon sacrifice, upon the 
calculus of an economy of violence…”23 This is the world of Romulus and Remus, of the 
one brother who slays the other brother for failing to observe the boundary. Sometimes 
the good of life must be sacrificed to the higher good of extracting order out of chaos.24 If 
Israel shares this pagan vision of the need to impose a favorable balance within the 
totality by force, then she is as indebted to the economy of violence as any pagan state.  
According to Hart, when Israel is most faithful to its original logic, its sacrificial 
practices are motivated by a very different ideal, the one he describes as the “infinite.” 
Thus, Hart offers his read on Genesis 22: 
…Israel, for all the multiplicity of its cultus, ‘fails’ to imagine an economy of 
sacrifice that neatly closes off the cosmos in a cycle of strict equivalence and 
indemnity…This is evident from the beginning of Israel’s story, in the binding of 
Isaac: a sacrifice, that is, that does not effect a limited transaction with the 
sublime, in the interest of founding or preserving a city, but that happens apart 
from and before every city; the offering of Isaac can serve no economy, because 
all of Israel slumbers in his loins, because he is the child of Sarah’s dotage who 
cannot be replaced, because he is the whole promise and substance of God’s 
covenant; he is manifestly, in his particularity, infinitely other. He is the entire 
gift, returned before the gift has been truly given; but then God, who is not a God 
of the indeterminate sublime, feeding upon the destruction of the beautiful, but a 
God of determinate beauty and love, gives the gift again…Henceforth Israel is 
doubly given, and can know itself only as gift, imparted by God and offered 
ceaselessly back to God, in the infinity of love’s exchange.25 
 
With this, Hart is able to perceive in Israel’s gifts a movement that fundamentally 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 346. 
24 Ibid., 353. 
25 Ibid., 351–52. 
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contradicts the totalizaing aspirations of “the world,” and which opens a new way of true 
liberation through non-grasping freedom, openness, and love before the God who created 
from nothing. In the second chapter of the present book, Hart’s brief interpretation of the 
Akedah was confirmed and strengthened through a close reading of the Genesis text 
itself, with support from contemporary biblical scholarship. Thus, there is good reason to 
suppose that Hart’s interpretation of the key “act” of Israel is aligned with the intentions 
of the ancient Jewish priestly authors themselves.  
Crucially, the mode of being introduced in the dramatic action of Abraham and 
Isaac is perfected in Christ’s own life, in the way he lived every moment. According to 
Hart, the integrity of the Son’s radical self-giving freedom before God was an absolute 
threat to “the totality” promoted by the prince of this world. Therefore, just as Babylon 
once moved to swallow Judah, “the totality” mobilized against the one called the Christ 
in an effort to enclose him within the normal economy of violence, to secure the peace of 
the state through his death. When the structures of violence mount their attack against the 
beauty, goodness, and truth of the Infinite-made-flesh, the shape of the attack is 
cruciform: “The cross itself, of course, is of pagan origin, and so the crucifixion in itself 
expresses perfectly the sacrificial logic of the secular order…”26 For Hart, the intersecting 
branches of the cross might be seen as the intersection of the two orders of sacrifice: 
“From a pagan perspective the cross is a sacrifice in the ‘proper’ sense: destruction of the 
agent of social instability in the interest of social order…”27 But, even as the powers and 
principalities surround him in an effort to close off his open-hearted communion with 
God, Christ lives more and more fully according to Israel’s sacrificial ideals, which is to 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 351. 
27 Ibid., 353. 
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say, Christ continues to lift his heart to the Father in the style of the burnt offering / 
purification offering, he continues to live in the way appropriate to one who dwells in 
God’s presence in the temple, he continues in all things to “choose life” over any alliance 
with the forces of death and violence. For those who crucified him, Christ’s death is a 
typical political sacrifice, but Jesus himself goes so much further, taking what the world 
had intended for evil and uniting it to the ultimate Good proper to his own divine nature, 
which is indeed the sacrificial movement of love for which the world itself was created—
the very sacrificial movement that Israel ritually practiced, morning and night, on Mount 
Zion. The deformed sacrificial practices of the “totality” confront the true “sacrificial” 
orientation of the persons of the triune God, and as when darkness encounters light, the 
former cannot comprehend the latter. The morning glow of Easter Sunday is the great 
conformation of what has always been true, the good news known since Moriah: Israel’s 
God is the God of life and not death, and thus to enter the divine movement of mutual 
self-giving is ultimately to find the abundant life which is the heart’s original, edenic 
bliss.  
Clearly, for Hart, to embrace the sacrificial mode of being is to discover the way 
of deification, because “sacrifice” rightly and analogically understood is proper to divine 
life. “For Christian thought the true order of sacrifice is that which corresponds to the 
motion of the divine perichoresis, the Father’s giving of the Son, the Son’s execution of 
all the Father is and wills, the Spirit’s eternal offering back of the gift in endless variety, 
each person receiving from and giving to each other in infinite love.”28 Such an 
awareness of God’s inner life is the fruit of intimacy with the incarnate (pierced) heart of 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
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God, and thus it is a revelation that goes further than the earlier Jewish covenants. But 
even here, looking at the Old Testament with Christian eyes, one finds this indiscernible 
mystery hidden in plain sight. It is God himself who renames the mountain of Abraham’s 
offering YHWH-yireh, which can be translated “the LORD is seen.” In the mutual self-
giving trust of Abraham, Isaac, and YHWH, an early icon of God’s own inner life is 
written, one which is perpetually re-dramatized and reinforced by the sacred liturgy of 
Zion. That God should be known as kenotic love is truly a “new” revelation of Jesus 
Christ, but it is a newness of a very particular sort, like that moment when one suddenly 
knows their life’s purpose. The discovery may come as a shock, and yet it has the strange 
familiarity of a long lost friend. When the truth is known for the first time, it is 
simultaneously clear that it had been known all along. This is the nature of analogical 
theology, where the Truth is known in-and-beyond history such that, when Truth and 
history converge in a single person, it clarifies what has nevertheless been known dimly 
at every other point, and especially what had been known uniquely and superlatively in 
symbol and truth by the chosen people through the great covenants. 
The Futility of Sin 
Hart’s account powerfully accentuates the idea that Jesus lives life to the fullest, 
as it had been intended from the start, in perfect beauty, goodness, and truth, despite the 
surrounding chaos of ugliness, evil, and deceit. Evil cannot sway him. Christ cuts through 
the fray and shows a different way is both possible and liberating. For Hart, sin is a 
discordant note, a sun-starved shadowland, a habituated amnesia, and above all, a 
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violence that destroys all that is well-formed by the good and loving Creator.29 Hart’s 
analogies always reflect his commitment to the revered philosophical affirmation that sin 
is a privation of being, and this philosophical truth is itself a corollary of Hart’s twin 
emphasis on creation ex nihilo and the analogia entis. When speaking about God as 
creator, Hart says, “But nothingness does not challenge God, it is not some ‘thing’ with 
which God becomes creatively involved; he passes nothingness by without regard, it is 
literally nothing to him, it has no part to play in the way by which he is God or in his 
desire to create. Nothing is what is overcome, indeed, but this is to say that there is no 
original overcoming.”30 Applying this insight to engagement with “evil,” which is “that 
purely privative nothingness that lies outside creations’ motion toward God,”31 it is 
indeed sensible to say that one does not confront the problem “head on” by screaming at 
the off note or stomping on the shadow, but rather one simply lives harmoniously again, 
one embraces the light again, despite every barrier created by our current age. To refer 
once more to a crucial text, Hart’s approach has impeccable biblical pedigree: “The Light 
shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it” (John 1:5, NASB).  
That verse really is the key to Hart’s soteriology. It is an approach where Christ 
recapitulates the original intention for creation, but very much unlike Adam, he lives out 
                                                 
29 In his own words, “Sin, violence, cruelty, egoism, and despair are the discords that disrupt the surface, 
but always as privation, a failure of love; they are no part of being’s deep music, but only shrill alarms 
and barren phrasings, apostasies from music altogether.  Evil, for all its ineradicable ubiquity, is always 
originally an absence, a shadow, a false reply, and all violence falls within the interval of a harmony not 
taken up, within which the true form of being is forgotten, misconstrued, distorted, and belied.” Ibid., 
208. 
30 Ibid., 259. In the original context, Hart is responding to Eberhard Jüngel’s theology of creation, but the 
view expressed here relates to his own understanding of how Christ responds to sin in the new creation.  
31 Ibid., 194. For a longer defense of the tradition of defining evil as privatio boni, which Hart says is “high 
among Christian tradition’s most venerable and most indispensable metaphysical commitments,” see 
David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami? (William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2005), 73–78. In this section, Hart effectively links the concept of evil as privation 
of the good to the doctrine of divine apatheia; defending the importance of the latter against the hazy and 
sentimental protests made by modern theologians is a primary objective in many of Hart’s works.  
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his vocation of perfect, heart-to-heart communion with the Father to the end. His 
suspension on the cross is his ascension to the holy of holies, where perfect obedience 
and love are made complete, where the intimacy between Father and Son is 
consummated. For Hart, reprising Irenaeus, that simply is the essence of Christ’s saving 
work: 
First and foremost, Christ recapitulates humanity’s struggle against evil, and in so 
doing achieves the victory that humanity could not...; he who is from the 
beginning the head of all things recapitulates the human entirely, in the shape and 
substance of a whole life lived for the Father, never lapsing into sin, never 
yielding to the temptation to turn from God, enacting in every instant the divine 
figure of the human... Thus, as Paul says, the disobedience of Adam, which brings 
death into the world, is undone by Christ’s obedience unto death...32 
 
This vision of realized perfection, in the midst of the forces of sin and death which circle 
like vultures, is exactly the idea behind the goat for YHWH, which recapitulates Israel’s 
image of restored edenic life, and overcomes the pollutants of uncleanness, sin, and death 
with purifying blood. Importantly, for the theology of the YHWH-goat—as articulated in 
Leviticus, in later rabbinic tradition, and by modern Jewish commentators—there is no 
great war between life and death in the holy of holies; life conquers death by virtue of its 
own infinitely superior dynamism, its perfect compatibility with the God of Life who 
makes Zion his throne. The high priest may be a type of divine warrior, but the imagery 
of the feast does not suggest a head-to-head battle against a chaos-monster or some living 
demonic force. Violence is not overcome by violence, as Hart so often insists in unison 
with the church fathers. If anything, the priest’s battle is within himself, to faithfully live 
                                                 
32 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 326. 
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out the call to remain pure,33 to stay awake,34 to not succumb to fear,35 and to be the very 
embodiment of the words he bears on his brow: “Holy unto YHWH.”36  
In the sprinkling of his own blood, as he ascends to the holy of holies of his own 
pierced heart, Christ achieves nothing less than the most perfect intimacy with the Father. 
In Beauty of the Infinite, the stories of difference and oneness between Father and Son in 
the Holy Spirit are mutually necessary. Distinction and perfect unity are non-sublatable 
themes in Trinitarian theology, and also in soteriology, because at the moment when the 
man Jesus, who is other than the Father, most nakedly confronts the horror of human 
violence in the pagan sacrificial symbol of the cross, he simultaneously joins his heart to 
the Father’s in absolute unity, enjoying a bond of love beyond human understanding, thus 
providing the final icon of Israel’s most holy sacrificial work. Ultimately, for Hart, any 
theology of sacrifice must find its home in the Trinitarian theology of gift: “There is only 
the gift and the restoration of the gift, the love that the gift declares, the motion of a 
giving that is infinite, which comprehends every sacrifice made according to love, and 
which overcomes every sacrifice made for the sake of power.” Christ’s life is 
thanksgiving, eucharistia, and in his death he refuses to waver from his identify.   
                                                 
33 Jacob Neusner, trans., The Mishnah: A New Translation (New Haven: Yale Univ Press, 1988), para. 1:1; 
page 265. 
34 Ibid., para. 1:4, 1:7; page 266. 
35 Ibid., para. 1:5; page 266. In the Mishna Yoma, the “agents of the court” charge the high priest with 
faithfully carrying out his liturgical duties. In this context, it says the high priest “turns aside and weeps” 
and the agents “turn aside and weep.” Reflecting on these words, Neusner says, “Here we are in the 
presence of deep emotion. The high priest weeps, so too the elders, as the high priest prepares for the 
arduous labor of the Atonement liturgy (described in Leviticus 16)...In the context of the narrative, it 
would appear that the weeping represents a response to the solemnity of the occasion and the 
responsibility incumbent on the high priest, namely, the fate of Israel should matters go wrong.” Jacob 
Neusner, Vanquished Nation, Broken Spirit: The Virtues of the Heart in Formative Judaism (Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 31. 
36 Exodus 28:36 
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Other Examples of YHWH-goat Soteriology 
Of course, Hart is not the first to develop YHWH-goat soteriology, but he does an 
exceptional job of articulating this ancient thought in critical dialogue with more recent 
perspectives. In addition to his own contributions to contemporary reflection on the work 
of Christ, one of the great strengths of Hart’s chapter on soteriology is that he shows how 
the much maligned soteriology of Anselm of Canterbury is itself (in effect) a version of 
YHWH-goat soteriology, which is ultimately also the soteriology of Irenaeus and his 
theory of recapitulation.37 A full analysis of Anselm’s work in light of Levitical 
atonement theory will require more space, but in anticipation of that, a brief comment: 
the basic conviction behind Cur Deus Homo is that the life of the Son, culminating in his 
death, is a positive movement of love and obedience toward the Father. Sin is not 
confronted directly, as it will be in Azazel-goat soteriologies, but it is effectively 
overcome, on our behalf, through the Son’s absolute freedom in unwavering self-giving. 
A key text for understanding Anselm is this:  
God, therefore, did not force Christ to die, there being no sin in him. Rather he 
underwent death of his own accord, not out of an obedience consisting in the 
abandonment of his life, but out of an obedience consisting in his upholding of 
righteousness so bravely and pertinaciously that as a result he incurred death.38  
 
The central idea here is that neither the Son nor the Father enter into any kind of alliance 
with death, as if such an evil can be willed as good, nor do they promote any other form 
of violent power, which would be inimical to the goal of restoring peace to creation. 
Rather, the mutual commitment of Father and Son is toward unwavering life, which is 
                                                 
37 See Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 360–72. The same argument is also published as David Bentley 
Hart, “A Gift Exceeding Every Debt: An Eastern Orthodox Appreciation of Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo,” 
Pro Ecclesia 7, no. 3 (1993): 333–349.  
38 St Anselm, Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford University Press, 1998), 277. 
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lived out as righteousness.  
The Father did not send the Son to die, but to live to the end…and in the context 
of our sinful world, the awesome power of triune life will inevitably provoke a challenge 
from the rebellious powers of death and despair. In the context of this unavoidable test, 
the Son is called to be brave, to be tenacious, to love, come what may. For Anselm, 
Christ defeats the ugliness of sin and death and restores the beauty of creation39 through 
his devotion to the way of life, a “way” he knew eternally as the second person of the 
Trinity, but also, a way he knew covenantally as a Jewish man who was there on Mount 
Moriah, slumbering in Isaac’s loins, when the son of great promise united his will to his 
father’s. Jesus further knew the way of life liturgically because his whole existence was 
shaped by the temple, where he lingered as a child and toward which he set his face as a 
man: “Did you not know that I must be in my Father’s house?” (Luke 2:49). For Anselm, 
in the solution that he gives, “…all that is contained in the New Testament and Old has 
been proved.”40 While using an eleventh century vocabulary to articulate perennial 
biblical truths, Anselm has reinforced the Jewish view of sacrifice as “drawing near,” and 
thus he again overcomes the temptation toward violent sacrifice, which so often ensnares 
                                                 
39 The aesthetic aspect of Anselm’s thought, and especially his emphasis on ‘fittingness,’ has lately been 
emphasized. Anselm says, “When such a being desires what is right, he is honoring God, not because he 
is bestowing anything upon God, but because he is voluntarily subordinating himself to his will and 
governance, maintaining his own proper station in life within the natural universe, and, to the best of his 
ability, maintaining the beauty of the universe itself. But when a rational being does not wish for what is 
right, he dishonors God, with regards to himself, since he is not willingly subordinating himself to God’s 
governance, and is disturbing, as far as he is able, the order and beauty of the universe.” This sin creates 
“a certain ugliness, resulting from the violation of the beauty of order” in the universe. Ibid., 288, 289. In 
this aesthetic emphasis on order and beauty—a beauty and order that Adam and Eve were called upon to 
protect and develop through free cooperation with God—there is a very natural connection to ancient 
priestly thought. When dealing with free creatures, order is not restored by imposition (which detracts 
from freedom) but by freely taking up again the work that was once abandoned. This beautiful, positive, 
life-affirming movement toward YHWH (“drawing near”) is the theological contribution of the temple 
tradition. 
40 Ibid., 355. 
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the human heart.  
An Eastern Orthodox theologian like Hart, who is so deeply immersed in patristic 
thought, is able to understand Anselm rightly where so many post-Enlightenment 
Westerners have failed. Thus, Hart concludes:  
Even here, then, in the text that most notoriously expounds the sacrificial logic of 
atonement, the idea of sacrifice is subverted from within: as the story of Christ’s 
sacrifice belongs not to an economy of credit and exchange but to the trinitarian 
motion of love, it is given entirely as gift—a gift given when it should not have 
needed to be given again, by God, at a price we imposed upon him. As an entirely 
divine action, Christ’s sacrifice merely draws creation back into the eternal 
motion of divine love, for which it was fashioned.41 
 
When one considers the long development of the “satisfaction” approach in the Catholic 
tradition, with eyes trained by the movements of the high priest who bears the lifeblood 
of the YHWH-goat, one finds that mainstream Catholic soteriology since the time of 
Anselm—including in a special way Thomas Aquinas and his students42—has primarily 
emphasized how, first, Christ restores the beauty, goodness, and truth of creation though 
his total self-giving,43 and second, how human beings are taken up into that work through 
God’s grace operating in the sacraments.44 Proclamation of this positive movement is the 
                                                 
41 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 371. 
42 For an outstanding contemporary reflection on Thomas’ soteriology with reference to Jewish temple 
theology, which compellingly expresses the long tradition of Catholic YHWH-goat soteriology, see 
Matthew Levering, Christ’s Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), esp. 51-66, 76-79. The extent to which 
Levering, drawing on Aquinas, articulates a theology of the first goat, and not the second, is clear when 
Levering responds to Balthasar’s claim that Aquinas lacks an emphasis on the ‘exchange of places’ 
theme: “For Aquinas, the ‘exchange of places’ occurs from within the positive content of Christ’s 
fulfillment of the Mosaic Law, not from within the (purely substitutionary) context of man’s confronting 
God’s wrath....Aquinas’s account of the ‘exchange of places’ involves satisfaction, not substitution.” 
Ibid., 52. 
43 “In [ST III] q. 46, a. 3, Aquinas notes that Christ’s passion was the most suitable means to achieve the 
end of man’s salvation, first because it revealed God’s charity, but second ‘because thereby He set us an 
example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues displayed in the Passion, which 
are requisite for man’s salvation.’ Christ’s perfect charity does not therefore make him ‘superhuman’; 
rather, he becomes the ‘exemplar’ cause of the holiness that is objectively the ultimate end of every 
human being.” Levering, Christ’s Fulfillment of Torah and Temple, 2002, 61. 
44 To cite just one recent example of this theme, which is prevalent in Catholic theology: “...all aspects of 
Eucharistic theology receive their intelligibility in light of the requirement of cruciform communion. It is 
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joyful heart of our shared patristic traditions, East and West. It is also certainly to be 
found in Protestant theologies. In modern times, the work of figures like John Milbank,45 
Katherine Tanner,46 or Sarah Coakley47 comes immediately to mind, and this list could 
certainly be expanded further. 
A Missing Piece? 
Hart’s soteriology is persuasive, inspiring, and incomplete. Certainly, in the ritual 
of Leviticus 16, the YHWH-goat is preeminent, and so the Christian tradition is well 
calibrated whenever it accentuates this aspect of Christ’s work. Hart’s theology succeeds 
in this respect. That said, what about the “second goat” who is “left standing” at the 
entrance of the tent; he cannot be neglected forever. While reestablishing the original 
glory of creation in the kenotic love of the Son is, liturgically and metaphysically, the 
priority, to neglect the saving work of the Azazel-goat is to promote an imbalanced 
                                                 
through Christ’s sacrifice, participated in sacramentally in the Eucharistic sacrifice and sacrificial meal 
that fully includes us within Christ’s action, that God caused the gift of charitable communion in us. By 
sacramental representation in the liturgy, inspired by the Holy Spirit, we share in Christ’s reconciling 
sacrifice and are included within his relationship to the Father.” Matthew Levering, Sacrifice and 
Community: Jewish Offering and Christian Eucharist (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 194. 
45 John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (Routledge, 2003), esp. 79-104. 
46 Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 247–73. Tanner calls 
her approach the “incarnational model of atonement.” Responding to feminist critiques of typical theories 
of atonement, Tanner articulates the core of her approach: “Each moment of Jesus’ life as it happens is 
being brought into connection with the life-giving powers of the Word...Jesus is not saved from death, 
therefore, until he dies and not saved from the terrible consequences of his rejection in a sinful world 
until he suffers them, at which time those aspects of Jesus’ human life are taken up by the Word and 
subject to a process of reworking through the powers of the Word. Here is a God who works 
unswervingly for our good, who puts no value on death and suffering, and no ultimate value on self-
sacrifice for the good, a God of gift-giving abundance struggling against the forces of sin and death in the 
greatest possible solidarity with us—that of incarnation.” Ibid., 261. Tanner’s interesting analysis of 
“sacrifice” itself is at points in agreement, and at other points in tension, with the arguments of this 
section. Ibid., 262–73. 
47 Coakley is currently developing a theology of sacrifice that does not presuppose divine or ontological 
violence and which is in conversation with contemporary evolutionary theory. For the inauguration of 
this project, see Sarah Coakley, Sacrifice Regained: Reconsidering the Rationality of Religious Belief 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). More recently, Coakley has developed her thoughts in 
the DuBose Lectures at the University of the South’s School of Theology (2015) and the Stob Lectures at 
Calvin Theological Seminary (2015). 
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soteriology because, without this goat, Christ’s direct engagement with sin “itself” is 
inadequately appreciated. Thus, when Hart says that Christ “passes [death] by as though 
it were nothing,”48 he accurately describes Christ the high priest’s triumph in bearing his 
own blood as the final “YHWH-goat,” but this same statement forgets that it is 
simultaneously necessary that the Azazel-goat bear the full weight of sin as “not 
nothing.”  
This imbalance in Beauty of the Infinite has been observed before. Lois Malcolm, 
in her review of Hart’s book, commends the fact that Hart refuses to follow those 
excessively “tragic” soteriologies which had become popular among some theologians, 
especially since the Second World War. She values the way Hart draws on the Jewish 
awareness of the fact that creation is good and that God is working to redeem the good 
creation. But then she perceptively notes that “that very Jewish wisdom, especially as 
expressed in Job, the psalmist’s laments, and even in Jesus’ quotation of Psalm 22 in 
Mark 15, also has a place for mourning and lament. Our world—with its hurricanes and 
earthquakes, senseless wars, bombings, inequalities between the poor and rich, injustices 
repeated over generations—though it is God’s good world is also a world of evil, sin, and 
suffering.”49 By celebrating what is most real and radiant, by persistently drawing the 
reader toward the holy of holies where Christ once entered and where he forever sits, 
Hart’s soteriology does not linger on the present trauma of howling exile, the Babylonian 
terrors that so many humans suffer, the various hells that we construct for ourselves and 
for our fellows.50 The full wonder of Christ’s saving act is not appreciated unless we 
                                                 
48 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 322.  
49 Lois Malcolm, “On David Hart’s The Beauty of the Infinite,” New Blackfriars 88, no. 1017 (2007): 598. 
50 In Hart’s response to Malcolm, he says that he takes her words to heart, and points her in the direction of 
his Doors of the Sea as a possible corrective to his “theological emphasis” in Beauty of the Infintie. That 
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appreciate that he himself does not look past this exile. He himself does not evade the 
mournful duty to fulfill also the work of the second-goat. The conquering messiah is truly 
a man of sorrows, one who knows the deepest grief. Perhaps it is right to say that, if one 
is to have an imbalanced soteriology, it is better that the imbalance be on the side of glory 
rather than wilderness. And yet, the mystery of Yom Kippur, the mystery of Good Friday, 
encompasses it all, and so we must press forward with Christ, who indeed drank the 
horrible cup, to the bottom, to the last drop.  
The Goat for Azazel in Contemporary Theology: Hans Urs von Balthasar 
In the previous section, David Bentley Hart’s work exemplifies an especially clear 
modern articulation of one theological interpretation of Christ’s work—an interpretation 
that might be called the “classical” approach since it is so widely affirmed in the 
Christian tradition, especially in mainstream Catholic and Eastern Orthodox thought. As 
                                                 
said, he insists that Beauty is not “one long, boisterous romp of merry rhapsody,” and that his argument, 
in its depths, is keenly attentive to the reality of evil as epitomized in the death camps. David Bentley 
Hart, “Response to James KA Smith, Lois Malcolm and Gerard Loughlin,” New Blackfriars 88, no. 1017 
(2007): 616–17.  
  Certainly, Doors of the Sea is a powerful argument against the many superficial or outrageous 
responses to evil that can be found in various Christian (or pseudo-Christian) discourse. The book is a 
sustained confrontation with the tragedy of evil, and an explanation for why Christianity must not and 
cannot provide a “total explanation” for evil and suffering. Hart, The Doors of the Sea, 68. Hart 
beautifully shows that what Christianity instead offers is the good news and theological hope:  
the knowledge of the evil of death, its intrinsic falsity, its unjust dominion over the world, its 
ultimate nullity; the knowledge that God is not pleased or nourished by our deaths, that he is not 
the secrete architect of evil, that he is the conqueror of hell, that he has condemned all these things 
by the power of the cross; the knowledge that God is life and light and infinite love, and that the 
path that leads through nature and history to his Kingdom does not simply follow the contours of 
either nature or history, or obey the logic immanent to them, but is opened to us by way of the 
natural and historical absurdity—or outrage—of the empty tomb. Ibid., 100–101. 
 While Hart’s argument in this little book is highly convincing, and while it does somewhat address 
Malcolm’s general critique, one still does not find Hart reflecting on the concept of Christ “bearing” the 
sins of the world, nor does Hart adequately address “Jesus’ quotation of Psalm 22 in Mark 15.” (See 
Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 360, for a brief attempt, which so quickly shifts from “My God, my 
God...” to “Father, into thy hands I commend my Spirit”). As I’ll argue below, Hart’s (philosophically 
commendable) commitment to the privation account of sin limits such a reflection. It is precisely here 
that Balthasar has much to contribute.  
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we shift our focus now to the work of the Azazel-goat, our guide will be Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, who will speak for a minority position within the great tradition, but one that 
nevertheless has been articulated by Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant theologians. In 
fact, it might be said that a feeling for the absence of the Azazel-goat in Catholic 
soteriology was a contributing factor in Luther’s critique of the “theology of glory,” and 
Balthasar himself is appreciative of the great “thunderbolt” thrown by the reformer in 
refocusing our attention on Christ’s cruciform encounter with sin.51 Balthasar’s own 
soteriology across the fifteen volumes in his “trilogy,” and then spilling out into the 
countless other books he wrote, is the richest and most challenging meditation on Christ’s 
saving action in modern Catholic theology, and it cannot be reduced to the Azazel-goat 
theme. In truth, most of the ideas expressed by Hart are also found in Balthasar.52 
Furthermore, the second chapter of this book was structured by Balthasar’s own 
reflection on the positive Christological themes of beauty, goodness, and truth, themes 
that are central to his work. But the focus here will be on the theme that sets Balthasar 
apart from Hart and from many in the dominant Catholic theological tradition, and thus 
my goal in this section is to make the following argument: that Balthasar’s soteriology—
and especially his controversial reflections on Christ’s descent to hell—is thoroughly 
biblical and absolutely necessary for Christian soteriology because Balthasar retrieves the 
work of the Azazel-goat with perspicuity that is unique in the Christian tradition.  
In the last couple chapters we have developed an understanding of the Azazel-
goat’s mission with help from modern Jewish biblical commentators, especially Jacob 
                                                 
51 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Vol. 4: The Action (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1994), 284. 
52 Hart himself says that his Beauty of the Infinite might be “read as a kind of extended marginalium on 
some page of Balthasar’s work.” The Beauty of the Infinite, 29. 
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Milgrom and Baruch Schwartz. The key terms associated with this movement within the 
Yom Kippur liturgy include sin-bearing, exile, darkness, lamentation, horror, and death. 
Milgrom strongly emphasizes that, in the liturgical symbolism of Yom Kippur, this goat 
is not a sacrifice because, as a beast covered in sin, it would have been unworthy as an 
offering to a demon, and it would be even more outrageous as a gift to the all-holy God 
of Israel.53 Instead, Milgrom says, this goat is a vehicle, a mode of transporting that 
which cannot be integrated into the “very good” cosmos of Israel—the raw “miasma” of 
sin—transferring it into the wilderness, which represents the chaos that is outside the 
field of God’s loving vision. Within ancient Jewish mytho-poetics, this is the “empty 
howling waste,” the expanse of darkness and death that in every way contrasts the lush, 
peaceful, luminous space of God’s paradise. On Yom Kippur, the pilgrim people Israel 
together move resolutely toward the promised land, and thus, when the Azazel-goat bears 
the sins into the demonic desert, it is removing the burden from the chosen ones so that 
they might glide more easily into God’s presence. After sin, it is the selfless 
substitutionary work of this humble beast that makes it possible for Israel to renew her 
intimacy with the most holy LORD.  
The Problem of Sin 
This vision is only possible given ancient Israel’s understanding of sin. Sin is a 
special problem for language. Every word that tries to understand the meaning of “sin 
itself” is a word in mourning because all such words speak to a loss, to what might have 
                                                 
53 For a fuller discussion of this, see chapter 3, pages 264 and following. It is true, and always worth 
emphasizing, that the two goats together are identified as a single ḥaṭṭā’ṯ (purification offering; Leviticus 
16:5), certainly because they are mutually necessary in achieving final atonement, even though properly 
speaking only the first goat is a sacrifice while the second goat is a disposal ritual.  
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been; none of them come close to the “thing itself” because—from the traditional 
metaphysical perspective, which Hart so strongly reaffirmed—sin has no substance that is 
properly its own. It is being inclined toward nothingness, and “nothing” is the truly 
unthinkable thought.54 Yet the psalmist says “my sin is ever before me” (Psalm 51:3): sin 
is our constant companion, and we have a pressing need to talk about it. Especially in this 
unhappy situation, we lean on metaphorical images. As I’ve noted, Gary Anderson’s Sin: 
A History is exceptional for tracing the imagery used to understand sin in different time 
periods; his primary observation is that Israel’s metaphor shifts from sin as a “weight” 
which has “a certain ‘thingness’,”55 a burden that must be borne, to sin as a debt that must 
be paid. This transition from the Hebrew idiom for sin to the Aramaic idiom certainly 
facilitated the dialogue with Greek philosophical concepts like “privation.” The major 
question for the theologian today, and especially for the theologian who seeks to be 
attentive to the canonical teachings of ancient Jewish priestly theology, is whether 
meaningful insights are lost when the idea of sin as “substantive” is left behind.  
Modern writers are no less reliant on metaphorical imagery when talking about 
sin. It is therefore necessary to pay attention to the images used, because when we don’t, 
we can fail to notice how these metaphors shape different understandings of salvation 
(and vice-versa). Thus, as I said in chapter two, to see why a modern theologian depicts 
the solution to sin the way he or she does, one should also survey his or her hamartiology. 
                                                 
54 The “apophaticism” of nothing is the polar opposite of apophaticism with respect to God. The 
incomprehensibility of God is due to the fact that God is infinitely and excessively knowable—and 
indeed we were made to know this Love forever. Christian apophaticism leads to a full and holy silence. 
Apophaticism of nothing is an apophaticism of the most grim sense, a pure negative, ordered toward 
dumbness. This calls to mind a quote from Ernest Hello, cited by Dietrich Bonhoeffer: “Silence is the 
excess, the inebriation, the sacrifice of speech. But being incapable of speech is not holy; it is like a thing 
that has only been mutilated, not sacrificed.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together: The Classic 
Exploration of Faith in Community, trans. John W. Doberstein (HarperOne, 1978), 78. 
55 Gary A. Anderson, Sin: A History (Yale University Press, 2010), x. 
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Looking at the metaphors used for sin in Balthasar, one finds a wide range of images. 
First, there are metaphors that correspond especially to particular sections of Balthasar’s 
great trilogy on beauty, goodness, and truth, or specific volumes within the trilogy: in 
developing a theological aesthetics, Balthasar will speak of sin as ugliness; in the book 
focusing on the Old Covenant, sin is covenant infidelity; in the volumes grouped under 
the heading Theo-Drama, Balthasar describes sin as a misuse of freedom; when he turns 
to his Theo-Logic, sin is described as “the lie.”56 Second, there are other metaphors which 
are so common that they cannot be associated with any particular volume or group of 
volumes. For example, sin is chaos. It is also (false) distance. And, for Balthasar, most 
importantly, sin is a burden.57 
Sin as a Burden 
Balthasar often speaks of sin as a “reality” that has a weight or density or 
thingness. It is a burden which has crushed human beings, but which can also be 
transferred or “loaded” onto the “sin-bearer.” The imagery is highly physical, highly 
substantial. For example, “…the one who abandoned himself can be utterly and 
completely determined by the will of the Father, who loads on him the burden of the 
reality that is ‘the sin of the world’.” 58 This is anything but an isolated statement; it is 
repeated over and over again. Balthasar says: “the Father—cooperante Spiritu Sancto—
                                                 
56 That said, Balthasar feels free to mix and match his metaphors, and thus there are many examples of him 
speaking of sin as a ‘lie’ within the volumes of the Theo-Drama, to give just one example. While it is 
notable that different metaphors take prominence in different volumes, but this should be seen as a 
general heuristic, not a hard and fast rule. 
57 For a fuller analysis of Balthasar’s hamartiology, especially in terms of the metaphors he uses, see 
Richard J. Barry, “Retrieving the Goat for Azazel: Balthasar’s Biblical Soteriology,” Nova et Vetera 15, 
no. 1 (Winter 2017). 
58 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Vol. 7: Theology: The New 
Covenant (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 208. Hereafter, GL7. 
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loads the Son with the sins of the world…”59 and adds that “Jesus takes upon himself the 
entire sin of the world…”60 Thus, the Father loads what the Son freely and kenotically 
accepts.  
When confronted with statements like these, theologians who rightly accept the 
Augustinian doctrine that evil or sin is a privation of the good immediately challenge 
Balthasar on his apparent belief that sin is somehow a substantial reality, capable of being 
transferred from one person to another.61 Here’s the major question: in what sense could 
the Son—who as the second person of the Trinity is eternally the perfect fullness of 
love—personally encounter and bear “sin itself” on the cross if sin were merely a 
privation of divine love? Unless Balthasar can find a way to think of sin as in some sense 
substantive, such an encounter would necessarily represent a threat to the eternal 
perfection, immutability, and unity of the divine persons.  
Balthasar is aware of this problem, but he is also unwilling to retreat from the 
biblical notion of “sin-bearing.” Therefore, in a remarkable and bold approach, he 
wrestles with the possibility that sin is (quasi?) substantive. For example, he says: 
“Because of the energy that man has invested in it, sin is a reality, it is not ‘nothing’.”62 
                                                 
59 Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Vol. 4: The Action (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 
335. Balthasar says this after he had already affirmed that it is human beings who load sins upon the 
willing Son: 
If, once the Incarnation has taken place, we ask who burdens the Son, the ‘Lamb of God’, the 
‘Lamb as though it had been slain’, with the unimaginable load of the world’s No to divine love, 
the answer—a preliminary answer, but nonetheless real—must be: men themselves in their 
darkness….But it is equally clear that nothing would be achieved by men unloading their sin if the 
one onto whom they load it were incapable of receiving it in its totality, as what it is: it 
presupposes he is both willing and  able to bear sin. Ibid., 334. 
Therefore, it is true to say that the Father loads the sins of the world onto the Son, and it is also true to 
say that we also load our sins onto the Son, and at the same time the Son actively opens himself to 
receiving the burden.  
60 Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 180. Or again, “The surrendered Son, in bearing sin, that is, what is simply alien to 
God, appears to have lost the Father…” Ibid., 320. 
61 See the discussion below on the challenges raised by Alyssa Lyra Pitstick and Matthew Levering.  
62 Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Vol. 5: The Last Act (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 
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Later, in the second volume of the Theo-Logic, he adds: 
Nevertheless, this “it” [the abomination that is the sin of the world] is not simply 
nothing. On the other hand, the question concerning the essence of sin cannot be 
positively answered, for sin is the lie and, hence, neither truth nor being, and yet 
men have lent it something of their personal being in order to make it possible. 
Herein lies the self-contradiction that makes sin at once abstract and concrete, so 
that it can be experienced only ‘unrealistically’, only ‘negatively’.63  
 
In this second quote, Balthasar admits that sin does not have reality in the same way that 
creatures have reality. Sin is not “truth” and it is not “being.”  Nonetheless, both quotes 
indicate that sin obtains some form of existence through us, through our energy or our 
donation, even if this existence is an absurdity, an ontological anomaly, an impossible 
possibility. This claim will heavily influence Balthasar’s mature soteriology, and so 
Balthasar’s vague comments about the “not ‘nothing’” “reality” of sin require much more 
reflection. 
To even propose that sin has some kind of reality—without being completely 
absurd, incoherent, or mythological—Balthasar must avoid landmines on all sides. He is 
confronting at least two major problems. First, as a leading advocate of analogical 
metaphysics, Balthasar is well aware of the fact that there can be no “thing” which does 
                                                 
314. 
63 Theo-Logic, Vol. 2: Truth of God (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 350. Balthasar is quoting von 
Speyr’s Kreuz und Hölle vol. 1 in this passage. In one of his last books, Balthasar says something similar 
in a discussion of the “principalities and powers”: “To describe the sort of reality that they have is very 
difficult, for if the evil that leads the world astray has at first only the form of a black ‘smoke like the 
smoke of a great furnace’ with which ‘the sun and the air were darkened’ ([Rev.] 9:2), then the men who 
are led astray by those powers lend the powers something of their own reality; the sins committed by 
men are something real, which, as it were, nourishes and concretizes the deceiving powers, and precisely 
this thing, being both somehow real and invested with that reality by man, is committed to self-
destruction along with the deceiving powers when God creates the new world and the holy city of 
Jerusalem.” Hans Urs von Balthasar, Dare We Hope That All Men Be Saved? With a Short Discourse on 
Hell (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 137. Balthasar emphasizes that, when it comes to a book like 
Revelation, we are dealing with “not a historical but a visionary book, all of this is described through 
images.” Ibid., 138. But that certainly does not mean that these “images” are irrelevant to theological 
reflection; to the contrary, they are signposts that help the theologian to reflect on truths that cannot be 
expressed by means of mere historical, “immanent” vocabulary.   
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not—somehow—participate in God’s Being. There is one God, the source of all that is. 
Balthasar would certainly not fall for any metaphysical dualism, some kind of paganism 
where there are evil forces that compete with God, beings that can independently give 
substance to evil. Ever since Irenaeus, such ideas have been exposed and dismissed as 
heresy. Second, on the other hand, there can be no evil in God. Balthasar’s theology 
absolutely rejects theological dualism, and thus he excludes any Hegelian scheme which 
entertains the possibility of a ‘dark side’ to God that is in the process of being overcome 
or synthesized.64 The eternal goodness of the sole Creator is vigorously affirmed by 
Balthasar. With these concerns in mind, it seems that, as a metaphysical guideline, 
“privation theory” remains necessary so as to avoid disastrous consequences, and 
Balthasar acknowledges its philosophical truth.65 And yet: behold, the Lamb of God does 
indeed bear away the sins of the world. Theologically, the great Swiss theologian must 
walk an exceptionally fine line so as to not say something metaphysically outrageous but 
also to meaningfully grapple with central New Testament assertions about Christ’s 
saving work. Whether or not he is explicitly aware of it, Balthasar is also following in the 
footsteps of ancient priestly theology and implicitly responding to the demands of Yom 
                                                 
64 See Cyril O’Regan, Anatomy of Misremembering: Von Balthasar’s Response to Philosophical 
Modernity. Volume 1: Hegel (Chestnut Ridge, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2014), for 
comprehensive justification of the claim that Balthasar is the “most concretely anti-Hegelian theologian 
of the 20th century.” 
65 Balthasar says, “[The Old Testament] understanding of evil is as unique as the divine covenant itself. It is 
a fully theological understanding that transcends every ‘metaphysical’ understanding of evil, whether 
mythical or (in later periods) philosophical. When biblical theology later takes up the Greek concept of 
the μὴ ὄν [non-being] and στέρησις [privation] in order to come closer conceptually to the essence of 
evil, this is not an error on the level of metaphysical truth, but it does not reach the distinctive essence of 
theological guilt...” GL6, 216. Balthasar is here able to both acknowledge that an expression can be 
metaphysically appropriate but also capable of further theological refinement in the light of revelation. 
He later mentions, with approval, that “…traditional Christian theology proceeds from the certain 
conviction that the God who created the world is good, that the creature’s freedom remains subordinate 
to him and that evil is an instance of the privation of good.” Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, 
Vol. 1: Prolegomena (San Francisco: Ignatius Pr, 1988), 48.  
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Kippur soteriology, and thus his work is doubly important when it comes to the goal of 
sympathetically engaging the Jewish theological tradition that gives definition to the 
word “atonement.” There is excellent reason, therefore, to take Balthasar’s remarkable 
claims about sin seriously, attempting to see whether these claims are defensible.  
Barth’s “Das Nichtige” 
In this precarious situation, what can be said? One possible resource for Balthasar 
was Karl Barth’s theory of “das nichtige,” which is generally translated “nothingness.”66  
For Barth, “nothing” has “reality” with reference to God’s electing will.67 In an apparent 
nod to the Calvinist doctrine of double predestination, Barth says that insofar as God 
elects and says “yes,” God also rejects and says “no.”68 By virtue of God’s rejection, das 
nichtige obtains a unique form of existence, one that is absolutely distinct from God’s 
own existence, and equally distinct from the good creation which God elects positively. 
That which is passed over and rejected becomes a “sinister system of elements,”69 an 
“alien factor,”70 an “adversary,”71 an “antithesis,”72 which has “no substantive existence 
within creation”73 and yet is “real but absolutely negative.”74 Attempting to explain what 
das nichtige “is,” Barth says, “Nothingness is that from which God separates Himself and 
                                                 
66 On this translation, see the note at Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation. Volume III, 
Part 3 (London ; New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 289 note 1. 
67 He says, “The ontic context in which nothingness is real is that of God’s activity as grounded in His 
election...” Ibid., 351. 
68 Ibid. Cf. Matthias Grebe, Election, Atonement, and the Holy Spirit: Through and Beyond Barth’s 
Theological Interpretation of Scripture (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2014), 134–36. 
69 Barth, Church Dogmatics the Doctrine of Creation, 289. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 302. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 304. 
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in the face of which He asserts Himself and exerts His positive will,”75 and he continues, 
“[God’s] rejection, opposition, negation and dismissal are powerful and effective like all 
His works because they, too, are grounded in Himself, in the freedom and wisdom of His 
election...For not only what God wills, but what He does not will, is potent, and must 
have a real correspondence.”76 When God freely elects a good creation, he implicitly 
rejects all evil, chaos, sin, and death, and precisely by rejecting those things, das 
nichtige—in a “third fashion”77—obtains its unique reality.78  
Remarkably, das nichtige is already present at the moment of creation; in Genesis 
1:2 it is indicated by the mention of chaos, “which the Creator has already rejected, 
negated, passed over and abandoned even before He utters His first creative Word, which 
He has already consigned to the past and to oblivion even before the beginning of time at 
His command.”79 The implication is that the rejected “nothingness”—which includes evil 
and sin—has a certain presence before any creaturely fall, whether angelic or human.80 It 
is coextensive with God’s electing will. That said, even though the bizarre “reality” of 
nothingness precedes human sin, it is not unrelated to human sin. Much to the contrary, 
Barth says, “We have called sin the concrete form of nothingness because in sin it 
becomes man’s own act, achievement and guilt.”81 Insofar as the sinner is conforming her 
will to that which God has not willed, she is personally embracing and advancing the 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 351. 
76 Ibid., 352. 
77 Ibid., 350. 
78 As Barth puts it, “Nothingness ‘is,’ therefore, in its connexion with the activity of God. It ‘is’ because 
and as and so long as God is against it.” Ibid., 353. 
79 Ibid., 352. 
80 In fact, Barth rejects the concept of an angelic fall, that is, traditional Christian demonology. Cf. ibid., 
519 ff. For Barth, demons “derive from” nothingness, and thus are not fallen but rejected from the start. 
Ibid., 523. 
81 Barth, Church Dogmatics the Doctrine of Creation, 310. 
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nothingness that God has rejected from the first.  
This idea of das nichtige is—like all theological truth for Barth—revealed only in 
Christ, who has become incarnate precisely to confront and overcome this force which 
has brought such suffering to the earth.82 On the cross, Christ encounters the full force of 
nothingness, it rains down on him in all of its cruelty and wretchedness, and in so doing it 
exhausts itself. One sees in the cross of Jesus Christ that das nichtige has been 
definitively overcome, and therefore nothingness “has no perpetuity” precisely because it 
“is not created by God, nor is there any covenant with it…It is from the very first that 
which is past. It was abandoned at once by God in creation.”83 The theological truth of 
this absolute rejection of nothingness is revealed and permanently affirmed by the cross.  
Balthasar’s “Not Nothing” 
Even as Balthasar was highly influenced by Barth, it is clear that his 
harmartiology is distinct from Barth’s theory of das nichtige. Although there seems to be 
a verbal echo when Barth says “nothingness is not nothing”84 and Balthasar says sin “is 
not ‘nothing’”85 the differences are illustrative. When directly addressing Barth’s das 
nichtige, Balthasar immediately exonerates his theological mentor and friend of the 
charge of Manichaeism86 insofar as Barth is adamant that “nothingness” has no reality 
independent of God’s electing will, that it has “‘being’ only insofar as God’s non-willing 
is also potent,”87 and thus it is not a real threat to God’s all-sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
82 See Ibid., 302ff. 
83 Ibid., 360.  
84 Ibid., 349. 
85 Balthasar, TD5, 314; Balthasar, TL2, 323. 
86 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation, trans. Edward T. 
Oakes (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 230. 
87 Balthasar, TD5, 206. 
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Balthasar is critical. His major concern seems to be that, even if one emphasizes the 
potency of God’s “no,” Barth is still obligated to say that evil has its being directly from 
God’s (non-)electing will, wholly independent of and previous to creaturely freedom. 
Balthasar says, “The theologoumenon of ‘nothingness’, however, which is not explained 
with reference to creaturely freedom (of choice) but is seen as arising from the mere 
denial and rejection of what is ‘chaotic’, ‘alien’ and ‘hostile to God’, is untenable.”88 In 
another place, he adds,  
But no ontology could entertain the idea that...this kind of pseudo-reality [e.g. das 
nichtige] could have a (‘third’) form of ‘being’ on the basis of mere rejection. The 
only way of coming to grips, concretely, with the problem of this kind of ‘being’ 
is to enquire about the ontological quality of a sin that has been performed by a 
concrete, free human person and yet has been forgiven by God.89 
 
Here it is clear that Balthasar wants to follow Barth in expanding theological reflection 
on the possible “ontological quality of a sin,” but Balthasar repeatedly insists that the 
origin of sin or evil must be in creaturely freedom, not in God’s electing and creating 
will.90 This is a vital qualification for Yom Kippur soteriology. Because for Barth 
                                                 
88 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Vol. 3: The Dramatis Personae : 
Persons in Christ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 483. 
89 Balthasar, TD5, 207. 
90 Balthasar’s anxiety about any suggestion that evil could have its foundation in God is, undoubtedly, also 
driven by his desire to completely avoid the errors of German Idealism—especially those associated with 
Jakob Böhme and Friedrich Schelling—which posits the origin of evil in the theogony of God. For an 
outstanding discussion of Balthasar’s engagement with these figures, and with the Russian idealists—
especially Nicholas Berdyaev—who follow them, see the third chapter of Jennifer Newsome Martin, 
Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Critical Appropriation of Russian Religious Thought (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), esp. 83-104. Martin shows that Balthasar shares the broadly 
Romantic goal—against modern rationalism—of taking sin “seriously,” but his way of doing this has 
absolutely nothing in common with Schelling’s non-privative metaphysical evil which originates in the 
process of God’s self-generation. To the contrary, Balthasar re-emphasizes the ancient Jewish-Christian 
doctrine that evil has its origin in finite freedom, thus preserving the indispensable affirmation of God’s 
eternal perfection against all Valentinian-gnostic speculation about divine becoming, while 
simultaneously imagining the possibility of a direct “confrontation” between God and evil (albeit a 
passive confrontation, as we’ll see in his theology of Holy Saturday) which effectively casts evil out. 
Evil’s reality and basic impotence is exposed, not through Titanic opposition (or integration, or sublation, 
or restoration in God), but by means of the incomprehensible freedom-in-obedience of true Love, who 
judges, removes, saves, and heals.  
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nothingness and sin have a “third” form of being, one which is always already “rejected, 
negated, passed over and abandoned,”91 and because sin therefore has no perpetuity, its 
removal is always a foregone conclusion, and thus the dramatic work of the Azazel-goat 
is undermined. This calls to mind a powerful critique leveled by Balthasar against his 
friend: “Too much in Barth gives the impression that nothing much really happens in his 
theology of event and history, because everything has already happened in eternity...”92 
Balthasar has a different vision, one in which sin as “reality” somehow obtains 
ontological weight in creation and has a certain eternal quality by virtue of our “yes” to 
evil in history. We give sin its twisted existence, and that work of dark creation on our 
part does have a sort of perpetuity because of the way time participates in eternity, and 
thus the Azazel-goat must walk the dolorous path to the wilderness, for our sake and for 
our salvation, to establish the eschatological distance between us and our sin. 
But still. What is Balthasar really saying when he claims that sin is “not nothing”? 
In what follows, I will make a couple attempts to grapple with how this might be 
possible—without truly violating the “rules” of privation theory—using the vivid 
imagistic language that is so common in Balthasar and von Speyr. It remains true (as I 
mentioned earlier in this chapter) that this imagery has a metaphorical quality, and maybe 
even a mythological quality, which is (as I mentioned in the last chapter) so appropriate 
when grappling with “vertical” metaphysical concepts.93 
                                                 
91 Barth, Church Dogmatics the Doctrine of Creation, 352. 
92 Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 371. 
93 I will leave to future research efforts at articulating how such images relate to more formal philosophical 
categories. 
Relatively few commentators on Balthasar have wrestled with the question of what he might mean 
when he says that sin is “not nothing.” One partial exception is Anne Hunt, who at least broaches the 
subject. She point out that Balthasar’s “graphic” depiction of sin, though it runs afoul of the privation 
tradition, also has advantages. Balthasar’s theology, first, clearly distinguishes “the sinner” from “the 
sin.” Also, in Balthasar, there is “no evading the dreadful reality of sin and no denying God’s 
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Recall again the key texts cited above: “Because of the energy that man has 
invested in it, sin is a reality, it is not ‘nothing’,”94 and then, “men have lent [to sin] 
something of their personal being in order to make it possible.”95 The concept here seems 
to be that sin has its “being” parasitically, that it originates from us, in our God-given 
capacity to be (co-)creators. God invites humanity to join in his creative activity, and we 
can use this power in two awe-inspiring ways: to cooperate in creating life (procreation) 
or to violently create corpses (by taking life). Through sin, in ways big or small, we 
create a “corpse” of our own still-living soul, or at least, we create lifeless amputations.96 
These severed faculties—intended to be alive with virtue—are now the “not nothing” 
                                                 
condemnation of sin in this theology. Instead we have a remarkably concrete portrayal of the enormity of 
evil. Sin is graphically portrayed as a formidable reality, a violent and even seemingly overwhelming 
presence, a monstrous affliction” Anne Hunt, The Trinity and the Paschal Mystery: A Development in 
Recent Catholic Theology (Liturgical Press, 1997), 73–74. Hunt points out that this concept of sin can be 
helpfully compared to a modern understanding of “institutionalized sin” (a point I made earlier with 
reference to priestly theology). Hunt concludes that “this ‘reification’ of sin also allows von Balthasar in 
effect to contrast the infinity of God’s love, the unimaginable excess of this love, with the finitude of 
sin.” Ibid., 74. These observations are very helpful in identifying some advantages to Balthasar’s 
approach, though without really discussing how this theory could be possible theologically. 
Another commentator on Balthasar who has engaged this question is John Saward, who says that 
the idea of Christ viewing “sin without sinners” is “[p]erhaps the most difficult notion in Balthasar’s 
theology of the Descent.” The Mysteries of March: Hans Urs von Balthasar on the Incarnation and 
Easter (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1990), 130. Saward says that, because 
sin is privation, Christ’s encounter with sin in hell (see below) could not be “ocular,” but only 
“intellectual”—in other words, there was “a recognition by the soul of the dead Jesus of what sin 
amounts to and where it finally leads to, the second death, eternal perdition.” Ibid.  And yet, this answer 
also creates additional theological problems: can a privation be an “object of knowledge”? After all, as 
privation, there is a “defect” of intelligibility in sin. Trying once again to understand this difficult 
teaching, Saward says, “And yet perhaps that is the point: in Hell the immaculate soul of Jesus looks into 
the yawning gulf of sin’s unmeaning.”  Through this experience, Christ comes to see that “the lie is 
exposed, the nothingness unmasked.” Ibid., 131. The major problem with this explanation is that the 
soteriological value pro nobis of such an experience is not clear. Christ understands something about sin 
and its defeat in Sheol, but is that in itself relevant to the work of salvation?  
More than any other commentator, Alyssa Lyra Pitstick is very attentive to the fact that, for 
Balthasar, “sin has some real existence”  Alyssa Lyra Pitstick, Light in Darkness: Hans Urs von 
Balthasar and the Catholic Doctrine of Christ’s Descent Into Hell (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2007), 303;  cf. 103ff., cf. 117, cf. 128-cf. 129, cf. 140, cf. 197-cf. 99, cf. 339-cf. 40, 390 
nn.64, 395 154, but her engagement with this idea is purely negative. I will briefly address some of her 
claims below. 
94 TD5, 314, emphasis added.  
95 TL2, 350, emphasis added.  
96 Cf. Aidan Nichols, No Bloodless Myth: A Guide through Balthasar’s Dramatics (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 216–17, who uses the same analogy. 
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remnants of what might have been. The brimming potential in us for dynamic prudence, 
temperance, fortitude, justice—and greater still—faith, hope, and love, lies lifeless now 
on the battlefield of our own lives. Again, these faculties were meant to enable us to live 
lightly and gracefully, but now we have the double burden of (a) struggling to get around 
without the aid of all our God-given faculties, and (b) carrying these spiritual amputations 
as dead weight. Over time, many find that they are increasingly crushed by the burden. 
As Balthasar says, we have “lent” our personal being to this hideous thing which is 
wholly our own, not of God, but nevertheless real.  
Let me try to articulate the same thing yet again, perhaps taking advantage of 
more Przywaraian and Balthasarian concepts: at some level, to be human—imago Dei—
is always to hand oneself over, to pour oneself out. As the type of creature who is 
ontologically always “becoming,” and thus inescapably dynamic, it is simply impossible 
to truly close ourselves off and remain where we are (try as we might). Thus, we are alive 
if and when we “die to self” and give ourselves over to the triune God, through the triune 
God. In that way, we are suspended in the “always-greater” God and thus truly free. In 
this state of perfect vulnerability, the perfectly vulnerable God lovingly holds us in being. 
The alternative, however—and this is the gate that is wide and the way that is broad—is 
that we should pour ourselves out, not through love of God and neighbor, but into the 
great nothingness of sin. The gift element of the human is unavoidable, but here the 
problem is we give our being, through our freedom, over to sin. This is the source of our 
ontological fragmentation. When the dynamics of “the gift” are properly lived, nothing is 
truly lost because God is the God of life, and what is given is given again (as we saw in 
the Akedah and temple theology generally). This is the superabundance of divine Life. 
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But when one gives oneself improperly, when the seed falls on rocky ground, we give 
ourselves in such a way that our being is fragmented, becoming a withered and 
misbegotten thing. In this case, what we have given or “lent” ourselves to, while it surely 
does not have a reality like God’s, nevertheless becomes real in its own way, in and 
through our willing. This perverse, demon-like “being,” entirely unlike divine Being, 
never returns the gift, but it only takes and entraps.97 It is we, in our freedom, who let this 
other “be,” and the God who gave us freedom that we might creatively elaborate on the 
beauty of creation by serving and protecting the garden, also allows us to hand ourselves 
over in this very different way. The gargoyle remnants of such an ugly kenosis, stony and 
grotesque, are now a fact of the old creation’s history, and with respect to our freedom, 
God will not simply un-create them, but he will overcome them.98 
                                                 
97 The idea of a “demon” of human origin can be found in the fascinating reflections of Valentin Tomberg , 
the “anonymous” author of Meditations on the Tarot: A Journey into Christian Hermeticism. This idea is 
notable here insofar as it receives critical recognition from Balthasar himself. In Tomberg’s meditation 
on the fourteenth tarot card, “The Devil,” he introduces a distinction between demons that are fallen 
angels and demons that are derived from human beings, individually or collectively, through the action of 
our will and imagination. (Tomberg claims that will and imagination are the “male” and “female” 
principles which together spawn this type of demon). Tomberg says, “In order to be able to grasp this 
Arcanum, it is necessary firstly to take account of the fact that the world of evil consists not only of fallen 
entities of the celestial hierarchies (with the exception of Seraphim) but also of entities of non-
hierarchical origin, i.e. entities who, in the manner of bacilli, microbes and viruses of infectious diseases 
in the domain of biology, owe their origin — to express it in the terms of Scholastic philosophy— neither 
to the primary cause, nor to secondary causes, but rather to tertiary causes, namely to arbitrary abuse on 
the part of autonomous creatures.” Meditations on the Tarot: A Journey into Christian Hermeticism, 
trans. Robert Powell (New York: TarcherPerigee, 2002), 404–5. Tomberg, drawing on occultist 
literature, calls these vital powers “egregores.” He adds: “Engendered subjectively, they become forces 
independent of the subjective consciousness which engendered them. They are, in other words, magical 
creations, for magic is the objectification of that which takes its origin in subjective consciousness.” 
Ibid., 407. Notably, Balthasar not only wrote a largely favorable forward to the French edition of 
Tomberg’s book, but he even remembered Tomberg’s concept of egregores when writing his Theo-
Drama; he comments on this possibility very briefly at TD3, 1993, 486–87, including footnote 61. For an 
interesting recent reflection on the relevance of Tomberg’s unusual work, see Caldecott, The Radiance of 
Being, 263–64. For more on Balthasar and Tomberg, see Kevin Mongrain, “Rule-Governed Christian 
Gnosis: Hans Urs von Balthasar on Valentin Tomberg’s Meditations on the Tarot,” Modern Theology 25, 
no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 285–314. 
98 For Balthasar, the very possibility of sin, as “false distance” is the good and luminous distance of the 
Trinity. What I have said here is a play on that idea. Balthasar considers, under the umbrella of 
Trinitarian kenosis, the options of true vs. false distance, of a God-forsakenness of love vs. the 
godlessness of sin. All of this builds on a relational ontology where every “to be” is related to some kind 
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This interpretation of Balthasar’s approach to sin is strengthened by von Speyr’s 
account of the “effigies” in hell. Drawing on the first volume of von Spery’s Kreuz und 
Hölle, Balthasar says: 
In his journey through hell, Christ encountered not only the sin which has already 
become amorphous, but also figures which Adrienne von Speyr called ‘effigies’. 
They consist of what a person has loaned from her substance to the sin which she 
has committed: ‘The lost piece of the person goes into hell with the sin.’ The Son 
replaces that which has been lost through his personal grace. ‘Therefore the one-
time sinner now stands closer to the Lord, but she is also imaged in the negative, 
as a sinner, in hell. An effigy of her...is buried and discarded in hell.’ The effigies 
are like a hollow impression, as when a body has been lying in the sand...Through 
the Lord’s passing by, they can be ‘settled,’ ‘extinguished,’ so that they ‘sink into 
anonymity’....Many [of the effigies] ‘cry, as it were, for the presence of the holy 
one’ and are ‘depersonalized’ by the Lord.99 
                                                 
of giving, some kind of simultaneous loving-into-existence and letting-be, some kind of communio. The 
(impossible-) possibility of the not-nothing of sin is a perversion of just this dynamic, by which the 
creature “loves”-into-existence and let’s-be a perverse form of being which has its existence by twisting 
away the human essence, its “life” by draining human vitality. Here is a violent kenoticism of perpetual 
wasting away. Both Sergei Bulgakov and Balthasar persuasively argue that the “underpinning” of such a 
damnable motion is the infinitely greater kenotic motion of love, and it is the later that ensures that the 
former can and will be overcome.  
  Before moving forward, it is appropriate to register the fact that this concept has—
understandably—attracted rebuke. In this respect, Alyssa Lyra Pitstick is without equal. Reviewing 
Balthasar’s work, she also notes that “The ‘God-lessness’ of the divine love ‘undergirds’ sin, 
‘embrace[s]’ it, ‘renders it possible and goes beyond it.’ The greatest suffering and forsakenness (and so 
all lesser sufferings) are also embraced by the Trinitarian ‘distance’ and have their archetype in God. 
Note that both sin and suffering are conceived here as positive realities.” Pitstick, Light in Darkness, 
121–22. A few pages later, she says, “although Balthasar denies that the Trinitarian ‘super-kenosis’ is the 
archetype of sin, it is difficult to see how his assertion (and it is only that) can be consistent with other 
essential aspects of his own theology, such as his positions that sin is not nothing, but a reality, and that 
God is the source of all being…If the Trinity is not sin’s archetype, what is?” Ibid., 128. Similarly, see 
Karen Kilby, Balthasar: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 
2012), 120–22. Here, Pitstick does not give Balthasar the best possible reading, and I am hopeful that my 
various reflections have opened the way to alternative interpretations. Balthasar does not say that “sin 
and suffering are positive realities.” Yes, the (warped, unnatural) distance that human beings put between 
themselves and God is dependent—in a sense—on inter-trinitarian distance. But this is true because it is 
only within a universe in which there is “space” for the other to be other that the advent of self-centered-
otherness, or the “wasting kenoticism” I just mentioned, becomes conceivable. If God were a perfect 
monad, there would be no space for genuine otherness (every distance would be collapsed), and there 
would be no space for finite freedom (every freedom would be overwhelmed), and thus there would be 
no sin…nor would there be love. The false-distance of sin is in no way a “positive” reality, directly 
partaking of God’s Being—Beauty, Goodness, Truth—though it is a possible reality because of distance 
within the Trinity and the fact that, created in the image of God, we ineluctably pour ourselves forth. 
That we should “lend” our being, which is created good, to dark purposes, does not at all mean sin and 
suffering are positive realities!  
99 My translation, adapted from Balthasar, TL2, 355–56. The German original reads as follows: “Christus 
begegnet in seinem Gang durch die Hölle nicht nur der schon amorph gewordenen Sünde, sondern auch 
Gebilden, die Adrienne v. Speyr «Effigien›› genannt hat. Sie bestehen aus dem, was ein Mensch von 
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There are two categories of sin identified here: the “amorphous sins” and the “effigies.” It 
seems that the latter are linked to sinners who are still in the process of purification. The 
ultimate goal is that the “effigy” would be wholly and definitively detached from the 
human person, at which point it is “depersonalized,” that is, made amorphous and 
anonymous. In a beautiful twist, Christ—and here I think of the YHWH-goat—through his 
grace, substitutes his fully-alive faculties where the sinner’s soul has grown dead. In 
other words, he prunes those wilted branches and replaces them with his own limbs of 
super-abundant fruitfulness. In this way, “where sin increased, grace abounded all the 
more” (Romans 5:20). But Balthasar continues to explain that the effigies stubbornly 
remain until the person is completely sanctified—or again, deified—and that all-too-often 
we sinners “revitalize”100 the effigies we create in hell. Interestingly, von Speyr claims 
that “The Lord can really unload sin only when man repents of it.”101 This again calls to 
mind aspects of Yom Kippur theology discussed in previous chapters. Each Israelite 
participates in the cleansing of the temple through his or her work of self-denial, 
abstaining, fasting, and repentance, culminating in the High Priest’s solemn prayer of 
confession before the Azazel-goat.102 What is objectively achieved in the Day of 
Atonement liturgy—the removal of the world’s sins by the Azazel-goat—must be 
                                                 
seiner Substanz der von ihm begangenen Sünde geliehen hat: «Dieses verlorene Stück des Menschen 
geht mit der Sünde in die Hölle.» Der Sohn ersetzt das Verlorene durch seine persönliche Gnade. «So 
steht der gewesene Sünder jetzt zwar näher beim Herrn, er ist aber zugleich als Sünder, negativ, in der 
Hölle abgebildet. Eine Efﬁgie von ihm. . . liegt in der Hölle begraben und verworfen.» Die Efﬁgien 
gleichen einem hohlen Abdruck, wie wenn ein Körper im Sand gelegen hat....Sie können durch das 
Vorüberschreiten des Herrn «bereinigt», «ausgelöscht» werden, so daß sie «ins Anonyme 
versinken»....Manche «schreien gleichsam nach der Gegenwart des Heiligen» und werden durch den 
Herrn «entpersönlicht».” Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theologik 2 / Wahrheit Gottes (Einsiedeln: Johannes 
Verlag Einsiedeln, 1985), 324–25. 
100 To speak using a twisted analogy, because sin is, first and foremost, dead “matter.”  
101 Balthasar, TL2, 356. 
102 I will return to this high priestly prayer below.  
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subjectively received by each person, otherwise they remain bound to their hellish 
reflection. Nevertheless, the goal is that each “effigy” would be released, not destroying 
the sin itself (which is impossible, as I’ve said), but fully detaching the parasitical sin 
from the person or persons from whom it originated: “Whoever is really redeemed goes 
to heaven; his effigy in hell is extinguished.”103 When the effigy is extinguished, the sin 
sinks into anonymity, and the redeemed saint is entirely free. 
I would argue that an approach to sin along these lines does not directly or 
radically violate the metaphysical insights of privation theory, even though it does 
emblazon those insights with added flourish so as to make them more harmonious with 
the great teachings of the ancient priests. (It would perhaps be fitting to call this 
Balthasarian approach “privation-plus.”) This approach also explains how evil is rooted 
first-and-last in the misuse of creaturely freedom,104 as oppose to Barth’s theory of das 
nichtige. Most importantly, it starts to clarify the nature of the Azazel-goat’s work in a 
comprehensive theory of atonement. The importance of this harmartiology will be clearer 
as we further unpack the nuances hidden in Balthasar’s Azazel-goat soteriology.  
Balthasar’s Soteriology of the Sin-bearing Goat 
In a radio sermon given on Good Friday, Balthasar asks, “Was [Jesus Christ] the 
one, great and final scapegoat for mankind? Did mankind load him with all its guilt, and 
did he, the Lamb of God, carry this guilt away?”105 The soteriology that he presents 
                                                 
103 Von Speyr quoted in Balthasar, TL2, 356, n. 165. 
104 In one place, Balthasar refers to our sin as “the darkness [the human] has manufactured...” Balthasar, 
TD5, 265. 
105 Hans Urs von Balthasar, You Crown the Year With Your Goodness: Sermons Throughout the Liturgical 
Year (Ignatius Press, 1989), 82. 
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throughout his career makes it clear that Balthasar’s answer to these questions is, 
emphatically, Yes. In this section we will consider how this basic theological conviction 
thoroughly shapes Balthasar’s interpretation of Christ’s passion and descent.  
Turning to look at Balthasar’s most substantive soteriological texts from this 
perspective, one quickly finds that he continually evokes the idea of the Azazel-goat. For 
example, he says, “Here the God-man drama reaches its acme: perverse finite freedom 
casts all its guilt onto God, making him the sole accused, the scapegoat, while God allows 
himself to be thoroughly affected by this, not only in the humanity of Christ but also in 
Christ’s trinitarian mission.”106 Immediately after Balthasar says this, he again refers to 
Jesus as the “sin bearing Son.” It is precisely this enactment of the Yom Kippur ritual that 
Balthasar calls the acme of the theo-drama.107 But Balthasar’s description of sin as a 
burden loaded onto the Son is even more nuanced than has been indicated thus far, and 
the additional details only strengthen the idea that Balthasar is developing an Azazel-goat 
soteriology. On the Cross, Balthasar says, Christ experiences the reality of sin in 
solidarity with human beings, but in the savior’s descent into hell, he experiences sin “as 
such,” independent of individual human persons. Therefore, in the first moment, on the 
Cross, “God is solidary with us not only in what is symptomatic of sin, the punishment 
for sin, but also in co-experiencing sin, in the peirasmos [trial] of the very essence of that 
negation—though without ‘committing’ (Hebrews 4:15) sin himself.”108 Fifteen years 
                                                 
106 TD4, 1994, 335. 
107 In Theo-Drama 4, Balthasar traces the history of Christian soteriology. In his telling, “Rupert [of Deutz 
(1075 – 1129)] was the first to apply to Christ the image of the scapegoat, an image that was to have such 
a long history. (Ibid., 292.) As we have seen, this is inaccurate; Barnabas, Justin Martyr, and Tertullian 
highlight this point long before Rupert. Balthasar then traces the idea through Denys the Carthusian, John 
Calvin, and Theodore Beza, and also explores the modern adaptation of René Girard and Raymund 
Schwager. 
108 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2000), 137. Hereafter, MP. 
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later, Balthasar reinforces this claim: “It is essential to maintain, however, that the 
Crucified does not bear the burden as something external: he in no way distances himself 
from those who by rights should have to bear it. (Indeed, he is in them 
eucharistically!)”109 It seems that Balthasar interprets Christ’s cross as a solidarity and a 
communion with sinners where he suffers God’s covenantal wrath (Leviticus 26, 
Deuteronomy 28) in union with God’s unfaithful people. The Son wishes to be with 
Israel in all things, even if it means suffering with her in exile.110 
However, turning attention to Holy Saturday,111 Balthasar pivots from the 
language of solidarity to the language of substitution. He asks: “what good [would] this 
solidarity do us if it did not have the potential of being intensified into a true 
substitution?”112 This intensification is the descent into hell. Quoting Adrienne von 
Speyr, Balthasar says 
In this view…, hell would be what is finally condemned by God; what is left in it 
is sin, which has been separated from the sinner by the work of the Cross….Sins 
“are remitted, separated from us, taken away from us. They are banished to the 
place where everything God does not want and condemns is hell. That is their 
place...”113  
 
                                                 
109 TD4, 338; Again: “The Son bears sinners within himself, together with the hopeless impenetrability of 
their sin, which prevents the divine light of love from registering in them” (ibid., 349). 
110 N.T. Wright emphasizes this point in his reflections on the cross. Discussing the way Jesus non-verbally 
relates his vocation to Isaiah 53, Wright says: “He spoke of it in his actions, particularly in the upper 
room, and in his readiness to go to the eye of the storm, the place where the messianic woes would reach 
their height, where the peirasmos, the time of testing, would become most acute, and in bearing the 
weight of Israel’s exile, dying as her Messiah outside the walls of Jerusalem.” Wright, Jesus and the 
Victory of God, 1996, 603. See also chapter 4, footnote 42. 
111 Though, it is important to recognize that, for Balthasar, “Holy Saturday” is not a completely distinct 
“day,” since the entire movement of the Paschal Triduum—the Last Supper, the High Priestly Prayer, the 
Garden of Gethsemane, Christ’s suffering and death, the descent, and Resurrection—are mutually 
revealing perspectives on a single saving action. 
112 Hans von Balthasar and Adrienne von Speyr, To the Heart of the Mystery of Redemption (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2010), 29. Balthasar originally wrote these words in 1977. 
113 Balthasar, TD5, 314. Balthasar is quoting Adrienne von Speyr’s commentary on the Letter to the 
Ephesians. For more on this theme in von Speyr, see Matthew Lewis Sutton, Heaven Opens: The 
Trinitarian Mysticism of Adrienne von Speyr, 2014, 177–78. 
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On the Cross, Jesus is united to all human beings and, as a corollary, to their burdensome 
sin. Through his solidarity with us, it becomes possible for our sin to be separated from 
us, and for Jesus—the sin-bearer—to bear the sins away into hell. In Mysterium 
Paschale, this is what Balthasar says Christ (passively) experienced on Holy Saturday: 
“…the second death which, itself, is one with sheer sin as such, no longer sin as attaching 
to a particular human being, sin incarnate in living existences, but abstracted from that 
individuation, contemplated in its bare reality as such (for sin is a reality!).”114 Then, in 
the seventh volume of the Glory of the Lord, Balthasar says that in the “visio (secundae) 
mortis” in Hell, Christ sees “the whole fruit of the redeeming Cross…That is to say, sin 
in its ‘pure state’ separated from man, ‘sin in itself’ in the whole formless, chaotic 
momentum of its reality, was seen by Jesus…”115 For Jesus, the fruit of the Cross is sin-
in-itself, which he has removed from sinners through his blood—just as the blood of the 
ḥaṭṭā’ṯ releases sins from the temple—to be finally taken away, as far from the Father as 
East is to West. 
 It is valuable to pause and emphasize the fact that Balthasar associates Hell with 
“sin itself” repeatedly throughout the trilogy. In the last years of his life, he insists, “Since 
[hell’s] ‘substance’ is the sin of the world, become (or becoming) anonymous, there is no 
community in hell; one simply goes ‘missing’ there without a trace.”116 Continuing to 
reflect on this nightmare, he adds, “Here the contradictions emerge with full force. First, 
there is contradiction in the essence of hell itself, insofar as hell is discarded sin. Hell is 
                                                 
114 MP, 173. 
115 GL7, 233. Similarly, and adding even more metaphors to the list, “The object of the visio mortis can 
only be the pure substantiality of ‘Hell’ which is ‘sin in itself’. Plato and Plotinus created for this the 
expression borboros (mud, ordure) which the Church Fathers (and notably the Cappadocians) gratefully 
took up. Likewise the image of chaos is a natural one here. In another image still, Eriugena says that, in 
our redemption, ‘all the leprosy of human nature was thrown to the Devil.’” MP, 173. 
116 Balthasar, TL2, 349. 
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and at the same time is not. Consequently, it is ultimately something that is at once 
atemporal-eternal and self-destroying, perishing, ‘dragged down’, ‘eddying down’. Being 
both, hell is only ‘dregs’.”117 Again, the Jewish conception of the wilderness as an 
“empty howling waste” comes vividly to mind. For Balthasar and von Speyr, the essence 
of hell is the substance of sin, and the “substance” of sin is necessarily irregular and 
desolating. Sin’s reality is a “formless, chaotic momentum,”118 it is a “second chaos”119 
introduced by humans, which simply “cannot be assimilated,”120 which is “the final 
‘residue and phlegm which it is absolutely impossible to restore to life.’”121 In the end, 
hell is the eternal essence of true exile: “Babylon, the chaos produced by sin, is being 
burned eternally; the devouring pit devours itself eternally.”122 Because sin is not nothing, 
it is devouring and devour-able, but because it is death-reified, it is never satisfied and is 
never satisfy-able. It is a swirling, sinking chaos, the heart of madness, the consummation 
of isolation, the sum of all terror, multiplied by every horror, nameless, faceless, the 
greatest hunger, the final thirst, screaming silence, breaking again what it has broken 
before, in an endless cycle. Yes, again, it is true Babylon, the greatest abyss known to the 
Azazel-goat alone. For Balthasar, because the essence of sin is the essence of hell, when 
the sin-bearer carries the “not nothing” of sin away from the sinner, he is both bringing 
that sin to hell and—in-so-doing—creating hell through the very same act.  
                                                 
117 Ibid., 351.Here Balthasar is especially drawing on von Speyr’s Kreuz und Hölle, Volume 1.  
118 Balthasar, GL7, 233. 
119 Balthasar, TD5, 316; cf. Balthasar, TL2, 348. 
120 Balthasar, TL2, 323. 
121 Balthasar, MP, 174. Balthasar is here quoting the early nineteenth century Swiss Catholic Romantic 
theologian Aloysius Gügler. Balthasar writes an essay on the now-obscure Gügler in The Glory of the 
Lord, Vol. 1: Seeing the Form, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), 94–104. 
122 Balthasar, TD5, 316. For von Speyr’s own thought on hell as “the reality of sin separated from the 
world,” see Lois M. Miles, “Obedience of a Corpse : The Key to the Holy Saturday Writings of Adrienne 
von Speyr” (Ph.D., University of Aberdeen, 2013), 178–80. 
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Thus far we have been drawing on different volumes in Balthasar’s “trilogy” to 
capture the essence of his Azazel-goat soteriology without too much attention to 
chronology. But there is at least one area in which Balthasar’s thought changes from the 
earlier books to the later. There is a footnote in the second volume of the Theo-Logic in 
which Balthasar laments that Mysterium Paschale was written quickly, and that students 
should now refer to von Speyr’s thought directly to better understand his own thinking on 
Holy Saturday. However, the only retraction Balthasar explicitly makes is when he says, 
“The term ‘solidarity with the dead’ was a compromise that no longer appears in what 
follows.”123 Of all the controversial things Balthasar said in Mysterium Paschale, this is 
the one phrase he made a point to correct. Why? Perhaps because of what we explained 
above: Balthasar wants to limit solidarity with sinners to the Cross; the descent into hell 
is about bearing away the disconnected, depersonalized “sin itself” to the place that God, 
in his grace, had prepared—that is, to Hell. This change in terminology late in Balthasar’s 
life, mentioned only in a footnote, further suggests his attentiveness to the pattern of Yom 
Kippur soteriology.  
Drawing on what I have said in earlier chapters, just as the temple is connected to 
all Israel, and the whole world, as microcosm, so also, if the Christ is the temple of the 
new covenant, he shares a similar relationship with the world. Therefore, just as the 
world’s sins are drawn to the Jerusalem temple according to priestly theology, they 
similarly invade the personal sacred space of Jesus. Then, through Christ’s purifying 
blood, sin is released from us through Christ’s high priestly action in the holy of holies, 
and (turning toward the second goat) he bears away the sin-in-itself, the dead weight of 
                                                 
123 TL2, 345, n. 75. 
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disembodied human sin. In his descent, in other words, Christ brings sin into a true 
wilderness, an infinite distance from the Father. 
The Passive Contemplation of Sin Itself 
One could say that, as Jesus offers himself on the cross, he mystically allows all 
the sinners around the world to “lay hands” on him, to confess, and thus to transfer their 
sins to the sin-bearing-goat chosen by God.124 In Leviticus, this confession was spoken 
by the high priest, representing the nation Israel, in the presence of the people, and later 
Jewish tradition recorded the priest’s full prayer. The prayer, which I also quoted above, 
reads: 
O Lord, your people, the house of Israel, has committed iniquity, transgressed, 
and sinned before you. Forgive, O Lord, I pray, the iniquities, transgressions, and 
sins, which your people, the house of Israel, have committed, transgressed, and 
sinned before you, as it is written in the Torah of Moses, your servant, For on this 
day shall atonement be made for you to clean you. From all your sins shall you be 
clean before the Lord (Lev. 16:30).125   
 
This prayer emphasizes that every kind of sin is addressed by the atoning ritual of Yom 
Kippur. As Israel confesses her sins over the Azazel-goat, she knows that by virtue of his 
lonely mission, she is made clean. However, the ritual does not end with the confession; 
after having received this great burden, the goat for Azazel must bear the sins into the 
wilderness.126 As Gary Anderson put it with reference to the Yom Kippur liturgy, “It is 
not enough for Israel to fast and repent; the physical material of the sin that had rested on 
                                                 
124 Commenting on Leviticus 16:8, Milgrom says, “The purpose of the lots is clearly to leave the selection 
of the animals to YHWH.” Milgrom, Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics, 168. For Balthasar, it is the 
Father who loads the sins on Jesus even as sinners also load the sins on him; the two are not mutually 
exclusive. 
125 Neusner, The Mishnah, 1988, para. 6:2, page 275. 
126 Which was, Anderson points out, “an area that was thought to be beyond the reach of God”. Anderson, 
Sin, 2010, 6. 
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the shoulder of every Israelite must be carted away into oblivion.”127 For Balthasar, this is 
what Jesus does for Israel, and for all humankind. In a way analogous to Milgrom’s 
interpretation of Leviticus 16, Balthasar depicts Christ as a kind of vehicle for removing 
sins that have been detached from us and thus depersonalized, carrying them out into the 
furthest wilderness. However, there is an important difference between Christ and the 
biblical goats which is relevant to Balthasar and von Speyr’s vivid descriptions of Christ 
in hell. Unlike the goats—which are liturgical “matter” that have theological efficacy in 
the context of the ritual “form” and which, seen from the Christian perspective, are types 
which anticipate the act of the coming messiah—Jesus Christ is able to add full 
intentionality to his saving action. This is true with respect to both movements fulfilled 
on the cross. The human Jesus offers himself as a ḥaṭṭā’ṯ with fullness of love in 
contemplative union with the Father in a way that would have been impossible for the 
humble YHWH-goat, and he also contemplates the bare reality of sin in utter isolation 
from the Father in a way that would have been impossible for the lamentable Azazel-
goat. For this reason, Balthasar and von Speyr’s theology of the Azazel-goat develops the 
Yom Kippur tradition by meditating deeply on the dark night suffered by the sin-bearing-
goat.  
The first word for Balthasar and von Speyr, here and everywhere, is “obedience.” 
This word is also applicable to both goats, but in different ways. We have seen that the 
YHWH-goat, who represents the wholeheartedness of Abraham and Isaac, is the liturgical 
symbol of Israel’s active obedience as she draws near to the Lord in ever-renewed love. 
The obedience of the second goat, however, is passive; in Leviticus 16, after the sins are 
                                                 
127 Ibid. 
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put on the Azazel-goat’s head, it says, “it shall be sent off to the wilderness through a 
designated man…” (v. 21). This goat is dressed with sins and led where it does not want 
to go, and for the latter Jewish tradition, it is cast into the abyss by the action of another. 
According to Mishnah Yoma, the designated man “pushed it backward, and it rolled 
down the ravine. And it did not reach halfway down the mountain before it broke into 
pieces.”128 For Balthasar, the passivity of this movement is of utmost importance: “Since 
the momentum of the Father’s will, which loaded the world’s guilt on to Jesus’ kenotic 
fiat, in the truest sense ‘crushed’ the sufferer (Is 53.10), we have here no active descent—
far less, a triumphant descent to take possession, or even only a descent that is a struggle 
in battle; we have only, in this ‘sinking down’ into the abyss of death, a passive ‘being 
removed’.”129 As Christ descends into the grave, and even into the pit of death, he is 
necessarily stripped of everything, including even the conscious awareness of the 
Father’s adoring presence, and his “obedience unto the end” becomes truly blind. Now he 
“must obey the Father at the point where the last trace of God seems lost (in pure sin), 
together with every other communication (in pure solitariness).”130 This is the exilic 
reality approached by the author of Lamentations: “He has made me dwell in darkness, 
Like those long dead. He has walled me in and I cannot break out; He has weighed me 
down with chains. And when I cry and plead, He shuts out my prayer; He has walled in 
my ways with hewn blocks, He has made my paths a maze” (3:6-9). For Balthasar, 
following von Speyr, in his passive descent the savior of the world endures the total 
chaos of sin such that he has no point of reference, no companionship, no imaginable way 
                                                 
128 Neusner, The Mishnah, 1988, para. 6.6, page 275. 
129 Balthasar, GL7, 230. 
130 Ibid., 233. 
381 
 
forward. 
At the time of the second temple liturgy, the poor Azazel-goat suffers a physical 
agony when he is cast into the ravenous abyss, but in the descent of Jesus Christ the 
experience of “breaking apart” is intensified into a spiritual shattering.  
He is the dead ‘sin-bearer’ of all sins. As such, he passes through what, looked at 
objectively, is his victory, the sin separated from man on the Cross, which God 
eternally damns as the second—man-created—chaos. However, because he is 
dead, he cannot know it subjectively as what he has made it to be. He can only 
‘take cognizance’ of it as the fearsome agglomeration of all sins that no longer has 
the slightest connection with the Father who is the good Creator…131 
 
This is the source of the psychological agony of the savior that is so prominent in the 
descent to hell theology of Balthasar and von Speyr. When the Azazel-goat hits bottom, 
reaching the far end of hell, his human soul is dashed upon the utter and unparalleled 
brokenness of the place. Here he is among the fragments and fragmentations of his own 
beloved creation’s utter evil. The shards of cruel torture, burning hatred, everyday 
degradation, callous abuse, all the murders, acts of stony indifference, the gnarling greed, 
the brutish rapes, violence against children—his own precious children!—the unkind 
thoughts, egotistical pride, the genocides...this terrible mountain of inhumanity...Jesus 
has borne it into the sea, and here he drowns under the weight of its madness. He has 
descended into one great chaos, the one authored by his own beloved, by his own image, 
but it is all now amorphous, unrecognizable, without logic. He confronts at last the 
abomination of desolation, and in this great cacophony, he is silent, and in his silence, he 
is evermore the living word: “Take Lord, and receive all my liberty, my memory, my 
understanding, and my entire will, all that I have and possess. Thou hast given all to me. 
                                                 
131 Balthasar, TL2, 348. For “objective sin” in von Speyr’s thought, see Miles, “Obedience of a Corpse,” 
180–82; Sutton, Heaven Opens, 183–84. 
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To Thee, O lord, I return it. All is Thine, dispose of it wholly according to Thy will...”132 
 As I’ve said, an essential aspect of this obedience to the end, this embrace of exile 
in its most concentrated form, is the fact that the Azazel-goat entirely loses sight of Zion. 
According to the rabbinic tradition, the cliff over which the second goat is sent is about 
twelve miles from the temple gate,133 and thus the glory of the dwelling place of God has 
dimmed to nothing. For Balthasar, Christ suffers a similar sense of distance in the sense 
that the Father is entirely veiled to the Son. This is the meaning of the word “forsaken.” 
“The Son hangs between earth and heaven, forsaken by men and God. The darkness of 
the world’s guilt that he bears within him veils and obscures all sight of a meaning to his 
suffering.”134 He is now truly stripped, truly alone, in an impossible “distance” that has 
been fabricated by humanity and which is now endured by God. But according to 
Balthasar, even in this desperate pit, there is an unseen glimmer of the eternal triune 
glory: “In fact, since all is obedience, he is moving toward the Father through this utter 
estrangement, but for the present he must not be allowed to know this.”135 In other words, 
the Son realizes the unity of the triune persons—in his economic mission—by virtue of 
the profound depths of his obedience, even suffering the midnight darkness of this world 
by experiencing the apparent loss of the Father’s presence. By allowing the triune 
distance, the diastasis, to stretch in such unnatural ways, for the sake of love, the Son 
actually reinforces the truth and beauty of divine oneness, even in the midst of the 
world’s gravest horrors, by showing that love is deeper still.  
                                                 
132 This is the Suscipe of St. Ignatius of Loyola. For the influence of this prayer on von Speyr (and, through 
her, on Balthasar) see Miles, “Obedience of a Corpse.” 
133 Neusner, The Mishnah, 1988, para. 6:4, page 275. 
134 Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 356. 
135 Ibid. 
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 The only way it would be possible to say all this, to even begin to imagine the Son 
performing this act of love for the sake of humankind, is if sin is “not nothing.” What 
could it mean to affirm that a metaphysical deficiency is “loaded” onto the Son? What 
could it mean to say Christ is “crushed” under a privation of the good? Something, some 
kind of nuance or some kind of supplement, would need to be added to the Augustinian 
philosophical discovery, without denying that that theory retains its authority. More than 
anything else, it is the liturgy of Yom Kippur which speaks to a reality that must be 
faced. The priestly theologians knew sin to be rooted in us and our actions and yet 
somehow independent and vital, having an existence that cannot be merely negated 
through a positive movement towards, but which must also be “physically” eliminated 
through a negative movement away.136 It may be that the only language we have to 
capture this phenomenon is poetic and mythic, as in the great dramas of Enoch, but still, 
the weakness of our language is not in itself an excuse for theologians to neglect the 
question entirely. With that in mind, Balthasar should be lauded for his efforts to grapple 
with the problem of how sin can have a certain kind of perverse substantiality.  
                                                 
136 At this point, Pitstick is highly perceptive: “In Balthasar’s soteriology, however, God’s freedom figures 
in a different way, because his soteriology operates in a more mechanical way [compared to a soteriology 
of satisfaction]. According to his theology, every man is redeemed because his sins have been physically 
removed from him, loaded on Christ on the cross, and ‘burned’ in the Trinitarian fire of love experienced 
by the Son in Sheol. It seems then that the change in the sinner’s reality does not occur at the moment of 
repentance (or sacramental absolution) but at the point in time when Christ took these sins upon Himself 
on the cross and buried them with Himself in Sheol.” Pitstick, Light in Darkness, 304. This framing 
concerns Pitstick, and she goes on to note that it might imply “universal salvation,” but it seems to me 
that qualifications could be made that run parallel to the 19th century debate with Harnack concerning the 
allegedly “physical” approach to salvation in Greek thought. In other words, more could be said on the 
relationship between objective and subjective removal. Furthermore, it would be easy to mock (gently or 
not-so-gently) the ancient priestly insistence on sins being “mechanically” or “physically removed,” but 
we should again say that—by any account—the “thing” removed is not physical in any crudely material 
sense, even while continuing to insist that this ancient liturgical theology is perceptive when it insists on 
a need for banishment. “Sin-bearing” is fundamental in Christian affirmation, and we need keep asking 
why.  
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Other Examples of the Azazel-goat in Contemporary Theology 
Balthasar’s Azazel-goat soteriology is the most widely discussed, and thus the 
most frequently critiqued, in contemporary theological literature. However, it is not 
unprecedented in every respect. A few words should be said about the Russian Orthodox 
sophiological theologian Sergius Bulgakov.137 One thing that is glaring in the section on 
Christ’s high priestly ministry in Bulgakov’s famous Christological book, The Lamb of 
God, is how frequently he mentions the fact that Christ bears sins.138 Indeed, this is the 
central image used in Bulgakov’s soteriology, and thus it immediately provides an 
opening for analysis from the perspective of Yom Kippur theology. In approaching this 
theme, the first question to ask is how Bulgakov depicts the “reality” of sin itself. Here 
we find that Bulgakov nods in the direction of Balthasar’s more developed theory, though 
he does not go as far. He says,  
Sin is just as real as the world and man, insofar as it is their state. To be sure, sin 
is not created by God; it is a product of creaturely freedom. But this freedom, in 
all its self-definitions, is real with all the reality of this world and of man; 
therefore, the sin that envelops the world and man is real. The difference is that 
the world and man, since they are created by God, are indestructible, whereas sin, 
which is a product of creaturely freedom, is destructible and must be destroyed.139 
 
Then, in another place, he adds that sin “is an illegitimate product of creaturely freedom 
and thus does not contain the power of being, for God did not create sin, just as He did 
                                                 
137 For a far broader and deeper comparison (positive and negative) of Balthasar and Bulgakov’s 
soteriologies, see the third chapter (“Emptiness vs. Effigies: Christology and the Descent into Hell”) of 
Katy Leamy, The Holy Trinity: Hans Urs von Balthasar and His Sources (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick 
Publications, 2015), 81–118. 
138 A partial list of examples: “the only one without sin, bore upon Himself the sin of the world” Sergii 
Bulgakov, The Lamb of God (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2008), 347. “Christ takes 
upon himself the sin of the world” Ibid.; “...as one who bore upon Himself the sin of the entire old 
Adam” Ibid. 350; “Having taken sin upon himself...” Ibid., 357; “only the God-Man could take upon 
Himself all human sin...” Ibid., 358. 
139 Ibid., 350–51. 
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not create death...”140 In these two quotes, one finds some similarities between Bulgakov 
and Balthasar. Unlike Barth, he does not ground sin or evil in the rejecting side of God’s 
electing will, but rather he sees it as a product of human freedom. He says it as somehow 
“real”—but then the similarities between Balthasar and Bulgakov quickly break down. 
For the great Russian theologian, sin’s reality is more with respect to humanity’s state 
than with respect to a perverse “not nothing” that we introduce into the good creation.  As 
something which is not created by God, Bulgakov says, sin does not have “being,” and 
thus it is destructible. We have seen that Barth similarly believes that nothingness or sin 
“has no perpetuity,” and thus Barth anticipates the “destruction of sin,”141 “its radical 
eradication, which leads to its annihilation.”142  
These views, however, contrast with the basic priestly intuition that, unlike 
impurities that pollute the temple, serious intentional sins are of the sort that cannot be 
eradicated, but only removed to a distant place. The priestly understanding of sin has an 
impressive parallel in Balthasar’s thought insofar as he sees the detached, depersonalized 
                                                 
140 Ibid., 361. 
141 David Lauber, Barth on the Descent into Hell: God, Atonement, and the Christian Life  (Ashgate Pub 
Limited, 2004), 37. 
142 Ibid., 36. Barth himself says that the “decisive thing” is that “in the suffering and death of Jesus Christ it 
has come to pass that in His own person He has made an end of us as sinners and therefore of sin itself by 
going to death as the One who took our place as sinners. In his person He has delivered up us sinners and 
sin itself to destruction.” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics. Vol. 4, Part 1 The Doctrine of Reconciliation. 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2004), 253. He adds that Jesus Christ “willed to make Himself the bearer and 
Representative of sin, caused sin to be taken and killed on the cross in His own person (as that of the one 
great sinner). And in that way, not by suffering our punishment as such, but in the deliverance of sinful 
man and sin itself to destruction, which He accomplished when He suffered our punishment, He has on 
the other side blocked the source of our destruction...” Ibid., 254.  
On this theme in Barth, see the book by Matthias Grebe which, in a way that is tantalizingly 
analogous to the present book, interprets Barth with respect to the two Yom Kippur goats: Election, 
Atonement, and the Holy Spirit, 38–45. What’s so striking about Grebe’s book is that, while he is highly 
attentive to the distinct role of each goat, he insists that the second goat should not be given a place in 
Christian interpretation of the cross, and thus he attempts to re-frame Barth’s thought (which, in its own 
peculiar way, does include both goats as the two sides of God’s election) only in terms of the YHWH-
goat. Whether or not this is a desirable way to untangle and reinterpret Barth—by retaining God’s 
electing Yes and suppressing God’s rejecting No in Barth’s theology of Christ’s saving act—I hope that 
my work here suggests why I consider this inadequate for Christian soteriology more generally.  
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“sin itself” as the eternal substance of hell.143 The advantage of this view is that it 
accentuates the fact that sin is truly removed, as far as the east is from the west, and thus 
Christians are completely relieved of the burden. At the same time, eschatologically, the 
historical reality of the sin—this mournful misuse of our creative freedom—is 
memorialized, but in the most deeply healing way.144 As I mentioned above, for 
Balthasar, creaturely history does not receive a Pollyannaish whitewash, but it is 
thoroughly redeemed. In other words, Balthasar’s view, like the priestly view, takes the 
concrete and often ragged shape of history seriously; the horrors we create in ourselves 
and in the world are not swept away like a bad dream, they are not annihilated in a way 
suggestive of cheap grace.145 It is all removed and cast into the pit, but still it remains a 
kind of tombstone for the old creation that has been overcome.146  
                                                 
143 Cf. Leamy, The Holy Trinity, 104–6. 
144 Thomas Aquinas made an argument that is not well received by modern Christians. Asking whether the 
‘blessed in heaven will see the sufferings of the damned’, he answers: “Nothing should be denied the 
blessed that belongs to the perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for being 
compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one another they become more 
conspicuous. Wherefore in order that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that 
they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the 
damned” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Supplementum Tertiæ Partis: 94.1c). When von Speyr 
suggests that the ‘substance’ of hell is the ‘sin of the world’, disconnected from human beings on the 
Cross and born away by the Son to this place which has been prepared by the loving Father, perhaps in 
this context Aquinas’s comment can be retrieved. Saints can certainly look at that hell and rejoice, 
because ‘sin itself’ has been so thoroughly removed. 
145 Donald MacKinnon is quite good on this point. Noting the fact that Balthasar was a young man at the 
start of World War II, and thus spent most of his writing career in the shadow of Auschwitz, MacKinnon 
says, “In the pages of his work with which we are here concerned there is comparatively little that treats 
directly of those horrors; but the nervous tension of the whole argument bears witness to the author’s 
passionate concern to present the engagement of God with the world in a way that refuses to turn aside 
from the overwhelming, pervasive reality of evil...[Balthasar] insists on a vision that can only be won 
through the most strenuous acknowledgement of the cost of human redemption.” Quoted in Kilby, 
Balthasar, 121. 
146 As O’Regan puts it, “Balthasar insists that the ‘all in all’ of Christ does not exclude the prospect of 
waste, of elements of reality that are not reconciled to God’s will.” O’Regan, Anatomy of 
Misremembering, 2014, 391. 
Balthasar’s view that these sins are not annihilated does not necessarily mean that he gives them 
more credit than they deserve. In fact, fascinatingly, he approvingly quotes C.S. Lewis’ The Great 
Divorce (which he calls a “masterpiece” in Balthasar, Dare We Hope That All Men Be Saved?, 56.) to 
suggest the pathetic smallness of hell. In that book, the narrator and George McDonald have the 
following conversation: “‘Do you mean then that Hell—all that infinite empty town—is down in some 
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 Bulgakov’s treatment of Christ’s experience of hell heavily emphasizes his 
encounter with God’s wrath. He writes:  
Having taken sin upon Himself, the only begotten and beloved Son also took upon 
Himself God’s anger at sin, God’s hostility, and this led to a separation, as it 
were, with the Father. The torment of the only one without sin is caused by sin 
that became His own sin, as it were, having infected the Creator Himself through 
His creation. The burden was so heavy that, beneath it, His God-abandoned 
human essence suffered and became infirm. But only such suffering could 
overcome the power of sin; this was the price at which the New Adam redeemed 
the disobedience of the old Adam.147 
 
Therefore, for Bulgakov—and this is again something he shares in common with Barth—
the descent of Christ to hell is less about removing a pollutant and more about suffering a 
penalty. Now, granted, Bulgakov does make efforts at distancing himself from what he 
identifies as the “Reformed” position, especially in arguing that Christ does not exactly 
suffer the agonies of hell in our place. The God-Man’s experience of hell could never be 
the same as that of true sinners precisely because their agony is driven in part by their 
“sin-corrupted soul,”148 which the sinless Christ cannot experience. Bulgakov is 
attempting a delicate operation here. Any theologian who argues that the incarnate Son 
experiences the Father’s dereliction and/or wrath must explain how Jesus, who was 
entirely “without sin,”149 can at the same time experience divine wrath and hell. In a 
sense, this is the looming question for this chapter: how can a single savior be both 
YHWH-goat (morally without blemish) and Azazel-goat (loaded with sin)? In his attempt 
                                                 
little crack like this?’ ‘Yes. All Hell is smaller than one pebble of your earthly world: but it is smaller 
than one atom of this world [heaven], the Real World.”...‘It seems big enough when you’re in it, Sir.’ 
‘And yet all loneliness, angers, hatreds, envies and itchings that it contains, if rolled into one single 
experience and put into the scale against the least moment of joy that is felt by the least in Heaven, would 
have no weight that could be registered at all....For a damned soul is nearly nothing: it is shrunk, shut up 
in itself.’” C. S. Lewis, The Great Divorce (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2001), 138–39. Balthasar cites 
this text at Balthasar, TD5, 307 n.12. 
147 Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, 356–57. 
148 Ibid., 361.  
149 Heb. 4:15; cf. 1 Peter 2:22, 1 John 3:5, etc. 
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to put these ideas together, Bulgakov says, “This sin—which He took upon Himself not 
only ideally but also really, although He lovingly experienced it in a sinless manner—
became His burden, and it was now He who answered God for human sin.”150 Bulgakov 
is right to turn to the theme of “sin-bearing” while attempting to address the theological 
problem of simultaneous perfection and abandonment, but as I’ll argue in the next 
section, I find that priestly theology undermines a strong emphasis on God’s personal 
wrath directed toward the Azazel-goat. From Bulgakov’s own perspective, insofar as the 
God-man truly takes up our fallen nature, and truly bears our sins, he must also endure 
God’s wrath against sin; anything less would be docetic.151  
There is one other important theme in Bulgakov that adds complexity to his 
concept of divine wrath, and that also makes him an important source for Balthasar. 
Bulgakov makes a connection between Christ’s sin bearing, his suffering, and Trinitarian 
kenosis. The reason why Christ is able to receive the load of the world’s sins, on 
Bulgakov’s account, is because “He humiliates Himself by emptying Himself of His 
divinity...”152 As an isolated statement, this is not the most felicitous formulation; it could 
suggest a strange variant of the Cerinthian Christological heresy where the “divine 
Christ” flees before the crucifixion, leaving the “human Jesus” to suffer.153 Of course, 
                                                 
150 Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, 350. Bulgakov’s view becomes nuanced—perhaps to the point of 
inconsistency—when he says, “That is, he no longer suffers only from the sins of the world that besiege 
Him from the outside; He now also inwardly assimilates these sins by a ‘compassionate love’...And by 
making them His own, as it were, He identifies His sinless human essence with the sinful essence of the 
old Adam.” Ibid., 354. He also says the sin of the world “penetrates” Christ’s human essence. Ibid., 355. 
Understanding exactly how Christ can remain sinless while “inwardly” assimilating (!) sin, and 
determining whether this concept is coherent, would require a more extensive analysis than I can here 
provide.   
151 He says, “Christ’s taking of sin upon Himself would have been docetic if it were not accompanied by all 
its consequences, that is, by God’s anger and by His abandonment of Christ.” Bulgakov, The Lamb of 
God, 361. 
152 Ibid., 351. 
153 Irenaeus says that, for Cerinthus, “after [the human Jesus’s] baptism, Christ descended upon him in the 
form of a dove from the Supreme Ruler, and that then he proclaimed the unknown Father, and performed 
389 
 
this concern is somewhat mitigated when one remembers that, for Bulgakov, kenoticism 
is the hallmark of God’s eternal nature. Thus, with reference to the Father himself, 
Bulgakov says: “This begetting power is the ecstasy of a going out of oneself, of a kind 
of self-emptying, which at the same time is self-actualization through this begetting.”154 
As Balthasar reads this, Bulgakov has articulated “an initial ‘kenosis’ within the Godhead 
that underpins all subsequent kenosis. For the Father strips himself, without remainder, of 
his Godhead and hands it over to the Son...”155  
This is the context for Bulgakov’s increasingly bold language in discussing the 
relations between the triune persons at the time of the Son’s passion. Meditating on the 
Son’s crucifixion, Bulgakov shifts focus to simultaneously introduce the corresponding 
theme of the “divine co-crucifixion” of the Father,156 which is a suffering that is seen as 
“equivalent” to the Son’s.157 In his descent to the cross, the Son is also surely not divided 
from the Holy Spirit, and thus we have “the image of the spiritual co-crucifixion of the 
                                                 
miracles. But at last Christ departed from Jesus, and that then Jesus suffered and rose again, while Christ 
remained impassible, inasmuch as he was a spiritual being.” Irenaeus, Against Heresies, trans. Alexander 
Roberts and William Rambaut, vol. 1, Ante-Nicene Fathers (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing 
Co., 1885), Book 1, Chapter 26. Cf. Gary A. Anderson, “Mary in the Old Testament,” Pro Ecclesia 16, 
no. 1 (2007): 47, for similar concerns about the thought of Theodore of Mopsuestia. 
154 Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, 98. 
155 Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 323. 
156 Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, 353. 
157 Ibid., 370. Emphasis in original. It is interesting that von Speyr has a similar teaching in the mutual 
abandonment of Father and Son: “Each word the eternal Word says on earth is likewise spoken by the 
Father, for the Son is the Word of the Father. This is true wherever the Word of God sounds forth on 
earth. It is also, and especially, true of the word of the Son on the Cross: My God, my God, why have 
you forsaken me? If the Son is forsaken by the Father, then no one is to think that the Father in turn is not 
forsaken by the Son: for, if the Son loses his access to the Father, it is impossible for the Father still to 
have his access to the Son. The Father too is forsaken on the Cross and is separated from the Son who is 
separated from him. This is so, because love is a unity, and it is not possible in love for one to be affected 
without the other being affected too. Thus the Father and Son together bear witness to the one, forsaken 
love.” Adrienne von Speyr, John, Volume 2: The Discourses on Controversy (Ignatius Press, 1993), 162–
63. See Lois Miles’ illuminating commentary on this passage in Miles, “Obedience of a Corpse,” 153–
54. The emphasis on mutuality, both in Bulgakov and von Speyr, will be an important concept when we 
discuss feminist critiques to Christian atonement theory below.  
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Love-Spirit with the Son, of the co-passion of the Third hypostasis...”158 The key here is 
that the triune God—in oneness and in distinction of persons—is fully engage in God-
Man’s saving descent. The Father and the Spirit do not sequester themselves from the 
Son’s passion; the kenotic motion of one cannot fail to involve the persons together.159  
Therefore, when the Father lets go of the Son for the sake of salvation, it is a 
profound kenotic act, a kind of “co-crucifixion,” and the Son (who never does but what 
he sees the Father doing) responds with his own kenotic “being let go.” By mutually 
handing themselves over—which is the eternal peaceful motion of the Trinity that has 
now been stretched out into the broken time of our sinful world—both Father and Son 
endure the loss of the other, which is a shared motion of Love that cannot fail to involve 
the Spirit with whom they are one.160 To risk repetition for emphasis: such a shared 
movement of handing over and letting be is not a crisis innovation for the Triune God, 
but it is the eternal way of being God, now expressed in an extreme and atypical way in 
the economic work of bearing away sin. This Trinitarian view provides a unique context 
for the words “abandonment” and “wrath.” Bulgakov does not use these words as a one-
way-street of unbalanced fury, but as indicating a co-kenotic work of enduring-to-the-end 
so as to radically and definitively undermine sin, all for us humans and for our salvation. 
With Bulgakov, therefore, there is an early twentieth century example of a 
theologian who emphasizes, again and again, the idea that Christ must bear away sins. He 
                                                 
158 Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, 370. 
159 Here again, Bulgakov needs to walk on egg shells to avoid re-awakening the heresy of theopaschism. He 
basically says that this early heresy was a failure to recognize the difference between the persons. But to 
say that there is a “spiritual ‘co-crucifixion’” is appropriate insofar as it excludes the absurd notion that 
there can be “nonparticipation” between the persons in the triune work of salvation, each person 
participating in a way appropriate to that person given the eternal relations between persons. This is 
effectively a defense of the trinitairan doctrine of appropriation. Ibid., 372. 
160 Cf. ibid., 370. Powerfully, Bulgakov invokes Abraham and Isaac here, father and son, who both let go of 
everything in mutual trust and mutual love, thus laying the foundation stone for the temple of life.  
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also provides a theologically powerful contextualization for such a “self-emptying” by 
developing kenotic Trinitarian theology. But his understanding of the “reality” of the 
burden that the messianic Azazel-goat bears is underdeveloped in this text, and thus his 
theology of Christ’s descent to hell is relatively inconspicuous, compared to Balthasar, 
insofar as Bulgakov’s descent simply emphasizes Christ’s true experience of the 
phenomenon of death, this being “the deepest point of His in-humanization.”161  (This is 
akin to Balthasar’s earlier emphasis on “solidarity with the dead.”) Also, Bulgakov’s 
theology of the cross features a strong focus on the Son’s experience of the Father’s 
wrath. This theme is also present in Balthasar, for better or worse.  
The Place of Wrath in Azazel-goat Soteriology 
I mentioned above that Balthasar’s Holy Saturday theology has received 
widespread attention and, often enough, sharp critique. An important goal of this book 
has been to outline a scriptural framework for responding to those critiques and for 
advancing a rich and comprehensive Christian soteriology. I am convinced that, overall, 
Balthasar has articulated a soteriology that is heavily indebted to the biblical priestly 
atonement tradition, and therefore what is so often dismissed as scandalously innovative 
should instead be received as a needed retrieval and a powerful development. And yet, 
from the perspective of a Christian Yom Kippur soteriology, aspects of Balthasar’s 
account seem unnecessary, and in any case, it is once again important to emphasize that 
there are two goats. The Azazel-goat alone is inadequate. This final section will reflect on 
some possible weaknesses in Balthasar’s soteriology, and make recommendations—
                                                 
161 Ibid., 373. 
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inspired by contemporary research into the book of Leviticus—for strengthening his 
insights.   
While it has not been emphasized in the foregoing discussion of Balthasar’s 
soteriology, the fact is that he does embrace the idea that the Son must endure the wrath 
of God the Father. In assessing this teaching, it is first necessary to appreciate and affirm 
the reasons why Balthasar insists on including the themes of divine anger and wrath in 
his soteriology while so many others do everything they can to sidestep these themes. To 
put it simply, Balthasar will not avoid this subject precisely because, again, he is a 
biblical theologian. In reading the Hebrew Bible, Balthasar cannot miss the fact that the 
joyful theme of covenant is repeatedly and increasingly matched with the dark clouds of 
creaturely infidelity and divine judgement, anger, and wrath. Balthasar has no 
difficulty—none whatsoever—in compiling extensive catena of biblical texts that 
describe the Lord as provoked, stirred, burning with rage against his own people, this 
traitorous, idolatrous nation, this beloved people who are called away from Egypt and yet 
who are always sneaking back. In the Glory of the Lord volume on the “Old Covenant,” 
Balthasar says,  
Existence in flight and in catastrophe, since the glory of God has changed to 
blazing wrath, is one of the fundamental themes of the old covenant. The great 
lists of maledictions in Leviticus [26:14-16] and Deuteronomy [28:15-68] are 
already in part the verbal expression of the experience of such catastrophes; the 
books of the prophets are full of the descriptions of these. Round about Israel too 
there are more and more descents into hell and ‘pursuits into the darkness’ 
(Nahum 1.8)...162 
 
In that same volume, Balthasar further reflects on how, in addition to the intensifying 
theme of divine anger, there are the corresponding concepts of obedience and divine 
                                                 
162 Balthasar, GL6, 218–19. 
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abandonment, a type of descent that is experienced in an acute way by the prophets, from 
Abraham down to the grief-stricken “Servant” (Isaiah 53).163  
Because of the sheer, unrelenting persistence of these themes, Balthasar has no 
patience for the modern Marcionism that would bowdlerize the Hebrew Bible in an effort 
to make YHWH acceptable to laissez-faire moderns. On the topic of God’s anger, 
Balthasar is uncompromising: “No doctrine of atonement may ignore this reality, which 
is attested a thousand times in Scripture...”164 Balthasar is fully aware of the fact that 
what is ultimately at stake, when acknowledging divine wrath, is the perfection of God’s 
love.165 We have the searing example of Ivan Karamazov’s conscience, who will not rest 
in a “higher harmony” that is content with the everlasting abomination of tortured 
children, these precious little ones, their weak fists beating their breasts, pleading with 
God through the long night for a rescue that will not come... Is such a reality the 
necessary cost of a future “paradise”? Does God sit serenely through all this, content with 
some contemptible, epic sublation of evil, as if suffering is a necessary down-payment for 
joy? Such an idea is abomination. It is deplorable. Will God not speak a definitive No? Is 
God’s love so languid that he will not resolutely strike out against these horrors? Love 
without wrath is the accomplice of history’s great torturers, the ferocious monsters who 
lurk in the dark to ruin poor lives forever. Will we have a nonjudgmental god? Such a 
scoundrel would not be worthy of respect, never mind worship. If the rage of Ivan in the 
face of these horrors exceeds the wrath of YHWH, well, to hell with Christianity and its 
                                                 
163 Cf. Ibid., 215–98; Balthasar, MP, 73–74. 
164 Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 55. He adds, “It seems naïve and superficial to me to wish simply to suppress 
everything that is said about God’s judgment in the Bible, in the NT as well as in the Old.” Balthasar and 
Speyr, To the Heart of the Mystery of Redemption, 33. 
165 Balthasar regularly speaks of “the inseparable unity of God’s wrath and his love”  Ibid., because “the 
wrath of God is...the reverse side of his love,” Balthasar, MP, 139.  
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god. Thus, Balthasar: “This wrath is no ‘pretense’, but fully real: the categorical ‘No’ of 
God’s reaction to the attitude that the world takes up over against him. God owes it to 
himself and to his loving covenantal righteousness to utter this ‘No’ and to maintain it as 
long as his will is not done on earth as in Heaven.”166 From this perspective, an 
atonement—an “at-one-ment”—that will not honestly and squarely face the reality of sin, 
fully suffer it, drinking the cup of wrath to the dregs, is theologically unserious and 
morally outrageous. It is an insipid fairytale, a pastel whimsy, an opiate escape that 
destroys everything good and humane. A god without wrath is an idol; a savior who will 
not bear sin is a pretender and a sop.  
The problem that Balthasar is trying to address here has nothing to do with 
placating, appeasing, or propitiating a god in mythological fashion. Balthasar could sign 
his name to Hart’s declaration that God would himself be directly complicit in the 
dynamics of creaturely violence “If the language of sacrifice in Christian thought did 
properly refer to an economy of exchange, such that God were appeased in the slaughter 
of a victim and his wrath were simply averted by way of a prudential violence of which 
he approved...”167 There is also no sense in Balthasar that there is a reservoir of wrath 
stored up in God that is seeking an outlet. Nor is judicial imagery central for him.168 
God’s wrath is very specifically and ineluctably tied to the reality of sin, and thus it 
cannot be separated from the presence of sin. With this in mind, it is fitting to say, with 
                                                 
166 Balthasar, GL7, 206. 
167 And, as Hart adds, “who can deny that many Christians have imagined their faith in just these terms?” 
Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 348. 
168 Balthasar does provide an extended review of the history of the idea of “vicarious punishment”—
Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 290–98—but his own assessment of such language is ambivalent. He is not deeply 
committed to it. Ibid., 337–38. Then again, he is also clear about the fact that juridical language itself is 
biblical, and thus it is not automatically ruled out. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological 
Dramatic Theory: The Dramatis Personae: Man in God, Vol. 2 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 
152 ff. 
395 
 
Balthasar, that an atonement theory that preemptively excludes the question of wrath has 
not yet fully faced the theological crisis of sin.  
Even with such contextualization, though, Balthasar’s words are distressing:  
Can we seriously say that God unloaded his wrath upon the Man who wrestled 
with his destiny on the Mount of Olives and was subsequently crucified? Indeed 
we must.169 
 
He has diverted onto himself all the anger of God at the world’s faithlessness. He 
himself has drained the cup and experienced the full extent of what, in an inchoate 
and anticipatory way, the Old Testament prophets underwent.170 
 
Divine anger is transformed ‘since the Father’s wrath is transferred from the 
nations to his own Son’...On the basis of the Incarnation it is possible to 
distinguish between sin and the sinner; on the Cross ‘the Son will divert the 
scourge of eternal wrath on to himself’ in order to spare sinners from it....On the 
Cross the Son ‘took all sin upon himself in such a way that God cannot strike the 
sinner without striking him’; so the anger is quieted by the love of the suffering 
Son.171 
 
Is there any sense in which this language of “unloading” and “diverting” and 
“transferring” wrath can be theologically acceptable? Can Balthasar adequately respond 
to Matthew Levering’s crucial question: “Does his theology fragment, by overstepping 
the limits of human language, the unity of God?”172 How could it ever be possible to 
speak of genuine anger and wrath directed from the Father to the Son without damage to 
foundational Catholic dogma on the consubstantiality of Father and Son, together with 
the Spirit?  
 It will require a longer and more focused study to answer this question fully. But I 
                                                 
169 Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 345. 
170 Ibid., 343. 
171 Balthasar, TD5, 266–67. In order, Balthasar quotes von Speyr’s commentary on Isaiah, her Objektive 
Mystik, and her commentary on Revelation.  
172 Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 132. Certainly there are those who think the answer to this question is “yes.” 
For example, Gavin D’Costa, “The Descent into Hell as a Solution for the Problem of the Fate of 
Unevangelized Non-Christians: Balthasar’s Hell, the Limbo of the Fathers, and Purgatory,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 11, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 154–55. 
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would like to make a suggestion rooted in the central issues we have been studying in this 
chapter. The key to understanding the Son’s experience of wrath—first on the cross in 
solidarity with sinners, then in his descent in the place of sinners—is to appreciate once 
more the radical teaching that sin is “a reality.” As I said before, the experience of 
wrath—which is a mode of God’s love—is inseparable from the presence of sin. If it is 
true that Jesus “bears sin,” then it seems right to me that Jesus does not experience the 
“wrath of God” directly, but rather he encounters wrath indirectly through his experience 
of the “sins themselves.”  
“Sins themselves” surely have a grotesquely irregular form of being.173 Because 
they have some kind of “reality,” perhaps one could even say they are somehow 
“suspended in being,” and thus they must in some way be related to Love (Being Itself). 
But, because this relation to Love is fundamentally negative or hostile (they are sins!), to 
the extent they remain “suspended in being,” they must be suspended in Love-as-Wrath. 
Therefore, when Christ bears sin, and what’s more, when he contemplates sin “in its bare 
reality as such,”174 the sin that becomes the object of his “vision” is a being that partakes 
of Wrath. The ultimate Azazel-goat, therefore, does not personally or directly suffer the 
wrath of God, as if the Father desired to or was able to “pour” wrath and punishment on 
an innocent victim out of a “need” to discharge this negative energy (like a 
psychologically deranged father who beats his children to release his frustrations from 
work, as so many critics say), but rather the Azazel-goat encounters “wrath” in a 
                                                 
173 It is worth re-quoting Balthasar’s important statement on sin: “…the question concerning the essence of 
sin cannot be positively answered, for sin is the lie and, hence, neither truth nor being, and yet men have 
lent it something of their personal being in order to make it possible.” Balthasar, TL2, 350. My 
stammering and fumbling for language in this section should not be taken as an effort at “positively” 
describing the essence of sin. Both the “cannot” and the “and yet” in Balthasar’s statement should be 
respected. 
174 Balthasar, MP, 173. 
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secondary or indirect way by virtue of his mission to bear away the sins we have 
manufactured in the world. The encounter with wrath comes through the encounter with 
the “second chaos,” the “second death.” It is, for sure, only an analogous knowledge; 
Bulgakov is quite right that the Son’s experience of Hell cannot be identical to the 
sinner’s experience because the Son remains sinless. Nevertheless, according to von 
Speyr’s teaching, the Son who bears the sins to hell completely enters into that 
experience, in perfect obedience to God’s saving will, and thus sin itself becomes an 
object of his “vision,” and by virtue of this encounter, God’s eternal wrath against sin is 
indirectly endured.175  
My primary thesis for this entire book is that the single atoning ḥaṭṭā’ṯ of the 
incarnate Christ fulfils the movements of both the YHWH-goat and the Azazel-goat in a 
single work on the cross. For that to be at all plausible, there must be a way to reasonably 
imagine absolute loving intimacy between Father and Son on Zion that is simultaneous to 
the absolute wilderness distance between Father and Son in sin-bearing. It seems to me 
that an Azazel-goat soteriology becomes imbalanced, and actually hostile to the YHWH-
goat, when it presents the theme of divine anger and wrath in such a way as to (absurdly) 
introduce, imply or risk a caesura in the ontological unity of Father and Son. It is clear 
that this is not Balthasar’s intent, but there is one way in which he puts himself in 
                                                 
175 Levering is extremely perceptive when he notices that Balthasar must understand “sin as ‘chaff’ so that 
Jesus can engage sin interiorly without perverting his will...” Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 2004, 
131. Levering is clearly unsympathetic to this hypothesis, though. He rhetorically asks: “Is [Balthasar’s] 
hypostasizing of ‘sin’ metaphysically acceptable?” Ibid., 132. (Nichols, No Bloodless Myth, 217, asks the 
same question). This is presented merely as a question, but it is notable that in the previous chapter, St. 
Thomas Aquinas’ teaching that “sin is a non-being” is positively presented. At the very least, Levering 
makes it clear that Balthasar is contradicting the Angelic Doctor, which is a position that any Catholic 
theologian should find uncomfortable! See Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 2004, 93–95, especially 
n.72. I hope that at the very least the “privation-plus” approach that I have tried to defend at least justifies 
further investigation. 
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unnecessary danger. For example, consider his reading of 2 Corinthians 5:21: “For our 
sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the 
righteousness of God.” In Balthasar’s soteriological texts, this may be the single verse he 
cites most regularly. In the last chapter, I presented an argument for why the key word in 
this verse—hamartian—should be translated “a sin offering” or a “purification offering,” 
which is, in fact, the traditional way of interpreting this passage. Balthasar is aware of 
this translation option, and he acknowledge the fact that this is the preferred 
understanding of the text in the Christian West from the early patristic period through the 
Middle Ages.176 For Balthasar, though, it is Luther who takes this Pauline verse “more 
seriously” than anyone else177 by accentuating the fact that Christ is made sin, and thus 
must suffer hell, and this seems to be a point at which the Swiss Catholic appreciates the 
great Reformer. After all, there are many places where Balthasar apparently strives to 
match Luther in “seriousness.” For example, he says: “Jesus has to experience from 
within every sin and ungodly doing that has estranged mankind, without distancing 
himself from it, so that, as Paul says, he is literally made ‘sin’ for us (2 Cor 5:21).”178 Or 
again, Balthasar uses this verse to claim that the Son “identifies himself” with sin,179 that 
he “was made the epitome of sin,”180 and that on the cross he “now embodies” the sin 
which receives God’s final judgment.181 Finally, building once more on both 2 
Corinthians 5:21 and von Speyr, Balthasar says that the experience of having been “made 
                                                 
176 Balthasar reviews the historical interpretive options for this key word at Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 248, 252, 
and 296. 
177 Ibid., 284. 
178 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Life out of Death: Meditations on the Paschal Mystery (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2012), 37. This little book was originally published in 1984. 
179 Balthasar, GL7, 443; Balthasar, TD2, 1990, 408. 
180 Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 363. 
181 Balthasar, TD5, 261. 
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sin” intensifies to the point where Christ no longer experiences himself as Truth, and he 
“experiences his suffering as ‘something like a destruction of the Trinity...’”182 
Balthasar will always say that the Son remains sinless throughout his dramatic 
saving work. But when he simultaneously claims that the Son suffers all sins “from 
within” and is “literally” made sin, identified with it, epitomizing it, embodying it, even 
to the point where he experiences something like the destruction of triune Love itself (!), 
the goat for YHWH seems very much forgotten. As the YHWH-goat fades from view, a 
real darkness seems to overwhelm the alleged “good news.” The great irony of all this is 
that the very verse Balthasar uses to support these exceedingly bleak statements is a verse 
that, I am convinced, originally celebrated Jesus Christ as the spotless “purification 
offering”! A verse that intended to speak of intimacy between us and the Father through 
the Son has become the proof-text for direct hostility between Father and Son, which is 
indeed a shocking and gratuitous shift in meaning. 
My assessment, therefore, is that Balthasar and von Speyr contribute something 
invaluable to Catholic theology when they speak of Christ bearing sins, and because of 
the “not nothing” reality of sin, they are also on solid theological footing when they 
propose an agonizing contemplative vision of sin on Holy Saturday, and it might even be 
possible to extend this idea to include an experience of vicarious divine wrath as 
coextensive with the naked encounter with sin...but when they push beyond this to claim 
that Jesus “becomes” sin, and use this as justification for the Father’s wrath being directly 
emptied upon the Son—who is now somehow considered the very embodiment of sin—
this is grimly unnecessary.183 Most objectionably, from my perspective, it both 
                                                 
182 Balthasar, TL2, 325. Balthasar is quoting from the second volume of von Speyr’s Erde und Himmel.  
183 As I mentioned earlier, and as Balthasar says repeatedly, wrath is a mode of divine Love. It is God’s 
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misinterprets the work of the Azazel-goat, who is after all a humble vehicle, and runs the 
risk of forgetting the YHWH-goat, as if the mournful experience of desert were the 
ultimate priority for Christian soteriology.184  All of this represents a real danger in 
contemporary Azazel-goat soteriology.  
Section Two: One Lord, Jesus Christ 
Alone. The whole world gathers at the temple on the highest holy day, but only 
one man—one adoring priest, clinging to the blood of life—will stand before God in the 
holy of holies.  
Alone. All have sinned and fallen short of God’s glory, but one poor creature, 
deserted, travels the long road to perdition.  
Alone. Flanked by criminals, mourned by mother and friend, Jesus Christ goes 
                                                 
necessary (fitting) response to sin, grounded ultimately in Love’s categorical rejection of violence. If 
God did not respond to sin with wrath, God would be complicit in violence. Therefore, Balthasar is 
coherent when he has the Son personally suffer the wrath of the Father only after “making” the Son sin. 
But the price of this coherence, vis-à-vis the Son’s direct encounter with the Father’s wrath, is 
destabilizing confusion in other aspects of Balthasar’s Christology and Trinitarian theology. That’s much 
too high a price to pay. It seems to me that some of the most damaging arguments made against Balthasar 
by his critics could be mitigated—without altering the basic shape of his soteriology or vitiating his 
boldest claims—by restoring 2 Corinthians 5:21 to its original YHWH-goat setting. Cf. Pitstick, Light in 
Darkness, 103–5, 105–12; Kilby, Balthasar, 121–22. I ultimately hope that the reflections in this section, 
based on other aspects of Balthasar’s theology, could provide a safer way forward. 
184 Balthasar is a profoundly rich and complex theologian, and his aesthetic and dramatic method creates a 
situation where he is almost always more complex than a first reading would suggest. I will broadly show 
in the next section, and despite my critiques in this section, that Balthasar’s own thought, in its unique 
way, also seeks to capture the movement of the YHWH-goat. That said, Steffen Lösel also makes a 
notable point: “for Balthasar the notion of sacrifice plays a minor role as a soteriological category.” “A 
Plain Account of Christian Salvation? Balthasar on Sacrifice, Solidarity, and Substitution,” Pro Ecclesia 
13, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 164. He later elaborates, “Nowhere does Balthasar develop his concept of 
sacrifice from the various Hebrew sacrifices in the context of the temple cult or even the sacrifice of the 
Day of Atonement (cf. Lev [16]). Rather, his notion of sacrifice builds on an existential interpretation of 
the term. For Balthasar, sacrifice is but an aspect of every loving relationship. Love, and certainly divine 
love, expresses itself as ‘self-sacrificial’ self-giving for the Other.” Ibid., 165, n. 126. “Nowhere” is 
putting it too strongly—there are places where Balthasar reflects on the “cultic point of view,” for 
example: Balthasar, TD3, 1993, 113; Balthasar, GL6, 24, 43–44, 154–55, 168–69, 196, 397–401. That 
said, one does not find an extended sympathetic investigation of priestly theology, and so that is an area 
where Balthasar can be supplemented.  
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where none can follow. Alone. Terribly alone. 
 There is only one, there is the singular man, but as the true unity of all, this one is 
enough to embrace the whole world. The high and the low, right and left, day and night. 
He is the rhythm between extremes, the measure of every proportion, the wholly other 
that makes all truly one.  
In this chapter we have surveyed two contemporary soteriologies, two portraits of 
the savior, that appear—on the surface—very different. There is one who recapitulates 
the glory of Zion, taking up the fully litany of praises associated with that most holy 
mountain. Here even the stones cry out in exaltation, and the angels join in doxological 
delight. The Son of Man approaches, the Prince of Peace appears. Yea, though his 
enemies close all around, yea though the valley of death appears, he lifts up his eyes: 
“Father, glorify your Son that your Son might glorify you!” It is a story of triumph, the 
way of life, as he gathers all creation to himself and, lifted up from the earth, restores the 
cosmos to its original beauty by fully embodying love. “Into your hands I commend my 
Spirit.” This is the one who enters the holy of holies and sits down, everything made 
whole, everything made new. It is finished. 
 There is another who is stripped bare in the tradition of the Servant. A man of 
sorrows, marred were his features, with no form, no beauty that we should look at him. 
He is the one who bears our sickness, our burden, our sin. He is the one who is wounded, 
crushed, bruised. And who could describe his abode?! He is cast into the abyss, headlong 
he falls, and he is definitively cut off and forgotten. Alone in the desert, he thirsts. Now is 
the time of judgement. Now is the night of wrath. His broken heart cries aloud: “Eli, Eli, 
lema sabachthani?” It is finished. 
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“I believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ.” 
For Christian theology, all things are summed up in Christ. Although two goats 
are brought to the temple, they are one. Our challenge is to see the single face in these 
clashing portraits. This is the great insight of the earliest Christian theologians as they 
meditated on the Day of Atonement. Both the beloved spotless offering and the sin-
bearing outcast are icons of Jesus the Lord. But how? The solution for the earliest 
Christians—an appealing solution for its tidiness—was to have each movement represent 
a different advent, the first and the second coming. First he comes as stricken, then he 
comes in glory. But this misses the deep unity of the Yom Kippur liturgy, how the entire 
rite is a single movement toward God, with both goats encompassing the single great 
ḥaṭṭā’t lovingly given to Israel by God as a unified act to restore his chosen people to life.  
So shockingly different, and seemingly incompatible, are the two goats that it is 
understandable that key figures in the tradition have tended to accentuate one movement 
or the other, or have interpreted them as types of different eras in the history of 
salvation.185 Today the context is ripe, however, for a deeper understanding of the word 
“atonement.” That is because, especially since the Second Vatican Council, Catholicism 
has been invigorated with a more profound appreciation of the Jewish roots of Christian 
theology, Catholics have been encouraged to embrace and utilize the discoveries of 
critical Bible scholars, and, through ecumenism, Catholics have more and more 
                                                 
185 Recently, the difference between the goats has been underlined by Matthias Grebe, as when he asks, 
“can (and does) Jesus simultaneously fulfil the role of both goats on Lev 16, the sin-laden Azazel-goat as 
well as the sinless sin offering, two goats which are entirely separate, serving different functions and 
experiencing different fates (the Azazel-goat released into the desert bearing away the sins, the sin 
offering slain in a salvation-bringing and purifying death)?” Grebe, Election, Atonement, and the Holy 
Spirit, 67. Ultimately, for Grebe, the two profiles are too different, and thus he chooses the former over 
the latter. I will continue to argue, however, that fidelity to the comprehensive understanding of the theo-
logic of atonement in Leviticus requires us to find a way to preserve both goats our interpretation of 
Christ’s saving act.  
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opportunities to be directly enriched by contemporary Jewish research and reflection on 
the Hebrew Bible. Concurrently, conditions have been such that Jewish scholars are now 
able to overcome negative liberal Protestant presuppositions about the Hebrew Bible’s 
priestly and temple theology and recover a more sympathetic and more holistic 
understanding of these ancient theological traditions. These factors, along with others, 
create an opportunity in modern systematic theology that is unparalleled when compared 
with any period of Christian history since the first century or two: there can now be 
Christian theological reflection that is indebted to, and thoroughly shaped by, the fact that 
Jesus Christ was and is unequivocally Jewish, as is his teaching, as is his salvation. 
When we speak of Christ’s “atonement,” then, the first place we should go for 
help in understanding this concept is the great liturgy that gives theological shape to the 
word. And there we find that that two goats, so radically distinct, are engaged in a single 
work. Based on this, I conclude that Jesus Christ’s saving work—iconically represented 
by the cross, but encompassing the single liturgy of the paschal triduum—must fulfill 
both movements concurrently, and with this claim we encounter a theological paradox. 
That’s good. With all of the great doctrines of classical theology, paradox has been 
paramount. Henri de Lubac understood this especially well: 
The whole of dogma is thus but a series of paradoxes, disconcerting to natural 
reason and requiring not an impossible proof but reflective justification. For if the 
mind must submit to what is incomprehensible, it cannot admit what is 
unintelligible, and it is not enough for it to seek refuge in an “absence of 
contradiction” by an absence of thought. It finds stimulation, then, in its very 
submission. Despite its natural laziness it is almost obliged to delve beneath these 
superficial contradictions and to penetrate into those deeper regions where what 
was hitherto a stumbling-block becomes darkness visible.186 
 
In soteriology, though, partly because so many “models” have developed side-by-side 
                                                 
186 Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man (Ignatius Press, 1988), 327. 
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(which is also good!), the fundamental paradox of Christ’s saving act is sometimes 
obscured. Turning to Leviticus 16, though, we find a biblical framework for articulating 
this paradox, which will, according to de Lubac, stimulate the theological imagination to 
reflective justification. By reinforcing the idea that the cross is a theological mystery, 
Yom Kippur soteriology is an improvement on modern rationalistic models that see the 
cross as a mere goad to human action or as exemplary of some more universal 
philosophical truth, and by emphasizing how the paradox of the cross prompts reflective 
justification, Yom Kippur soteriology is an improvement on fideistic accounts which 
depend on the inscrutable movements of God’s Sovereign Will. Yom Kippur soteriology 
is also paradoxical in a way that that pure YHWH-goat and Azazel-goat soteriologies are 
not, the former tending toward triumphalist accounts which—unallayed—fail to directly 
engage the horrors of creaturely evil, and the latter tending toward tragic accounts 
which—unallayed—suggest that overcoming evil comes at the cost of divine unity, 
simplicity, and impassibility. 
A few words, then, prompted by the paradox. The question is this: how is it 
possible, how is it not a contradiction, to say that the more Jesus fulfills the mission of 
the YHWH-goat, the more he fulfills the mission of the Azazel-goat? The more he is a 
spotless offering, the more he bears our sins? The more he goes to the center, the more he 
is cast to the periphery? In my own deliberations on this question—which has become 
more and more the question, the unavoidable and unanswerable question—I have 
ascertained three aids to reflection.  
The first is a principle which is unmistakably fundamental to priestly thought, as 
articulated by Milgrom. Within Levitical theology, this priestly law is the key to 
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understanding the temple and Yom Kippur. As Milgrom puts it, for Israel, “impurity was 
a physical substance, an aerial miasma which possessed magnetic attraction for the realm 
of the sacred”187 and “sancta contamination varies directly with the charge (holiness) of 
the sanctuary and the charge of the impurity.”188 In other words, the most holy attracts the 
least. Sin penetrates the temple in proportion to its severity, such that the very most 
grievous crimes of Israel pierce the center, the heart, the holy of holies.  
In a fascinating way, and without reference to temple theology, Balthasar noticed 
a similar phenomenon in salvation history. He calls this the “theological law of 
proportionate polarization” where “the more God intervenes, the more he elicits 
opposition to him.”189 Later in the same book, but in slightly different language, he 
repeats this law when he speaks of “the reciprocal escalation of love and sin: ever-greater 
mercy arouses ever-greater anger.”190 It seems, therefore, that love and sin, intervention 
and opposition, are indexed to each other in a directly proportional way. What is most 
holy, what is most pure, will draw to itself—like a magnet—what is least holy, what is 
least pure. Repeatedly throughout scripture, these opposites find themselves face-to-face. 
It is a remarkable and shocking fact that within Jewish theology the most holy and sacred 
place on earth, the “incarnate” dwelling place of God himself, becomes the dumping 
ground for the world’s greatest evils: murders, sexual crimes, and idolatries. These 
abominations come screaming into the Lord’s inner chamber, haunting the place with 
their filth, blaspheming the Name, endangering the cosmos. The more YHWH draws near 
                                                 
187 Jacob Milgrom, “Israel’s Sanctuary: The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray,’” Revue Biblique 83 (1976): 
392. 
188 Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16 (Yale University Press, 1998), 980–81. 
189 Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 51. 
190 Ibid., 342. 
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to Israel, the more the opposition gathers.  
As Jesus Christ draws nearer and nearer to the Father in love and in obedience in 
his earthly mission, approaching the Father in the ultimate holy of holies, his own divine 
heart, and as he simultaneously unites himself to his beloved people Israel, in steadfast 
solidarity, as their representative (and as microcosm to macrocosm), the more he makes 
himself vulnerable to the full army of hell. The more perfectly his love and intimacy with 
the Father is expressed in his incarnate mission, the more our evils are roused in 
opposition. It is not possible for Jesus, the great high priest, to pass through the final 
curtain into the highest unity with the Father in the economy of salvation without at the 
same time confronting that which is marked for final damnation. With this in mind, we 
can start to imagine the true extent to which the one Christ is stretched out. He is joyfully 
called, in communion with Israel and (though her) with the world, to draw near to the 
Father with his own blood, his own life, and thus he is propelled by the true beatific 
vision. Yet also, in that very same atoning movement, he will be—he must be—pressed 
down by ever intensifying sin, throw down to the place bereft of love—and all because 
his love has surpassed all measure. It is not possible to have the second movement 
without the first, even as it is also not possible to strictly comprehend how they can occur 
at once, how his highest vision of perfect beatitude on the cross coexisted with the 
deepest encounter with hopeless damnation. It is simply necessary to say that each pole 
of this paradox must respect the unsuppressible and undilutable necessity of the other in 
the economy of salvation if that economy is to be faithful to the theological shape of Yom 
Kippur.191 
                                                 
191 For consideration of the problem of Christ as “comprehensor” of the beatific vision and Christ as 
wayfarer, as it relates to Yom Kippur soteriology, see Appendix A. 
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 Adrienne von Speyr, so typically perceptive, is aware of this dual movement. As 
she says, “The Son presents to the Father, in his own person, the sin of the world that he 
has taken away”, and at the same time Christ presents to the Father, “in his Body, his 
Bride, the living sinner now stripped of sin”.192 At the same time. This is a wonderfully 
succinct expression of the duality of Christ’s single movement, on the one hand 
performing the heroic act of separating out sins to relieve the world’s burden, and on the 
other hand presenting himself as the Second Adam, perfect in love, alive in worship, free 
in delight. Balthasar himself puts it in these words:  
Fundamentally, [Christ] goes in two opposite directions: (with the thief on his 
right) toward paradise and (with the one on his left, in order to fetch him) into 
deep hell. The contradiction, then, is that he is at once the farthest from hell and, 
as sin-bearer, the closest to it; that, being this dead man, he has lost his Word-
character (hence the silence) and yet, at the same time, is also the Father’s loudest 
and clearest message to the world.193 
 
Exactly. A paradox like this frustrates our preference for neat lines, but as a student of 
theological aesthetics and the drama of salvation, as a master of theo-poetics,194 Balthasar 
is highly attentive to the way in which the God-Man turns worldly logic on its head, not 
ultimately in a destructive way, but in a transfiguring way. How it is possible for the 
                                                 
 
192 Balthasar, TD5, 314–15. Balthasar is quoting from von Speyr’s Katholische Briefe, II.  
193 Balthasar, TL2, 351–52. Balthasar cites von Speyr’s Kreuz und Hölle, I, in the footnotes associated with 
this passage.  
194 For an illuminating analysis of how Balthasar “presents us with a theo-poetic rather than sheer 
systematic theology,” see Anne M. Carpenter, Theo-Poetics: Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Risk of Art 
and Being (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), 3. According to Carpenter, 
Balthasar’s theology is performed according to the “logic of poetry,” which “rests in its fragile and 
powerful ability to resonate. A poem will...press its point by its unusual comparison of images...” Ibid., 
139. One certainly sees the fragility of language in the way Balthasar here tries to bring together the 
images of the highest heaven and deepest hell in the one work of Christ, but the hope is that the 
imaginative and spiritual experience of reflecting on these images together will prompt an experience of 
“resonance” that will communicate theological truth. With respect to theological paradox, theological 
mystery, a “theo-poetic” has certain advantages over discursive modes of logic. Notably, for Balthasar, 
this “unusual comparison of images” is not intended to work like a Zen kōan, prompting apophatic 
disturbance, but rather it hopes to encourage a deeper encounter with the concrete form of the crucified 
Word.  
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second person of the trinity to go in “two opposite directions” on the cross, especially 
when those “directions” encompass the cosmic high (paradise) and cosmic low (hell) is a 
true challenge, a potential stumbling block, but such a paradox may well orient us toward 
a deeper encounter with God’s Wisdom itself.  
The second aid to reflection is one articulated by both Balthasar and Hart: the 
“Trinitarian substructure” of the atoning act.195 When confronted with the two goats, we 
are confronted with a set of images that suggest absolute unity and absolute difference, 
perfect intimacy and perfect distance. According to the standards of creaturely logic, 
these dichotomies are in acute tension, if not in outright contradiction. But of course, 
from the perspective of trinitarian theology, these “dichotomies” are simply markers of 
who God is. The theme of infinite distance and difference has its origin in the eternal 
begetting of the Son, which is the Father’s kenotic act whereby he both “makes space” 
for the other, and hands himself over to the other. Thus:  
It is possible to say, with Bulgakov, that the Father’s self-utterance in the 
generation of the Son is an initial ‘kenosis’ within the Godhead that underpins all 
subsequent kenosis. For the Father strips himself, without remainder, of his 
Godhead and hands it over to the Son; he ‘imparts’ to the Son all that is his....[The 
Father] is this movement of self-giving that holds nothing back. This divine act 
that brings forth the Son, that is, the second way of participating in (and of being) 
the identical Godhead, involves the positing of an absolute, infinite ‘distance’...196 
 
At the very center of what it means to be God, from this perspective, is handing over, 
                                                 
195 “Trinitarian substructure” is Balthasar’s phrase. Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 332. As he says, “Scripture 
clearly says that the events of the Cross can only be interpreted against the background of the Trinity and 
through faith...” Ibid., 319. 
196 Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 323. Cf. Balthasar, GL7, 213–14. This quote goes on to reinforce the general 
relevance of Trinitarian “distance” to Azazel-goat soteriology, because the Trinitarian distance “...can 
contain and embrace all the other distances that are possible within the world of finitude, including the 
distance of sin.” Hart says much the same, with reference to Christ’s prayer at Gethsemane: “his distance 
from the Father, which both recapitulates and overcomes humanity’s sinful estrangement from God, 
reveals the intratrinitarian distance. In going into the region of death, which lies over against God in 
enmity toward him and his creation, Christ shows that the divine infinity surpasses all separations.” Hart, 
The Beauty of the Infinite, 322.  
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pouring out, in love. The Son, who does only what he sees the Father doing, eternally 
responds with a corresponding act of self-gift, and it is precisely in the joy of realizing 
self-in-other that, through the Spirit, absolute oneness abides.197 In a single eternal Act, 
there is distance that is unity. Hart puts it succinctly: “God is the distance of the infinite, 
the actus of all distance”198 and “God is in himself a gift of distance.”199 For the 
immanent Trinity, such “distance” is never absence, but the fullness of Love.  
When we contemplate the saving mission of Jesus Christ, we are considering how 
the “primal divine drama”200 of divine love is stretched out upon the world stage, thus 
healing and elevating creation. That is why any consideration of the possibility of Christ, 
in “the action,” exemplifying unity and difference, must circle back to the paradigmatic 
Christian paradox of trinitarian theology. This is clearly the move that Balthasar is 
striving to make. From this perspective, economic concepts like radical “self-surrender” 
(i.e., obedience-to-the-end) and “abandonment” (analogously conceived), have a 
suspended foundation in the eternal drama of divine Love, and thus they do not represent 
a fundamental threat to the triune God. As I mentioned above, Balthasar believes that the 
condition of the possibility of even sin (unfreedom, false-distance) is the primordial 
freedom and distance in the Trinity. 201 It is for this reason that the Son can take on, and 
                                                 
197 As Balthasar says, “absolute fullness...does not consist of ‘having’ but of ‘being=gift.’” Balthasar, GL7, 
391. 
198 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 182. 
199 Ibid., 207. 
200 Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 325. 
201 For the most powerful critique of Balthasar’s Trinitarian theology, especially insofar as it draws 
unconventional analogies from the Son’s suffering and death, see Bernhard Blankenhorn, “Balthasar’s 
Method of Divine Naming,” Thomist 64 (2000): 499–519. More recently, see Karen Kilby’s careful 
critique in Balthasar, 99–122. For a formidable defense of Balthasar’s approach, especially in light of his 
desire to overcome the scourge of Hegelianism, see Cyril O’Regan, who presents Balthasar’s use of these 
ideas as a justifiable use of “second order” “meta-symbols and/or conceptual ciphers”—or “protocol”—
which “unnamed in the very act of naming, but importantly unnamed directionally rather than into the 
agnostic void.” Anatomy of Misremembering, 2014, 228; cf. 227-244. 
  Kilby rightly shows the connection between Balthasar’s Trinitarian theology and his theology of 
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thus radically undermine, our pathetic and violent attempts at creating an empty-distance, 
a pride-distance, between us and God. By way of an ever-greater obedience, through 
carrying sin down to the deepest abyss of human depravity and pushing infinitely further, 
hell is objectively overcome at the moment of its formation. In other words, as Balthasar 
always says, hell is now and is always a Christological reality since it is established in the 
very movement of removing sins (which are the substance of hell!), and that same 
movement is the movement of love and obedience, and thus in a delightful twist, hell is 
radically undermined from its foundation! Even hell cannot avoid the stamp of love. In 
this sense it seems right to say, despite Balthasar’s objections, that Christ is victorious 
over hell, hell is entirely harrowed, even as the final Azazel-goat passively suffers the 
sins of the world.  
Through this obedient kenosis, the Son is not becoming other than divine, but 
living out his divinity, as incarnate and in the context of sin, with greater transparency 
than ever. Hence, again, the twist: the more kenotic the Son, the more he images the “ur-
kenosis” of the Father, and thus the greater the unity-of-being in the economy of 
salvation. It is simply the nature of Trinity that the deepest intimacy is within the furthest 
distance. Balthasar and von Speyr write: 
During the Passion the Spirit maintains the internal divine diastasis between 
                                                 
the cross. She suggests that the concept of an analogous “distance” or “abandonment” in the immanent 
Trinity is largely indebted to a narrow and contested interpretation of Jesus’ “cry of dereliction”: “My 
God, my God, why have you abandoned me.” One must first read this cry as evidence of the Father’s 
“abandonment” of the Son in the economy of salvation, rather than a citation of Psalm 22 as a whole. (A 
defense of the latter possibility can be found in John Yocum, “A Cry of Dereliction? Reconsidering a 
Recent Theological Commonplace,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 7, no. 1 (2005): esp. 
75-77; and also Thomas Joseph White, “Jesus’ Cry on the Cross and His Beatific Vision,” Nova et Vetera 
5, no. 3 (2007): esp. 560-62, 566-68.) One must then argue, Kilby says, that the abandonment which this 
verse implies requires, as a “condition of its possibility,” a “Trinitarian substructure.” While it is true that 
the interpretation of the cry of dereliction is contested, and that it is not in itself a strong enough thread to 
support Balthasar’s approach to Trinitarian “distance,” I hope the importance of the Azazel-goat theme in 
a full Christian soteriology will provide added support for the theological developments introduced by 
Balthasar. 
411 
 
Father and Son in its economic form, so that “What seems to us to be the sign of 
separation of Father and Son is precisely the sign of greatest unification...”202 
 
This “absolute paradox” is necessary to make it credible that the Father “does not 
leave the Son for a moment, even in the final abandonment”. The Son is “at the 
same time united more and more to the Father in this separation, until he is 
nothing more on the Cross than the revelation of the will of the Father.” “What is 
Two here can be shown only in unity: what is One here can be shown only in 
duality.”203 
 
This is all crucially relevant to the question of the possible identity of the YHWH-goat and 
the Azazel-goat. It shows how the apparently contrasting categories of separation and 
unity are significantly reshaped when they are read in a Trinitarian context. That said, we 
need to be careful here and not give this too superficial an interpretation. After all, both 
“goats” are obedient and kenotic in their own way—one by embodying and (in the case 
of Jesus) perfecting the Yes of Isaac, the openhearted act of love, the spotless way of life, 
the other by bearing the No of humanity, contemplating the reality of sin, descending to 
the pit of death. While the first exemplifies the (for us, deifying) oneness between God 
and the high priest in the holy of holies, this is not a oneness that obliterates difference 
(like a Platonic One). And then, while the other exemplifies the (for us, damning) 
distance between God and sin-bearer, this is not a separation that obliterates communion 
(like a polytheistic ontology of violence). Therefore, while Trinitarian theology provides 
another aid to reflection when wrestling with the unity and difference between these 
aspects of Christ’s saving work, creating opportunities to avoid simplistic contrasts, one 
must simultaneously avoid an equally simplistic division that sees the goats as 
respectively representing “De Deo Uno” and “De Deo Trino.”  
                                                 
202 Balthasar, TD5, 262. Balthasar is quoting von Speyr’s Commentary on John, Vol. 3: The Farewell 
Discourses.  
203 Ibid., 263. Balthasar is quoting von Speyr’s Commentary on John, Vol. 2: The Discourses of 
Controversy.  
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 The full extent to which the latter would be a mistake is evident as we turn to the 
third aid to reflection, which is the theological priority of the YHWH-goat. It is essential to 
remember that the existence of a godforsaken “wilderness,” and thus the very need for 
the Azazel-goat, is theologically unnecessary, and indeed, tragic. This action is not a 
necessary stage of creation, and it is even less a necessary stage in divine actualization.204 
That that creature should have to make that journey is what ought not to be, but 
nevertheless is. The relevance of this fact to the qualifications in the previous paragraph 
is hopefully clear: “difference” in the trinity in no way implies hell in the trinity—a 
grotesque thought and a complete misunderstanding of Balthasar’s analogical method. 
The Son can descend to hell bearing sin without endangering his ontological and 
volitional unity with the Father because God is triune and infinite distance is therefore 
compatible with infinite unity. If the world had remained pure Yes, and if the Son had 
been incarnate in that world, he would still be “other” and “one” with the Father. 
Primordial peace does not depend on an expulsion rite; the Edenic “holy of holies” is 
chronologically and ontologically prior to any imaginable hell. Eden could be Eden, in 
spotless joy, forevermore, if sin had never occurred. Would that this had been the case! 
 With that in mind, this observation from Andrew Louth is illuminating:  
One way of putting this is to think in terms of an arch stretching from creation to 
deification, representing what is and remains God’s intention: the creation of the 
cosmos that, through humankind, is destined to share in the divine life, to be 
deified. Progress along this arch has been frustrated by humankind, in Adam, 
failing to work with God’s purposes, leading to the Fall, which needs to be put 
right by redemption. There is, then, what one might think of as a lesser arch, 
leading from Fall to redemption, the purpose of which is to restore the function of 
the greater arch, from creation to deification. The loss of the notion of deification 
leads to lack of awareness of the greater arch from creation to deification, and 
thereby to concentration on the lower arch, from Fall to redemption; it is, I think, 
not unfair to suggest that such a concentration on the lesser arch at the expense of 
                                                 
204 Hart highlights this point exceptionally well. Cf. Hart, The Doors of the Sea, 73–75. 
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the greater arch has been characteristic of much Western theology.205 
 
Because of the diabolical shadows that have spread across the earth, the movements of 
both “goats” in Christ’s saving work are simultaneously necessary, but only in this 
context. Certainly, by embodying the movement of the Azazel-goat, Christ is 
dramatically taking upon himself something that is absolutely unnatural and unnecessary. 
This is a mighty work, a work of mercy and grace, but it is still rightly considered the 
“lesser arc.” In the broadest biblical perspective, in the overall movement from Genesis 
to Revelation, it is the movement of the first goat, as true Adam, that is the ultimate truth 
of the world. Here we have the embodiment of true life, transfiguring light, joy and 
peace, love and sabbath. This is the story of the glory of God, humanity fully alive. Even 
here, in temple theology, the form of such abundant life is somewhat contorted insofar as 
it is being embodied in the context of sin. After all, the YHWH-goat is a purification 
offering and not a burnt offering (which, as we saw, is more primordial and ideal), and 
thus it too is obviously ensnared in the realities of this fallen world. Nevertheless, I have 
argued that the purification offering is an adaptation of the burnt offering to the broken 
world, and thus it recapitulates the most authentic sacrificial movement in our lamentable 
condition.  
Louth believes that the Eastern Church has kept its eyes trained on this “greater 
arc” in a way that the Western church has not; that may be. But whatever the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of East and West, moving forward, Christian Yom Kippur 
soteriology will continue to struggle with the simultaneous importance of the two 
                                                 
205 Andrew Louth, “The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology,” Partakers of the Divine Nature: The 
History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, 2007, 35. I had alluded to this text in 
chapter 3, footnote 146. 
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movements of Christ’s saving act, but in doing so we must remember once more this 
important qualification: “The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not 
overcome it.” Between light and darkness, there is no competition. Thus, it is the first 
movement that is primary—it is Beauty, Goodness, Truth—and it is the second 
movement that is merely fitting, altogether to be mourned, even as our hearts swell with 
gratitude for so great, so glorious a redeemer.  
 Jesus Christ, in his single passion, fulfills the work of both goats. Much more 
thought is needed on how this paradox might achieve “reflective justification,” but I hope 
the three aids to reflection, enumerated in this section, can help us move in the direction 
of those “deeper regions” where the infinite God of revelation is encountered as 
“darkness visible.”  
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EPILOGUE: TREE OF LIFE: LAST AND FIRST 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
   
—T.S. Eliot 
 
A tree stands at the center, and all history mysteriously spirals round. This is the 
secret in the midst of the garden, the gift at the heart of the city. In the final revelation, 
the tree of life is the cross of love; here, where love flows like living water, here, when 
the nations come and wash their robes, here the whole world finds its place in that shade. 
This is our beginning, our deepest and most original truth, and it is our end, our highest 
and most complete happiness: “And the one who was seated on the throne said, ‘See, I 
am making all things new.’ Also he said, ‘Write this, for these words are trustworthy and 
true.’ Then he said to me, ‘It is done! I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and 
the end...’”  
All things new. Newness is not with reference to chronology, the cycles by which 
things come and go. Surely history unfolds, and surely there is only Now. T. S. Eliot 
understands the meaning of this “Now,” the single “Day” that gives shape to the 
millennia. While working as an air raid warden during the Second World War, Eliot 
wrote “Little Gidding,” which would become the capstone of his Nobel Prize winning 
masterpiece, The Four Quartets.1 “Little Gidding” is (among other things) a remarkable 
meditation on atonement that is in its own way shaped by the great journey of Leviticus 
                                                 
1 See T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets (New York: Mariner Books, 1968). 
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16, which is oriented toward the holy of holies, toward this long-anticipated trysting 
place where the burning love shared between Israel and her Lord will at last be 
consummated. In the fifth movement of the poem, Eliot finds himself at the gate which is 
at once a sorrowful exit and the joyful return. There he reflects on the mystery of time: 
“The moment of the rose and the moment of the yew-tree / Are of equal duration. A 
people without history / Is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern / Of timeless 
moments...”  
All history plays out, in a million acts, the one pattern, the Day that encapsulates 
it all. This Day, lived now on this day, is the day of our triumph: “since we have 
confidence to enter the sanctuary by the blood of Jesus, by the new and living way that he 
opened for us through the curtain (that is, through his flesh)...let us approach with a true 
heart in full assurance of faith...” (Heb 10:19-22). This Day, lived now on this day, is the 
day of our lamentation: “But as for the cowardly, the faithless, the polluted, the 
murderers, the fornicators, the sorcerers, the idolaters, and all liars, their place will be in 
the lake that burns with fire and sulphur, which is the second death” (Rev. 21:9). The Day 
is now and forever. As Eliot says, “And any action / Is a step to the block, to the fire, 
down the sea’s throat / Or to an illegible stone: and that is where we start.” Every act of 
violence is a tombstone, weathered by the centuries until illegible, and yet stubborn in its 
presence. Something past and eternal. Every act of love is a white stone, a new name 
given by God, illegible to all but the recipient, persistent in its beauty. Something past 
and eternal. It is all Now, as we follow Azazel into the sulfuric abyss, as we pass through 
the divine fire into joy, every act a destiny, every act a beginning, as we add our own 
embellishments on the historical stage.  
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I am the alpha and omega. Whichever way we go, Christ goes before, and thus 
there is never reason for pride or despair. This is the ultimate meaning of the affirmation 
that Christ fulfills the total work of “the Day,” of Yom Kippur, through his singular work 
of love. As Second Adam, he forges the eschatological paths. If in this action I find 
myself following after the YHWH-goat, I may not boast. Hinneni-life is Christ alive in me: 
I live, yet no longer I, but Christ. If in this action I find myself following after the Azazel-
goat, I must not despair. Christ has gone further still, bearing sins to the end, so that I 
may convert and be liberated: If we confess our sins, he who is faithful and just will 
forgive us our sins and cleanse us from all unrighteousness. This is a story of hope on all 
sides as we strive now to become who we are, to put into act the love that makes us 
unique and irreplaceable. When we come to the end, when the truth of our character is 
fully expressed, when we receive that new name, each will understand fully what she 
always knew dimly. In the end, we receive the gift of the beginning. 
We shall not cease from our exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
 
All of history is oriented around a tree, beginning and end. This tree alone gives 
immortality, but immortality is a gift that requires fertile soil to take root. Love alone is 
the way: the open heart will find the gate open, the closed heart will find it closed. When 
we arrive at last, we see it for the first time. It is the tree of life with its twelve kinds of 
fruit, producing its fruit each month; and the leaves of the tree are for the healing of the 
nations. It is the true cross upon which the savior died. The fruit is his body, given for us. 
The leaves are his graces, which makes us whole. As the full expression of life—
resurrection life—and love—eternal love—it is the one sign that contains the whole truth. 
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It is the holy of holies where God wishes to dwell most intimately, outside the gates, 
between two thieves, stretched out and abandoned, making all things new. The mystery 
of this life and this love was always present, in the hidden origins of the human story, as 
the deep magic that fuels the adventure of our lives, but it is only truly known now at the 
end of the world.   
Quick now, here, now, always— 
A condition of complete simplicity 
(Costing not less than everything) 
And all shall be well and 
All manner of thing shall be well 
When the tongues of flames are in-folded 
Into the crowned knot of fire 
And the fire and the rose are one. 
 
Amen. Come, Lord Jesus! 
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APPENDIX A: SIMUL COMPREHENSOR ET VIATOR 
In grappling with the question of how to conceive of the single work of Jesus 
Christ as a fulfillment of the divergent movements of the two goats, I avoided the long-
standing problem of how to reconcile Christ as comprehensor of the beatific vision, and 
Christ as wayfarer, who moves toward beatitude through suffering (simul comprehensor 
et viator), or even more to the point, how “Jesus simultaneously experienced fruitio beata 
while suffering maximos dolores.”1 I cannot here pursue anything approaching an 
adequate reflection on the full Christological implications, given the nature of the 
hypostatic union, of the claim that Christ fulfills the work of both goats at once, but I will 
briefly consider how the Yom Kippur soteriology outlined in this chapter might uncover 
new paths for further exploration. 
Aaron Riches’ recent, dazzling defense of traditional Catholic Christology is 
particularly helpful on this point because Riches also struggles over how “Thomas’s 
doctrine of the simultaneous fruitio beata and maximos dolores of the Suffering Servant”2 
can be maintained without falling into contradiction. Quoting John Paul II, Riches asks 
the crucial question: “How can the Father be both present and absent to Jesus? How can 
Jesus have a ‘perfectly clear vision of God and certainly of his union with his Father’ and 
yet experience his soul ‘reduced to a desert’ such that ‘he no longer feels the presence of 
the Father’?”3 St. Thomas himself sought a way to affirm both truths; to address this 
Christological conundrum, Aquinas relied on the distinctions between the upper and 
                                                 
1 Aaron Riches, Ecce Homo: On the Divine Unity of Christ (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2016), 
197. 
2 Ibid., 200. 
3 Ibid. 
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lower parts of Jesus’ soul (putting the beatific vision in the upper, and the maximal 
suffering in the lower; cf. ST III q. 46, aa. 7 - 8). For Riches, along with many other 
respected Thomists, this straightforward solution sits awkwardly with other aspects of 
Thomas’ hylomorphic anthropology.4 Instead, Riches hopes to fully embrace the 
simultaneity of fruitio beata and maximos dolores “as leading us to the frontier of an 
unfathomable mystery at the heart of the incarnate fact.”5  
In Balthasar’s own thought, there are mixed messages over his commitment to, or 
the extent of, Christ’s perpetual enjoyment of the vision of God.6 Von Speyr’s own 
insistence on Christ’s continual enjoyment of the beatific vision in hell is also highly 
relevant here.7 However Balthasar’s various statements should be interpreted and judged, 
it seems right to me to affirm the beatific vision in Christ’s soul as a genuine corollary of 
the affirmation that the Word became flesh. As Riches summarizes the Thomist position: 
“the beatific vision proceeds from the hypostatic unity of his human nature with the 
person of the Logos.”8 Paul Gondarou further explains why Aquinas insisted on the 
perpetual beatific vision in his theology of the cross: “Christ can only lead others to the 
ultimate end of human life—the full vision of God—i.e., he can only ‘cause’ others to 
attain the direct visio Dei, if he himself possesses this vision fully in his own lifetime…”9 
If we are called to be grafted into the new Adam by dying and rising with him, then it is 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 198–99; cf. Paul Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas 
(Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2009), 447–51; Nicholas E. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: 
Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 218–20. 
5 Riches, Ecce Homo, 200. 
6 For example, Pitstick, Light in Darkness, 166–90; Joshua Brotherton, “Hans Urs von Balthasar on the 
Redemptive Descent,” Pro Ecclesia 22, no. 2 (2013): 180–81, 184–86; John Cihak, Balthasar and 
Anxiety (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2011), 169–73. 
7 See Sutton, Heaven Opens, 161, 183; Miles, “Obedience of a Corpse,” 117–20, 165–66 for more on what 
von Speyr meant when she taught the perpetual beatific vision. 
8 Riches, Ecce Homo, 198. 
9 Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 444. 
421 
 
proper that that act include perfect intellectual oneness with the Father. Without this 
comprehensive enlightenment, YHWH-goat soteriology is attenuated. In fact, the 
affirmation of the beatific vision in Christ’s saving action is clearly suggested by YHWH-
goat theology, where Christ the high priest definitively enters the holy of holies, the place 
which received the name YHWH-yireh from God himself: the LORD-is-Seen. There can be 
no blindness at the place where Glory most intimately dwells.  
But this enjoyment of perfect happiness cannot come at the expense of the twin 
soteriological requirement that the Son should bear sin for our sake, an act of removal 
that is, for us, liberation, and for him, an agonizing encounter with the ruins of the old 
creation, the horrors of our own making. Azazel-goat soteriology knows that the journey 
to exile, which is the messiah’s separation from Zion, is of simultaneous necessity. For 
Balthasar, to speak of true exile and the “maximos dolores” must necessarily include 
reflection on the suffering of hell. And yet, the proposition that Christ endures hell has 
been forcefully challenged in Catholic theology, especially since the time of Calvin, and 
there are good reason to suggest that if Christ so suffers, it would be impossible to say 
that he simultaneously enjoys perfect union with the Father or the beatific vision. As 
Thomas Joseph White explains, the agony of hell would, speaking precisely, require 
hostility toward God: “Damnation, meanwhile, presuppose the absence of hope in and 
love for God, but also entails (1) the pain of definitive privation of the grace, knowledge, 
and vision of God; (2) by a personal aversion to the will of God. The latter point is most 
important. Damnation as a form of suffering stems from malice toward the divine will.”10 
Therefore, White says, we cannot even speak of an analogous experience of hell in the 
                                                 
10 White, “Jesus’ Cry on the Cross,” 559. 
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life of Christ. To maintain the teaching that Christ is the fulfillment of the YHWH-goat 
(who is spotless in every respect), everything White says here must be correct. 
But in this book, following Balthasar, we have argued that the substance of hell is 
“sin itself,” and “sin itself” is not mere privation. If sin were only an absence of 
goodness, then as I have said, it is true that Christ could not bear it or contemplate it 
without destroying his own consubstantiality with the Father. But if sin has some kind of 
reality on loan from us, then a way has been opened to positive, passive, lamentational 
engagement with sin in Christ’s descent. Balthasar complains that in Anselmian-Thomist 
soteriology there is a “lack of any inner contact between Jesus and the reality of sin as 
such”11 but given the necessary commitment to the advancement of privation theory in 
the high Middle Ages (especially after the appearance of Albigensianism), such an “inner 
contact” was indeed unthinkable. But if we now entertain a “privation-plus” approach, 
partly due to a recovery of Jewish priestly theology, then there is an opportunity to 
reopen the question (pace White) of how Christ could suffer something genuinely 
analogous to hell, by means of an encounter with the “reality” of sin as it exists thorough 
the perverse human will, without giving any credence to the idea that Christ himself 
suffers any loss of love, or even vision, and while certainly denying that there is any 
“personal aversion” to God’s will in Christ.  
In fact, it seems to me that Aquinas is closer to this very point than White himself 
acknowledges. White explains how there are “three dimensions of agony” in Aquinas 
(which is White’s reading of ST III, q. 46, a. 6). The third dimension is most crucial. 
White says that, for St. Thomas, Christ suffers “above all from his extraordinary 
                                                 
11 Balthasar, TD4, 1994, 263. 
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awareness of our human sinfulness, distance from God, and refusal of God. The object of 
his suffering in this case is not found in himself, but in us.”12 But note what Thomas 
himself says: “The cause of [Christ’s] interior pain was, first of all, all the sins of the 
human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, so to 
speak, to Himself, saying (Psalm 21:2): ‘The words of my sins,’13” (ST III, q. 46, a. 6, c.) 
and then, in the reply to the fourth objection, he adds, “Christ grieved not only over the 
loss of His own bodily life, but also over the sins of all others. And this grief in Christ 
surpassed all grief of every contrite heart, both because it flowed from a greater wisdom 
and charity, by which the pang of contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the 
one time for all sins, according to Isaiah 53:4: ‘Surely He hath carried our sorrows.’” 
Reflecting on this question, Matthew Levering goes so far as to say:  
Christ’s suffering has the intensity, then, of a “dark night,” in which the horror of 
the darkness of sin is ﬁnally and perfectly exposed in Christ’s soul by contrast to 
the glorious light of the divine Goodness, which Christ also knows. It is only by 
contrast to this light that ‘darkness’ is intelligible. Christ bears interiorly the 
darkness in his anguish over the sins of each one of us, but it is crucial to note that 
he can only bear this darkness fully because of his simultaneous ‘light’ by which 
he knows God.14 
 
For White, it is necessary to insist that these sins that Christ encounters are not in (or on?) 
him, but in us. For Balthasar, following Leviticus, it is necessary that Christ’s solidarity 
with us be intensified into substitution as he bears our sins away. Both positions stem 
from sound biblical concerns. In any case, while Balthasar’s Azazel-goat soteriology 
pushes the reflection on Christ’s sorrow to the extreme, I believe there is more room for 
                                                 
12 White, “Jesus’ Cry on the Cross,” 576–77. 
13 There is a fascinating echo here—certainly unintentional—to 1 Enoch. St. Thomas says the “words of my 
sin” are ascribed [adscribit] to Christ—“so to speak”—while in the Book of Watchers God commands 
Raphael to “write all the sins” of the world over Asa’el (1 Enoch 10:8). 
14 Levering, Sacrifice and Community, 80; cited in White, “Jesus’ Cry on the Cross,” 579. 
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positive dialogue between the Thomist and Balthasarian position on this issue than is 
sometimes suggested.  
The main point I would like to defend with respect to the fruitio beata and the 
maximos dolores is that the intensity of the two movements is isomorphic. It is the 
ontological fact of Christ’s absolute intimacy with the Father that makes possible the 
encounter with sin-itself in its greatest horror. This “vision” of sin is possible only to one 
who is, in his entire being, consubstantial with the Father in the Holy Spirit; any other in 
those circumstances would curse God and die long before the descended to the 
bottommost depths of hell. Christ can experience such sin and endure in love precisely 
because there is no sin in him and he enjoys the beatific vision. The way in which 
beatitude and suffering are positively related is, in fact, a point that recent Thomists have 
made effectively precisely because they insist on the perpetual beatific vision. Riches 
words are so powerful here: “In this light it would seem that, almost impossibly, the 
maximos dolores of Christ occur precisely ‘because of the knowledge and experience of 
the Father,’ and are therefore rooted in the fruitio beata,”15 or, “Another way of saying 
this is to say that the darkness of grief in the moment of the Son’s dereliction is rooted in 
the luminous experience of his perfect charity.”16 Yes, exactly right. Christian Yom 
Kippur soteriology requires nothing less. 
  
                                                 
15 Riches, Ecce Homo, 202. 
16 Ibid., 203. 
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